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FORTY YEARS AGO in the United States, psychologist Stanley Milgram’s Obe-
dience to Authority (1974) was followed by Albert Ellis’s A Guide to Rational 
Living (1975). In the early 1990s, educator Jonathan Kozol’s Savage Inequalities 
(1991) was joined on the bestseller list by motivational guru Anthony Rob-
bins’s Awaken the Giant Within (1991). In France, journalist Olivier Levard’s 
We All Are Robots [Nous sommes tous des robots] (2014) followed psychic and 
spiritual adviser Serge Boutboul’s How to Unleash the Spiritual Beings That 
We Are [Comment déployer l’être spirituel que nous sommes] (2013), and on 
the heels of economist Thomas Piketty’s Capital in the Twenty-First Century 
[Le capital au XXI siècle] (2013) came therapist Sylvie Bernard-Curie’s You 
Have What It Takes to Succeed [Vous avez tout pour réussir] (2014). These 
titles, broadly stated, represent polarized popular perspectives on individ-
ual conduct and consequent sense of self. One perspective starts from the 
premise that societal forces undercut the very idea of individual autonomy. 
Another concentrates instead on the high importance of individual action 
and decision. The first strand of analysis tends to be academic in nature, 
while the second is more commonly directed toward a popular audience 
of readers who are curious (or who the authors believe should be curious) 
about how to be, in that hackneyed but serviceable phrase, a better person. 
In other words, parallel to decades of studies questioning individual agency, 
not to mention moral authority, comes an equally relentless insistence that 
individuals must make decisions, take action, and hold their futures in hand.
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 It is curious that sociological and psychological studies underscoring 
obstacles to autonomy have run for years alongside a multitude of self-help 
books. Against the backdrop of such contradictory strands of thought about 
individual accountability, I examine a genre that puts them in direct con-
frontation. This genre is hard-boiled crime fiction. The cynical but kind-
hearted detective is the soul of the classic hard-boiled, that chronicle of 
world-weary urban pessimism. Whether in Los Angeles, New York, or Paris, 
the hard-boiled detective is the guardian of individual moral authority and 
the embodiment of ideals in a corrupt environment. He also incarnates the 
idea that the individual can be such a guardian—can act as conservator of 
ideals for an entire society. All hard-boiled fiction casts its protagonists in 
this role, but it is in the American and French traditions that crime fiction 
character profiles are most congruent with paradigmatic national personali-
ties or culture heroes. Other national crime fiction traditions have subse-
quently produced hard-boiled literature, but these productions have neither 
generated nor aligned with nationally specific heroic paradigms the way that 
American and French crime fiction has.1 American and French hard-boiled 
traditions remain notable in their pioneering deployment of individual per-
sonalities both to stand for an entire culture and to accomplish what society 
as a whole cannot. Furthermore, and rather paradoxically given their char-
acters’ relative solitude, they cast the hard-boiled personality as a broadly 
resonant beacon of morality and accountability. American and French hard-
boiled fiction, in other words, uses its characters not just to conserve cultural 
values in a devolving modern world but also to represent, even advertise, its 
individuals as instinctive conservators of culturally specific attributes and 
values.
 1. Even in British detective literature, where Sherlock Holmes famously incarnated the 
gentleman detective and Jane Marple the proper British lady, the hard-boiled authors of 
the 1930s and 1940s principally generated imitations of the American character model. Brit-
ish authors James Hadley Chase and Peter Cheyney, popular in the French publisher Galli-
mard’s Série noire for their violence-soaked crime novels, sampled American vocabulary and 
environments rather than creating distinctly British heroes and historical scenarios. Other 
such notable hard-boiled authors as Kenzo Kitakata, Arimasa Osawa, and Haruhiko Oyabu 
(Japan), Jakob Arjouni (Germany), Yasmini Khadra (Algeria), Ian Rankin (Scotland), Karin 
Fossum and Jo Nesbo (Norway), Sara Blaedel (Denmark), Arnaldur Indridason (Iceland), 
and Maj Sjowall, Per Wahloo, Stieg Larsson, Kjell Erikson, Camilla Läckberg, and Henning 
Mankell (Sweden) have created maverick individualists to critical and commercial acclaim, 
but none of their protagonists became cultural personae as American and French characters 
have. The possible exception is Stieg Larsson’s Lisbeth Salander, from a well-populated tradi-
tion of Scandinavian noir, but even this character transcends rather than represents or defines 
a nationally specific heroic paradigm.
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 The history of American and French hard-boiled fiction follows the same 
road: building, demolishing, and finally reconstituting an exemplary indi-
vidual. For this reason, the genre functions as a singular barometer for indi-
vidual accountability in the modern age. It also demonstrates, I will argue, 
the enduring and reparative status of such accountability across a variety 
of cultural circumstances. As the hard-boiled hero goes, so goes the idea of 
the autonomous self in its respective cultures, and when the heroic model 
devolves, the very conceptual validity of individual moral authority can seem 
to devolve as well. In tracing the history of that model through the twenti-
eth century and on both sides of the Atlantic, I view the idea of morality 
as not simply represented by a historically and culturally specific character 
model but generated for it and dependent upon it as well. It is because of that 
dependence that this book is necessarily comparative in its assessment. As 
the history of crime fiction demonstrates, the idea of morality comes alive 
through character. Historical crises of accountability and moral authority 
become manifest when character models go off the rails, and those character 
models are culturally specific. They enact crises in culturally specific ways. 
This specificity undergirds the relevance of hard-boiled character mod-
els to the wider culture—a relevance, again, that is intensely present in the 
American and French traditions. American and French protagonists share 
empathic awareness of others, willingness to hold themselves to account, 
ease with violence, and sanguine resistance to corrupt atmospheres. The 
American model is heavier on anti-intellectualism and declarations of per-
sonal independence, whereas the French model emphasizes historical and 
cultural consciousness and aesthetic discernment. These variables, these 
behavioral indicators, are recognizable cultural markers both of hard-boiled 
character and of respective paradigmatic national character profiles as well. 
The present book charts the evolution of the hard-boiled character, the mid-
century devolution of his exemplarity, and twenty-first-century gestures to 
resuscitate the accountable hero. The history of hard-boiled crime fiction, I 
argue, tells nothing less than the story of individual autonomy and account-
ability in modern Western culture.
 Although crime fiction showcases individual personalities with particu-
lar clarity, hard-boiled character models and their deterioration through the 
twentieth century are not unique to crime fiction. The tough, plainspoken 
American cowboy and the melancholic, poetic French aesthete are basic cul-
tural types that pervade political discourse, moral paradigms, and popular 
culture in both countries. They are bedrocks of national identity, and what 
is more, as it happens, they are bedrocks in conversation with one another. 
The conversation itself is embedded in popular cultures: from the farcical 
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Hollywood French detective to the “Old Europe” French politician cited by 
former secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, the French character model 
of the contemplative but ineffectual humanist has long played the foil for 
the American straight shooter. So too has the American cowboy, drawing 
his pistol first and asking questions later (as in the 2003 French play George 
W. Bush or God’s Sad Cowboy [George W. Bush ou le triste cowboy de Dieu]), 
served as counterpoint to the judicious French thinker. Furthermore, crime 
fiction has from the start been shaped by Franco-American dialogue, a dia-
logue that has made for considerable overlap between hard-boiled and noir 
as generic designations and enabled the roman noir to be understood as 
a French-American hybrid. It is in France that the American hard-boiled 
novel has from its inception met with consistent commercial, critical, and 
cinematic success. And French detective fiction fascinates American readers. 
From Georges Simenon to Fred Vargas, to Anglophone detective fiction set 
in France (Martin Walker from Britain, Cara Black from the United States, 
J. Robert Janes from Canada), to the French television crime serial Spiral 
(Engrenages) to film noir, the specter of French culture is crucial to America’s 
own hard-boiled self-image. At the same time, French film adaptations of 
American crime novels have proliferated for decades. What interests me in 
the specificity of American and French character models and in the interac-
tion between them is the way in which their respective devolutions chart 
modern crises of accountability. In both national traditions, the ostentatious 
detachment of cultural hard-boiled markers from actual ethical conduct, the 
sudden meaninglessness or outright perversion of formerly beloved behav-
ioral indicators, are crucial to the apparent devolution of the hard-boiled 
protagonist. On both sides of the Atlantic, crises of individual accountability 
are enacted through the building, breaking down, and rebuilding of culture 
heroes. Hard-boiled fiction diagnoses corruption as the inevitable conse-
quence of modern disaffection and capitalist venality, of toxic parenting and 
mental illness, of political disenchantment and technological alienation—in 
other words, all those influences that decades of sociological studies on both 
sides of the Atlantic have identified as real obstacles to full and independent 
selfhood. And yet, I contend, the hard-boiled genre presents those diagnoses 
as shockingly and transparently disingenuous. The twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries narrated in hard-boiled fiction contain numerous real obstacles to 
accountability. But in one historical period after another, despite one mitigat-
ing circumstance after another, hard-boiled fiction refuses to let the individ-
ual off the hook. The history of the genre suggests the end of the accountable 
and autonomous individual not to be a historical fact, nor even an inevi-
table correlate of modern analyses of subjectivity and society, but a narra-
tive effect. It is an ostensible means to make a point about the oppressive 
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nature of insurmountable social and psychological forces, but at the same 
time a way to create a despondent atmosphere for which no one can really 
be blamed and which no one can repair. As I will argue, the hard-boiled 
consistently intimates that individual abdication or suspension of account-
ability is deliberate and is the foundation of social disorder, not its product. 
The intentionality of such abdication and suspension becomes most evident 
in contemporary attempts to redress them, to reconstitute both autonomy 
and accountability. In those endeavors—and this is where the hard-boiled’s 
sociological resonance meets shades of the self-help exhortations mentioned 
above—individual reclaimings of agency and accountability repudiate mas-
ter narratives that equate secular modernity with social decline. Continued 
dialogue between these national character-driven literatures has ensured the 
specificity of each culture’s character outline, and study of those outlines illu-
minates the problems of accountability that arise in the hard-boiled. It is 
through those character models that we can best follow crises of autonomy 
and accountability in literature and in cultural master narratives writ large.
 I do not mean this book to be a complete history of either American 
or French crime fiction. It does not claim that the constitution, devolution, 
and restoration of moral authority form the sole undercurrent of twentieth-
century crime fiction, nor does it try to give an exhaustive account of that 
trajectory. It does show that American and French hard-boiled crime fiction 
galvanizes culturally specific spiritual character models, suits those models 
to culturally specific twentieth-century circumstances, and then dismantles 
their exemplary characteristics in such a way as to compel a crucial historic 
reckoning with the questions of individual accountability itself. It also dem-
onstrates that in the twenty-first century, both American and French crime 
fiction are profoundly concerned with the loose ends of that reckoning and 
stand thus in a privileged position to stimulate the restoration—or more 
accurately the continual reconstitution—of individual moral authority. As 
I trace this road, I examine those instances of the genre that are the most 
characteristic (more on this in a moment) and that have attained the great-
est commercial and critical success. Because the corpus is vast and particu-
larly because this study is both transhistorical and cross-cultural, inclusions 
of certain texts mean exclusions of others. I start with the first American 
and French hard-boiled novels, then move to mid-century post–hard-boiled 
American fiction and to the French néo-polar, and finally to the contempo-
rary or “restorative” hard-boiled. The final chapter concentrates on American 
television rather than literature, for, I contend, it is in this widely resonant 
medium that contemporary interrogations of individual accountability find 
the strongest both popular and intellectual representation. This does not 
mean, of course, that twenty-first-century American authors are no longer 
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producing hard-boiled crime fiction, or that twenty-first-century literature 
is second to television in richness. The years since Jim Thompson have seen 
Ross Macdonald’s Lew Archer, Robert Parker’s Spenser, Rex Stout’s Nero 
Wolfe, Sara Paretsky’s V. I. Warshawski, Sue Grafton’s Kinsey Millhone, and 
countless others. And yet, series such as The Wire and True Detective have 
generated questions about responsibility and the boundaries of heroism that 
resonate powerfully throughout popular culture and address most directly 
the abdications examined in this book. In turning to television, my goal is 
to examine the crime fiction that, at the time of this writing, is having con-
siderable critical and commercial success, and whose success centers on the 
reconstruction of individual moral authority. If we take David Simon at his 
word when he describes The Wire as a “visual novel” and consider the meta-
narrative character of True Detective, then the inclusion of literature on the 
French side and television on the American will seem organic.
 Although I will be pointing out the romantic foundations of crime fiction 
and arguing that the hard-boiled casts individual moral accountability as an 
alternative to narratives of modern devolution, it is crucial to underscore that 
hard-boiled focus on individual moral choice is neither idealistic nor pre-
scriptive. The continual or repeated emphasis on individual accountability 
as I read it is neither morally reactionary nor morally utopian. Rather, the 
hard-boiled represents individual accountability as a continual and repara-
tive response to a diverse series of modern cultural crises. These reparations 
do not amount to an erasure of history and certainly do not mean a res-
toration of imagined sacred frameworks. Rather, they constitute a series of 
endeavors, exertions even, that reinsert individual moral choice into modern 
master narratives. It is true that there is something atemporal (in the sense of 
resisting chronologies) about the hard-boiled detective, the person who sees 
the world as it is, who wants more, yet who is content with not having more: 
the hard-boiled returns to this individual again and again, but that return is 
not counterhistorical. In a sense, hard-boiled crime fiction does for theories 
of modern decline what its fictional detective does for the world in such a 
decline: it continually reconstitutes a traditional concept of the individual 
even within frames that could seem antipathetic to such concepts.
A BRIEF HISTORY OF EXEMPLARITY
Although traditional nineteenth-century “whodunit” detective fiction main-
tained a stable social and moral landscape, the hard-boiled as a genre tends 
to acknowledge its loss: the detective does not preserve morality so much as 
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reincarnate and reconstitute it for a corrupted world. As Raymond Chan-
dler famously wrote in his iconic definition of the hard-boiled hero: “Down 
these mean streets a man must go who is not himself mean, who is neither 
tarnished nor afraid.  .  .  . He must be, to use a rather weathered phrase, a 
man of honor, by instinct, by inevitability, without thought of it, and certainly 
without saying it.”2 The classic hard-boiled featuring such a character flour-
ished in the American 1920s and 1930s and in the French 1940s and 1950s, 
in the fiction of Carroll John Daly, Dashiell Hammett, Raymond Chandler, 
Léo Malet, and Jean Amila. When the first American hard-boiled protagonist 
boasted, “My ethics are my own,” he did not seem dangerous or unethical; his 
“own” ethics reproduced to a striking extent the traditional and even religious 
principles he claimed to ignore.3 His instinctive honor, his intuitive lack of 
meanness, and his exceptional nature make him an iconic Western paradox, 
the person who combines estrangement from established forms with a narra-
tive and philosophical form-giving position. Those paradoxical individuals, I 
will argue, are the direct descendants, incarnations even, of culturally specific 
character models of spiritual authority—the tough, plain-speaking maver-
ick in the United States and the contemplative poet-aesthete in France—that 
were outlined in early nineteenth-century romantic and religious literature. 
These paradoxes have a powerful resonance for popular culture, both Ameri-
can and French, and for individual moral authority as a conceptual phenom-
enon. They point to an outstanding characteristic of Western culture’s most 
treasured modern ideals, or most precious heroic commodities: the secular 
individual for whom spiritual ideals come naturally, unforced, and constitute 
durable character attributes.
 The hard-boiled model of instinctual heroism that Chandler outlined 
devolved and deteriorated over the twentieth century. The classic Ameri-
can hard-boiled morphs into the post–hard-boiled of the 1950s and 1960s, 
which included the entropic fictions of Mickey Spillane and subsequently Jim 
Thompson; the French roman noir turns into the polar and then the néo-polar 
of the 1960s and 1970s, the violence-strewn novels of Jean-Patrick Manchette, 
Francis Ryck, and Pierre Siniac. These last novels follow classic models in 
their placement of an individual subject in a polluted and crime-soaked envi-
ronment. But in a resounding escalation of Chandler’s The Big Sleep, which 
ended with the detective admitting, “I was part of the nastiness now,” the 
post–hard-boiled and néo-polar explicitly make their principal characters—
who may be detectives, policemen, politicians, bored civilians, housewives, 
 2. Chandler, “Simple Art of Murder,” 59. 
 3. Daly, Snarl of the Beast, 1.
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adolescents, or hardened criminals—crucial drivers of that ambiance.4 The 
traits of the exemplary hard-boiled character twist and grow out of control: 
the tough American maverick becomes a dangerously resentful loose cannon 
and the contemplative, sardonic French intellectual an indolent pessimist. In 
each case, these distortions correspond to simultaneous denials of account-
ability, to intimations that society, family, or heredity is to blame. The result 
of such devolution is the loss of not only a cultural paradigm but also a hero 
who, through his apparently innate and instinctive embodiment of traditional 
virtues, once guaranteed that individual moral authority would remain a bed-
rock in the absence of spiritual imperatives.
 The hard-boiled genre in its early twentieth-century incarnation is inextri-
cably connected with the idea of the individual as a reliably intelligible entity. 
The hard-boiled character simply is: the outside world can act upon him, but 
he maintains an ontological solidity that keeps him “not mean” even when 
on mean streets. This solidity is supported by narrative arcs that avoid any 
hint of the Bildungsroman; there is something complete from the start about 
the character. In this sense, he enacts Aristotelian notions of character, which 
Gilbert Harman describes as “relatively long-term stable dispositions to act in 
distinctive ways.”5 The hard-boiled joins instinctual virtues to a nonjudgmen-
tal nature. It celebrates the fusion of what Gregory Currie names “character 
(a person in a story) and Character (inner source of action, related to person-
ality and temperament).”6 The idea of inner sources parallels Chandler’s “by 
instinct, by inevitability” by positing an individual distinct, rounded, finished, 
and at the same time open to the world.7 Harman himself has argued against 
the existence of character traits, and the idea of character as a coherent entity 
has come in for much questioning in contemporary discourse.8 The history of 
hard-boiled crime fiction tells the story of that conceptual dissolution of the 
individual. But it also repeatedly casts that story, and the notion of the porous 
sociological person, as a disingenuous endeavor on the part of the subject to 
 4. Chandler, The Big Sleep.
 5. Harman, Explaining Value, 166.
 6. Currie, “Narrative and the Psychology of Character,” 61.
 7. The functions of hard-boiled character are similar to the notion of noir authenticity 
outlined in Eric Dussere’s America Is Elsewhere: as an imagined antithesis of a corrupt or inau-
thentic world. Dussere frames authenticity as “an ideological attempt to imagine a negation of 
American consumer culture,” whereas the hard-boiled casts authenticity as happening in and 
through the character. Like Dussere’s authenticity, the hard-boiled character is a world unto 
itself and its “long-term stable dispositions” are “relative” and exist as an “effect.” Eric Dussere, 
America Is Elsewhere: The Noir Tradition in the Age of Consumer Culture (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 4.
 8. Peter Callero’s Myth of Individualism (2009), for instance, argues persuasively for iden-
tity, thought, and emotion as sociological phenomena.
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avoid responsibility. As a result, the hard-boiled in fact sustains a traditional 
concept of the individual, one based on “long-term stable dispositions.”
SUBJECTIVE FACTS
Here, I want to return to the earlier statement that classic hard-boiled charac-
ters are secular versions of nineteenth-century character models of spiritual 
authority. I will argue that the hard-boiled’s treatment of the individual qua 
individual plays out particular cultural anxieties about secular morality, so its 
synthesis of ideals and character attributes is crucial. To frame that synthesis 
historically and philosophically, I want to consider the classic hard-boiled’s 
foregrounding of the individual paragon as reminiscent of Georg Lukács’s 
account of the genesis of the novel: an account that focuses on the rise of 
the individual as repository of ideals. In Lukács’s formulation, the epic—as 
distinct from and anterior to the novel—had presumed an abiding alliance of 
individual and world. As he notes, the epic hero is, “strictly speaking, never 
an individual.” His description of the novel’s dissolution of that alliance is 
germane to the hard-boiled’s singular reconciliation of individualism and cul-
tural heroism. He states:
If the individual is unproblematic, then his aims are given to him with imme-
diate obviousness, and the realisation of the world constructed by these 
given aims may involve hindrances and difficulties but never any serious 
threat to his interior life. Such a threat arises only when the outside world is 
no longer adapted to the individual’s ideals and the ideas become subjective 
facts—ideals—in his soul. The positing of ideas as unrealizable and, in the 
empirical sense, as unreal, i.e. their transformation into ideals, destroys the 
immediate problem-free organic nature of the individual. Individuality then 
becomes an aim unto itself because it finds within itself everything that is 
essential to it and that makes its life autonomous—even if what it finds can 
never be a firm possession or basis of its life, but is an object of search.9
The hard-boiled air of “constructed nostalgia,” as Dean MacCannell puts it, 
which can also be read as an equally constructed mood of loss, makes the 
hard-boiled hero a durable conservator of ideals “without thought of it.” In 
the early hard-boiled, “ideas as subjective facts” are lived by the character as 
“aims given with immediate obviousness,” with the certitude, if not the vocab-
 9. Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 66, 78.
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ulary, of epic forms.10 An “aim given” implies a larger aim-giving framework, 
but when an autonomous individual takes over the conservation and anima-
tion of ideals “by instinct, by inevitability, without thought of it and certainly 
without saying it,” their “obviousness” becomes limited to him—their solidity 
as given aims becomes subjective. And yet, their obviousness to the individual 
character—their sturdiness as subjective facts—gives the narrative impres-
sion, because the character is the protagonist and often narrator, of being 
shared and valued by the world of the novel. This narrative valorization of the 
hero’s inclinations, this impression of sharing created by his centrality, is not 
at all the same as the total and totalizing “immediate obviousness” that for 
Lukács was characteristic of the epic world. Rather than operating from the 
outside in, meaning that the individual is valuable because of what he embod-
ies, it operates primarily from the inside out. In other words, the embodied 
characteristics seem valuable because they are borne by the individual qua 
individual, and because they are borne entirely without the supporting foun-
dation of transcendent meaning.
 For Lukács, the transition from the epic to the novelistic world was inter-
twined with the transition from a religious to a secular or modern world. 
He describes his vision of this transition as “essentially determined by Hegel, 
e.g. the historico-philosophical view of what the epic and the novel have in 
common and what differentiates them.” The diachronism of the epic-novel 
distinction resonates throughout The Theory of the Novel—one need look no 
further than the statement that “once this unity disintegrated, there could be 
no more spontaneous totality of being”—and in some sense echoes the mood 
of loss that reverberates through the hard-boiled. The “giver” of aims in the 
epic world was (past tense) the “roundness of the value system which deter-
mines the epic cosmos.” The hard-boiled character is (present tense) much 
more likely to declare the absence of moral ideals than their presence. At 
the same time, I contend, even when it represents absence, the hard-boiled 
unites Lukács’s diachronic account of transition with a consistently vital sub-
jectivity through that transition—a subjectivity that counteracts the sense of 
loss. Lukács further states that “the present in The Theory of the Novel is not 
defined in Hegelian terms but rather by Fichte’s formulation, as ‘the age of 
absolute sinfulness.’”11 As Axel Honneth writes of Fichte’s formulation, “What 
is methodologically significant about this kind of philosophy of history is that 
it seems to allow one to make a negative judgment on the present without 
basing it explicitly on a value judgment.”12 This postulation of value-free judg-
 10. MacCannell, “Democracy’s Turn,” 280, quoted in Dussere, 10.
 11. Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 18.
 12. Honneth, Pathologies of Reason, 97.
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ment, I would propose, is crucial to the hard-boiled; indeed, it is the ground 
from which hard-boiled subjectivity and ethics are drawn.
 Judith Butler describes the Hegelian subject—one without a persisting 
identity that endures through various phases—as “not a self-identical subject 
who travels smugly from one ontological place to another; it is its travels, 
and is every place in which it finds itself.”13 I read in the hard-boiled a sub-
ject conscious of his own actions, and whose consistent presence rests on 
that consciousness throughout his travels. He resides in the negativity of the 
outside world as in a permanent home, even as he counteracts that nega-
tivity through his own conscience. Chandler’s “Simple Art of Murder” puts 
forth a historical and comparative account of detective fictions but repre-
sents the “mean streets” as a given: those mean streets surround the subject 
rather than negating him. As Lukács writes, “Art always says, ‘And yet!’ to 
life.”14 The hard-boiled as I read it in this book says “And yet!” to theories 
of secular modernity as decline and to the determinism of cultural circum-
stances, as well as to the utopian dream of warmer historical periods. Dean 
Moyar, noting in Hegel’s Conscience that “the distinctive mark of conscience is 
that it is reasoning from the first person perspective,” writes, “In understand-
ing modernity and the nature of ethical content within modern societies, we 
inevitably aim to give an account of the true nature of practical reasoning, but 
that should not blind us to the fact that conscience in all its forms is a fragile 
achievement.”15 In its resistance to narratives of decline and in its instinc-
tive insistence on accountability and ethics, the hard-boiled foregrounds con-
science, that “fragile achievement,” as a continual regenerator of autonomous 
subjectivity. In so doing—and here again are shades or tones of the self-help 
books cited earlier—it insists on the abiding importance of individual moral 
choice across historical periods and circumstances.
 In one sense, the hard-boiled character is an existential hero who does not 
know or care that he is one. Chandler’s description implies an involuntary and 
indeed automatic heroism—an exemption from atmospheric contamination 
but also an exemption from any subjection to or even consciousness of moral-
ity or ethics as concepts. At the same time, the concept of moral choice is as 
crucial as it is paradoxical. The hero’s “honor without thought of it” cannot 
mean goodness without exertion. On the contrary, I contend, it means more 
precisely “exertion without thought of it.” The most persuasive critical treat-
ments of hard-boiled subjectivity have argued for the detective’s individual-
ism being a critical response to the possible dangers of political collectivity 
 13. Butler, Subjects of Desire, 8.
 14. Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 72.
 15. Moyar, Hegel’s Conscience, 14. 
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(McCann), to a corporate capitalism that alienated even as it enclosed the 
individual (Breu), to the diminishing of sentimental affiliations and group 
traditions (Cassuto), to modernity’s critical stance (Rolls), and to crises of 
postwar nation-building (Gorrara). In such treatments, the detective’s char-
acter emerges both as psychologically determined and as culturally or envi-
ronmentally driven. He exists within and in response to his circumstances, 
which are almost invariably dispiriting. The character must engage with the 
desolation of the outside landscape, the hopelessness of institutions, and the 
indifference of the general public. What is more, the meanness of the mean 
streets necessarily affects the character, so that the envisioning of aims and 
the embodiment of ideals is not automatic. If conscience is a “fragile achieve-
ment,” it is also a conscious and continually repeated one; this necessary repe-
tition and the intention implied in “achievement” preclude moral utopianism. 
Autonomy and accountability are at a premium because these are as hard-
won as they are necessary.
THE DANGER OF SUBJECTIVE FACTS
Putting aside the rather dispiriting notion of a shared culture for which one 
person or even group of people is responsible, the principal problem of the 
hard-boiled may be that the primacy of the individual imbues him with con-
siderable power and thus, by extension, with menace. If honor becomes a 
matter of instinct, if it is a character attribute or what Currie names “an inner 
source of action” within the hard-boiled hero, what happens when the indi-
vidual turns bad, as he ultimately does in the course of the twentieth-century 
hard-boiled? And what happens when theories of character as a concept, as 
a series of “relatively long-term stable dispositions” come apart, as they ulti-
mately start to along the same timeline? It is when the soul, that ideal reposi-
tory, becomes itself a source of contamination, that a noir grimness settles 
not only on modern crime fiction but also on its cultural master narratives.
 In examining American and French crime fiction alike, my focus is on 
the culturally specific resonances of early nineteenth-century spiritual para-
gons and on their dissolution. In considering the French néo-polar and the 
American post–hard-boiled, their purposeful renunciations of individual 
accountability, and their casting of complex (and accountability-undermin-
ing) models of subjectivity as the inevitable correlates of modern existence, I 
focus nonetheless on what remains of a traditional concept of the individual. 
This is intentional, and indeed represents the central argument of this book, 
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because even without recourse to a sacred frame, the long history of the hard-
boiled nonetheless encourages a reading of individual moral choice as dura-
ble and vital. The complex ideological models of the political néo-polar and 
of Jim Thompson’s postmodern psychopaths may seem difficult to reconcile 
with a traditional concept of the individual (and of society as a grouping of 
individuals), but this incompatibility is precisely my point. Those traditional 
concepts continue to intrude, to assert themselves, and even as the néo-polar 
and the mid-century American post–hard-boiled deconstruct the traditional 
subject they continue, in their exchange with nineteenth-century models, to 
resurrect it. The surprising result of such resurrections is that poststructur-
alist theories of subjectivity appear as so many disingenuous distractions. 
When individual conduct and the conceptual sturdiness of character devolve 
in concert, the result is a spectacular threat to the idea of accountability.
 Because it focuses on character and on questions of accountability, this 
book privileges certain ancestries of the hard-boiled over others. In the 
French domain, I concentrate more on the romantic antecedents of hard-
boiled character than on the urban chronicles of Balzac and Hugo that laid 
the ground for crime fiction’s settings and social formations. Alistair Rolls 
notes, “Crime fiction is a genre (if indeed it can properly be called a genre) 
that was born in the modern city, and indeed in Paris in particular,” and 
underscores the detective “as a trope, alongside the flâneur, of mid- to late-
nineteenth-century Parisian modernity.”16 Thus the urban foundation of 
crime fiction runs alongside a strongly retrospective romanticism at the level 
of character. Indeed, insofar as nineteenth-century Paris is a site of inchoate 
modernity, crime fiction’s evocation of romantic roots and its insistence on 
respecting their outlines speak to a charged ambivalence about that moder-
nity. It also informs an abiding and sometimes nostalgic authority the genre 
accords to individual personality. Outside the scope of the present study are 
the numerous film adaptations of hard-boiled novels and the evolution of the 
female hard-boiled hero.17
 16. Rolls, Paris and the Fetish, 29.
 17. John Irwin, Stephen Faison, Gene Phillips, Paula Rabinowitz, Alastair Phillips, and 
Alistair Rolls and Deborah Walker, among others, have given film noir rich consideration. 
And while choosing to limit the discussion to masculine hard-boiled subjectivity, I nonethe-
less address the question of the hard-boiled character’s romantic and sexual relationships and 
his treatment of women, reading in these expressions or dilutions of empathy, honesty, and 
consciousness of others.
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OVERVIEW
The first chapter examines nineteenth-century American and French ser-
mons, romantic literature, and traditional nineteenth-century works of crime 
fiction. It outlines the respective character portraits of each culture’s ideal 
spiritual authority and follows the transformation of spiritual authorities 
into romantic heroic exemplars. Just as American romantic literature turns 
into innate American character traits such elements of preaching as unpre-
tentiousness, plainspokenness, and an instinctive sense of right, so French 
romantic literature turned into sentimental attributes the sensitivity and 
poeticism of the preacher’s message. These characteristics born in romantic 
and religious literature were the fruits of historical specificity, but they have 
nonetheless turned into durable character models. It has been a long time 
since an American frontiersman crashed through the forest or a Frenchman 
wandered mountain paths, and yet these are canonical models, points of ref-
erence, culture heroes, and modern foundations for each nation’s vision of 
character and of spiritual authority. That lineage is shared by both countries, 
fused on the French side with Balzac and Hugo and in the process estab-
lishing the heroes of France’s urban streets. That coincidence of secular psy-
chology and spiritual authority, that rendition of virtue as personality and of 
personality as virtue, anticipates the hard-boiled accidental paragon, the man 
of honor “without thought of it.” This chapter also locates in early nineteenth-
century texts the seeds of crime fiction’s eventual twentieth-century contam-
ination of this ideal model. French religious writings warn against amoral 
aestheticism and nihilistic lassitude. In the American model, on the other 
hand, a greater source of concern was the perversion of the spiritual message 
by a theatrical narcissism.
 The second chapter focuses on the first hard-boiled crime fiction novels in 
the United States and France, concentrating on the principal detective. In The 
Snarl of the Beast (1927) by Carroll John Daly, the narrator, Race Williams, is 
at once the lone pioneer and the garrulous revival preacher, announcing on 
the first page: “Right and wrong are not written on the statutes for me, nor do 
I find my code of morals in the essays of long-winded professors. My ethics 
are my own. I’m not saying they’re good and I’m not admitting they’re bad, 
and what’s more I’m not interested in the opinions of others on that subject.”18 
Though Race Williams makes no claim for the universal value or prominence 
of his “ethics,” the very use of the word indicates at least a nodding familiar-
ity with systems, schools of thought, and the idea of an absolute. Displaying 
 18. Daly, Snarl of the Beast, 1.
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restraint, psychic fortitude, anti-intellectualism, empathic capacity, and intui-
tive morality, he functions as an ideal respondent to a fragmented and alien-
ating New York as well as to a postwar America. In Léo Malet’s 120, rue de la 
Gare (1943), Nestor Burma reanimates the nineteenth-century postrevolution-
ary poet for contemporary wartime. Through a nuanced sense of the aesthetic 
and its ethical limitations, through an understatement of his own problems 
and an empathic response to those of others, and through reliance on literary, 
cultural, and architectural history to solve a murder, Burma uses his status as 
outsider private detective to advocate for an entire culture under attack. The 
German occupation engenders an ethical stance that at the same time con-
serves French cultural hegemony. Although the idea of the exemplary out-
sider has always resonated more problematically in a European context than 
in an American, the occupation allowed the outsider to become an exem-
plary cultural insider. At the same time, Burma’s fusion of aesthetic sensibility, 
empathic capacity, narrative mastery, and heroic exemplarity, so resonant for 
occupied France, powerfully underscores the importance of individual heroic 
models to the conservation of a culture under assault.
 Chapter 3 examines the deterioration of the American character model 
in The Killer Inside Me (1952), the best known of Jim Thompson’s post–hard-
boiled novels. Jim Thompson’s drifters, con artists, alcoholics, and psycho-
pathic small-town sheriffs have been read as “only the most extreme examples 
of a whole world gone wrong” and “wriggling past private madness, or Amer-
ican rot, to universal horror.”19 And yet, what renders Thompson’s name syn-
onymous with a hard-boiled turn toward hopelessness is his simultaneous 
insistence on and evacuation of individual responsibility: a constant alterna-
tion between the Race Williams model of determined centrality and grand 
gestures of nihilistic powerlessness. Lou Ford, the Texas sheriff who narrates 
The Killer Inside Me, refers to the “sickness” that he calls dementia praecox 
(schizophrenia) and which drives him to murder. Numerous intertextual 
parallels between Lou Ford’s narrative and Daniel Paul Schreber’s 1903 Mem-
oirs of My Nervous Illness—written by an actual dementia praecox patient—
cast him as overdetermined by an accountability-erasing diagnosis and by 
the traumatic memory of a Foucauldian panopticon-like childhood. These 
parallels conjure two major threats to individualism and even to the idea of 
character. One is psychic trauma—an experience that resists and derails nar-
rativization and results in a splintered self—and the other an overwhelming 
and ongoing social control. “Universal horror” comes from narrative manipu-
lation of these specters: from the disillusion that arises when Ford’s insistence 
 19. McCauley, Jim Thompson, 242; Polito, Savage Art, 456.
16 • INTRODUCTION 
on narrative control clashes with his calculated surrenders to traumatic mem-
ories and mad impulses, and with his enthusiastic imitations of a dumbed-
down American lexicon. Similar strategies to both master one’s narrative and 
undercut accountability emerge in Jim Thompson’s Pop. 1280, in the novels 
of Horace McCoy and Patricia Highsmith, and in American political actors 
of the last fifty years. As Stephen King writes in his foreword to Thompson’s 
novel, “Looking back at the record, one would have to say that [the descrip-
tion of Ford] .  .  . also describes a generation of politicians: Joe McCarthy, 
Richard Nixon, Oliver North, Alexander Haig, and a slew of others. In Lou 
Ford, Jim Thompson drew for the first time a picture of the Great American 
Sociopath.”20
 The fourth chapter considers the French néo-polar, the violent and 
politically jaundiced descendant of the roman noir, focusing on its princi-
pal author and theorist, Jean-Patrick Manchette. The néo-polar launches the 
same double-pronged assault on the classic hard-boiled French character 
model as did the American. First, it practices a point-by-point undoing of 
French heroic characteristics, namely, an ethical sense of the aesthetic and 
its limits, a respect for French cultural and literary history, and an empathic 
and readerly interest in other people. At the same time, it blames that undo-
ing on social, political, or philosophical forces, casting what Dominique 
Manotti calls “existential disenchantment” as an inevitable accompaniment 
to political disillusion.21 And just as Thompson’s characters turn the direct, 
plain-speaking individualist into an unhinged hayseed, so Manchette’s char-
acters turn the melancholic aesthete into a bored, destructive, self-absorbed 
nihilist. In L’affaire N’Gustro, Manchette’s first sole-authored novel, sometime 
narrator Henri Butron echoes the disgruntled protagonists of Roger Nimier 
and Albert Camus but in so doing distorts the nineteenth-century romantic 
model by beating up strangers, embracing reactionary politics, and urinating 
on historic Parisian monuments. All the while he contemplates, or pretends 
to contemplate, his own character, value, and existence. These contemplations 
build up character as such—the “fictional character” that Robbe-Grillet out-
lined in his writings on the nouveau roman—as an absent narrative center.22 
Dismantling or deconstructing the subject is in fact the subject’s most impor-
tant and most intentionally dispiriting accomplishment. Similar distortions 
emerge in the principal character of Morgue pleine and Que d’os!, Manchette’s 
most traditional private detective novels. The very characteristics that make 
detective Eugène Tarpon so subdued a specimen—disenchantment, lassi-
 20. Thompson, Killer Inside Me (1989), n. pag.
 21. Frommer and Oberti, “Dominique Manotti,” 46.
 22. Robbe-Grillet, Pour un nouveau roman, 26.
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tude, confusion—are precisely those of the early nineteenth-century romantic 
heroes, in hyperbolic form.
 The last chapter considers contemporary efforts on both sides of the 
Atlantic to redress the collaborative problems of exaggerated autonomy 
and hamstrung accountability. It focuses on Fred Vargas’s novels, particu-
larly Seeking Whom He May Devour [L’homme à l’envers], in which Commis-
sioner Adamsberg is described as having “many scruples, but few principles.” 
In keeping with Jacqueline Hodgson’s descriptions of the French republican 
tradition as one in which “the sovereignty of the people becomes the sover-
eignty of the state,” Adamsberg valorizes and incarnates a symbiotic repub-
lican ideal of the state as representative of the people.23 The privileging of 
scruple over principle demonstrates that individual interiority can become—
both reflect and morph into—the character of the state. It brings crime fic-
tion back to the Chandler model of “honor without thought of it” and to a 
rendition of principles as instinctual traits, reinserting the early nineteenth-
century romantic model in the midst of contemporary judicial operations. In 
the United States, where the hard-boiled mantle has increasingly been taken 
up on television as well as in novels, crime dramas similarly reconcile recla-
mation of individual responsibility with the myriad psychic, institutional, and 
discursive challenges to that reclamation. Almost without exception, crime 
television grapples with tensions between individual accountability and the 
leaden weight of judicial and procedural norms. HBO’s The Wire (2002–2008) 
and True Detective (2014) showcase the endeavor to make autonomy matter 
and to arrive at an enlivening rather than destructively entropic result. True 
Detective acknowledges and even underscores that hard-boiled moments of 
empathic, philosophical cool are indeed ideals rather than sustained modes. 
The Wire reproduces the pervasive hopelessness of the néo-polar but none-
theless sustains the accountable subject, insisting on self-examination as an 
unavoidable element of the living mind.
THE CHALLENGE OF HARD-BOILED CRITICISM
Before moving to a discussion of early nineteenth-century heroic models, I 
want to put in a few words about attempts to analyze the hard-boiled genre, 
which has known an enduring popularity and been the subject of much 
recent academic analysis. Urban-centered and touched with nihilism and 
violence, it lends itself to political and historical analyses of modern capitalist 
 23. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, 16.
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alienation. Featuring an independent detective and abandoning the murder-
investigation-resolution structure of the armchair detective novel, it dovetails 
with critiques of institutional processes and of cultural understandings of the 
law as well as with investigations of narrative structure. Character-driven 
and focused on the individual, it opens itself to studies of the intersection 
of the sociological and the psychological and to analyses of cultural mythol-
ogy. And since hard-boiled fiction belongs, for the above reasons as well as 
for its association with film noir, to a marginally literary “shadow” category, 
it has inspired examination of the very nature of the canon and the tension 
between marginal and universal in the cultural imagination. Criticism of this 
particular genre is always somewhat circular in nature. On the one hand it 
examines and situates individual novels within the hard-boiled corpus and 
at the same time resituates that corpus within literature and culture, taking 
into account the particular novel at hand. All such criticism has to negotiate 
with the fact that the genre is an apparent whole made of disparate parts as 
well as to acknowledge the genre’s marginal nature—all of which makes its 
place in the world of literature and literary studies a necessarily vexed one.
 At times, for instance, criticism of crime fiction has argued that a particu-
lar novel or author had transcended the pulp marginality of the genre and 
should be counted as “literature.” Raymond Chandler and Dashiell Hammett 
have come in for much commentary of this sort. And yet, as Uri Eisenzweig 
contends in Le récit impossible, claiming that crime fiction has always occu-
pied a critical and conceptual place between “bad literature” and “paralitera-
ture,” the appeal of crime fiction lies in its resistance to such elevations. He 
writes, “It was particularly in the 1890s, when the detective novel exploded 
onto the literary scene, that its negative characterization correlated unam-
biguously to its new perception as a generic unit” [C’est surtout au cours des 
années 1890, alors que le roman policier surgit massivement sur la scène litté-
raire, que s’affirme sans ambiguïté la corrélation entre sa caractérisation néga-
tive et la perception nouvelle de son unité générique].24
 What Eisenzweig describes as the “negative characterization” associated 
with the genre goes a long way toward explaining the unavoidably ambivalent 
as well as Sisyphean nature of endeavors to elevate it. Arguments for the lit-
erary and cultural importance of a literature whose very importance resides 
in its refusal to embrace traditional concepts of “importance” are doomed 
to a certain amount of self-contradiction. The genre’s marginal and at times 
anti-intellectual nature is absorbed into, becomes in the end the foundation 
of, its place within the world of literature. Indeed, in part as a result of criti-
cal attention, its readiness to trawl the bottom of the canon becomes crucial 
 24. Eisenzweig, Le récit impossible, 32.
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to its place in it. Its deliberate urban marginalism, combined with repeated 
critical introductions into the realm of literature, amount to a sort of edgy 
advertisement for the genre. The place of the hard-boiled, one foot in the 
world of literature and the other in paraliterature, is especially relevant to the 
present study because that place is characteristic of its protagonist as well. 
It is a critical commonplace that the toughness and moral ambiguity of its 
characters represent an authorial indictment of social corruption—in other 
words, the character is responding to a dangerous, disordered, or demoral-
izing cultural habitat. Raymond Chandler’s famous “mean streets” statement 
presented the tension between overweening meanness and individual moral 
solidity as the foundation of the hard-boiled. So it is too, I would contend, 
with the individual hard-boiled novel within the hard-boiled canon.
 Because of its storied place in the margins of literature, as well as in the 
margins of law, culture, family, and psychology, criticism stops short of fully 
integrating the hard-boiled into the world of literature. Although directing 
literary criticism to a genre that wholeheartedly sidesteps the literary may not 
qualify as a literary critical endeavor, what makes the hard-boiled a compel-
ling focus of academic study is precisely its almost coincidental, surprising, 
or precarious literary nature. It is even an accidental literature, much as its 
character is an accidental hero. Its precarious capacity to transcend the genre 
and join the mainstream ranks of literature becomes the foundation of its 
academic (because anti-academic) appeal.
THE TOO-FAMILIAR HARD-BOILED OUTLINE
The occasionally antiliterary and anti-intellectual hue of the hard-boiled, 
combined with its sheer numbers, has created peculiar problems in the anal-
ysis of individual novels and characters, as well as a curious circularity in 
discussions of the genre. One such problem, which arises indirectly from the 
very number of novels, is that not every novel that conforms to generic defi-
nitions of the hard-boiled is either good or interesting enough to be woven 
into the practice of literary criticism and welcomed into the club of literary 
elevation. At the same time, because it is a genre, and because it is read and 
sought and celebrated as such, the practice of exclusion tends to threaten the 
integrity of the totality more so than in other forms less about outline and 
ambiance. John Milton, in his 1963 study of the western novel, had written of 
the cowboy:
This was the golden era of the cowboy, a short and frantic era which ended 
abruptly in the severe winters of 1886–87 and the accompanying drought, 
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but which left behind a myth, or at least an image of the cowboy-hero, riding 
the range in loneliness and courage. The image has been built upon general 
impressions and somewhat isolated facts, because no one cowboy lives on in 
legend or fact to take his place beside the notable hunters and scouts such 
as Carson, Boone, Glass, and Buffalo Bill. What remains in literature (as it 
also remains in the movies and in television) is simply the “typical” cowboy, 
the stereotype which has ridden his faithful horse at a gallop through a large 
number of bad novels and a very few good ones.25
Even aside from its dependence on sometimes mediocre foundations, the pre-
dominance of “type” has its problematic implications. With crime fiction in 
general, and with the hard-boiled in particular, the “image” seems greater 
than and in some sense independent of the sum of its component parts. Char-
acters are specific, their particular actions and words distinct, but “the hard-
boiled character” is an outline, within an atmosphere, within a mood. The 
phenomenon of a type that supersedes individual examples, the dominance 
of the “typical” that John Milton describes in his study of the cowboy, is as 
characteristic of the hard-boiled as it was of the cowboy western. And it is 
characteristic for some of the same reasons: the connection of the hard-boiled 
genre to film noir (analogous to the cowboy novel’s connection to western 
movies) underscored the interchangeability of faces, not to mention insinu-
ated the hero literally as a silhouette, a trench-coated form in the evening. 
One could know the hard-boiled hero by his cigarette, his inscrutable glance, 
and the shadows and rain that surrounded him. This familiarity has proved 
profitable for the hard-boiled’s place in popular culture and by extension in 
academic studies, since it accords the form a strong cultural currency that 
interacts well with its high-low literary nature, yet at the same time defends 
itself from critical examinations. From a twenty-first-century perspective, it is 
almost impossible to unknow what has become such a familiar cultural image 
that, no matter how schematic, has virtually become visual and conceptual 
shorthand for the urban underworld. Or perhaps it is more correct to say that 
it is difficult to see how much the familiarity of the outline precludes knowing 
what resides within—much as Shklovsky meant when he wrote, “We appre-
hend objects only as shapes with imprecise extensions; we do not see them 
in their entirety but rather recognize them by their main characteristics. We 
see the object as though it were enveloped in a sack.”26 In the case of the hard-
boiled character, that sack takes the form of clichés (“a man of honor,” “mean 
 25. Milton, “Western Novel,” 80–81.
 26. Lemon and Reis, Russian Formalist Criticism, 11.
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streets,” “urban wasteland”) that abound both in the literature and in criticism 
of it. The problem with an excessive familiarity with the hard-boiled outline is 
that discussion of its component parts—that is, examination of the protago-
nist’s character, thoughts, words, ideas—often veers into reification of that 
general and rather schematic personality outline. Because of the large number 
of hard-boiled novels and characters, because of the many variations on the 
theme, because of the sometimes clichéd nature of the theme itself, such criti-
cism often turns into a repeated list of characteristics, of plot and character 
outlines. Criticism that situates an individual novel or character within the 
hard-boiled canon and then re-delineates that canon based on the reading of 
that individual novel or novels—which most criticism does to some extent, 
including this present endeavor—must be aware of its tendency to move in a 
circle, thus to both pursue and create a moving target.
EVOLUTION OF FORM AND CHARACTER
Because so many early authors of the hard-boiled have vanished into the his-
torical ether, and because the genre has gained what Milton called a “recog-
nizable pattern,” the historiography of the hard-boiled often reads the genre 
as “evolving.” As Robert Skinner writes, “The writers who shaped the hard-
boiled hero in the early years were a diverse group whose writing was rough 
and volatile, like raw petroleum, but which, over time, was refined and filtered 
into a smooth, high-grade product.”27 We can recall John Milton’s description 
of the “cowboy” as a “stereotype which has ridden his faithful horse at a gal-
lop through a large number of bad novels and a very few good ones.” That 
characterization demonstrates the dependence of proliferation and medioc-
rity—the way in which abundant production, and a consequent profusion of 
mediocre examples, dull or blur the substance of the hard-boiled “type” even 
as it solidifies its outlines. What is more, in the realm of the hard-boiled, some 
of the early writers who are best at creating an “outline”—contributing to the 
firm contours of the hard-boiled character as a type, or to what Lee Horsley 
called “the most characteristic narratives”28—are at the same time not terri-
bly good at creating either a multifaceted individual character or a fictional 
world. I will be making an argument for the unsung psychological complexity 
of the much-maligned Carroll John Daly, the first hard-boiled author. Critics 
have declared, and not without some justification, that Daly was “a dreadful 
 27. Skinner, New Hard-Boiled Dicks, 10.
 28. Horsley, Noir Thriller, 16.
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writer” and “impossibly crude.”29 Daly, it would seem, was entirely aware of 
writing a “first” and establishing which would be its “most characteristic nar-
ratives.” And numerous authors followed close on his heels, authors who were 
not “firsts” but who wrote with similar crudeness—a crudeness that, para-
doxically enough, contributed to the fixed canonical contours of hard-boiled 
mood and vocabulary. Subsequent critical treatments of Hammett and Chan-
dler acknowledged their debt to Daly. In some readings, Hammett and Daly 
are presented as equally primitive, with Chandler contributing more stylistic 
sophistication.30 According to these evolutionary scenarios, a schematic or 
poorly written character and novel could nonetheless gain value through its 
subsequent resonances in other novels, echoes in now-canonical authors, and 
thus an eventual contribution to the groundwork of the hard-boiled “type.” 
Hammett’s improvements on Daly are instances of such contribution, as are 
Chandler’s on Hammett. Because the hard-boiled outline has become both 
more familiar and more abstract, and because its tributaries have multiplied, 
assessments of the hard-boiled sometimes point, as Skinner’s does, to a pro-
cess of evolution and refinement. It is important, however, to note that the 
“smooth, high-grade product” to which Skinner refers is hard-boiled writ-
ing—writing that was “rough and volatile” in the first decade of the genre, 
when paper (a product in its own right) was inexpensive and the disposable 
weekly magazine the most popular publication forum. The hard-boiled char-
acter as modern individualist embodiment of morals and ethics, on the other 
hand, follows a very different sort of arc, one that is quite the opposite of 
refinement and can more properly be called “devolution”—the rotting of the 
object within its familiarizing sack. For all the alternation and ultimate fusion 
between the marginal and the literary, the main event of the hard-boiled as I 
read it is not the refinement of a form but rather the weakening both of the 
idea of individual embodiment and of shared ideals as conserved or conserv-
able by individuals, and at the same time a blueprint for reinstatement of that 
embodiment. Contemporary crime fiction endeavors to reanimate individual 
autonomy, to correct for the excesses that made that autonomy dangerous, 
and to restore the notion of responsibility for the common good. In other 
 29. William Nolan writes of Daly, “The writing was impossibly crude, the plotting labored 
and ridiculous, and Race Williams emerged as a swaggering illiterate with the emotional insta-
bility of a gun-crazed vigilante.” Nolan, Black Mask Boys, 35.
 30. According to Sigelman and Jacoby, “the low-brow character of the readership imposed 
on hard-boiled writers the imperative of simplicity—the need to use simple words joined in 
simple sentences strung together in simple chronological order. The pioneering hard-boiled 
mysteries of Carroll John Daly and Dashiell Hammett did precisely that, and little more. Chan-
dler’s achievement was to graft stylistic complexity and sophistication onto the rudimentary 
hard-boiled format.” Sigelman and Jacoby, “Not-So-Simple Art of Imitation,” 15–16.
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words, it underscores the importance of reviving the concept of “honor” that 
in fiction stands “without thought of it.” When narrative insistence on indi-
vidual agency is inseparable from the presence of shared moral responsibili-
ties, that alliance allays certain hopeless tendencies not just in crime novels 




CONSTRUCTING A CULTURE HERO
I wrote earlier that one of Western culture’s most treasured modern ideals is 
the secular individual for whom spiritual ideals come naturally, unforced, and 
constitute durable character attributes. I read such embodiment of ideals and 
possession of personality attributes as simultaneous functions of novelistic 
character rather than as distinct historical roles. And yet the early nineteenth 
century was witness to a moment in literary history that expressly blended 
those perspectives on character, actively situated exemplarity within psychol-
ogy, and, not coincidentally, gave rise to crime fiction as a genre. Both France 
and America saw a decline in religious enthusiasm in the immediate after-
math of their respective late eighteenth-century revolutions.1 Both countries 
saw endeavors to reanimate that enthusiasm on a national-cultural scale dur-
ing the early nineteenth century. And in the literature of both, that reanima-
tion singled out a principal character that retained its appeal as a cultural 
type long after the religious framework had faded. Although the transition 
from a religious to a secular society was an actual and well-documented lived 
sociohistorical phenomenon, literary romanticism retained a nostalgic remi-
 1. Finke and Stark write, “The characterization of the religious situation in the immediate 
aftermath of the American Revolution as the ‘lowest ebb-tide’ in our history was used nearly 
word for word by all the leading authors from Robert Baird in 1844 to Sydney Ahlstrom in 
1972.” Finke and Stark, Churching of America, 2.
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niscence that portrayed transition as redolent of loss and defeat. This por-
trayal aligned with the inclination of contemporaneous sermons and religious 
writings to describe secularism as decline. It also aligned with the advent of 
social and political changes (industrialism, capitalism, urbanization) that did 
in fact give rise to as much lament as optimism. The transition to a secular 
society thus became not just a historical phenomenon but also a story, replete 
with melancholic reminiscence, dramatic warning, and—importantly for the 
present study—strong individual characters who could mediate that social 
evolution.
 Whereas American religious revival went the way of evangelicalism, 
revival meetings, and a devaluing of clerical gentility, France saw the return 
of Old Regime ecclesiastics and an aesthetic-poetic argument for religion. 
The French emphasis on lyrical grace was in contrast to an American pref-
erence for religious dynamism, with the artist and the evangelist serving as 
respective cultural models of spiritual standing and strength. These mod-
els amounted to character portraits of each country’s ideal believer, or ideal 
moral leader—models that emerged solidified through nineteenth-century 
sermons in both countries. At the same time they are precisely the respective 
heroic models that populated both nineteenth-century romantic literature in 
the two countries and crime fiction, especially the hard-boiled.
 American and French hard-boiled protagonists are direct descendants of 
nineteenth-century models of spiritual authority who emerged from the ser-
mons and religious writings of the first quarter of the nineteenth century, 
as well as of the romantic heroes who carried those same characteristics. In 
this chapter I describe how nineteenth-century models of spiritual authority 
morphed into particular cultural heroic models—the frontier individualist 
in America and the contemplative poet-aesthete in France—and how those 
foundational heroes in turn became cornerstones of the hard-boiled. In 
examining the hard-boiled character as a descendant of the spiritual-romantic 
hero, I focus on the sort of persona and individual qualities that each nation 
associated with spiritual connection, in order to demonstrate to what extent 
these were codified by the time of their rendition in crime fiction.
 This is not to suggest that romantic and religious writing were the sole 
precursors to crime fiction. Nor does it mean that hard-boiled fiction remi-
nisces about anterior historical frames or turns around to recuperate aban-
doned religiosities. It means instead that hard-boiled exemplarity and early 
nineteenth-century spiritual exemplarity function in analogous ways: by com-
bining the embodiment of virtue with the possession of individual charac-
teristics and by casting those characteristics as antithetical to narratives of 
modern degeneration. It is true that in romantic literature, that antithesis 
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can resonate as recuperative and thus both historical and counterhistorical 
in nature. But the innate characteristics themselves, which in the hard-boiled 
emerge connected to the notion of ideal embodiment, function in that genre 
as emblems of individual capacity for moral choice and action across a variety 
of historical circumstances.
 In the early nineteenth century, cultural models of right and power were 
drawn with surprising clarity as character portraits—as actors in a histo-
riographical narrative. It is worth a moment to trace the evolution of these 
portraits, these paragons able to temper the winds of historical transforma-
tion simply by being who they are, since their enactment of “honor without 
thought of it” constitutes, somewhat paradoxically, the dominant thought of 
the hard-boiled and the aim to which it would reach. Lukács wrote that “if 
the individual is unproblematic, then his aims are given to him with imme-
diate obviousness.” The hard-boiled detective is not an unproblematic indi-
vidual, but the early nineteenth century hands him the aim of individual 
conscience, that “fragile achievement” that has continued for centuries to 
remain an aim in and of itself. Indeed, by the time they appear in the hard-
boiled, the attributes outlined in this chapter function as markers of an abid-
ing subjectivity. The pertinent personae set the stage for respective cultural 
incarnations of Raymond Chandler’s “honor without thought of it” as well as 
for the stakes of individual choice and for reparative hard-boiled returns to 
accountability.
FRENCH RELIGIOUS WRITING
Broadly stated, French emphasis on introspection contrasted with American 
preference for religious dynamism. The contrast between the contemplative 
poet and the vigorous revival preacher pervades religious and romantic por-
traits as well as crime fiction in America and France. The seventeenth century 
had been known as the “time of the beautiful sermons” [temps des beaux 
sermons], but the postrevolutionary period brought renewed attention to the 
voices and personae of religious authority.2 French nineteenth-century reli-
gious writings interweave spiritual connection with sensitivity, artistic sensi-
bility, and intellectual finesse. That affiliation remains whether the preacher is 
Catholic or Protestant, the tone of the sermon wistful or vigorous. For priest 
and philosopher Félicité de Lamennais, for instance, the element of senti-
ment and especially of sadness was paramount: “Man’s life on earth is full of 
 2. Landry, Le temps des beaux sermons.
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pain, misery, and suffering . . . In that state, human wisdom has a choice to 
make: harden oneself against nature and deny the torment, or seek distrac-
tion in the pleasure of it” [La vie de l’homme sur la terre est pleine de dou-
leurs, de misères, de souffrances . . . Or, en cet état, la sagesse humaine n’a vu 
que le choix entre deux partis: ou de se raider contre la nature et de nier le 
supplice, ou d’y chercher une distraction dans la volupté].3 He echoed many 
of his Catholic contemporaries in his 1817 Essay on Indifference in Matters of 
Religion [Essai sur l’indifférence en matière de religion], declaring the feeling 
of divine love more important than the act of penitence. Henri Lacordaire, 
an admirer of Lamennais and another precursor of modern Catholicism, 
counseled as well the importance of love and affirmed the value of verbal 
eloquence as both product of and incitement to passion.4 Just as spiritual 
connection is said to evoke love and sensitivity, the converse is also true. 
According to Athanase Coquerel, Protestant theologian and pastor, “a moral, 
intellectual, perceptive, religious being cannot be happy unless he sees a path 
of knowledge, holiness, and love rising continually before him. To give him 
less, to offer him other riches, would be to wrench him from his very nature: 
created for light, he would be forced to seek his happiness in the dark” [un 
être moral, intellectuel, sensible, religieux, ne peut être heureux sans qu’il 
soit tracé devant lui une ligne sans cesse ascendante de science, de sainteté, 
d’amour. Lui donner moins, l’enrichir autrement, ce serait le jeter avec vio-
lence hors de sa nature; créé pour la lumière, ce serait l’envoyer chercher sa 
félicité dans la nuit].5 The interconnection between moral, intellectual, per-
ceptive, and religious sets forth a character model for the ideal believer in 
nineteenth-century France.
 The above-cited priests are either proponents of liberal Catholicism 
(Lamennais and Lacordaire) or of liberal Protestantism (Coquerel). Sen-
timental theology coexisted with the dire and menacing remonstrations of 
more conservative preachers. Alexandre Soulier, for instance, a Protestant 
predicator from Andouze, adopted the voice of God to proclaim the discourse 
of hellfire: “Go on, false disciples, go accursed into that eternal flame that 
awaits the devil and his angels” [Allez donc, méchans serviteurs, allez donc, 
disciples prétendus, allez maudits, au feu éternel, préparé au diable et à ses 
anges!].6 There was menace to be found in Catholic writings, too, through less 
 3. Lamennais, L’imitation de Jésus-Christ, 197. Translations are mine unless otherwise 
noted.
 4. Lacordaire, Conférences du révérend père Lacordaire, 4:149, and Conférences du révé-
rend père Lacordaire, 4:149, 64.
 5. Coquerel, Sermons, 1:543.
 6. Soulier, Les jugements de Dieu, 103.
 FROM VIRTUE TO HONOR • 29
apocalyptic vocabulary, however.7 Love and lyricism correlated with a liberal 
side of theology, whereas dire menace, with its proliferation of capital letters 
and italics, remained the property of the conservative wing. One of the earli-
est and most powerful lines in that battle of style was drawn by François-René 
de Chateaubriand, who not only celebrated the association of lyricism with 
religion but also aligned both with the heroic character portraits of French 
romanticism.
CHATEAUBRIAND AND FRENCH ROMANTICISM
One of the best-known instruments of French nineteenth-century religious 
revival, Chateaubriand’s Génie du christianisme, underscores the intercon-
nections among beauty, musical rhetoric, romanticism, and mystical inten-
sity. Génie, which Napoleon would call the “work that had done the most 
harm to his power” [l’ouvrage qui avait le plus nui à son pouvoir], also defin-
itively blends spiritual and romantic literature and identifies lyricism as its 
instrument of conversion. Intended as a gentler alternative to heavy-handed 
doctrinal admonition, Génie declared in its preface: “We had to prove .  .  . 
that of all the religions that had ever existed, Christianity is the most poetic, 
the most human, and the most propitious to liberty, to art, and to literature” 
[On devait chercher à prouver . . . que de toutes les religions qui ont jamais 
existé, la religion chrétienne est la plus poétique, la plus humaine, la plus 
favorable à la liberté, aux arts et aux lettres].8 The very titles of its chapters 
reinforce the reliance of spiritual connection on the interdependence of the 
“moral, intellectual, perceptive, and religious”: “Song of Birds,” “The Poetic 
of Christianity Is Divided into Three Branches: Poetry, the Fine Arts, and 
Literature” [Que la poétique du christianisme se divise en trois branches; 
poésie, beaux arts, littérature], “Of Some French and Foreign Poems,” 
“Music,” “Sculpture,” and “Architecture.”9 The words “beauty,” “tenderness,” 
“sweetness,” “song,” “music,” and “poetry” appear again and again in Génie, 
as they do in sermons of the period. Chateaubriand sold his readers on the 
lyrical value of the scriptures, and his defense of the use of Latin in the 
Church is as much aesthetic as historical. Chateaubriand was of course not 
 7. Cf. Freppel, Cours d’eloquence.
 8. Chateaubriand, Génie du christianisme, 1:12.
 9. The emphasis on lyricism responded expressly to Hughes Old’s description of the last 
days of French classical preaching: “The forms themselves were worn and tired. Even worse, 
the homiletical forms were compromised by their association with absolutism.” Old, Reading 
and Preaching of the Scriptures, 6:16.
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the first French author to wed religious feeling with poetry.10 He continues 
Fénelon’s tradition in declaring that a precondition of belief—or a precon-
dition of openness to his argument for belief—is an appreciation of poetry 
and art.
 The gentle and lyrical arguments presented in Génie amounted to a sort 
of modern liberal evangelical methodology. “God does not forbid us to tread 
the flowered paths, if they serve to bring us back to Him” [Dieu ne défend pas 
les routes fleuries quand elles servent à revenir à lui], wrote Chateaubriand, 
creating both a sermon and a metasermon.11 Importantly, Génie also served to 
create an emotional character portrait of the author’s ideal Christian, defin-
ing the sort of personality or character that would respond to his arguments. 
First, he paints people as fond of mysterious phenomena. “Considering man’s 
natural attraction to the mysterious, it is hardly surprising that the religions 
of all nations have had their impenetrable secrets” [Il n’est point étonnant, 
d’après le penchant de l’homme aux mystères, que les religions de tous les 
peuples aient eu leurs secrets impénétrables]. Once he has declared that peo-
ple are constituted to embrace Christianity, he outlines the “perfect harmony 
of feeling and thought, of imagination and understanding” [parfait accord du 
sentiment et de la pensée, de l’imagination et de l’entendement] that makes 
them so. He then zeroes in on the precise characteristics, inclinations, and 
dispositions that form the groundwork for the romantic heroic model. These 
include a taste for the bucolic, for “the voice of the zephyr or the storm, of the 
eagle or the dove, that called man to the temple of the God of nature” [la voix 
du zéphyr ou de la tempête, de l’aigle ou de la colombe, qui appelait l’homme 
au temple du Dieu de la nature]. He also declares that “there is in man an 
instinctive melancholy, which puts him in harmony with scenes of nature. 
Who has not spent hours on end seated on the bank of a river, watching its 
passing waves?” [Il y a dans l’homme un instinct qui le met en rapport avec 
les scènes de la nature. Eh! Qui n’a passé des heures assis sur le rivage d’un 
 10. In his 1713 Treatise on the Existence of God [Traité de l’existence de Dieu], Fénelon had 
famously argued for the existence of God by comparing the world to an epic poem: “Let one 
reason as subtly as he wants; no man in his right mind will be persuaded that the Iliad had 
no other author than accident. Cicero said as much of the Annales of Ennius, and he added 
that chance would never write a single verse, much less an entire poem. Why then should this 
reasonable man believe of the entire universe, which is doubtless much more marvelous than 
the Iliad, what his good sense would not let him believe of this poem?” [Qu’on raisonne et 
qu’on subtilise tant qu’on voudra, jamais on ne persuadera à un homme sensé, que l’Iliade n’ait 
point autre auteur que le hasard. Cicéron en disoit autant des Annales d’Ennius; et il ajoutait 
que le hasard ne feroit jamais un seul vers, bien loin de faire tout un poème. Pourquoi donc 
cet homme sensé croiroit-il de l’univers, sans doute encore plus merveilleux que l’Iliade, ce que 
son bon sens ne lui permettra jamais de croire de ce poème?]. Fénelon, Œuvres complètes, 10.
 11. Chateaubriand, Génie du christianisme, 1:13.
 FROM VIRTUE TO HONOR • 31
fleuve, à voir s’écouler les ondes?]12 I have quoted these declarations about 
human nature at some length because what sermons had set forth as spiri-
tual counsel and method, these phrases describe as inborn human inclina-
tions. In using the vocabulary of instinct, imagination, and understanding 
(entendement), Chateaubriand creates a character who is, to borrow Chan-
dler’s phrase, religious “without thought of it,” someone to whom the aim 
of “harmony with nature” is both obvious and immediate. At the same time, 
crucially, that innateness or “immediate obviousness” accompanies an exis-
tential isolation. The experiences described are solitary. In other words, this 
is not an epic hero at one with vast spiritual expanses, whose “lesser strength 
is guided to victory by the highest power in the world,”13 but rather someone 
existing well outside the realm of sacred frames. The sensitive and melan-
cholic young man who finds beauty in nature and classical music and loves 
literature and melodious sounds emerges as a collage of innate attributes and 
tastes. Combining spiritual virtues with instinctive character traits, he also 
becomes an enduring cultural type.
 Within Génie, of course, Chateaubriand declares that the principal inter-
est of sensitivity and artistic tastes is their connection to God and religion. Yet 
the sensitive, sentimental, and poetic aspects of his ideal reader/believer are 
precisely those of his secular romantic heroes as well. One of Chateaubriand’s 
most important legacies is precisely that subtle move in focus from the spiri-
tual to the sentimental. Rather than being in touch with God—or perhaps as 
the most remarkable and celebrated manifestation of being thus in touch—
the romantic hero is in touch with his emotions. This shift in focus has been 
variously interpreted. Alain and Arlette Michel write of Chateaubriand, “His 
work is among those that have contributed most to passing the Christian tra-
dition on to romanticism. The author does this not with the dilettantism of 
the aesthete or the dreamer, but with the sharp lucidity of an intelligence 
conscious of all its movements, an intelligence often visionary” [Son œuvre 
est l’une de celles qui concourent le plus largement à transmettre la tradition 
chrétienne au romantisme. Il ne le fait point avec le dilettantisme de l’esthète 
ou du rêveur mais avec la lucidité aiguë d’une intelligence consciente de tous 
ses mouvements, intelligence souvent visionnaire qui s’exerce].14 Other critics 
of romanticism deny this view of the spiritual within the sentimental, pro-
posing instead that the very blending of sentimental and spiritual leads to 
a repudiation of the divine.15 The change in emphasis from the religious to 
 12. Ibid., 1:16, 86, 135, 298.
 13. Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 98.
 14. Michel and Michel, La littérature française, 23.
 15. Cf. Lacoste, “Un substitut théologique,” 224.
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the romantic and from matters of virtue to matters of temperament took the 
form of a growing focus on the heart and mind. Génie casts spiritual connec-
tion as supremely desirable, but its author nonetheless contributed (whether 
intentionally or not) to the romantic displacement of religious discourse into 
the domain of the literary and also, importantly, of virtue into the domain of 
individual character attributes.16
 There is perhaps no better example of this displacement than Chateaubri-
and’s own René, a romantic novella embedded within Génie du christianisme. 
Placing this sentimental book within Génie amounts to inserting the senti-
mental into the religious—an insertion that gradually leads the reader from 
spiritual ideals to the portrait of an individual personality. As René opens, it 
is clear that the principal interest of the story lies in the movements of the 
psyche. “[The elders of the tribe] were all only the more ardent in exhorting 
him to open his heart to them. They showed so much discretion, tenderness, 
and authority that he was obliged in the end to satisfy them. He therefore 
spent time with them, not in recounting the adventures of his life, since he 
had had none, but the secret feelings of his soul” [Ils n’en furent que plus 
ardents à le presser de leur ouvrir son cœur; ils y mirent tant de discrétion, 
de douceur et d’autorité, qu’il fut enfin obligé de les satisfaire. Il prit donc 
jour avec eux, pour leur raconter, non les aventures de sa vie, puisqu’il n’en 
avait point éprouvé, mais les sentiments secrets de son âme]. The emotions 
and sensations are valuable in and of themselves rather than as conduits to 
spirituality. Religion functions in the service of melancholic nostalgia rather 
than the other way around. René’s fleeting attraction to the monastic life 
bears out this orientation: “My heart moved by these pious conversations, I 
wandered often toward a monastery, close to my new abode; for a moment I 
was even tempted to hide my life away there” [le cœur ému par ces conver-
sations pieuses, je portais souvent mes pas vers un monastère, voisin de 
mon nouveau séjour; un moment même j’eus la tentation d’y cacher ma vie]. 
Despite this temptation, however, René decides to pursue solitude in other 
ways. “Either by an inconstant nature or a prejudice against the monastic 
life, I changed my intentions; I resolved to travel” [soit inconstance naturelle, 
 16. As Guilhem Labouret notes of the mid-nineteenth century, “An outdated form, 
sermons no longer move crowds. Lacordaire had no successor at Notre-Dame. And yet, 
religious discourse continues to echo in different forms, from Claudel to Maritain. In other 
words, if religious discourse was powerful in the nineteenth century, it had doubtless left 
sermon and homily behind” [Forme passée de mode, le sermon ne touche plus les foules: La-
cordaire n’a pas trouvé son successeur à Notre-Dame. Pourtant, le discours religieux conserve 
un large écho, mais à travers des formes différentes, de Claudel à Maritain .  .  . Autrement 
dit, si le discours religieux fut puissant au XIXe siècle, sans doute est-il sorti des sphères du 
sermon et de l’homélie]. Labouret, “Les mutations du discours religieux,” 39. 
 FROM VIRTUE TO HONOR • 33
soit préjugé contre la vie monastique, je changeai mes desseins; je me réso-
lus à voyager].17 This rejection of monasticism engenders both his voyage to 
America and the present narrative. Indeed, there are numerous instances in 
René where religious meditation is subsumed to a melancholic contemplation 
that becomes the nucleus of the narrative.
 The early nineteenth-century turn from religious writing to romantic lit-
erature combines spiritual virtues with secular character attributes. By the 
time these attributes surface in the twentieth-century hard-boiled, they are 
no longer taken to signify “goodness” per se but rather to characterize the 
protagonist’s way of being—the steadiness of character that marks his ongo-
ing and active subjectivity. To contemplate, walk along a river, lean against a 
tree, peruse a volume of poetry—these actions become markers of his ability 
to observe an insufficient material world and yet still flourish within it. Open 
and evolving, he nonetheless carries into the twentieth century a dependable 
regenerative force of conscience and the courage to maintain his subjectivity 
“without thought of it.”
ROMANTICISM AND THE SECULAR CHARACTER MODEL
Chateaubriand is not the only author whose romantic personages distill spir-
itual virtue into individual characteristics and mood. The writings of Lamar-
tine, Hugo, Vigny, and other nineteenth-century romantics imbue their 
characters with sadness, solitude, contemplation, love, and remorse, echo-
ing the models outlined in sermons and in Chateaubriand’s Génie. Alphonse 
de Lamartine, in “Cours familier de littérature: un entretien par mois,” nar-
rates his encounter with a young poet whom he describes thus: “The young 
Provençal was at ease in his talents as he was in his clothes; nothing both-
ered him, because he sought neither to inflate himself nor to rise above his 
natural position. Perfect propriety, that instinct for precision that gives both 
shepherds and kings a dignity and grace in speech and posture, governed 
his entire person. He had that seemliness that truth confers; he was pleas-
ing, interesting, moving” [Le jeune provençal était à l’aise dans son talent 
comme dans ses habits; rien ne le gênait, parce qu’il ne cherchait ni à s’en-
fler, ni à s’élever plus haut que nature. La parfaite convenance, cet instinct 
de justesse dans toutes les conditions, qui donne aux bergers, comme aux 
rois, la même dignité et la même grâce d’attitude ou d’accent, gouvernait 
toute sa personne. Il avait la bienséance de la vérité; il plaisait, il intéressait, 
 17. Chateaubriand, Œuvres, 1:65, 68, 69.
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il émouvait].18 Although this description of Provençal poet Frédéric Mistral 
reveals a secular profile, it is strikingly similar to Rousseau’s description of 
Jesus, reproduced and paraphrased in countless sermons throughout the 
nineteenth century: “What elevation in his maxims! What profound wisdom 
in his speeches! What presence of mind, what delicacy, and what precision 
in his responses! What mastery over the passions! Where is the man, where 
is the sage, who could thus act, suffer, and die without weakness or ostenta-
tion?” [Quelle élévation dans ses maximes! quelle profonde sagesse dans ses 
discours! quelle présence d’esprit, quelle finesse et quelle justesse dans ses 
réponses! quel empire sur ses passions! Où est l’homme, où est le sage qui 
sait agir, souffrir et mourir sans faiblesse et sans ostentation?].19 What mat-
tered in Lamartine’s formulation (and also in Rousseau’s, for that matter, but 
not for the priests who cited him) was the disposition of the poet, his mood, 
his comportment. Virtue as such distills into temperament, and the story of 
the individual psyche as such begins to dominate the story as an end in and 
of itself. Attributes like the “seemliness that truth confers” are within his 
personality rather than in the outside realm of rules or first principles; they 
are organic elements of his character. Because these attributes are combined 
with virtues and appear in romantic literature during a transition to secular-
ism, they appear imbued with a spiritually representative function. But they 
are nonetheless his own reliable features and as such are not representative 
of anything outside or anterior to him. They are elements of his personality 
and form the foundation of his subjectivity.
AMERICAN RELIGIOUS WRITINGS
Just as French romantic literature turned the conduct and personae outlined 
in religious writings into romantic personality portraits, so too did American 
romantic literature distill the counsel of American sermons. There was no 
American literary equivalent of Génie du christianisme, a seminal text that 
introduced a literary genre even as it expressly promoted religion and pre-
sented a romantic author even as it offered a guiding voice of spiritual author-
ity. Indeed, the absence of an American literary equivalent is a testament to 
the relatively antiliterary nature of American religious revival compared 
with the intensely literary nature of its French counterpart.20 The American 
 18. Lamartine, Cours familier de littérature, 238.
 19. Rousseau, Œuvres mêlées, 3:72.
 20. The Bible is of course the notable exception to this rule. An American minister writes 
of a visit to Paris in 1803, the year that Génie was published: “In Paris, it required a search 
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contemporary and equivalent of Génie—equivalent in the sense that it too 
instructed vast audiences of believers on how to find God and act in rela-
tion to God, and also instructed other clerics how best to spread the word 
of God—is the Second Great Awakening series of revival meetings, which 
embodied a singularly American model of spiritual exemplarity. This revival 
movement, theatrical in nature, generated a strong connection between per-
sonality and spiritual authority—a connection that on the French side was 
nourished primarily through literature.
 The Second Great Awakening (1790–1840s) was promoted mainly 
through camp meetings. As historian John Finger recounts, during the camp 
meetings, “people would gather from miles around to spend anywhere from a 
night to a week or so listening to hell-fire and damnation sermons and joyfully 
experiencing the presence of God. . . . Peter Cartwright, a famous preacher, 
noted with satisfaction that he had seen more than five hundred people at a 
time convulsing in ecstasy.”21 The revival meetings offered spiritual exercises 
designed to encourage conversion as well as vigorous and theatrical preach-
ing. Thomas Abernethy writes, “It was not theological abstractions, nor yet 
the simple gospel of love with which the itinerant Samsons slew their tens 
of thousands. It was with the fires of hell, and the vengeance of God that 
they accomplished it. .  .  . Thundered at with all the stentorian verbosity of 
the primitive evangelist . . . they [attendees at the meeting] listened in awed 
stupefaction until their nerves failed.”22 Where French sermons deployed the 
discourse of truth, beauty, sensitivity, and love, the American counterpart 
both encouraged and performed unpretentiousness, plainspokenness, and 
an appreciation of fear. The theatrical nature of preaching was, it should be 
noted, particular to revival meetings; outside that arena, the vocabulary of 
fire and brimstone was delivered with relative calm.
 Because the camp meetings constituted such a public and theatrical venue, 
message and persona overlapped considerably. Even sermons that were not 
performed before the masses accentuated the importance of personality and 
insisted on powerful, plain-speaking simplicity. Jonathan Pomeroy, in his 1800 
metasermon “On the Folly of Denying a God,” insisted not only that sermons 
should inspire fear but also that threats of suffering be earthly and immediate 
rather than vaguely celestial: “A prospect of immediate suffering, deters more 
from outward acts of sin, than any thing which can be threatened, as coming 
among the booksellers of four days, to find a single Bible. We fear this is also the awful situation 
of the greater part of France, and other countries formerly connected with the see of Rome.” 
New York Missionary Society, Interesting Account, 4.
 21. Finger, Tennessee Frontiers, 174.
 22. Abernethy, Frontier to Plantation, 218.
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after death.”23 Warren Fay, a pastor in Massachusetts, similarly insisted that 
preachers convey force: “Can [ministers] rouse the conscience and affect the 
heart, unless their discourses glow with warmth, strike with force, seize and 
melt the affections, and estamp the seal of divine truth?”24 American sermons 
like these were often metadiscourses about spiritual modeling; that is, they 
instructed listeners how to act as spiritual authorities. But sermons intended 
for audiences of believers, rather than for audiences of other Second Great 
Awakening preachers, also drove home the elements of menace and fear 
with such titles as “The Guilt and Danger of Unbelief,” “Guilt of those who 
strengthen the Wicked,” “Destruction of those who despise the Gospel,” and 
others similar in tone.25
 God in American sermons was a more menacing prospect than in 
France’s liberal Catholicism. And connection with that God aimed at indi-
vidual salvation rather than nuanced emotional connection. It could be 
argued that the American emphasis on individual exhortation had to do with 
the distinctions between Protestantism and Catholicism. Such nineteenth-
century evangelicals as Charles Finney, Lyman Beecher, and Francis Asbury 
focused on sin as a choice and on the notion that humans had the power to 
turn away from sin and embrace moral action. This message shifted away 
from a Calvinist theology based on predestination and toward a belief that 
people were responsible for their own destiny.26 But comparison of French 
to American preachers, Catholics, and Protestants reveals contrasts along 
national rather than religious lines. What most distinguishes the discourse 
of American sermons and public revivals is its righteousness, its use of fear 
as an instrument of persuasion, and, in the realm of persona, its emphasis on 
both charisma and unpretentiousness. Indeed, to praise an American orator 
for plainspokenness was to contrast American practicality with European 
intellectualism, or American frankness with European lyrical ornamenta-
tion. This preference for simplicity was largely political in nature, since the 
refusal to embellish separates the preacher from the upper class and thus 
by extension from English authority. For this reason, and because of con-
temporaneous American frontier literature that also foregrounded individ-
ual choice and audacious action, spiritual exemplarity was united with such 
 23. Pomeroy, Folly of Denying a God, 15.
 24. Fay, A Sermon, 10.
 25. See Lathrop, Sermons on Various Subjects.
 26. Cf. Lyman Beecher’s writings on Unitarianism, including his citation of articles stating 
that “men are free agents, in the possession of such faculties, and placed in such circumstances, 
as to render if practicable for them to do whatever God requires. .  .  . Such ability is here in-
tended as lays a perfect foundation for government by law, and for rewards and punishments 
according to deeds.” Beecher, Sermons Delivered on Various Occasions, 312.
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choice and action—a union that predicts the combination of right and vio-
lence featured in the hard-boiled. But what I want most to underscore in 
the citation of American sermons is precisely the conflation of the sermon-
izing voice with the force of individual subjectivity. The declaration of right 
expresses individual conscience in much the same way as the French roman-
tic heroes, as voices and persona existing in various cultural circumstances. 
The nationally resonant American character model thus connected, as it did 
on the French side, to the fact of being as an individual and subjective act—
even when that being seemed volatile or susceptible to adverse forces. Once 
again, this connection is not intended to indicate that the American charac-
ter model is “really” religious in nature or that ideals embodied must stand 
within a sacred frame. Rather, I am arguing that the historical phenomenon 
of religious revival, aligning with romantic literature to create canonical cul-
tural voices, contributed materially to the enduring valorization of individ-
ual subjectivity, particularly in times of historical transition. The result was 
a cultural personality outline that functioned as an indicator of existential 
sturdiness.27
AMERICAN ROMANTICISM
Just as French romantic literature turned the love, sensitivity, and lyricism of 
the preachers’ counsel into natural attributes, so American romantic litera-
ture casts unpretentiousness, plainspokenness, practicality, and an instinctive 
sense of right as innate American character traits.28 James Fenimore Coo-
per’s Leatherstocking (1823–1841) and John Kennedy’s Horse-shoe Robinson 
(1835) are two examples. The description of Hawkeye in The Last of the Mohi-
cans (1826) codifies woodsy simplicity: “The frame of the white man, judg-
ing by such parts as were not concealed by his clothes, was like that of one 
who had known hardships and exertion from his earliest youth. His person, 
though muscular, was attenuated rather than full; but every nerve and muscle 
appeared strung and indurated by unremitted exposure and toil.” And yet, 
for all this duress, he is open and straightforward: “The eye of the hunter, or 
scout, or whichever he might be, was small, quick, keen, and restless, roving 
while he spoke, on every side of him, as if in quest of game, or distrusting 
the sudden approach of some lurking enemy. Notwithstanding these symp-
toms of habitual suspicion, his countenance was not only without guile, but 
 27. See Cotkin’s Existential America, particularly chapter 2.
 28. See Jason Shaffer’s discussion of the Western romantic hero as a descendant of the 
Revolutionary-era comic character in Performing Patriotism, 9.
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at the moment at which he is introduced, it was charged with an expression 
of sturdy honesty.”29 With a “keen,” “guileless,” and “honest” countenance, 
Hawkeye possesses at once acute sensitivity to his surroundings and a solid 
character within them. Perception of the outside world accompanies stead-
fast existence in its midst, which allows the subject to evolve without the 
“smugness” that Butler had cited. Kennedy’s Horse-shoe in turn is “as brave a 
man as you ever fell in with,” and the narrator notes that “the men have great 
dependence on what he says.”30 Like Cooper’s Leatherstocking, Horse-shoe is 
simple and courageous:
The habits of the experienced soldier were curiously illustrated in the 
thoughtful and sober foresight with which Robinson adapted his plans 
to the exigencies of his condition, and then in the imperturbable light- 
heartedness with which, after his measures of safety were taken, he waited the 
progress of events. His watchfulness seemed to be an instinct, engendered by 
a familiarity with danger, whilst the steady and mirthful tone of his mind 
was an attribute that never gave way to the inroads of care. He was the same 
composed and self-possessed being in a besieged garrison, in the moment of 
a threatened escalade, as amongst his cronies by a winter fire-side.31
“Instinct,” “attribute,” and “composed” indicate a subject who comes on the 
scene fully assembled and complete. “Foresight” and “watchfulness,” simi-
lar to Hawkeye’s “keen” and “roving” eye, indicate at once both sensitivity to 
and openness to one’s surroundings, which echoes a subjectivity elastic but 
secure. It also echoes Chateaubriand’s formulation of an “instinct” that admits 
openness to nature, as well as Lamartine’s description of Mistral as having 
“that seemliness that truth confers.” These literary formulations address the 
relationship of subjectivity to constitution, and in turn to endurance within 
adverse circumstances both individual and historical. As in the French 
example, character attributes can appear imbued with a spiritually repre-
sentative function: Horse-shoe’s influence over others resembles that of the 
preacher, but his character traits are nonetheless his own natural posses-
sions and as such retain a strong cultural significance. Whereas the French 
romantic hero carried tomes of poetry and rested dreaming against a tree, 
the frontier hero—the American romantic—carried a gun, strode through 
the forest, and remained sparing with his words. And these personae, fruits 
of cultural and historical specificity, have produced durable character models 
 29. Cooper, Leatherstocking Tales, 1:501. 
 30. Kennedy, Horse-Shoe Robinson, 112, 273.
 31. Ibid., 127.
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and indeed “culture heroes.” It has been a long time since an American fron-
tiersman crashed through the woods or a Frenchman wandered forest paths, 
yet these are canonical models, points of reference, modern foundations for 
each nation’s vision not just of spiritual authority but of conscience “without 
thought of it.” The reason for that durability, it seems, is precisely the coin-
cidence between spiritual authority and individual character—a coincidence 
borne of the congruence of romanticism and religious writings and of the 
attendant elevated value of individual subjectivity.
 As in the French example, the coincidence between character attributes 
and spiritual virtues emerges through the common vocabulary that Ameri-
can romantic literature shares with American sermons. Cooper, for instance, 
described an army “saved from annihilation by the coolness and spirit of 
a Virginian boy [George Washington], whose riper fame has since diffused 
itself, with the steady influence of moral truth, to the uttermost confines of 
Christendom.” The boy’s “spirit” and “moral truth” contrast with the menace 
of his enemies, as the passage continues: “A wide frontier had been laid naked 
by this unexpected disaster, and more substantial evils were preceded by a 
thousand fanciful and imaginary dangers. The alarmed colonists believed that 
the yells of the savages mingled with every fitful gust of wind that issued from 
the interminable forests of the west.”32 The stormy vocabulary of this battle is 
strikingly reminiscent of numerous sermons against the “lurking enemies” of 
sin. For instance, as Lyman Beecher famously intoned against intemperance 
in the same year as Cooper’s novel: “It is here, then, beside this commenc-
ing vortex, that I would take my stand, to warn off the heedless navigator 
from destruction. . . . Loud thunders should utter their voices—and lurid fires 
should blaze.”33 Eli Meeker also compares sin to a dangerous spark of fire: “In 
a moment, massy walls of wood and stone, the pride of war, and the labour 
of years, yield to the dreadful explosion, and scattered in ten thousand frag-
ments, spread terror and destruction around.”34 In romantic literature, the 
spiritual adversary gives way to the human one, but the dominant character 
elements of vehemence and temper, cornerstones of American Western and 
frontier literature as of the hard-boiled, remain in place. The frontier hero 
can be read as what Alexander Saxton calls a “natural Jacksonian,” or “a ver-
nacular character of lower-class status to whom is attributed class conscious-
ness in the form of egalitarian values.”35 But he is at the same time, in style 
and temperament, a counterpart of Pomeroy’s direct, declarative preaching.
 32. Cooper, Leatherstocking Tales, 1:481–82.
 33. Beecher, Six Sermons, 29.
 34. Meeker, Sermons, 77.
 35. Saxton, Rise and Fall of the White Republic, 186.
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 On the American as on the French side, the intersections of religious 
writings with romantic literature turn spiritual virtues into secular character 
attributes. As in Cooper’s earlier-cited description of George Washington, for 
instance, the phenomenon of “spirit” functions in American romantic and 
religious writings much as “sensitivity” does in the French. Lyman Beecher 
declaims: “The Spirit of God revives the tender feelings of childhood and 
brings into the fold his wandering lambs.”36 This phrase situates “spirit” as 
God-given and thus external to the human subject. On the romantic side, 
American literature of the early to mid-nineteenth century subordinates the 
element of the divine to natural courage. Cooper’s above-cited “coolness and 
spirit of a Virginian boy,” referring to George Washington’s role in salvag-
ing the “unexpected disaster” of a French and Indian victory, is one such 
instance.37 Bird’s Nick of the Woods has one man deride another’s hesitancy: 
“The man has some spirit now and then; but whar’s [sic] the use of it, while 
he’s nothing but a no-fight quaker?”38 Washington Irving, Nathaniel Haw-
thorne, and John Kennedy (author of Horse-Shoe Robinson) also use the word 
extensively to denote both divine energy and force of character, even bellicos-
ity. Rather than being the force of righteousness, “spirit” in these instances 
can mean vigorous independence or a simple desire to fight; and it is these 
qualities just as much as an explicit God-consciousness that have come to 
identify the American culture hero. Recall that for the French, in a similar 
turn, Coquerel wrote that a being “created for light” “cannot be happy unless 
he sees a path of knowledge, holiness, and love continually rising before him.” 
But secular romantic characters, who are the early nineteenth century’s more 
enduring personae, cast the search for knowledge and love as innate impulses 
and narrative themes.
FROM SERMONS TO ROMANTICISM TO 
THE HARD-BOILED CHARACTER MODEL
What romantic literature transmitted was not a teleological blueprint for spir-
itual salvation or even connection but rather the contours of human experi-
ence, the outlines and adventures of a personality. Romantic characters do 
 36. Beecher, Sermons Delivered on Various Occasions, 136.
 37. Cooper, Leatherstocking Tales, 1:481. The emphasis on toil emerges also as a metaphoric 
thread in American sermons: “The apostle Paul was a bold, intrepid, and zealous preacher of 
the gospel. How extensive are the blessed effects of his unwearied labours.” Meeker, Sermons, 
67.
 38. Bird, Nick of the Woods, 52.
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not themselves have an ideological or religious agenda. Their authors may 
have such an agenda, or their narrators may, but representation is not the 
character’s own intention. Indeed, the absence of such intention, whether 
from nonchalance, nihilism, self-absorption, or (mainly in the case of Ameri-
can fiction) the pressing demands of survival, is often a crucial aspect of his 
character. And yet, when these accidental heroes emerge in their twentieth-
century hard-boiled incarnations, their function as characters is precisely to 
represent ideals that have gone missing—because they have gone missing—
from society and its institutions. Once again, this representation is neither 
idealist nor utopian in nature. It is the return of instinctual conscience rather 
than idealism that enables the hard-boiled to counter historical master narra-
tives of modernity in decline.
 In most traditional crime fiction, returning to moral and legal order is 
the point of the plot. Although the novel in general, as Peter Brooks has 
remarked, presented a narrative order that replaced the absent master plot, 
crime fiction rendered its absence as an atmospheric and judicial starting 
point.39 It is therefore not surprising that the crime fiction genre was born at 
a time of political change and religious uncertainty on both continents. Cer-
tainly, there were other circumstances that drove the development of crime 
fiction. Roger Caillois, for instance, noting the importance of urban develop-
ment to the genre, observed the echoes of Cooper’s Leatherstocking Tales in 
crime fiction’s representations of the city. Describing the “transformation of 
the adventure novel into the detective novel,” he writes, “it is a fact that the 
City’s metamorphosis stemmed from the transposition of the savannahs and 
forests of Fenimore Cooper into the urban setting. In his novels, every broken 
branch signifies a particular anxiety or hope, and every tree trunk conceals an 
enemy’s rifle or the bow of an unseen, silent avenger” [Il faut tenir pour acquis 
que cette métamorphose de la Cité tient à la transposition dans son décor de 
la savane et de la forêt de Fenimore Cooper, où toute branche cassée signifie 
une inquiétude ou un espoir, où tout tronc dissimule le fusil d’un ennemi 
ou l’arc d’un invisible et silencieux vengeur].40 The character traits that are 
our focus gained value within that anxious atmosphere, and it is not sur-
prising that the appearance of the detective in literature coincided with that 
of the romantic individual as spiritual authority and individual. The hard-
 39. Brooks, Reading for the Plot, 6.
 40. Caillois, Edge of Surrealism, 178; Le mythe et l’homme, 157. Eugène Sue, author of Les 
mystères de Paris (1842), declared his intention to “mettre sous les yeux du lecteur quelques 
épisodes de la vie d’autres barbares aussi en dehors de la civilisation que les sauvages peuplades 
si bien peintes par Cooper” (1). Sue’s Mystères inspired Léo Malet’s Les nouveaux mystères de 
Paris. See also Stierle and Starobinsky, La capitale des signes.
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boiled conflation of psychology and embodiment is rooted in the two roles, 
the simultaneous frameworks for reading individual character in the early 
nineteenth century. The rest of this book examines the return of the character 
models through the twentieth- and twenty-first-century hard-boiled; to start, 
here are a few examples of their incarnations.
 Cynthia Hamilton has noted that the Western genre and the American 
hard-boiled share an emphasis on individualism, though she points out that 
where the Western “pays homage to the need for progress,” the hard-boiled 
“man of conscience” lives in essential isolation.41 Some of the most funda-
mentally canonical American characteristics are unpretentiousness, bravery, 
and an instinctive and anti-intellectual certitude. The Last of the Mohicans’s 
Hawkeye announced, “I am no scholar and I care not who knows it.”42 The 
preface to the first edition of Nick of the Woods states: “It is not to be denied 
that men of education and refinement were to be found among the earlier 
settlers of Kentucky; but the most prominent and distinguished founders, 
the commanders of the Stations, the leaders of the military forces,—those 
who are, and must continue to be, recollected as the true fathers of the State, 
were such persons as we have described, ignorant but ardent, unpolished and 
unpretending, yet brave, sagacious, and energetic,—the very men, in fact, for 
the time and the occasion.”43 The first American hard-boiled hero, Race Wil-
liams, echoed this sentiment when he proclaimed: “Right and wrong are not 
written on the statutes for me, nor do I find my code of morals in the essays 
of long-winded professors. My ethics are my own.”44 Exemplary character is 
connected in American religious and romantic writings as well as in the hard-
boiled to anti-intellectualism; the most valuable truth is the truth one knows 
rather than the truth that must be learned.
 Modesty also emerges as an ideal American characteristic that passes 
from sermons to romanticism to crime fiction. Cooper’s Hawkeye declared, 
“I am not a prejudiced man, nor one who vaunts himself on his natural privi-
leges,” as though in anticipation of Chandler’s “honor without thought of it, 
and certainly without saying it.”45 Horse-shoe Robinson shares this humil-
ity: “He was a man of truth—every expression of his face showed it. He was 
modest besides, and attached no value to his exploits.”46 Hard-boiled detec-
tives evince this same unassuming manner. Sam Spade in The Maltese Falcon 
 41. Hamilton, Detective Fiction in America, 16, 29.
 42. Cooper, Leatherstocking Tales, 1:502.
 43. Bird, Nick of the Woods, 28. Owen Wister’s Virginian also announced, “I have got no 
education and must write humble against my birth.” Wister, The Virginian, 371.
 44. Daly, Snarl of the Beast, 1.
 45. Cooper, Leatherstocking Tales, 1:502; Chandler, “Simple Art of Murder,” 59.
 46. Kennedy, Horse-Shoe Robinson, 297.
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declares to Cairo, “You’re not hiring me to do any murders or burglaries for 
you, but simply to get [the falcon] back if possible in an honest and lawful 
way.”47 Philip Marlowe announces to General Sternwood, “I’d like to offer you 
your money back. It may mean nothing to you. It might mean something to 
me.  .  .  . It means I have refused payment for an unsatisfactory job.”48 Both 
these statements echo the sense of the detective as moral commodity and as 
participant in a redemptive economy. In Farewell, My Lovely, Marlowe notes, 
“I’m getting a hundred dollars for doing nothing. If anybody gets conked, 
it ought to be me.” Positive action becomes more crucial than good inten-
tion, and to “be” is to be of service to others. In addition to a modest vision 
of one’s worth, clarity and plainspokenness are also at a premium. When in 
Farewell, My Lovely, Mrs. Grayle tells Marlowe that “there’s such a thing as 
being just a little too frank,” he responds, “Not in my business.”49 In The Mal-
tese Falcon, Gutman admires Spade, noting: “It never occurred to me that 
you’d hit on such a simple and direct way of getting at the truth.”50 In word 
and in the act of detection, the main character functions as an instrument 
and example of intuitive understanding.
 In French crime fiction, by contrast, even maverick detectives tend to 
come—as romantic heroes do—from a humanist tradition of philosophical 
contemplation and aesthetic consciousness. This is even the case for Eugène 
Vidocq, the criminal turned first chief of police, then founder of the first 
detective agency, then inspiration for Balzac’s Vautrin (among other char-
acters), and author (albeit via a ghostwriter) of the Mémoires. The editor of 
the 1869 edition of the Mémoires casts them as a realistic alternative to “sen-
timental mush”—which they are—but the book nonetheless puts forth the 
recognizable outlines of romantic character.51 The narrator compares himself 
to the biblical Prodigal Son,52 and his description of Christiern, a fellow pris-
oner, is a virtual echo of the romantics earlier cited: “His intelligence seemed 
to divine our very thoughts: he was sad, thoughtful, and kind; in his features 
there was a mixture of nobility, candor, and melancholy that was at once 
seductive and moving. . . . Although a smile was often on his lips, Christiern 
appeared beset by the deepest sorrow; but he kept his chagrin to himself, and 
no one even knew why he was in prison” [Son intelligence semblait deviner 
 47. Hammett, Maltese Falcon, 53.
 48. Chandler, Big Sleep et al., 180.
 49. Ibid., 245, 306.
 50. Hammett, Maltese Falcon, 204.
 51. His 1869 editor describes the Mémoires as containing “un réalisme palpitant qui s’offrait 
tout à coup à une société blasées sur les mièvreries sentimentales.” Vidocq, Mémoires, 6.
 52. “L’aumônier .  .  . me cita la parabole de l’enfant prodigue: c’était à peu près mon his-
toire.” Ibid., 13.
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la pensée; il était triste, méditatif, bienveillant; dans ses traits, il y avait un 
mélange de noblesse, de candeur et de mélancolie, qui séduisait et touchait 
en même temps. . . . Quoique le sourire fût souvent sur ses lèvres, Christiern 
paraissait en proie à un profond chagrin, mais il le renfermait en lui, et per-
sonne ne savait même pour quelle cause il était détenu].53
 When Émile Gaboriau (who himself was inspired by Vidocq in creat-
ing Lecoq, as was Maurice Leblanc in creating Arsène Lupin) introduced 
the troubled, ambivalent juge d’instruction in L’affaire Lerouge, he focused 
similarly on the character’s melancholic nature: “Kind despite his coldness; 
his countenance sweet and a little sad. This sadness had remained with him 
since his grave illness two years before, which had nearly been the end of 
him” [Sympathique malgré sa froideur, d’une physionomie douce et un 
peu triste. Cette tristesse lui était restée d’une grande maladie qui deux ans 
auparavant avait failli l’emporter].54 Douceur and tristesse are reminiscent of 
Chateaubriand’s René, while mention of the “grave illness” recalls Chateau-
briand’s account in Mémoires d’outre-tombe of the malady born of a “disor-
dered life.”55 Come the twentieth century, Georges Simenon’s iconic Maigret 
is himself given to meditation and nocturnal ramblings: “He walked along 
the embankment, stopping from time to time. He looked at the sea, at the 
multicolored silhouettes that abounded in the waves on the bank” [Il mar-
chait le long du remblai, en s’arrêtant de temps en temps. Il regardait la mer, 
les silhouettes multicolores qui devenaient de plus en plus nombreuses dans 
les vagues du bord].56 Fred Vargas’s commissaire Jean-Baptiste Adamsberg 
embodies the solitary and contemplative wanderer: “Adamsberg turned off 
the road to get to the narrow path that had a crop of sprouting maize on one 
side, and on the other flax. . . . He stopped walking and sat for a long while 
with his back propped against a tree trunk as he sounded out his thoughts” 
[Il quitta la route et rejoignit le chemin étroit qui passait entre un champ 
de jeunes maïs et un champ de lin.  .  .  . Il s’arrêta, s’assit un long moment 
contre un arbre, explorant la solidité de ses pensées].57 In this description, 
rumination on the criminal investigation is not unlike Chateaubriand’s con-
templation of the church bells in his town: “On Sundays and holidays I often 
heard, through the trees in the great woods, the sound of distant bells calling 
men in the fields to prayer. Leaning against the trunk of an elm, I listened 
in silence to the pious murmuring” [Les dimanches et les jours de fête, j’ai 
 53. Ibid., 130.
 54. Gaboriau, L’affaire Lerouge, 10.
 55. Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’outre-tombe, 257.
 56. Simenon, Œuvres romanesques, 3:14.
 57. Vargas, Seeking Whom He May Devour, 269–70, and L’homme à l’envers, 298.
 FROM VIRTUE TO HONOR • 45
souvent entendu, dans le grand bois, à travers les arbres, les sons de la clo-
che lointaine qui appelait au temple l’homme des champs. Appuyé contre 
le tronc d’un ormeau, j’écoutais en silence le pieux murmure].58 The image 
of a man leaning against a tree and gazing into the distance as if listening 
to a “pious murmuring” became the iconic illustration of Chateaubriand by 
Anne-Louis Girodet de Roussy-Trioson—an image not of a spiritual icon but 
of romantic melancholy. Vargas’s Adamsberg offers a virtual tableau vivant of 
that painting, though again the detective’s intention is neither to pose nor to 
represent. Rather, his instinctive contemplation, like Marlowe’s modesty, is in 
the service of understanding. Similarly, in Sous les vents de Neptune, the com-
missaire is described as “walking away slowly, a thin, dark, stooping figure, 
steering a slightly irregular course through the night” [s’éloigner d’un pas 
lent, mince silhouette noire et courbée, tanguant légèrement dans la nuit],59 
an image that recalls Alfred de Vigny’s association of the night with a sub-
lime and divine solitude.60 These characteristic actions and positions taken, 
marking exemplarity in their respective national traditions, return through-
out the history of the hard-boiled.
THE FRAGILITY OF CONSCIENCE
I said earlier that the concept of moral choice necessarily contains an element 
of conscious effort, and that what Chandler calls “honor without thought of 
it” constitutes more precisely an acceptance of that sustained effort. In the 
nineteenth century, religious writing takes a romantic turn and develops a 
personality figure as the embodiment of internal spiritual (or even doctri-
nal) virtues. But as the century progresses, the assumed spiritual/doctrinal 
context fades, leaving the persona standing largely on its own, attractive or 
compelling in and for itself. As the twentieth century begins, this persona is 
taken up by writers who claim no religious or doctrinal foundation but find 
instead a natural paradigm for stories about individuals confronting the mean 
streets. That natural paradigm becomes valuable not because it promises to 
restore anachronistic sacred frames but because it constitutes the capacity of 
individual conscience and subjectivity to create an alternative narrative. How-
 58. Chateaubriand, Œuvres, 1:67.
 59. Vargas, Wash This Blood Clean from My Hand, 20, and Sous les vents de Neptune, 29.
 60. “The sentiment of solitude, of silence, of a waking dream in the night is poetry itself 
for me, and the revelation of man’s angelic future existence” [Le sentiment de la solitude, du 
silence, du rêve éveillé dans la nuit est la poésie même pour moi et la révélation de l’existence 
angélique future de l’homme]. Vigny, Les destinées, 190.
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ever, precisely because the hard-boiled embodies and perpetuates the idea of 
instinctual exemplarity, it risks the possibility of that instinct faltering. As an 
evolving genre, the hard-boiled places the individual in a position of narra-
tive, moral, and judicial authority and then, over the course of the twentieth 
century, proceeds to threaten the notion of the individual qua individual as 
an incarnation of anything, any institution or abstraction, any sense of truth 
and right. The unraveling of the force of individual conscience proves much 
more demoralizing than the now-familiar notion of lost sacred frames. Curi-
ously enough, nineteenth-century religious and romantic writings themselves 
predict the vulnerability of conscience as well as the necessity—and possibil-
ity—of its continual reconstitution.
 French and American nineteenth-century writings insinuate eventual 
faults in the very character models they put forth, suggesting that surmount-
ing such faults will demand “thought of it” on the part of the character. These 
potential faults are as culturally specific as the character models themselves. 
From the standpoint of the nineteenth century, they are associated with the 
faltering of virtue, but in the hard-boiled, they mark the faltering of con-
science—a conscience that the principal character, like the hard-boiled genre 
itself, then moves to reassert. According to French religious writings, the 
potential underside of artistic contemplation and sensitivity is an amoral aes-
theticism, an excessive reclusiveness. Chateaubriand specifically decried the 
person who wanted to write a beautiful work of literature without regard to 
God, pointing to “that moral tint without which nothing is perfect” [cette 
teinte morale sans laquelle rien n’est parfait] and thus warning against the 
peril of a pretty but empty envelope. As I noted earlier, he also insisted that 
“God does not forbid us to tread the flowered paths, if they serve to bring us 
back to Him,” subtly warning that the aesthetic pleasures of “flowered paths” 
can lead one astray. Indeed, the question of aesthetics detached from religion 
or morality permeated the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It permeates 
the hard-boiled in the late twentieth century, when—as the chapter on Jean-
Patrick Manchette will demonstrate—we meet fiction describing violence as 
spectacle, using the aesthetic as either coy excuse or ironic instrument of per-
versity. Another troubling seed in the French romantic model, one that comes 
into full bloom in the late hard-boiled, is the dangerously alienated nature 
of the solitary young man. This nature is rooted in the romantic model, and 
although it can indicate an admirable restraint and contemplativeness, it can 
also become a dangerous twentieth-century néo-polar outsider. Examples of 
such a morphosis are Manchette and his disgruntled anticapitalists, Michel 
Steiner and his self-absorbed psychoanalyst, Daniel Pennac and his sadistic 
Monoprix clerks.
 FROM VIRTUE TO HONOR • 47
 American writings, on the other hand, find risk not in overvaluation of 
the aesthetic but in perversion of the spiritual message via messianic egos. 
One Baptist leader in 1802, concerned that attendees at the revival meetings 
could fall victim to demagogic manipulators of popular opinion, writes: “A 
number of hot-headed young men, intoxicated with the prevailing element of 
excitement, and feeling confident of their own powers and call to the work—
though entirely destitute of any suitable education—assumed the office of 
public exhorters and instructors. When once this door was opened it was 
found difficult to close it.”61
 Another potential American pitfall is overvaluing anti-intellectualism 
and instinctive certitude. The same is true in the grandiosity of the indi-
vidual—that is, the interest of the individual in himself as a character in 
the drama of conversion and spiritual awakening. A letter from one Sec-
ond Great Awakening convert to the preacher who converted him, cited 
in McClymond’s Embodying the Spirit, reads: “I fear they [revivals] are fast 
becoming with you a sort of trade, to be worked at so many hours every day 
and then laid aside. Dear brother do you not find yourself running into for-
mality, a round of formality in the management of revivals?”62 McClymond 
goes on to cite Jimmy Swaggart’s offer of a free satellite dish to any church 
that would broadcast him instead of listening to a live local preacher. The 
contradiction of the egomaniac claiming exemplary humility (or the self-
aggrandizing person claiming to “embody the spirit”) has become a com-
mercial (and religious) commonplace, but it is a contradiction nonetheless 
and one that—as the chapter on Jim Thompson will illustrate—the American 
hard-boiled develops to theatrical and catastrophic effect. In American crime 
fiction, it is not the blithe aesthete, the cold intellectual, or the philosophical 
recluse who poses a threat, but rather the egocentric power driver, the hot-
headed actor and orator in whom natural vigor transforms into a volatile and 
perilous blast of emotion.
 In the aforementioned instances, nineteenth-century writings warn 
against precisely those personality failings and excesses that would come 
to fruition in the late hard-boiled. In the nineteenth century, such excesses 
are cast as threats to virtue, whereas in the hard-boiled they are the lurk-
ing enemies of conscience. Indeed, at times they pose as evidence that con-
science is an unsustainable anachronism. The abandonment or demolition of 
accountability is crucial to the bleak atmosphere of the late twentieth-century 
hard-boiled. And yet, crucially, abandonment of accountability is as much a 
 61. Murray, Revival and Revivalism, 177.
 62. McClymond, Embodying the Spirit, 17.
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deliberate narrative choice as is its maintenance, and the hard-boiled novel 
makes that choice on every page.
DALY AND MALET
The history of the hard-boiled is that of the assertion of individual moral 
agency as well as of the vulnerability of that agency—a balancing act between 
the “fragile achievement” of conscience and obstacles to it. Although those 
obstacles are in the air from the start, the hard-boiled in both the United 
States and France starts out by celebrating individual moral choice as remark-
ably reliable and instinctual. In the very first hard-boiled novels from those 
two countries, the nineteenth-century coincidence of romantic character and 
spiritual exemplarity, as well as the nineteenth-century background of cul-
tural upheaval, are transposed into and suited for the twentieth century. In 
American literature, the postwar 1920s are characterized by the emblem of 
the returning soldier, the specter of shell shock, and the rise of free-market 
capitalism. These factors place a premium on psychic fortitude, self-reliance, 
physical courage, and instinctual morality. In France, the first hard-boiled 
was published during the Nazi occupation, and the salient attributes of the 
principal character were sensitivity to French literary and cultural history and 
an empathic response to suffering. Also fundamental was a clear sense of the 
ethical limitations of hard-boiled nonchalance and aesthetic distraction. In 
each case, the canonical character traits rooted in a nineteenth-century atmo-
sphere of postrevolutionary nation-building arise in periods of similar crises 
of national identity. The first hard-boiled novels demand much in the way of 
empathy, fairness, historical sensibility, and self-awareness from their subject. 
And in each case, that subject delivers those character attributes and exempli-
fies the reliability of individual morality.
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THE FIRST AMERICAN hard-boiled novel was Carroll John Daly’s The Snarl 
of the Beast (1927), the first French hard-boiled Léo Malet’s 120, rue de la 
Gare (1943). In each of these works the principal characters reincarnate the 
heroic characteristics of their early nineteenth-century romantic predeces-
sors, and they do so in response to the particular modern needs and cir-
cumstances of their culture. Crises of national and cultural self-definition 
in a burgeoning capitalist postwar period (United States) and in a period 
of wartime occupation (France) enable or invite the reemergence of the 
nineteenth-century model of exemplary character. Carroll John Daly’s Race 
Williams reembodies the characteristics of self-reliance, plainspokenness, 
anti-intellectualism, and an instinctive sense of right. Léo Malet’s Nestor 
Burma represents a literary sensibility, an aesthetic discernment, and an epi-
grammatic nonchalance. In each case the familiar qualities at hand, markers 
of an active conscience, are tailored to the era of publication. The American 
1920s saw the return of the soldier and the phenomenon of shell shock, as 
well as a laissez-faire economy and the rise of organized crime. France in 
1943 was under Nazi occupation, which raised the stakes of national identity, 
cultural patrimony, and ethical sensitivity. Just as the hard-boiled detective 
rushes in to do what he can against the crime at hand, doing society’s dirty 
work and sometimes being sullied in the process, so the hard-boiled as a 
genre acts as mediator and protector from present cultural circumstances.
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 In each case, the principal character represents a model of moral indi-
vidualism, claiming accountability for his actions and remaining conscious 
of himself as an autonomous actor and narrator. This consciousness may 
seem to contradict Chandler’s idea of honor “without of thought of it.” Even 
the most modest of honorable characters inevitably thought about the right-
ness of their actions. And if they were narrators they almost inevitably said 
it or hinted at it; “The Simple Art of Murder” is an essay, not a work of fic-
tion. But by the time the individuals Chandler described came to the page 
in the 1920s, it was entirely common for characters to be conscious of their 
impact, of their properties and parameters as characters. That conscious-
ness is innate; detached from the nineteenth-century discourse of religion 
and virtue, it takes the form of an automatic impulse to be a subject, to act 
autonomously, and what is more to recognize others as subjects as well. In 
the case of Race Williams, he is responsible for standing apart from corrupt-
ing currents, whether these are social, such as the venality of capitalism and 
crime, or personal, such as anger and pessimism. In the case of Nestor Burma, 
his responsibility is to stand apart from ongoing assaults on French soil and 
French culture and to carry France’s humanist heritage aloft through them. In 
both these protagonists, that awareness of accountability, sometimes thought 
and said as such and sometimes not, blends with nineteenth-century char-
acter outlines to constitute a model of secular moral authority. This chapter 
examines that combination, reading each of these characters as a model for 
the character-based nature of modern morality. It locates in these respective 
“first” novels a startlingly clear blueprint for conscious subjectivity as a vital 
response to modern cultural crises.
THE SNARL OF THE BEAST
In the traditional nineteenth-century detective story à la Sherlock Holmes or 
Gaboriau, an individual commits a crime, upsetting the moral and judicial 
order of a normally intact world. That upset also carried a spiritual resonance: 
Jeffrey Mahan writes that “the classical detective story reflects a disruption 
of God’s orderly creation.”1 When the police or an associate then apprehends 
the criminal, order is restored and the problematic individual removed. In 
the hard-boiled, on the other hand, rather than an ordered world and a dis-
ordered individual, we see the opposite: a disordered, corrupt world and an 
ordered (narrative-driving, narrative-structuring, principle-maintaining) 
 1. Mahan, “Hard-Boiled Detective,” 90.
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individual. This is the case in both the American and French hard-boiled, 
though what passed for order and disorder varied between the two. Social 
distortion that in the traditional detective story was embodied in and elimi-
nated with the criminal is now projected and represented outward, and it is 
the detective who remains ordered, intact, and articulate.
 By the time The Snarl of the Beast was published as a novel in 1927, Car-
roll John Daly had already written stories for Black Mask, many featuring 
detective Race Williams.2 As early as 1923, Daly’s editor had embraced the 
idea of Race Williams as a serial character and as a model for other writers. 
In 1927 the serial Snarl of the Beast was published as a novel. Daly has been 
criticized for the crudeness of his writing; as William Nolan remarks, “Daly 
produced what may be termed ‘instant clichés,’” and indeed The Snarl of the 
Beast is as much a hard-boiled statement of intent as it is a hard-boiled story 
in itself.3 This very crudeness, however, coming in the form of declarations to 
the reader, lends a directness and transparency to his philosophy. It also fur-
nishes a model for the hard-boiled combination of conscious accountability 
and maverick nonchalance and allows the reader to measure his words against 
his actions. Although “my ethics are my own” is in some sense a blustering 
throwaway line, it nonetheless marks a clear turn away from rules and first 
principles. As such, it raises questions about the intersection of accountabil-
ity and autonomy and about the possible moral authority of one who admits 
no authorities. The phrase proposes an individualist dismissal of norms, and 
yet to speak of ethics, associated as the word is with morality and right and 
wrong, implies an appeal to or at least a nodding familiarity with the tran-
scendent. Every definition of the word ethics includes some component of 
morality, principle, and governance. Even the most individualistic sense of 
ethics includes an element of guidance, a subdivision of the individual into 
governor and governed, id and superego. Race Williams does not say, “I do 
what I want” or even “I do what I think is right” but rather uses a term evoca-
tive of those very ancient Greek philosophers and long-winded professors 
whose writings he dismisses. His claim to ethics is neither parodic nor per-
verse—Williams is erratic and bombastic but does nothing to demonstrate 
 2. Daly’s short-story “Three Gun Terry,” published in 1923, introduced the first hard-
boiled detective, Terry Mack, who beat Race Williams to the pages of Black Mask by two weeks. 
As William Nolan remarks, “Terry Mack is the prototype for ten thousand private eyes who 
have gunned, slugged, and wisecracked their way through ten thousand magazines, books, 
films, and TV episodes. . . . The pioneer private-eye tale is remarkable in that almost every cli-
ché that was to plague the genre from the 1920s into the 1980s is evident in ‘Three Gun Terry.’” 
Nolan, Black Mask Boys, 43.
 3. Nolan, Black Mask Boys, 43.
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that he is unethical—but it does introduce an uneasy fusion of the autono-
mous and the absolute, of moral values and natural character attributes.
 Stephen Faison notes, “The private detective is not ethical to the extent 
that ethics are defined as a set of established rules and standards of con-
duct. . . . The detective obeys his own personal code.” But as Race Williams’s 
conduct bears out, there is little practical difference between ethics as “a set 
of established rules and standards of conduct” and ethics as one’s “own per-
sonal code.” Although one definition situates the source of the imperative 
outside the individual, in the abstract or in the firmament, and another situ-
ates that source within the individual, yet both share an absoluteness of deci-
sion. The latter may be less grandiose than the former, less couched in the 
vocabulary of transcendence, but the subsequent actions and their conse-
quences may not be different at all. Still, it is almost impossible to talk about 
the hard-boiled without reproducing this same collapsing distinction, the 
same sense that ideas transposed into subjective facts gain in grandeur. Fai-
son continues, “The hard-boiled detective believes in justice and fairness but 
not as abstract concepts. He practices these virtues in particular situations 
with specific individuals who demonstrate that they deserve these consider-
ations. In a world in which ethics are impossible, self-determined personal 
integrity is all that remains.”4 “Self-determined” implies containment within 
the individual, but to “believe in” implies an external existence, and what are 
“these virtues,” or indeed any virtues, if not “abstract concepts”? And yet to 
talk about the hard-boiled, and indeed to talk about individual morality at 
all, is inevitably to bump up against these contradictions. What makes the 
character intelligible and vital is a consistency of conduct—an instinctive 
awareness of and responsibility for treating others well.
THE HOMAIS PROBLEM
To return to Chandler’s “honor without thought of it,” even if the “it” in 
question is not called honor per se, it nonetheless signifies some standard 
of decision. But to examine more closely the potential contradictions in 
Race Williams’s statement and furthermore the potential collapses of mean-
ing therein, I want to turn to a rather unlikely rhetorical counterpart to this 
hard-boiled detective. There is a moment in Flaubert’s 1857 Madame Bovary 
when the Yonville innkeeper Madame Lefrançois admonishes the pharmacist 
Homais: “You are an infidel! You have no religion” [Vous êtes un impie! vous 
 4. Faison, Existentialism, 88, 89.
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n’avez pas de religion]. To this, Homais protests: “I have a religion, my reli-
gion, and I even have more than any of them, with their mummeries and their 
juggling!” [J’ai une religion, ma religion, et même j’en ai plus qu’eux tous, avec 
leurs mômeries et leurs jongleries!]5 Whereas Race Williams’s ethics are his 
own, Homais’s religion is his own. And just as Race Williams’s statement lines 
up with the moral disillusionment of his time, so the pharmacist’s claim lines 
up with the religious transition in progress in 1857, namely, the disconnection 
of religion-as-social-institution from religion-as-personal-experience. From 
Madame Lefrançois’s accusation to Homais’s response, however, the meaning 
of religion undergoes a subtle but problematic change. For the innkeeper, to 
“have religion” means to be a good Catholic and to respect the institution of 
religion with its social rules and norms. On the other hand, to “have a reli-
gion, my religion” means to have one’s own doctrine and one’s own sense of 
spirituality. Again, this is not a particularly scandalous idea, for it represents 
the sort of personal theism that many theologians had already deemed crucial 
to the maintenance of faith in the midst of secularization. But when Homais 
says, “I even have more than any of them,” the meaning of his “religion” starts 
to waver, for to have “more than any of them” implies once again a public and 
socially recognized commodity. If what Homais has “more of ” is his own doc-
trine or code, it makes sense that he would have “more” of it than anyone else. 
But in that case, the fact that he even makes the claim becomes questionable, 
for it goes without saying that he would have “more” than others of something 
that is by definition his alone. On the other hand, if what he has “more of ” 
is a faith that others would share or recognize, then his individualistic bran-
dishing of “my religion” loses meaning, and the sincerity and personal value 
of that religion decline.6
 Race Williams’s declaration about ethics combines the personal and the 
universal in a manner similar to Homais’s. But rather than ending up with 
a parodic and meaningless middle ground, as Homais does, Williams—and 
here we see The Snarl of the Beast as a hard-boiled statement of intent con-
scious of autonomy and accountability for action—manages both. On the 
one hand, this is because Race Williams is the novel’s sole voice of judicial, 
moral, philosophical, and narrative authority, and thus the insouciant auton-
omy of the individualist necessarily claims a more universal moral value. 
Furthermore, the hero who rejects intellectual arguments and eschews “long-
winded” humanism to find his own ethical path is a classic American type. In 
the context of historic dismissals of scholarship as articulated by preachers, 
 5. Flaubert, Madame Bovary, 116.
 6. Lee, A World Abandoned By God, 70–72.
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romantics, and vernacular writers, “my ethics are my own” is more promising 
than dangerous. But this historical background and Race Williams’s narrative 
dominance alone would not suffice to hold his statement above water: what 
matters is that his “own” ethics bear a surprising resemblance to establish-
mentarian ethics and thus set up a comforting vision of individualism. Much 
as nineteenth-century romantic sentimentality echoed the spiritual exemplar-
ity outlined in religious writings, so Race Williams’s echo of received defini-
tions of ethics prepares the reader of the hard-boiled to trust this notion of 
an ethics “of my own.”
 The principal factor that prevents Race Williams from becoming a sort of 
Homais with a handgun is not the theoretical or historical foundation of his 
claim, or even its appurtenance to American character traditions, but simply 
his conduct. He treats other people well and thinks about the effect of his 
actions on others. Although Race claims no interest in other people’s notions 
of morality, and he systematically detaches the word “ethics” from all the 
ideas and markers commonly associated with it, he nonetheless acts in a way 
that corresponds to received definitions of the word. The coincidence of word, 
action, and consequence—the fact that the violent, relentlessly autonomous, 
statute-ignoring maverick reaches the same desirable crime-solving result and 
manages the same empathy as teams of policemen and principled armchair 
detectives did in the nineteenth century—makes the hard-boiled detective a 
viable and desirable embodiment of otherwise lifeless ideals.
TRAUMATIC MEMORY, OR THE ENEMY FROM THE PAST
It is a sign of the times as well as of American individualism that the idea 
of ethics originating with “someone else” is so disagreeable to Williams. To 
write one’s own script and make one’s own rules is a conscious response to 
the corruption of the 1920s. At the same time, Williams’s embodiment of early 
nineteenth-century American personality characteristics combined with his 
ethical conduct constitute him as a cultural type, even commodity, much 
needed in modern America: the subject conscious of his own accountability. 
Throughout the novel, we see references to the historical and cultural value 
of Williams’s conscience.
 William’s trustworthiness as character and as ethicist results in part from 
the traditional dominance of the American anti-intellectual maverick, but it 
also comes from the personal background and cultural resonances of his self-
control. On the cultural front, Race Williams’s particular brand of fortitude 
and reliability corresponds to the figure of the soldier or, more precisely, the 
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former soldier. The novel encourages that association, according considerable 
importance at once to empathy and psychic resilience in the face of danger 
and violence. Uri Eisenzweig has described detective fiction as being con-
nected to a crisis of realism, as the dramatic enactment of the very difficulty 
of narrating. “In any case, the idea of a genre whose entire thematic raison 
d’être centers on the impossibility of telling the truth corresponds historically 
to growing frustrations within Western accounts of the real” [En tout état 
de cause, c’est incontestablement au moment des difficultés grandissantes de 
la narration occidentale du réel qu’émerge et se constitue, historiquement, 
l’idée d’un genre dont toute la raison d’être thématique tourne précisément 
autour de l’impossibilité de raconter la vérité].7 The historic circumstances 
surrounding the hard-boiled connect this comment, this impossibility of tell-
ing the truth, to the phenomenon of post–World War I crises of narration, 
and more precisely to the difficulty of narrating violence. Race Williams’s 
principal stock-in-trade is how easily he encounters, assimilates, and nar-
rates violence. Indeed, it is perhaps for this reason that Joseph Shaw, veteran 
of World War I and editor of Black Mask from 1926 to 1936, was so fond of 
the Race Williams character and encouraged the production of more Race 
Williams stories as well as the publication of this novel. Williams’s particular 
brand of fortitude is perfect for a postwar audience conscious of the psychic 
perils of war as well as of the outlines of modern psychological discourse. 
This is not to say that the readers of Black Mask were simultaneously reading 
the works of Freud, but rather to suggest that some awareness of war’s psy-
chic aftermath, as well as of the phenomenon of the unconscious, was part of 
the cultural imaginary in the mid-1920s. Different historical periods valued 
different precise manifestations of individual conscience. Early nineteenth-
century writings featured honesty and spirit on the frontier, while the early 
twentieth century, having formed an idea of the intact psyche, valued the 
conscious subject who would not come undone in the face of violence. The 
core notion of a subject who exerts himself to ethical action and whose “frag-
ile achievement” improves the lives of others, however, has not changed.
 On the personal front, Race Williams recounts a grim childhood, one that 
underscores the absence of any ethical foundation as such. Toward the end 
of the novel, when Milly—a friend of Williams’s client—kisses Race Williams 
in gratitude, he writes, “Was it the warm kiss of a woman who loves, or the 
cold kiss of a woman who plays? Neither—more like the soft lips of a young 
child—memory must serve me there—for such a feeling knocks off the years 
and brings a picture of dirty, unkempt children—a hard, cruel face—and the 
 7. Eisenszweig, Le récit impossible, 29.
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bleak walls of the orphanage where I learned to coldly calculate the frail-
ties of man.”8 This childhood experience, mentioned in passing, solidifies the 
impression of Race Williams’s unforced character attributes. My contention 
is that he can be read as courageous and heroic because of his capacity to 
transcend experiences that were known at the time of the novel’s writing to 
produce either shell shock (encounters with violence) or persistent fear (a 
loveless childhood). One salient characteristic of such experiences, which 
today are called traumatic, is their ahistoricity, their ability to transcend or 
compress time, reaching across time into the present and even into the future, 
across generations.9 Psychiatrists and psychoanalysts have noted that trauma 
does not (at the instant of its occurrence) enter the conscious or unconscious 
mind in the same way as other experiences do. Cathy Caruth connects this 
resistance to the Freudian phenomenon of “Nachtraeglichkeit,” or belated-
ness: “Traumatic experience suggests a certain paradox: that the most direct 
seeing of a violent event may occur as an absolute inability to know it; that 
immediacy, paradoxically, may take the form of belatedness.”10 Experience 
that was not assimilated and incorporated may end up resisting historiciza-
tion, thus bleeding into the present.
 To a surprising extent, The Snarl of the Beast articulates Williams’s expe-
rience in the terms of contemporary understanding of trauma and of 1920s 
accounts of war-related neurosis. These representations raise problems of 
accountability that Race Williams addresses head-on, with a directness that 
makes him a model of conscience for the posttraumatic era. Hard-boiled 
toughness has become a well-worn cliché, as has the idea of the hard-boiled 
character as morally ambiguous or autonomous. What is significant about The 
Snarl of the Beast, particularly in its role as “first hard-boiled novel,” is that 
it represents such toughness as coterminous with a successful assimilation of 
loss and violence. Such assimilation then becomes the foundational condition 
for autonomy and its exemplarity—not just because toughness is an enviable 
characteristic but also because obstacles to it are at the forefront both of the 
novel and of contemporary discourse.
 8. Daly, Snarl of the Beast, 156. Subsequent references to this work will be given paren-
thetically in the text.
 9. Laub and Auerhahn. “Forms of Traumatic Memory.” 
 10. Caruth, Unclaimed Experience. Laplanche et al. define this belatedness: “The subject 
revises past events at a later date, and that revision invests them not only with a new meaning 
but also with psychical effectiveness. .  .  . It is not lived experience in general that undergoes 
a deferred revision but, specifically, whatever it has been impossible in the first instance to 
incorporate fully into a meaningful context. The traumatic event is the epitome of such unas-
similated experience.” Laplanche, Pontalis, and Nicholson-Smith, Language of Psychoanalysis, 
111–12.
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 What The Snarl of the Beast represents as psychic intactness is a twentieth-
century, Freudian-era version of nineteenth-century American frontier cour-
age. As John Kennedy had said of Horse-shoe Robinson, “His watchfulness 
seemed to be an instinct, engendered by a familiarity with danger, whilst the 
steady and mirthful tone of his mind was an attribute that never gave way to 
the inroads of care. He was the same composed and self-possessed being in 
a besieged garrison, in the moment of a threatened escalade, as amongst his 
cronies by a winter fire-side.”11 And as Mabel announces to Pathfinder, “Your 
truth, honour, simplicity, justice, and courage are scarcely equaled by any on 
earth.”12 In Daly’s twentieth century, the courageous person who can stand up 
to “a threatened escalade” (or what Caillois called “an unseen, silent avenger”) 
is the one who embodies mental strength in the service of national protec-
tion and in smaller-scale kindnesses to others. The Snarl of the Beast opens: 
“It’s the point of view in life that counts. For an ordinary man to get a bullet 
through his hat as he walked home at night would be something to talk about 
for years. Now, with me; just the price of a new hat—nothing more. . .  . My 
position is not exactly a healthy one. The police don’t like me. The crooks 
don’t like me. I’m just a halfway house between the law and crime; sort of 
working both ends against the middle” (1). In this formulation, the first image 
we encounter, the bullet in the hat, is remarkable for not being remarkable—
the event that will not dominate this narrative. What separates this narra-
tor from the “ordinary man” becomes his neutral and nonchalant vision of a 
traumatic event, his ability to transcend or detach himself from it. The entire 
first chase scene can be read as a dramatic enactment of that detachment. In 
that scene Race Williams is pursued by the Beast, the novel’s snarling and 
literally inarticulate predator. Besides the symbolic fact of sneaking up from 
behind, the Beast explicitly represents a disturbing past, for he is the abusive 
stepfather of Williams’s client Daniel Davidson; as such, he constitutes the 
past and present threat to both client and detective, and the impetus for the 
case. As Davidson describes him to Williams, “The man that [my mother] left 
my father for was little short of a beast. He dominated her life and mine” (29). 
And further on: “A beast who beat me as a child until I lay a helpless heap 
upon the floor. I see him yet—his flaming eyes, great hairy hands” (31). Daniel 
Davidson, who lacks the narrator’s capacity to surmount past incidents and 
in a sense incarnates compromised subjectivity, is immersed in the memory 
of the man: “I see him now—Raphael Dezzeia—my stepfather—the snarl-
ing lips—the great teeth—those hands—those hands . . .” (31). Race Williams 
 11. Kennedy, Horse-Shoe Robinson, 52.
 12. Cooper, Leatherstocking Tales, 2:279.
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himself describes the Beast in similar terms, as a “reeking mass of rottenness. 
No way to describe it” (6). And yet, Williams is not undone by this sight-
ing as his client is. Several pages later, the Beast has murdered a policeman 
and menaced Williams; Williams has escaped and goes on to meet his client: 
“When a thing is done it’s done. So I dismissed the incident from my mind” 
(16). He later explains his rapid detachment from the haunting vision of the 
Beast with the statement, “He wasn’t related to me, you see, and I had little 
to fear” (32).
 One of the real advantages of Daly’s “crude writing” is the heavy-handed 
obviousness of his allegories and symbols, and the “Beast” comes to represent 
a persistent childhood fear in which Davidson is ensnared but from which 
Williams is free. Thus it becomes important to learn that Race Williams 
once had as much to fear as Davidson—that the detective’s own childhood 
unfolded within “the bleak walls of the orphanage where I learned to coldly 
calculate the frailties of man.” Williams does not mention this background 
until much later in the novel, nor does he dwell on it, but it underscores the 
organic and automatic nature of Williams’s fortitude.
 The sense of being able to escape a problematic past is also aligned with 
the use of narrative time in Daly’s novel. Snarl, which starts in the present 
tense for its action and its philosophizing, moves suddenly to the past tense 
as Williams gains the upper hand over the Beast: “I don’t have to turn to know 
that my shadow has quickened his pace and now takes two steps to my one; 
fast, short strides of a heavy body that swings from side to side. Things were 
getting interesting. I slipped off my thick gloves and wound my fingers about 
the heavy forty-four in my coat pocket” (3). This shift to the past tense is 
almost imperceptible, but it is placed so as to remove the narrator from dan-
ger both physical and mental. Not only has Williams survived long enough 
to make it beyond the past tense, he has gained a mental remove: a distance 
that allows both synthetic distancing (“things”) and intellectual observation 
(“were getting interesting”). This remove contrasts furthermore with the dis-
tress of his client Daniel Davidson, the terrified drug addict whose dominant 
punctuation is the dash and whose submersion in fear makes him barely able 
to finish a sentence. He starts accounts in the past tense and finishes them 
in the present, demonstrating the ahistorical persistence of his recollections. 
Lewis Moore calls the Beast “a possible allusion to the orangutan in Poe’s 
‘Murders,’”13 and indeed his “snarl” underscores the primal and preverbal 
nature of the threat he poses. As the Beast represents the menacing past—
gunshots and a traumatic childhood contained in one monstrous presence—
 13. Moore, Cracking the Hard-Boiled Detective, 9.
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the narrator’s escape from him and his movement to the past tense represent a 
post-posttraumatic moment, a literal and symbolic creation of liberating his-
torical distance. Furthermore, of course, the actual action that Williams nar-
rates is that of pulling out the gun. As Sean McCann notes, for Daly, “gunfire 
and rhetorical power are virtually identical forces,”14 and in this scene, the one 
allows deployment of the other. Victory over the Beast is explicitly framed 
both as a victory of mental fortitude over an amorphous adversary from the 
past and as a victory of present consciousness over the transhistorical reach 
of violence.
SHELL SHOCK
The intimation that detachment from a traumatic childhood is a condition for 
hard-boiled toughness is initially surprising in this “crudely written” novel, 
though it lines up with psychoanalytic discourse published at the time. But on 
a more national-cultural scale, the insistence on transcending the past reso-
nates with the postwar nature of the hard-boiled. As Lee Horsley describes:
The noir thriller began to develop as a popular form in the aftermath of one 
devastating war and came to maturity in the two decades that terminate in 
a second world war. In its most characteristic narratives, some traumatic 
event irretrievably alters the conditions of life and creates for its characters 
an absolute experiential divide between their dependence on stable, pre-
dictable patterns and the recognition that life is, in truth, morally chaotic, 
subject to randomness and total dislocation.15 
Race Williams the character is neither a soldier nor a former soldier, unlike 
Dashiell Hammett’s Nick Charles and Charles Todd’s Rutledge, who both 
fought in World War I, and Mickey Spillane’s Mike Hammer, who would 
come to the page after the end of World War II.16 Still, the hard-boiled does 
tend to cast the contemporary urban scene as a sort of battlefield and to use 
a military vocabulary. The Snarl of the Beast uses this lexicon, as do the nov-
els of Hammett and particularly Chandler. But what interests me here is the 
 14. McCann, Gumshoe America, 58.
 15. Lee Horsley, http://www.crimeculture.com/Contents/Hard-Boiled.html (accessed Feb-
ruary 17, 2016).
 16. The phenomenon also appears in British crime fiction. Charles Rzepka describes Dor-
othy Sayer’s Lord Peter Wimsey as a “shell shocked” veteran officer “feeling guilty for having 
sent so many of the men enlisted under him to their deaths during the war.” Rzepka, Detective 
Fiction, 164.
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way in which Williams remains empathic and stable in the midst of violence 
as well as the ways in which surmounting violence functions in the public 
service.
 As Jon Adams describes in Male Armor, “War provides a pivotal arena 
for actualizing masculinity.” He labels “soldierly masculinity” the particular 
brand of traditional male function associated with heroism—courage, sup-
pressed emotion, strength, and clearheaded decisiveness. Men who exhibit 
these behaviors are soldier-heroes.”17 The First World War wedded “soldierly” 
to “courage” with renewed force, but for the first time the “suppressed emo-
tion” had a sense of emotional peril not previously present in public dis-
course. By the end of World War I, the American army had had to face more 
than eighty thousand cases of shell shock. The phenomenon of shell shock 
was examined in 1915 by the British psychiatrist Charles Myers, who had ini-
tially described it not as a psychological but rather sensory disorder result-
ing from exploding shells. At the same time, he wrote, “The close relation of 
these cases to those of ‘hysteria’ seems fairly certain.”18 Snarl’s description of 
Daniel Davidson, his drug addiction (he is described in the novel as a “snow-
bird”), and his jumpiness are almost verbatim repetitions of what medical 
literature of the postwar period had to say about traumatic neuroses: “I got a 
look at his face. White, drawn, sunken cheeks, colorless lips—and far distant, 
somber, searching, roving eyes. .  .  . Haunted eyes followed me. .  .  . But our 
snowbird was talking; gulping it, coughing it and squeaking it out” (26). As J. 
Rogues de Fursac wrote in 1918, shell shock was marked by “panting, irregu-
lar and shallow breathing; stammering, scanning, or explosive speech” and 
“motor reactions [that] are slow, uncertain, feeble.”19 Davidson shows these 
same symptoms: “His breath came in uncertain gasps” (24); “uncertain feet—
feet that stumbled” (45); “his feeble step and his jerking body told their story” 
(45). Davidson’s symptoms are attributed to the “ravages of dope,” but they 
become most obvious when he describes his stepfather: “I see him now—
Raphael Dezzeia—my stepfather. . . . He clung suddenly to me like a fright-
ened child, but his bony fingers still pointed and his weird, wild, searching 
eyes glared past me at the door” (31). So it was with de Fursac’s patient: “A 
shot fired in the distance, the sight of an airplane, a simple conversation 
about the war, suffice to let loose manifestations of anxiety. Thus another 
patient of mine, upon hearing several cannon shots, though fired at a great 
distance, was seized with such trembling that he had to be put to bed.”20 
 17. Adams, Male Armor, 9.
 18. Myers, “A Contribution to the Study of Shell Shock,” 320.
 19. De Fursac, “Traumatic and Emotional Psychoses,” 37, 34.
 20. Ibid., 37.
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Myers describes a patient “still very jumpy and alarmed, even at the sound of 
a footstep,” citing the “recurrence of such terror that a special nurse was con-
sidered necessary that night.”21 Race Williams, on the other hand, unruffled 
by the threat from his past, “had tramped through the woods like a regiment 
of soldiers—cavalry, more like. I guess I made nearly as much noise as an 
army bringing up the heavy artillery” (207).
 At the time of the hard-boiled genesis, war neurosis, which would later 
come to be called battle fatigue and then posttraumatic stress disorder,22 was 
initially associated with “generally excessively emotional” subjects.23 Race 
Williams seems to subscribe to this idea (echoed in Myers’s comparison of 
shell shock to hysteria), describing Davidson’s trembling as antithetical to 
masculinity: “There’s only one cure and that’s manhood; a will power which 
is so seldom built into the racked brain of the weakling who becomes a sleigh 
rider” (42). The experience of shell shock was either seen with suspicion—
thought to be a sort of malingering—or associated with a weak emotional 
constitution. As Anthony Babington writes, “It had once been believed that 
shell shock patients could be divided into two classes: firstly, those who had a 
pre-existing form of mental deficiency, and secondly, those who were exhib-
iting a type of hysterical manifestation.”24 At the same time, numerous schol-
ars and doctors argued that the nature and duration of modern war posed 
more challenges than had earlier wars. William Hocking argued in 1918 that 
“the strains of war on nerve and courage are not less but more severe than 
in previous wars.  .  .  . The prevalence of shell shock means not that human 
quality has declined, but that it can deliberately expose itself to more inhu-
man and longer suffering than men have ever before in large numbers been 
called on to endure.”25 In recent decades, the soldier model and the fact of 
military experience become closely intertwined—in public and psychiatric 
discourse—with the threat of posttraumatic stress. As Cathy Caruth noted 
in her seminal study of trauma and narrative, “The experience of the soldier 
faced with sudden and massive death around him, for example, who suffers 
this sight in a numbed state, only to relive it later on in repeated nightmares, 
is a central and recurring image of trauma in our century.”26
 21. Myers, “Contributions to the Study of Shell Shock,” 608.
 22. Not all combat sequelae are PTSD.
 23. De Fursac, “Traumatic and Emotional Psychoses,” 30.
 24. Babington, Shell Shock, 70.
 25. Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, 7. Babington also notes that “it was a rarity for 
soldiers in past generations to suffer from the types of war neuroses which might be classi-
fied today as ‘battle fatigue’ or ‘battle exhaustion,’ owing to the much shorter duration of the 
encounters between opposing armies.” Babington, Shell Shock, 10.
 26. Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, 11. But even in the 1920s, public consciousness of shell 
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THE ENEMY TO THE REAR
To return to Williams’s position in the first action scene, between the Beast 
and his decoy: this position, facing one enemy while turning one’s back on 
another, further connects Race Williams to the soldier who stands between 
the battlefield and the civilian world. As James Daughton describes it, a sense 
of being menaced from all sides, of being unsupported at home and in the 
command center, was often characteristic of the soldier’s sense while at war: 
“The ineptitude of military officials and the callous indifference of the civilian 
population drove soldiers to imagine ‘an enemy to the rear.’”27 The impression 
of adversaries to the front and indifference to the rear represent the soldier’s 
vulnerable and indeterminate place between home and war. This impres-
sion also describes the shell shocked soldier in the aftermath of war, between 
an inescapable past and a worrisome future: it is not a coincidence that the 
Beast, Raphael Dezzeia, with his un-American name, represents a foreign 
menace as well as a traumatic memory. At the time of Snarl’s publication, the 
specter of the war continued to loom both psychologically and financially. 
In his State of the Union address in 1926, Calvin Coolidge remarked that in 
the midst of a flourishing economy, “The one weak place in the whole line 
is our still stupendous war debt. In any modern campaign the dollars are 
the shock troops. With a depleted treasury in the rear, no army can main-
tain itself in the field. A country loaded with debt is a country devoid of the 
first line of defense. Economy is the handmaid of preparedness.”28 In this for-
mulation, war debt becomes itself an “enemy to the rear.” Furthermore, his 
Italian-sounding name and the association of the Beast with criminal “gangs” 
associate him with organized crime. In 1926 Al Capone and his associates 
killed the prosecutor who was pursuing him for the 1924 murder of another 
gangster. The Beast becomes a menacing floating signifier, his snarl the myr-
iad intrusions upon the American national psyche, law, and economy. Yet 
Race Williams, standing between a cold orphanage and a threatening urban 
landscape, is remarkably at ease with enemies to the front and rear. His posi-
tion between decoy and beast in his first street scene corresponds to his own 
self-proclaimed position “working both ends against the middle.” And rather 
shock increased over the decade. According to Eric Dean, “In the United States, the num-
ber of veterans receiving hospital care for neuropsychiatric disorders stood at 7,499 in 1921 
and increased over the subsequent ten years to 11,342 in 1931. . . . In 1944, almost half of the 
67,000 beds in VA hospitals were occupied by the psychoneurotics of World War I.” Dean, 
Shook Over Hell, 39.
 27. Daughton, “Sketches of the Poilu’s World,” 61.
 28. Calvin Coolidge, “State of the Union,” December 7, 1926. In Kalb, State of the Union, 
158.
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than sensing abandonment by social structures, he finds a welcome inde-
pendence: his physical and economic self-reliance make him a microcosm 
of instinctive preparedness on a personal and a national level. While Race 
announces on the first page that his position is “not exactly a healthy one,” he 
nonetheless seems much healthier (and in the end, more alive) than most of 
those around him. Daniel Davidson has died of a heart attack and the Beast 
has been killed.
THE EMPATHIC OUTSIDER
The idea of trauma as an experience that resists conscious incorporation into 
an individual’s personal narrative is an extreme psychological phenomenon, 
but even when he does not experience shell shock, the soldier is situated 
outside society even as he is emblematic of it. Studies of the psychology 
of the soldier published during and just after World War I underscore this 
separation. As William Hocking writes, “The mind of the soldier is marked 
off from the mind of the same man in civil life. Soldiering is a life hav-
ing its own special strains, and its own standards.  .  .  . The army is a world 
of peculiar structure: the conditions of success and the meaning of success 
are not the same as elsewhere; consequently it is not always the same men 
who come to the top.”29 Studies of the military discuss this separateness 
extensively.30 And yet, of course, although it is understood that war has its 
own rules and laws, the soldier is also expected to incarnate and defend 
the national principles that make civilian existence possible.31 The hard-
boiled reincorporates or reintegrates that paradoxical position, as it takes 
battlefield effectiveness and improvisation and transplants them—has them 
thrive within and become beneficial to—a civilian landscape. The soldier’s 
strength, formed in the midst of a quintessentially patriotic but at the same 
time often almost incomprehensible experience, connects national virtues 
with outsider status—with a sense of independence or alienation from the 
social mainstream. This independence-as-national-paradigm corresponds 
both to the model of soldierly masculinity and to the hard-boiled character. 
Hard-boiled subjectivity is thus linked, paradoxically enough, with a class 
of national protectors.
 29. Hocking, Morale and Its Enemies, 97.
 30. See Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State; Keegan, History of Warfare; Weber 
and Eliasson, Handbook of Military Administration.
 31. See Weber and Eliasson, Handbook of Military Administration; Snyder, Citizen-Soldiers.
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 Race Williams, surmounting enemies from front and rear, moving 
beyond an orphan’s upbringing and surviving the onslaughts of snarling pan- 
European monsters, embodies classic American notions of masculine cour-
age, at the same time joining outsider status to posttraumatic mental forti-
tude. As such, he situates “soldierly masculinity” in the modern era and in a 
civilian environment, which makes him not just a successful soldier on urban 
streets but, more crucially, a successful former soldier and thus a proven one: 
a person who can survive the onslaught of violence and maintain control of 
the narrative. To be sanguine and matter-of-fact in the face of violence is of 
course both a classic American masculine trait and also a soldierly character-
istic. Various scholars have located this quality in the hard-boiled hero as well 
as in the American Western. John Cawelti writes, “This narrative pattern—a 
protagonist placed in a situation where some form of violence or criminal-
ity becomes a moral necessity—is one of the basic archetypes of American 
literature.”32 But ease in violence and the successful assimilation of a trau-
matic past are not enough to make a character the trusted conservator of ide-
als as “subjective facts.” The Snarl of the Beast showcases with equal insistence 
the importance of ongoing empathy and accountability.
 In time of war, the enemy is the adversarial nation. But in its aftermath, 
the internalization of traumatic experience becomes in turn another enemy, 
one that perpetuates the first. Race Williams, as he repeats ad infinitum, is in 
his element in violence, yet he demonstrates a discerning use of force, draw-
ing the line between people who are part of the criminal world and peo-
ple who are not. Such discernment is fundamental because it establishes a 
sense of awareness, of conscious responsibility for his actions and their con-
sequences. “That the end justifies the means was made for me all right—but 
no end would justify the taking of an innocent life” (136). Toward the end of 
the novel, he repeats that he shoots “to protect my life or the life of another. 
But I don’t go out to kill” (151). When a “derelict of the night”—actually the 
Beast’s decoy—approaches him to ask for money, “The temptation to lift my 
gun and smack him one was strong but I didn’t. It wasn’t a big heart or a sen-
sitive conscience that made me hesitate. Just common sense and the hope of 
a long life” (3). Here again, an evocation of the future (“hope of a long life”) 
and of a capacity for reason (“just common sense”) contrasts with the trau-
matic sense of being stuck in the past, dominated by volatile emotion. When 
he then goes to meet with Davidson, he is kind to him and understands his 
demons. “I’m not one for sympathy, but I stretched out a hand and tight-
 32. Cawelti, “Myths of Violence,” 529.
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ened it on his wrist.  .  .  . This thing was real enough to him” (29). Later, he 
contemplates Davidson as a therapist might: “Danny might have been lying, 
but unconsciously. He believed every word he told me” (62). Williams values 
authentic expressions of feeling: “Here was real emotion” (35); “there was sin-
cerity in them all right” (38).
 In a historical era that saw the recognition of shell shock as a medical 
phenomenon and the rise of psychoanalysis as a discipline this narrator who 
could claim instinctual fortitude and maintain kindness to others makes of 
himself an ideal American hero.33 The capacity for empathy keeps him from 
being “hardened,” from being desensitized or indifferent to violence. David-
son embodies an almost parodic rendition of posttraumatic defenselessness, 
whereas Williams incarnates strong emotional constitution. Since the dis-
course around shell shock initially described it as a problem for the weak 
rather than as a broad situational hazard, Williams’s coping mechanisms read 
as natural and unforced—a strength “built in,” as he puts it. This instinc-
tive empathy recalls the combination of virtue and character attributes that 
nineteenth-century writings had established. Virtue as such is absent from 
the present calculation, but it is important to note that nothing is lost through 
this absence. A strong empathic presence is necessary to constitute this nov-
el’s exemplary protagonist, but it is also sufficient.
 The empathic presence and emotional generosity that he shows is also 
shared by Milly, the “girl of the night” who works hard to rescue Davidson. 
Milly also seems touched by something similar to shell shock as Williams 
describes her “uncertain, animal doubt and watchfulness of danger” (36). But 
she concentrates on supporting Daniel “as one who is used to meet with and 
tackle the abuses of life—but nothing haunted in her eyes” (35). When Daniel 
dies, Milly receives his inheritance and sails for Europe. Race Williams con-
templates joining her, both of them compensated by the narrative for their 
kindness and courage (49). Indeed, insofar as Race Williams’s treatment of 
Milly is emblematic of the hard-boiled treatment of women, this novel set 
a standard that began almost immediately to decline. He distrusts Milly ini-
tially, but his kindness to her (as well as to the woman who breaks into his 
home) shows a basic inclination to give others the benefit of the doubt. Lewis 
Moore cites Williams’s “chivalric relationship to women” and notes that few 
hard-boiled writers “have the Victorian image of women that Race Williams 
demonstrates in The Snarl of the Beast.”34 He alternates between crusty and 
 33. Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), The Ego and the Id (1923), and Inhibitions, 
Symptoms and Anxiety (1926).
 34. Moore, Cracking the Hard-Boiled Detective, 81.
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sentimental in his musings on women, but he does them no harm and denies 
them no dignity or autonomy.
 The nineteenth-century outsider was an example to others not because 
he had eluded the shroud of violence and uncertainty that covered the pres-
ent day, but because he had not eluded it; he had simply learned, or grasped 
through instinct and a tough constitution, how to exist within it. So it is with 
Williams and his inauspicious childhood, his solitary position on the mean 
streets of New York. As Butler puts it, “he is his travels,” which means that he 
lives and functions fully within the historical present rather than as an anach-
ronistic ideal. In the case of the hard-boiled character, competence in con-
temporary culture demanded acceptance of that culture, whatever its form. 
The combination of a troubled past and an emotionally intact present became 
a heroic paradigm in the post–World War I period, which coupled national 
intactness and national identity with the successful assimilation of violence 
and traumatic experience.
 If I have talked at some length about the circumstances of Race Williams’s 
strengths, and about the background of shell shock as a neuropsychiatric phe-
nomenon, it is because the solidity of the character as character is also at 
a premium. The concept of “war neurosis” associates soldierly masculinity 
with the risk of pathology, thus introducing dubious undercurrents into the 
courageous persona of the soldier. It sows a seed of doubt and dissolution 
that will germinate in the post–hard-boiled and ultimately threaten to sub-
vert both accountability and character as such. Gregory Currie talks in terms 
of “character (a person in a story) and Character (inner source of action, 
related to personality and temperament).”35 The hard-boiled character opens 
and closes the novel with a certain stasis—indeed, “hard-boiled” implies a 
character capable of sustained exertions of conscience. What Gilbert Har-
man describes as “relatively long-term stable dispositions to act in distinctive 
ways”36 remains intact, at the level of the individual protagonist and at the 
metalevel of the hard-boiled character as phenomenon. Hard-boiled charac-
ter, in other words, is disposed over the long term to admit the outside world 
without disintegrating in response to it. Williams narrates that stability as if it 
were a matter of innate ease, but his constant talking underscores the element 
of conscious effort.
 35. Currie, “Narrative and the Psychology of Character,” 60.
 36. Harman, Explaining Value, 166.
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WHAT COULD GO WRONG?
The Snarl of the Beast is not the best written of the American hard-boiled nov-
els, nor is it now the best known. Yet during the 1920s and 1930s, every hard-
boiled writer built upon or cribbed from the Race Williams model, and Daly 
is the undisputed originator of the hard-boiled character. In this first instance 
of the hard-boiled novel, the nineteenth-century frontier maverick becomes 
a modern urban soldier able to assimilate a miserable background and stop 
past perils from spoiling the present. Charles Rzepka, among others, points 
out the self-reliance implicit in the hard-boiled character:
Despite America’s postwar economic gains, new insecurities were under-
mining public confidence in the promise of the American Dream. Writers 
for pulp magazines like Black Mask responded by portraying an America in 
which no one could be trusted, least of all wealthy society types. . . . Lacking 
the respect for “tradition” and “history” that helped motivate his Golden Age 
English counterpart to defend an idealized prewar way of life, the American 
tough-guy detective knew he could count on only one thing: himself.37 
The Snarl of the Beast’s representations of escape from traumatic history 
underscore the notion that the detective who counts on “himself ” has gained 
a victory. He remains ostentatiously dismissive of tradition, education (“long-
winded professors,” “I’m not quoting from books”), and authority (“empty as 
a congressman’s head,” “I always like to play the game outside the law”), but 
he nonetheless generates ethical and empathic decisions through his indi-
vidualism. Sean McCann’s Gumshoe America attributes that victorious indi-
vidualism to an anticollectivist mentality. Outlining the linkage between the 
hard-boiled genre and the decline of New Deal liberalism, he ventures that 
Race Williams’s individualism does not just coincide with national intactness 
but actually works crucially in its service, in a manner consistent with con-
temporary political ideas:
For the politically unsubtle Daly, labor unions and liberal politicians assume 
the same status as the Klan. Each represents a corrupt form of political 
solidarity. Each aspires to a spurious national status.  .  .  . Thus, while Race 
Williams’s refusal to be a joiner undermined the Klan’s vision of native com-
munity, the potential endpoint of such a commitment was a radical skepti-
 37. Rzepka, Detective Fiction, 186.
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cism about all forms of social organization—one that would invalidate not 
just Klannish fantasies of community, but every idea of civic obligation or 
human solidarity.38 
As McCann further notes, when political communities were the problem, the 
individual who eschewed communities was the solution. The idea that any 
community could become problematic gives political resonance to the com-
mon observation that the dominant quality of the hard-boiled “world,” with 
its institutions and its people, is one of contamination and corruption: the 
sort of corruption, that is, to which only the unaffiliated individual could be 
an antidote.
 Without contesting McCann’s astute political reading of hard-boiled 
responses to corruption, I would underscore as well the enormous responsi-
bility that the unaffiliated individual now carries. As a genre the hard-boiled 
puts great emphasis on the extent of corruption and particularly on the criti-
cal vocabulary of contamination and loss. Snarl contributes to this wide attri-
bution, describing “gun fights [as] a nightly affair in most any section of the 
city, and the killing of a policeman no longer a national event” (18) and New 
York buildings “whose only claim to distinction was the glories of the past” 
(105). Because that sense of a desolation at once spiritual, medical, and envi-
ronmental is so pervasive and now iconic, the dominant hard-boiled prob-
lem, at first glance, would seem to be not whether or not individualism and 
individual incarnation of “subjective facts” are well advised but whether indi-
vidualism is even possible. It is because of this contamination—be it polit-
ical, as in McCann’s reading, or psychological—that the exceptionalism of 
the individual resonates as a triumph over such an environment. Subsequent 
hard-boiled novels encourage this sense of struggle against contamination. 
(“Anybody that brings any ethics to Poisonville is going to get them all rusty,” 
states Hammett’s Continental Op in Red Harvest. “I was part of the nastiness 
now,” concedes Chandler’s Marlowe at the end of The Big Sleep.39) The prob-
lem that Race Williams actually sets up, however, is not just contamination 
from the outside in. Rather, it is the complications of grounding “ethics”—and 
eventually law—in an individual in the first place.
 When Race Williams says, “My ethics are my own,” he sets himself up as 
spokesperson and bodyguard—for the novel has no other—not just of social 
principles and national ideals (as in the cowboy model, for instance), not just 
of sentimental connection and historical consciousness, as Leonard Cassuto 
 38. McCann, Gumshoe America, 62.
 39. Hammett, Red Harvest, 549. Chandler, The Big Sleep, 197.
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describes, but of ideas and principles themselves—of their very meaning and 
content. This appropriation, of principles in general and of ethics in particu-
lar, will become a major hard-boiled selling point. No one else in Daly’s novel 
mentions ethics at all, so the narrator’s appropriation has a conservationist 
function. At the same time, “my ethics are my own” points to an immedi-
ate and fundamental problem with the maverick nature of the hard-boiled 
detective and with a “nonconformist authority” in general, namely, that these 
constitute a contradiction in terms. In Williams’s early declaration, the dis-
missal of “statutes” and “essays of long-winded professors” amounts to a dis-
tancing of “my ethics” from legal and philosophical frameworks, respectively. 
And the reluctance to qualify those ethics as “good” or “bad” seems indeed 
to eschew any moral system of evaluation, including but not limited to the 
theological. The Homais problem, in other words, always looms. In distanc-
ing himself from philosophical, legal, social, and moral contexts, Race Wil-
liams makes principles coterminous with “subjective facts.” This coincidence 
functions well when the subject is willing and able to perform such embodi-
ment. In this section, I have been examining Williams as both untraumatized 
soldier and conservator of ethics to demonstrate that the hard-boiled recon-
stitutes the nineteenth-century culture hero and establishes an individualistic 
American response to disorder. At the same time, the “emotional psychoses” 
Davidson introduces continue to threaten. The fears and suspicions evoked 
when shell shock was first diagnosed—fears of incurability, suspicions of 
malingering, equation of symptoms with excessive emotionalism—rise again 
in the post–hard-boiled novel. The various specters of posttraumatic distress 
that Snarl enumerates, the “bleak walls of the orphanage,” the ravages of drug 
addiction, the encroaching criminal atmosphere, the menacing and inarticu-
late “Beast” signifying menace within and without: these all emerge in the 
post–hard-boiled novel of the mid-twentieth century to threaten the psychic 
intactness of the character as such. As the century progresses, in other words, 
the self as such becomes unreliable, as character and accountability deterio-
rate from within and the subject begins to doubt whether he actually is one.
120, RUE DE LA GARE
In this section I will focus on 120, rue de la Gare, the first Nestor Burma novel 
by former surrealist poet Léo Malet. Widely considered the first French hard-
boiled novel, 120 combines the often antiheroic pessimism of mid-century 
noir fiction with the certitude and exemplarity of the American hard-boiled. 
The French roman noir is a cultural hybrid, and its French lineage runs from 
70 • CHAPTER 2 
the Memoirs of Vidocq through the urban forests of Balzac, Hugo, and Sue, 
then to the roaring Parisian streets of Baudelaire. Michelle Emanuel observes 
that Malet “writes of Paris with a surrealist eye and a popular sensibility.”40 
Alistair Rolls and Deborah Walker note that Malet’s “texts bear many traces of 
[Baudelaire’s] prose poems, which will pave the way for the more fully fetish-
istic Weltanschauung of 1945,” and echoes of surrealist referents arise in the 
course of 120.41 Malet’s novel does for France much of what the first American 
hard-boiled did for America. That is, it reconstitutes the nineteenth-century 
culture hero for the needs of the twentieth century and brings the model of 
spiritual authority and romantic heroism into the modern era. 120, rue de la 
Gare was published in 1943 during the occupation. Nestor Burma, the novel’s 
hero, heads the detective agency, Fiat Lux, whose operations have been sus-
pended by the Second World War. Burma is as verbose as Race Williams and 
as conscious of himself as a character. Perpetually ready for a close-up, he 
announces: “Suddenly, I was no longer the POW . . . but Nestor Burma, the 
one and only, the director of the Fiat Lux agency, Dynamite Burma” [Subite-
ment, je ne fus plus le Kriegsgefangen .  .  . mais Nestor Burma, le vrai, le 
directeur de l’Agence Fiat Lux, Dynamite Burma].42 Breaking into a moment 
of English to posture for his readers: “What do you want? I’m Burma, the 
man who can knock a mystery out flat” [Que voulez-vous? Je suis Burma, 
l’homme qui a mis le mystère knock-out] (89).43 Anne Mullen and Emer 
O’Beirne note that the French antihero is more often a criminal or a police-
man than a private detective and that Nestor Burma is the exception to this 
rule. Like Race Williams, he is a thorn in the side of criminals and police 
alike, and at ease in violence.44
 Whereas Race Williams’s claims to a nationally resonant ethical intact-
ness are an anti-intellectual manner and a soldierly resistance to violence, 
Nestor Burma’s are a contemplative aestheticism, sardonic understatement, 
and a quintessentially French esprit. The timing of publication, moreover, 
allows Burma to function as a mainstream culture hero at a time when cul-
tural frameworks are being dramatically shut down. These circumstances are 
 40. Emanuel, From Surrealism to Less-Exquisite Cadavers, 28.
 41. Rolls and Walker, French and American Noir, 23. Malet is not the only detective novelist 
to dovetail with surrealism; Robin Walz notes that “Fantômas was surreal before the letter, and 
surrealists later recognized the ‘Lord of Terror’ as their confrère.” Walz, Pulp Surrealism, 45.
 42. Malet, 120, rue de la Gare, 20. Subsequent references to this work will be given paren-
thetically.
 43. The movie version of 120, rue de la Gare (1946) is more cartoonish in its representation 
of Burma’s posturing: the character karate-chops his own valet and flexes his muscles for the 
camera. At the end of the film, he and his secretary Hélène, united in romance, face the camera 
and recite the movie’s title.
 44. Mullen and O’Beirne, Crime Scenes, 233.
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crucial to Burma’s role, to the “first-ness” of this novel, and to the cultural 
resonance of Burma’s heroism. At the same time, the occupation demands a 
certain ethical tact. The American hard-boiled detective had declared ethical 
independence after a war, and what is more, after a war that had never threat-
ened American soil. Nestor Burma, on the other hand, conducts his investi-
gation during an occupation that assailed French culture as such—literature, 
music, theater—as well as the amorphous leisure that had made aesthetic 
sensibility and romantic heroism possible. To “watch the passing waves” in 
the midst of the occupation would be an act of poetic resistance, but it could 
also, depending on what is happening around, be egregiously tone-deaf. Part 
of Nestor Burma’s responsibility, then, is to navigate the ethical parameters of 
the aesthetic even as he embodies the sensibilities so closely associated with 
the French heroic model.
THE INDEPENDENT ETHICIST
In American crime fiction, moral codes and decisions come from the indi-
vidual less as they derive from historical precedent or even rumination than 
from an intrinsic or instinctive sense of right. In French crime fiction, by con-
trast, even maverick detectives tended to come from a humanist tradition of 
philosophical contemplation and awareness. Nestor Burma never states that 
his ethics are his own. And yet, he reaps the autonomy of such a claim pre-
cisely because of the occupation, which has weakened sociocultural frames, 
forcing ethics into the hands of the individual. As David Platten writes of 
the occupation-era roman noir, “In L’Étranger et L’Être et le néant, both pub-
lished in 1943, Camus and Sartre wrote of the absurdity and loneliness of the 
human condition, of the inescapable burden of choice, and the impossibility 
of freedom beyond that individual choice. During the Occupation these were 
not abstract ideas, but realities rapping at the front door with such sustained 
regularity that a whole generation was left traumatised for years afterwards.”45 
In this formulation the existence of ideals as “subjective facts”—or the postu-
lation of virtues as personality features—gives way to a debilitating isolation. 
And yet, as Platten notices, the characters in 120, rue de la Gare are far from 
debilitated:
120, rue de la Gare, which introduces to the world of crime fiction the char-
acter of Nestor Burma, could have been written at any time in the last sixty 
 45. Platten, Pleasures of Crime, 79.
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years. It does refer to features of occupied life, such as “Ersatz” goods and 
the difficulties in acquiring the “interzone” passes. .  .  . However, it is strik-
ingly devoid of any political or social comment. And although commenta-
tors have identified 120, rue de la Gare as the first properly French roman 
noir, generically, in tone and narrative design it harks back to the “innocent” 
age of the classic whodunit.46 
Malet’s novel does indeed “hark back” in this manner, but I would argue that 
its apparently retrograde innocence is not about the social forms or master 
narratives of the nineteenth century, but rather about the resilient individual 
able to live and even thrive within “the burden of choice.” The hard-boiled 
subject that “is its travels” has moved into an era that casts such resilience 
as countercultural. The principal draw of the hard-boiled is its promise to 
deliver the solace of commitment to civil society and the functioning order 
of a rationalized world without the deadening effects that were often asso-
ciated with each. Another draw is its postulation of a subject that experi-
ences the burden of choice as livable rather than traumatic. This is the precise 
sort of fantastic scenario that Chandler provided when he described a man 
who is not mean going down mean streets, for he portrays that aloneness in 
one’s decency as a tolerable condition rather than—as Platten rightly finds 
in Sartre and Camus—a draining and impossible one. Honneth’s account 
of making a “negative judgment on the present without basing it explicitly 
on a value judgment”47 can also be understood to describe that tolerance. 
Burma thus crucially combines component parts of existential aloneness and 
unstinting solidity, a point of balance in which a critical perspective on the 
whole of society does not turn into hopeless resignation, as it tended to for 
other noir authors such as Albert Simonin and August de Breton. These lat-
ter were in a sense the more seminal French noir authors, their respective 
Touchez pas au grisbi and Du rififi chez les hommes catapulting the Série noire 
to greater popularity.48 And Rolls points out that Malet himself, in Nestor 
Burma contre C.Q.F.D, provides a “distinctly prose-poetic non-resolution” 
that he contrasts with the “synthetic resolution” of 120, rue de la Gare.49 But 
120 nonetheless earns its place as first hard-boiled because it reconstitutes the 
conscious subject for the twentieth century.
 46. Ibid., 80.
 47. Honneth, Pathologies of Reason, 97.
 48. Philips, Rififi, 19.
 49. Rolls, Paris and the Fetish, 146. See also Laurent Bourdelas, who notes that “the Oc-
cupation is the literary equivalent of the fog that lends atmosphere to Anglo-Saxon detective 
novels” [l’Occupation est l’équivalent littéraire du brouillard qui donne leur atmosphere aux 
romans policiers anglo-saxons]. Bourdelas, Le Paris de Nestor Burma, 9.
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 The French hard-boiled creates a powerful union of communitarian con-
nections, individual conscience, and national security. Claire Gorrara writes 
that 120, rue de la Gare “eschews a directly political history of the Occupa-
tion” but notes that insofar as it reveals “a social fantastic which subverts the 
rational and political order of the Occupation,” it can be read “as a deeply 
politicized text about the state of occupied France.”50 For the purposes of 
this discussion, Platten’s statement that 120 could have been written any 
time in the last sixty years in fact raises the value of Burma’s primitive and 
unstated wholeness. Assaults on the fullness of the individual’s subjectivity, 
constraints placed on his originality or authenticity, do not occur within the 
hard-boiled world. The grievous vacuum that abandons the individual to the 
“burden of choice” is the hard-boiled’s vital precondition, but the detective 
is born to thrive within it. Existential concerns for the individual’s fullness 
of being or for the dreaded abyss of a meaningless world either never come 
up or have been resolved already. The external circumstances—wartime on 
the French side, urban peril on the American—that force and underscore 
individual responsibility for the ethical also ensure that the ethical remain 
individual, instinctive, bound not to theories of subjectivity but to the mere 
fact of daily living.
A CULTURAL OUTSIDER, AND A CULTURE OUTSIDE
The idea of the exemplary maverick has long been canonically and tradition-
ally American, so Race Williams was at least partly type rather than para-
dox. For Burma, on the other hand, the paradoxical combination of maverick 
and classically French becomes possible precisely because of the occupation. 
In this particular historical moment, when an entire culture comes under 
assault, the wartime outsider is at the same time a French insider. He is a 
conservator of culture. As Claire Gorrara writes, “In 120, rue de la Gare, the 
Occupation emerges as a period of dislocation when the everyday is radically 
altered by the eruption of an alien order.” Earlier, she had noted, “Censorship 
. . . was more than the control of mere information; it represented a sustained 
attack on French culture as the repository of values and ideals that could bol-
ster national confidence during the ‘années noires’ as the war years came to 
be known.”51 In the political and ideological sense, the conditions of the occu-
pation allowed the irreverent outsider—a canonically American hard-boiled 
 50. Gorrara, Roman Noir, 28.
 51. Ibid., 25, 22.
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notion—to take the form of a Frenchman standing up for French culture on 
French soil.52 What is more, he does this in a particularly French way: con-
templating nature, solving the murder through literary clues, and taking care 
not to wander into amoral aestheticism.
THE PASTORAL MUSE
Nestor Burma shares Race Williams’s familiarity with violence and danger. 
Like Williams, he is able to transcend fear and elude self-pity. And like 
Williams, he uses these capacities to become, or rather be, an ethical indi-
vidual. But rather than declaring outright that a bullet in the hat is noth-
ing to talk about, Burma uses sarcastic epigrams and derisive references to 
bourgeois comforts. When asked why so talented a detective as he had not 
escaped from the POW camp, “I responded that I hadn’t taken a vacation 
in quite some time, so prison was its substitute” [Je répondis que je n’avais 
pas bénéficié de vacances depuis longtemps et que, pour moi, cette capti-
vité en tenait lieu] (15). When his partner and close friend Bob Colomer 
does not recognize him: “You don’t know your friends any more? Burma 
.  .  . Nestor Burma .  .  . just back from a country holiday” [Tu ne remets 
plus les copains? Burma . .  . Nestor Burma . .  . qui revient de villégiature] 
(24). And then, recounting that moment of misrecognition to another per-
son: “It took him a minute to recognize me. I must have gained weight” 
[Il a mis un sacré moment à me reconnaître. J’ai dû grossir] (28). These 
understatements and dismissals, rooted in Burma’s experience as prisoner 
of war, have the same toughening function as Williams’s blithe discounting 
of the bullet through the hat. That turning of pain into witticism consti-
tutes the French version of the psychic toughness that characterized the 
American hard-boiled. Comic pretense at aesthetic consciousness (“I must 
have gained weight”) and aristocratic contentment (“back from a country 
holiday”) mock the detached contemplativeness of the romantic hero, but 
they serve a particularly twentieth-century psychic function. Burma, by his 
own admission, is the man “who can knock [any] mystery out flat!” Turning 
imprisonment into a quip is Burma’s contribution to what Gorrara called 
 52. In a sense, the entire French hard-boiled genre constitutes such a homegrown out-
sider. As Michelle Emanuel describes in her study of Léo Malet, fellow writer Louis Chevance 
encouraged the author to write a detective novel for the Minuit collection, citing the new mar-
ket for crime fiction “made in France.” Emanuel, From Surrealism to Less-Exquisite Cadavers, 
23. In a commerical sense, then, the occupation’s prohibition on books from outside France 
created the original market conditions for French “outsiders” to flourish within France.
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the “social fantastic which subverts the rational and political order of the 
Occupation.” Since actually knocking out the intruding enemy (the occu-
pier) was not possible (in practice or even on the page, for reasons of cen-
sorship), as knocking out the Beast was in Snarl, the best way to surmount 
the wartime experience was to turn it into the subject of an epigram. The 
ability to mock or understate marked a victory of intellectual creativity, 
which in turn marked a psychological and cultural triumph.
 The idea of the individual or instinctive moral compass is fundamental to 
the hard-boiled. Because Burma is represented at the mercy of an occupying 
army, he becomes ethical by opposition to them—ethical by virtue of sur-
viving imprisonment by the unethical. This survival allows the individual to 
carry his culture aloft through circumstances that suppressed the cultural as 
such. Burma’s use of understatement in particular equates the ethical status 
of the prisoner of war and the ethical status of the person who can dimin-
ish his own misfortune but not that of others, and so gives to the occupied 
Frenchman a moral finesse. A detached or sardonic perspective that would 
be obscene coming from a perpetrator, or unfeeling coming from a witness, 
can read as a defense mechanism—and thus answer to a different ethical stan-
dard—coming from a prisoner. Crucially, Burma trains the lens of understate-
ment on his own experience rather than on someone else’s, which lends an 
ethical legitimacy to his mockeries.
 Burma’s ironic mentions of vacations and weight gain introduce the ethi-
cally problematic parameters of the aesthetic. Indeed, a crucial element of 
Burma’s response to violence and privation, and one that can be coded as 
particularly French, is his aesthetic emphasis on the visual and the sensorial. 
The question of the ethical parameters of such concentration permeates dis-
cussions of the ethical and the aesthetic from Kant to Hegel, from Adorno to 
Foucault. Burma as occupation-era character and as hard-boiled innovator 
seems conscious of the tension between ethics and sensual pleasure. Walk-
ing that line gives him a philosophical credibility akin to Chandler’s “honor 
without thought of it,” one that we could call “a [Foucauldian] beautiful life 
without thought of it.” Burma’s aesthetic perspectives on violence and pain 
have an intuitive ethical sense, but they also intimate what can go wrong, and 
what in the néo-polar will go wrong, with the aesthetic perspective.
 120, rue de la Gare contains various moments where the décor of wartime 
morphs into pastoral landscape descriptions—a combination that recalls the 
romantic pastoral and raises, in a seemingly intentionally provocative ges-
ture, the ethical tension that surrounds art in wartime. Whereas Race Wil-
liams declares that a bullet in the hat is nothing to write home about, Nestor 
Burma ruminates on the shape of that bullet. Early in the novel, Burma 
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articulates a pastoral appreciation for the scenery of the POW camp: “I went 
out to stretch my legs. .  .  . It was July. The weather was balmy. A warm sun 
caressed the barren landscape. A gentle breeze blew from the south. A sen-
try walked back and forth on the watchtower. The barrel of his gun shone in 
the sun. After a moment, I went back to my table, drawing contentedly on 
the pipe I’d just lit” [Je sortis me dégourdir les jambes. . . . On était en juillet. 
Il faisait bon. Un soleil tiède caressait le paysage aride. Il soufflait un doux 
vent du sud. Sur son mirador, la sentinelle allait et venait. Le canon de son 
arme brillait sous le soleil. Au bout d’un instant, je regagnai ma table, tirant 
avec satisfaction sur la pipe que je venais d’allumer] (11). In this moment of 
leisure, appreciation of nature—Chateaubriand contemplating heavy artil-
lery rather than a babbling brook—distracts from the human-authored war. 
In the course of his rumination, the weapon shining in the sun also becomes 
part of the bucolic, sharing the same visual and phenomenological status as 
the “warm sun” and the “gentle breeze.” In this scene, since the gun appears 
at the end of the sentence, it seems to put an end to the bucolic meditation: 
once it comes into the picture, the moment of leisure is over. And yet, silence 
about sentiment and emotional reaction, so fundamental to the hard-boiled, 
wanders by definition into morally problematic territory. The very blank slate 
that the silence produces, the absence of commentary, introduces the possi-
bility that silence contains unconcern or, more disturbingly, actual pleasure, 
a possibility that has inspired much writing about the mutual exclusivities of 
aesthetics, morality, and violence.
 Burma pushes the envelope of the ethical because his understatements, 
dismissals, and visual abstractions, although understandable or even touch-
ing considering his status as prisoner of war, are nonetheless rooted in the 
offhanded toughness of the American hard-boiled. The American counter-
part was not conceived during an instance of American peril and so did not 
have to navigate the ethical in the way that the French did. Rendering heed-
less American toughness in the voice of a French prisoner of war lends that 
toughness an ethical complexity not present in the American version. More 
precisely, the rendering of aesthetic contemplation in the voice of a French 
prisoner of war raises the shade of a question about the dominant sentiment 
at hand—is it amoral coldness or victim’s self-defense? Mackaman and Mays 
had written that “the course and outcome [of World War I] eradicated for 
poets, painters, and writers the right to follow a pastoral muse.”53 The insis-
tence on nonetheless following a pastoral muse, which could be read as an 
 53. Mackaman and Mays, World War I, xviii.
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act of resistance after World War I, came after World War II to read as an act 
of insensitivity or even perversion.
The first war set adrift survivors who had lived too long “eye deep in Hell,” 
young men wandering the streets of large cities and small towns physically 
maimed and, worse, psychically shattered, yet there still remained after 1918 
a sense that some understanding of this horrible tragedy could eventually 
be gained. . . . Not even this miniscule consolation could endure the second 
war, however, after which survival itself became the question posed by such 
figures as Primo Levi, Tadeusz Borowski, and Bruno Bettelheim.54 
It must be said that the wartime Paris of 120, rue de la Gare is quite an ano-
dyne version, as is the narrator’s POW experience. Bureaucratic inconve-
nience presents a foil for narrative ingenuity, but as Platten rightly observes, 
real demoralization and physical threat are absent. The stakes for this narra-
tor’s contemplations of the pastoral muse are thus lowered, since he does not 
risk coming across as perverse or inhuman. And yet, because those stakes are 
sufficiently high for the narrator to use the wartime environment to ques-
tion the ethical defensibility of retaining the “pastoral muse,” that retention 
becomes the occupied French version of the toughness characteristic of the 
hard-boiled genre.
 Turning now to another bucolic moment, I examine Burma’s balancing 
the occupation victim’s self-protective instinct to understate with the Ameri-
can hard-boiled’s tough embrace of violence. This moment also questions 
the ethical resonance of understatement and, more precisely, the abstraction 
of violence into visual spectacle. In so doing, it constitutes the hard-boiled 
hero as a critical historian, able to tailor his words and actions to the pres-
ent ethical landscape. In this scene Burma again enjoys a moment outside: 
“I knocked my pipe against the wooden steps. Sprinkling the ashes over the 
sparse heather bushes, I refilled the pipe with the Polish substance that the 
canteen called tobacco. It was a sort of stomach-turning dynamite, strong 
enough to bathe the landscape in a dusty and pleasantly bitter smoke” [Je 
cognai ma pipe contre les marches de bois. A la place des cendres que je 
venais de disperser sur les maigres bouquets de bruyère, je mis le produit 
polonais qu’on nous vendait à la cantine sous le nom de tabac. C’était une 
espèce de dynamite à ébranler les estomacs, très suffisante pour enfumer 
le paysage, répandre alentour une odeur poussiérieuse, agréablement âcre] 
(16). To pause a moment with one’s pipe is a detective fiction standard: clas-
 54. Ibid., xix.
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sic Sherlock Holmes and classic Simenon. As for meditation on the coun-
tryside, the heather bushes, like the “gentle breeze” of the earlier citation, 
are a romantic commonplace; Chateaubriand, for instance, describes such 
a bouquet in the bosom of a woman he met harvesting tea leaves in Cap 
d’Aigle. Maigret, a twentieth-century promeneur solitaire, contemplated the 
landscape as he pondered the murder at hand.55 But in this scene narrated 
by “Dynamite Burma” in and about a war-torn landscape, the pastoral muse 
relies upon—even as it distracts from—the vestiges of war. On the one 
hand, it recounts simply the ironic ruminations of a disenchanted smoker 
who dislikes wartime tobacco. At the same time, the image of a “stomach- 
turning dynamite, strong enough to bathe the landscape in smoke,” even as 
it describes Burma’s tobacco, evokes just as much bomb as pipe. “Dynamite” 
points to an explosive, and the words “stomach-turning” (ébranler les esto-
macs), referring to the strength of the tobacco, in fact anticipate the French 
néo-polar practice of turning figures of speech into gruesome anatomical 
literalisms. What is more, “Dynamite Burma” is the narrator’s own nick-
name, pointing both to his own explosiveness and to his admirable talents 
for detection. To call something “dynamite” is to praise it, and to call this 
detective “Dynamite” is to praise among other things his explosiveness. The 
sentence thus floats the possibility of violence as a visual pleasure—indeed, 
raises the possibility of participation in violence, but remains within the eth-
ically anodyne parameters of pipe-smoking contemplation and the prisoner 
of war perspective.
 In addition to appreciating the shininess of accessories of war, Burma 
presents several moments of actual violence abstracted into the performa-
tive. For instance, when Burma pushes an assailant into the Seine, the man’s 
tumble has something of the ballet to it: “I kneed him in the stomach and 
caught him with an uppercut. His feet just missed hitting me in the face” [Je 
lui plongeai mon genou dans le ventre et le redressai d’un uppercut. Ses pieds 
manquèrent m’atteindre en pleine face] (73). When he knocks out Gerard Laf-
alaise in order to put him out of commission, the focus is once more on limbs 
in motion rather than expression of sentiment: “My fist shot out and caught 
him on the chin. He went down, joining his hat on the ground. I tossed a 
scarf to Covet” [Mon poing partit et l’atteignit en plein menton. Il alla au sol, 
rejoindre son chapeau. Je lançai une écharpe à Covet].56 To render violence as 
a sort of acrobatic art falls in line with classic American hard-boiled noncha-
lance, but it also approaches a morally vacant version of what philosophers 
 55. Simenon, Les vacances de Maigret, 17.
 56. Malet, 120, rue de la Gare, 80.
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later in the century would call “an aesthetics of existence.” As Richard Wolin 
writes of later Foucauldian aesthetics,
Instead of an ethic of reciprocity or brotherliness, Foucault opts for what 
we might call a dramaturgical model of conduct, in which action becomes 
meaningful solely qua performative gesture. But this theory risks sanction-
ing an approach to ethics that is brazenly particularistic and elitist. Formally 
it remains only a hair’s breadth removed from Nietzsche’s rehabilitation of 
the right of the stronger. With Foucault, however, it is not necessarily the 
will of the strongest that is legitimated, but instead the “rights of the most 
beautiful.”57 
It could be argued that Burma raises ethical tension in order to dispel it—
in other words, that he insinuates the possibility of an unethical use of the 
aesthetic in order to retreat from that possibility and maintain an “ethics of 
reciprocity or brotherliness.” Ultimately, however, even when Burma is under-
stating his own acts of violence, he maintains a consciousness of that eth-
ics of reciprocity. The murder is reduced to the status of a somersault and 
the push to a voluntary recline; but because the murder is committed in 
defense of another—the assailant on the bridge has tried to kill Burma’s friend 
Marc—the disembodiment of the recounting is balanced by the defensibil-
ity of the act. When Burma’s friend and partner, Bob Colomer, is shot, on 
the other hand, the narrator focuses on the victim’s face: “Suddenly, his face 
contorted as if in terrible pain” [Soudain, son visage se crispa, comme sous 
l’effet d’une intolérable douleur] (25). No humor and no lyricism intrude on 
this description.
 Burma’s instinct to give respect to the sentiments and sufferings of others 
marks him as ethical and kind. His long-standing friendships with Covet and 
his secretary, Hélène Chatelain, demonstrate his friendliness and even hark 
forward to the partnership-based hard-boiled model that will gain currency 
in the twenty-first century. It is worth noting that Hélène provides a crucial 
clue to the location of the mysterious address and maintains a decorous resis-
tance when Burma wants to interrogate her, thus representing the strong and 
confident female interlocutor.58
 57. Wolin, Terms of Cultural Criticism, 195.
 58. The movie version, with Sophie Desmarets as Hélène, shows her as a rather girlish 
character, though still a smart one. At the end of the movie, it is she (rather than the daughter 
of Georges Parry, also named Hélène) who becomes Burma’s romantic interest.
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FIAT LUX
The hard-boiled subject as Burma embodies him makes an ethical sense of 
the aesthetic a cornerstone of conscience: this particular sensibility is suited 
to French cultural and historical circumstances. In examining Burma’s sen-
sibilities, I mean to underscore the notion of the hard-boiled character as a 
first responder (in these first novels, literally a first responder) to a diverse 
series of cultural crises—an individual who holds himself accountable for 
the actions that his cultural circumstances demand. Even when the idea of 
virtue as such is absent, which it is here, the value of a subject conscious of 
himself and his responsibility to others remains at a premium; part of this 
responsibility is an instinctive historicocultural sense of individual and social 
needs. The model of accountability “without thought of it” perseveres rela-
tively unchanged, but the particular sensitivities, words, and actions called 
for do change over time and place.
 Where Race Williams was ethical without being interested in ethics, Bur-
ma’s French version of that hard-boiled distinction is in maintaining an ethi-
cal stance through words and actions—here, his fusion of the pastoral and 
the explosive—that would seem to threaten it. Fiat Lux, the biblical name of 
Burma’s prewar detective agency, constitutes another instance of that fusion. 
The novel abounds with objects—weapons, flashlights, sun, fire, pipes—that 
shimmer, shine, and glow. Some of these shine in the service of investigative 
illumination, either as practical instruments of perception (the flashlights in 
the darkened house at the titular address, for instance) or as evidence (“the 
glint of burnished steel” [l’acier bruni scintillait]). Others shine in the sun as 
attractive articles somewhat removed from their actual function (“the bar-
rel of his gun shone in the sun”), objects one could ponder while smoking a 
pipe. When Burma introduces himself it is clear that his preferred illumina-
tion is the symbolic sort: “‘My name is Nestor Burma,’ I said, trembling all 
over at the idea of casting light on this poor man’s identity. ‘In civilian life, 
I’m a private detective.’” [Je m’appelle Nestor Burma, dis-je, frémissant de 
tout mon être à l’idée d’élucider le mystère de la personnalité de ce malheu-
reux. Dans le civil, je suis détective privé] (17). Much of what lights up this 
novel, however, is not symbolic elucidation in the form of truth, or flash-
lights used for investigation, but explosions in the form of gunshots or fire. 
These two sorts of clarification are closely intertwined, but Burma is care-
ful to maintain the distinction between light that illuminates and light that 
demolishes. When he arrives at 120, rue de la Gare, there is a citywide black-
out so solid that he has to guess whether or not he has in fact passed the Lion 
de Belfort at Denfert-Rochereau. Because the chapter starts, “I’m starting 
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to see clearly” [On commence à y voir clair], with the treasure to be found 
in the “Maison Blanche,” this scene promises to set darkness against light, 
obscurity against clarity. When the chauffeur notices a light upstairs in the 
white house, “Sir . . . there’s a light up there on the second floor” [Monsieur 
. . . de la lumière, là-haut, au premier . . .], Burma distinguishes between the 
“good” illumination of the torches and lamps and the “bad” illumination of 
the house on fire: “You call that light? Hurry, Faroux. It’s a fire” [Vous appelez 
cela de la lumière? Vite, Faroux. Ça flambe] (169). This distinction parallels 
another, when the searchlights (pinceaux lumineux de projecteurs) light up 
the sky and the sirens start to wail. Burma, enlightened in matters historico-
political as well as criminal, quips, “They’re signing the peace treaty. Don’t 
you hear the fireworks?” [C’est la signature de la Paix. Vous n’entendez pas 
le feu d’artifice?] (168). The lights and sounds of war remain distinguishable 
from the lights and sounds of celebration, the flashes of discovery from the 
flashes of destruction. Furthermore, the vocabulary of lumière rescues the 
idea of illumination from occupation discourse and so contradicts or denies 
a connection between fascism and enlightenment.
BURMA AS EMBODIMENT OF 
FRENCH NATIONAL INTACTNESS
In the French model, “individualisme” connotes self-containedness rather 
than a maverick tone. Burma’s ethics endorse the values and needs of the 
republic. And yet, incarnation of the French character model is presented as 
a matter of individual taste and manner: a style of incarnation consistent with 
the idea of cultural values as instinctual. This latter notion is crucial to the 
wartime hard-boiled, since it implies that cultural values are able to survive 
the dismantling of cultural institutions. Burma’s detective work in 120—the 
methods he uses to expose the criminals—situates him at once as a self- 
contained individualist and as an occupation-era culture hero. In an early 
scene, Burma is meeting with Armand Bernier, the Lyon police commissaire 
investigating the murder of Bob Colomer. Bernier, as it turns out, was a con-
spirator in that murder, although his involvement is not initially suggested. 
Burma has made a joke, and the following conversation ensues:
—Let’s not joke around, Mr. Burma. I’m trying to catch the man who mur-
dered your employee, understand?
 —Collaborator.
 —What? Ah! Yes, if you like. So, you met him by chance?
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—Ne plaisantons pas, monsieur Burma. J’essaie de venger votre employé, 
comprenez-vous?
 —Collaborateur.
 —Quoi? Ah! Oui .  .  . si vous voulez. Alors, vous vous êtes rencontrés 
par hasard?
This rapid dialogue first appears to be a provocative appropriation of lan-
guage. “Collaborateur” at the time the novel was written was a loaded indict-
ment no one would want to claim in public. For Burma then to declare that 
Bob had been his “collaborateur” is a way of shutting out the word’s sinister 
connotations, reclaiming its positive associations with cooperation and part-
nership as though there were no other meaning of the word. The dialogue, 
however, has another function, which is to connect the indictment of the 
murderer with the maintenance of national integrity. When Burma states 
“Collaborateur,” his interlocutor is taken aback. His reaction first seems one 
of surprise that Burma would use this word about his closest associate. But 
on second reading, and once we understand that Bernier did collaborate in 
the murder of Colomer, it suggests a nervous reaction to a name that, in the 
framework of the occupation, resonated most immediately and forcefully as 
an accusation.
 This dialogue allies the uncovering of the “collaborateur” with the uncov-
ering of the murderer, underscoring the similarities between life under the 
occupation and detective work. Julian Jackson writes, “One aim of German 
propaganda was to encourage a return to ‘normal.’”59 The practical threats of 
the occupation, including the menace of the French collaborator who blurs 
the line between friend and foe, are the realities that must be understood 
and navigated, for the occupation imposed at once an apparent order and 
an actual constant threat (what Gorrara had described as “the eruption of 
an alien order”).60 In the American model, in which the threat of war had 
passed into the domain of memory and was carried onto American soil in 
the minds and recollections of the soldiers rather than being inscribed on the 
land itself, the detective was menaced by—and showed his prowess by domi-
nating—actual and metaphorical enemies from the past. In the French model, 
where the threat of the occupation remained present and ongoing, the detec-
tive’s valor came from his ability to comprehend and narrate the sinister facts 
beneath apparent normality. Of course, in one sense, that precise ability is the 
 59. Jackson, France: The Dark Years, 239.
 60. Gorrara, Roman Noir, 25. Jackson describes the nuances and variations among “collab-
orators,” “attentistes,” “functional collaborators,” and “functional resisters,” citing Cobb, French 
and Germans.
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essence of all crime fiction. The murderer is generally someone the reader has 
seen from the start and whose guilt has been concealed. In this case, to have 
the first French hard-boiled detective—a former prisoner of war detecting 
under the occupation—unsettle a guilty party in an early scene by deadpan-
ning the word “collaborator” is to link the work of hard-boiled detection to 
the conservation of moral, national, and cultural intactness.
 Carroll John Daly, who, though a less subtle writer than Malet was in 
many ways the more overarching psychologist, ensures the accidental or 
“ex nihilo” nature of Race Williams’s psychological health by rooting his 
childhood in an unfeeling orphanage. Nestor Burma, whose childhood is 
unknown, nonetheless follows the classically hard-boiled, never-married, no-
children convention to emerge similarly untethered to bourgeois “Oughts,” 
even without taking into consideration the fact of the occupation.61 At the 
root of both Nestor Burma’s and Race Williams’s exemplarity—the one 
coming from a grim orphanage and the other from a POW camp—is their 
exemplarity as sufferers. The absence of a normalizing social frame and the 
presence of adversity conspire to underscore individual subjectivity. Individ-
ualism, or an empathic life intuitively lived, can be read here as an excep-
tional response to the absence of conventions rather than either a rebellious 
response to them or a mannered absorption. As such, Burma can claim sole 
credit for sustaining “regulated forms of civilized conduct” in the absence 
of regulation. Each detective discussed in this chapter faces pain (his own 
and that of others) in a way that resonates with the particular circumstances 
of the culture as a whole: Williams with the sequelae of postwar neuroses, 
Burma with the privations and deceits of the occupation. Moreover, each 
faces pain with behavior mechanisms reminiscent of specific cultural heroic 
models—Williams with tough but empathic independence, Burma with a 
witty aesthetic distanciation. The capacity to remain within the bounds of 
good taste—in the sense of being able to both retreat into the aesthetic and 
understand the limits of such a retreat—functions as an essential and histori-
cally particular element of the French hard-boiled character model.
 61. “In these regulated forms of civilized conduct, a pervasive aestheticizing of social 
practices gets under way: moral-ideological imperatives no longer impose themselves with 
the leaden weight of some Kantian Ought but infiltrate the very textures of lived experience 
as tact and know-how, intuitive good sense or inbred decorum. Ethical ideology loses its un-
pleasantly coercive force and reappears as a principle of spontaneous consensus. The subject 
is accordingly aestheticized: like the work of art, the subject introjects the Law which governs 
it as the very principle of its free identity and so, in Althusserian phrase, comes to work ‘all 
by itself ’ without need of political constraint.” Eagleton, Ideology of the Aesthetic, 77.
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THE USES OF LITERATURE
Another element in Burma’s arsenal, one that marks him as French and as an 
epitome of French conceptions of virtue, is his use of literature to separate 
the population into those who care and those who do not, those who are 
decent and empathic and those who are not. In an early scene, Burma goes 
to visit Julien Montbrison, the lawyer he hopes will have information about 
Bob Colomer’s murder. Montbrison was Colomer’s lawyer, of a sort, and had 
seen him before he took off for the train station where he was murdered. 
When he enters Montbrison’s office, Burma finds him reading “a lovely edi-
tion of the works of Edgar Allan Poe” [une belle édition des Œuvres d’Edgar 
Poe] (53). Later in the novel, Burma learns that an important private let-
ter from another of Montbrison’s clients had been opened and then resealed 
before arriving at its intended destination. That discovery reminds him of 
the Poe story “The Purloined Letter,” which in turn leads him to two conclu-
sions. One is that the treasure described in the opened and resealed letter, 
treasure stashed away at the titular address, would be hidden in that house 
in plain view, on the mantel. The second is that Montbrison is the guilty 
party: the one who intercepted and resealed his client’s letter, who murdered 
Bob Colomer, and who found the treasure on the mantel and stole it. When 
explaining the crime to an assembled crowd, Burma says of Montbrison, “He 
thinks of Edgar Poe and a light goes on. ‘The Purloined Letter,’ to which 
everything points in this adventure, you must agree . . . the best hiding place 
is the simplest, the one in plain sight” [Il songe à Edgar Poe et un trait l’il-
lumine. La ‘Lettre volée’ des Histoires extraordinaires, que tout semble dési-
gner, vous en conviendrez, à marquer de son signe une telle aventure . . . La 
cachette la plus sûre est la plus simple, la plus visible] (200).
 In their first meeting, Montbrison is presented as a well-fed, contented 
lawyer who smokes hard-to-find Philip Morris cigarettes instead of medio-
cre tobacco. As such, he is juxtaposed with the wry, postcamp Burma. Dur-
ing that meeting Burma recounts his captivity: “When I entered, he closed 
the book he was reading—a lovely edition of the works of Edgar Poe—and 
came toward me with a charming smile, his plump hand extended. I sat down 
and at his urging spoke about my imprisonment. Most people you talk to 
couldn’t care less about it, but to be polite they pretend to ‘feel your pain,’ as 
they put it” [A mon entrée, il ferma le livre qu’il lisait—une belle édition des 
Œuvres d’Edgar Poe—et vint vers moi avec un charmant sourire, sa main 
grasse tendue. Je m’assis et, à son invitation, parlai de la captivité. Générale-
ment vos interlocuteurs s’en foutent, mais ils croient poli de faire semblant 
de compatir à vos souffrances, comme ils disent] (53). The implication that 
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Montbrison is likely among those who “couldn’t care less” places him in the 
ranks of those who have hardly suffered, and the evocation of “people you 
talk to” and “your pain” encourage reader alignment with the narrator/suf-
ferer, the one about whom Montbrison “couldn’t care less.” Indeed, as Burma 
notices on first seeing him, “Montbrison did not appear to be suffering too 
much from [food] restrictions” [Montbrison ne paraissait pas souffrir outre 
mesure des restrictions] (52). Montbrison’s contented distance from the camp 
experience—whether or not that distance is imagined by Burma—also cor-
responds to a particular representation of Montbrison as critical reader. A 
crucial function of this scene is to connect French cultural status to ethical 
intactness and to measure both of these according to one’s response to other 
people’s stories, whether fictional or real. In this way, response to literature 
functions as a measure of empathic capacity, and it is the hard-boiled char-
acter who takes that measure.
 Even before Burma recounts his experience as a prisoner of war, the prin-
cipal clue in this first meeting is the edition of Poe. At the end of the novel, 
the recollection of Poe proves crucial to the identification of Montbrison as 
the person who opened and resealed the letter locating the treasure and also 
as the person who found that treasure in plain sight in the house at the titular 
address. This intertextual interlude presents Montbrison and Burma as differ-
ent species of reader, with that difference signaling an ethical, intellectual, and 
cultural division.
 Montbrison reads Poe and steps into the role of purloiner, slipping then 
into the role of investigator—the one who finds treasure in plain sight—solely 
for his own gain. Burma reads Poe, reads Montbrison reading Poe, and steps 
into the role of detective, finding the treasure and understanding the crimi-
nal’s relationship to it. The novel’s detour through Poe matches the opposi-
tion of Burma to Montbrison, of detective to criminal, to the opposition of 
the reflecting reader to the mere collector or spinophile—which ultimately 
amounts to the opposition of one who can enter into and learn from the 
experience of others to the one who cannot or will not do so. Insofar as detec-
tive fiction recounts a series of widening circles of perspective—the criminal 
schemes while the detective watches the criminal scheming—the detective 
represents the greater volume or level of understanding. In “The Purloined 
Letter,” that greater volume or scope of understanding is directly associated 
with a curiosity about human nature. Dupin describes to the narrator the 
police prefect’s error regarding the purloiner D:
They consider only their own ideas of ingenuity; and, in searching for 
anything hidden, advert only to the modes in which they would have hid-
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den it. They are right in this much—that their own ingenuity is a faithful 
representative of that of the mass; but when the cunning of the individual 
felon is diverse in character from their own, the felon foils them, of course. 
This always happens when it is above their own, and very usually when it is 
below.62 
Montbrison, in imitating the concealment mechanisms of the purloiner D, 
seems to have given the text a cursory once-over and thus been doomed to 
imitate the limitations of D, not his victories; to imitate his status as an actor 
and planner, foregoing the role of observer. Montbrison reading Poe seems to 
have stopped at Dupin’s description of D as an exceptional thinker, which is 
enough to find him the treasure but not enough to evade detection. To cite 
Poe again: 
“I mean to say,” continued Dupin, while I merely laughed at his last obser-
vations, “that if the Minister had been no more than a mathematician, the 
Prefect would have been under no necessity of giving me this check. I know 
him, however, as both mathematician and poet, and my measures were 
adapted to his capacity, with reference to the circumstances by which he was 
surrounded. I knew him as a courtier, too, and as a bold intrigant. Such a 
man, I considered, could not fail to be aware of the ordinary political modes 
of action.”63
READING LIKE DUPIN
When Burma comes into Montbrison’s office, he sees the volume of Poe 
but cannot know which story Montbrison is reading. And yet, at the end of 
the novel, he points with certainty to “The Purloined Letter” as the lawyer’s 
source of inspiration. It is true that a letter has been opened and resealed. But 
so far, that is the only indication of the Poe story in this narrative. The con-
tainer of pearls was hidden in plain view on the mantel, but that fact emerges 
much later in the narrative. The “everything” in “everything points” seems 
as connected to Montbrison the character as to the facts of the case: as the 
reader discovers at the end, Burma’s conviction of Montbrison’s guilt predated 
the discovery of the intercepted letter. The illumination, then—in “un trait 
l’illumine”—is double in nature: an idea inspires Montbrison and at the same 
 62. Poe, Complete Tales, 132.
 63. Ibid., 134–35.
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time a character trait of his own “illuminates” him, in the “Fiat Lux” sense 
of highlighting his guilt. That character trait, an absence of interest in oth-
ers, an appurtenance to the class of interlocutors who couldn’t care less, who 
smoke expensive cigarettes and wear flashy jewelry, makes of Montbrison a 
limited sort of reader: one who approaches Poe as a manual and a mirror and, 
more important, one who chooses a story that at some level invites such an 
approach—invites an egotistical reading and promises a self-serving inspira-
tion. Burma’s initial reference to the “lovely edition” points out the materiality 
of the volume, a materiality that obscures its content, its strata of meaning, 
its other extrapolatable morals. The treasure is hidden in plain view, but so is 
Montbrison, who all along has contacted Burma and acted in friendly fash-
ion. “Burma! What a nice surprise! What are you doing within our walls?” 
[Burma! Que voilà donc une belle surprise! Que faites-vous dans nos murs?] 
(53). Of course, this question, “What are you doing in our walls?” brings to 
the reader’s mind one of Poe’s craziest narrators.64 And yet, the notion of hid-
ing in plain view resonates powerfully within the context of the occupation, 
during which the capacity to unearth the evil and criminal within the appar-
ently normal was at a premium. As Burma later discloses, “It was when you 
recovered your bearings that I really got suspicious” [C’était au moment où 
vous recouvriez relativement votre tranquillité que mes soupçons se préci-
saient] (207).
 Montbrison as criminal hides in plain view until the end, even as he 
uncovers treasures that others have hidden in plain view. In taking up the 
role of “mathematician and poet,” “courtier,” and “bold intrigant,” Montbri-
son has suppressed the inevitable future moment of capture, and not to have 
grasped that possibility is inextricably intertwined with the role of intrigant. 
When Montbrison asks, “What are you doing within our walls?” the reference 
is not only to geographical location but also to his field of vision, the param-
eters of his own plan. The idea of being “within the walls” of another does 
not occur to him, for he has sufficiently compartmentalized his reading in an 
effort to remove the character from its nineteenth-century confines. Montbri-
son, himself closed within his self-image, does not see that his name is a near 
homophone of “my prison” (mon prison), which his subjectivity and read-
ership constitute, and where these will ultimately lead him. Burma, on the 
other hand, comes at the volume as clue, as illustration of human nature, as a 
Rorschach-esque diagnostic instrument—as a story important not just for its 
 64. In “The Black Cat,” the narrator hides his wife’s body in the wall, but he is found out 
by the police when the cat—also in the wall—starts howling during their visit.
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content but also for the telling and illuminating readings it might inspire in 
other narrative agents.
 The entire Poe interlude within 120 serves to align Burma with intuition 
and literary appreciation, and to link both to the detective novel at hand. As 
Jacques Lacan and other psychoanalysts have noted, the detective who can 
evaluate the capacities and motives of various sorts of reasoners becomes the 
reasoner par excellence. The literature fan who can evaluate the capacities 
and motives of various sorts of readers becomes the reader par excellence 
as well as an exemplary denizen of French culture. In this novel as in most 
detective novels, the person clearly interested in the characters of others and 
the most able to forget his own story while listening to another’s is the crime 
solver and cultural exemplar. That interest, embodied in Dupin and Burma, 
also coincides with a loyalty to literature as placeholder of French culture. 
And in a period that generates such urgency of listening and witnessing, it 
functions here as a critical element of twentieth-century hard-boiled sub-
jectivity. The intertextual interlude allows Burma, making his debut in the 
twentieth-century 120, to claim a connection with nineteenth-century Paris 
and prewar France. Of course, Poe’s Paris-centered ratiocination tales, his 
admirable Parisian protagonist, his introduction into French culture through 
Baudelaire’s translations, and his role as father of the much-loved-in-France 
detective genre have earned him an honorary French status in the world of 
the roman policier. Furthermore, as “one of the ‘saints’ of surrealism”65 and 
as author whose detective could get into the mind of the criminal without 
turning into one, Poe embeds Burma in a literature-identified Paris: in which 
a reference to Crébillon could serve as calling card and in which politi-
cal manipulation was understood by reader and criminal alike to resonate 
with the horrors of Greek tragedy, in which, in short, political manipulation 
became at one with Crébillon’s “gruesome plan.” André Breton cites both Poe 
and Sade as figures of black humor, which he calls “the mortal enemy of 
beleaguered sentimentality” [l’ennemi mortel de la sentimentalité à l’air per-
pétuellement aux abois].66 Finally, with the reference to Crébillon at the end, 
which assigns radically varying levels of moral turpitude within the text,67 the 
Poe interlude is not so much about who is the better thinker but who is the 
better person. Through Poe, love of literature and nostalgia for solid narrative 
 65. Hollier and Bloch, New History of French Literature, 723.
 66. Breton, L’anthologie de l’humour noir, 16.
 67. “So gruesome a plan, while not worthy of Atrée, is worthy of Thyeste” [Un dessein si 
funeste, s’il n’est digne d’Atrée, et digne de Thyeste]. Poe, Complete Tales, 202.
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closures, a binding moral compass, and horror of atrocity become embedded 
in this occupation-era novel.68
THE LITERARY OUTSIDER
Although Nestor Burma seems to have little time to read, he embodies a cul-
tural ideal through his fondness for literature. Michelle Emanuel writes, “It 
is the combination of streetwise abrasiveness and well-read refinement that 
makes Burma such a compelling character.”69 I would contest the reading 
of Burma as being refined, but being “well-read” was central to the French 
cultural tradition, especially in 1943.70 To love literature is to be on the side 
of France, of art, and of ethics, an association that becomes apparent when 
the clue to the location of the treasure has to be deciphered. In the opening 
chapters of 120, rue de la Gare, the title clue is whispered to Burma by a dying 
prisoner of war—the man who had sent the letter to the treacherous Mont-
brison—and then shouted to him by his detecting partner, Bob Colomer, just 
before the latter is shot dead in a train station. Its immediate accessibility 
to Burma and to the reader initially conceals the trouble that Colomer had 
taken to find it. As it turns out, the address was the solution to a puzzle in 
the intercepted letter: “Coming from the Lion, after meeting the divine and 
infernal Marquis, it’s the most prodigious of his works. (My mania for word 
games persists even after death . . .)” [En venant du Lion, après avoir rencon-
tré le divin et infernal marquis, c’est le livre le plus prodigieux de son œuvre. 
(Je persiste dans ma manie des rébus jusqu’au delà de la mort .  .  .)] (178). 
Deciphering the puzzle demands familiarity with literary history: one must 
understand that the “divine and infernal Marquis” is the Marquis de Sade 
and that 120 appears in the title of his best-known work. It also requires the 
ability to read “SADE” as an acronym: the street number without a street can 
 68. In one French version of Murders in the Rue Morgue, Dupin was renamed Bernier, 
which in Malet’s novel will be the name of the corrupt policeman.
 69. Emanuel, From Surrealism to Less-Exquisite Cadavers, 83. She also notes that Malet’s 
use of dream sequences places Burma “in a realm already utilized by poetry, [which] risks a 
literariness not readily associated with the American genre” (67).
 70. In another famous wartime text, Vercors’s clandestine publication Le silence de la mer 
(1942), the German soldier notices the books in the French house he occupies: “Les Anglais, 
reprit-il, on pense aussitôt: Shakespeare. Les Italiens: Dante. L’Espagne: Cervantès. Et nous, 
tout de suite: Goethe. Après, il faut chercher. Mais si on dit: et la France? Alors, qui surgit à 
l’instant? Molière? Racine? Hugo? Voltaire? Rabelais? Ou quel autre? Ils se pressent, ils sont 
comme une foule à l’entrée d’un théâtre, on ne sait pas qui faire entrer d’abord.” Vercors, Le 
silence de la mer et autres récits, 28.
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only be found once one grasps that “SADE” refers to the city water authority. 
The bulk of detective interpretation is completed by Burma’s colleagues: Bob 
Colomer’s father had worked as night watchman at the SADE, and Burma’s 
assistant mentions the place, enabling Burma to locate the address. Burma 
stands out in his present cohort because unlike Bob Colomer, who had to 
consult a journalist and visit the library in order to identify the Marquis, he 
knows who Sade is. Burma’s journalist friend Marc Covet announces that he 
himself had had no idea: “I didn’t know Sade had written anything. Don’t 
look at me like that, Burma” [J’ignorais que Sade eût écrit quoi que ce fût. Ne 
me regardez pas comme cela, Burma] (38). Covet also remarks, remember-
ing Colomer’s sudden interest in Sade or in libraries in general, “He needed 
to do some library research. That gave me a good laugh” [Il en avait besoin 
pour effectuer des recherches à la bibliothèque. Cela m’a fait rigoler de plus 
belle] (39).
 On the one hand, finding the solution to the mystery through the Mar-
quis de Sade (as it was through Poe) is tantamount to reanimating or at 
least recalling a prewar culture in which French literature had a storied role, 
in which “collaborateurs” constituted no threat and criminals such as D. 
and Montbrison were caught in their own webs. As Claire Gorrara writes, 
“Burma’s past as ‘Dynamite Burma’ .  .  . represents an assured and autono-
mous prewar identity that seems irrecoverable in 1941.”71 Sade is associated 
with the era of the French Revolution—in other words, with a time when 
modern France was coming into being—therefore in contrast to the occu-
pation, which threatens the very existence of France as such. Sade and Poe 
both emblematize the value of literature to the solving of crime and to the 
reconstitution of a culture under assault. At the same time, both authors 
represent literature as a passcode to a transgressive, even criminal, men-
tality but also an ethical one. Jonathan Eburne writes that “Malet’s crime 
novel is in many ways dedicated to [Sade’s publisher and defender] Maurice 
Heine” and says of the latter, “As Heine argues .  .  . noir fictions render a 
stark contrast between the indifference and lack of awareness of those who 
take them literally and the analytical power available to those who are atten-
tive to their atmosphere and structure.”72 Given Sade’s aesthetic of violence 
and Poe’s poeticization of death, to evoke these authors is to hint at French 
crime fiction’s later moral dissolution, to its amoral use of the aesthetic, and 
to its deliberate fracturing of the accountable subject.73 It is also to link the 
 71. Gorrara, Roman Noir, 31.
 72. Eburne, Surrealism and the Art of Crime, 251, 194.
 73. See discussion of violent aestheticism in Sheehan, Modernism and the Aesthetics of Vio-
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roman noir, as Eburne points out, to reading and writing as ethical practices 
and to cast the ethical reader (Burma) as a national treasure. In one sense, 
had the novel wanted to evoke canonical French culture, it could have based 
its cryptograms on Balzac or Hugo rather than on surrealist darlings Sade 
and Poe. In raising Sade’s name, and in knowing him when others did not, 
Burma at once stands up for his nation and sneaks in (the French version 
of hard-boiled maverick subversion) the homespun literary outsider. The 
point of this chapter has been to examine how the first hard-boiled novels 
of France and the United States, respectively, reconstitute early nineteenth-
century models of spiritual authority and exemplary character. It has also 
been to demonstrate how the outlines of such character, each associated with 
national intactness and patriotic morale, function as modern markers of psy-
chic fortitude and social accountability. Finally, it has been to point out how 
these first hard-boiled personages introduce the menace of moral devolu-
tion, then ultimately avoid it. The American detective responds to violence, 
murder, and another’s pain with an ethic “of his own” that, coincidentally, is 
intelligible rather than bizarre or menacing to others. The French detective 
responds with a seemingly instinctual balance of the ethical and the artis-
tic, the empathic and the sardonic. To some extent the downside to both 
these balancing acts might seem to be the inauthenticity of the individualism 
at hand—the too-marvelous nature of its coincidence, the too-intelligible 
or too-classic nature of an ethics that are purportedly “of one’s own.” In 
other words, the congruence of moral-ideological imperatives and one’s own 
instinctual ethics could paint the very idea of that autonomy as illusory. But 
the hard-boiled as a genre, throughout its history and most particularly in 
these initial texts, has taken considerable pains to preserve the individual as 
a phenomenon by separating him from a bourgeois world and by underscor-
ing the experiential, personal, and organic foundations of his conduct. In so 
doing, it insists on the existence of individual subjectivity as independent 
from social strictures.
 Twentieth-century constitution of individual conscience is distinct from 
that of nineteenth-century romanticism, which represented character attri-
butes without such concern that those attributes be independent of hege-
monic bourgeois values. Daly and Malet do contend with that concern. 
And yet they imitate the romantics by creating a space in which personality 
features can arise—in their own culturally and historically specific ways—
from nothing, devoid of any larger frame that could force those aims with 
lence; Sanyal, Violence of Modernity; Bronfen, Over Her Dead Body; Matthews, “Right Person 
for Surrealism.” 
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“immediate obviousness.” Those personality features have a social and politi-
cal resonance, but like the character attributes of the romantic characters, 
they ultimately represent only themselves, their effects, and the very force of 
conscience.
THE PRECARITY OF MORAL AUTHORITY
The principal menace to the future hard-boiled will not be an individualism 
insufficiently realized or overly allegorical but an individualism squandered. 
In its initial incarnations, the character generates—not just incarnates but 
generates, creating against a negative and adverse background—positive ide-
als. As Sean McCann demonstrated in Gumshoe America, the hard-boiled 
genre celebrated the individual as a phenomenon not just valid and possible 
but salutary. What “society” as a whole could no longer provide or exemplify, 
the individual could. What happens as the hard-boiled evolves is that the 
notions of ethics and principle, and by extension the very nature of ideals, 
come to be reconstituted as essentially, fundamentally embodied. They live in 
the mind and instinct of the character rather than being rooted in an “else-
where.” Mikhail Bakhtin had written of Dostoevsky’s fiction, “Living an idea 
is somehow synonymous with unselfishness.”74 “My ethics are my own,” how-
ever, does not mean living an idea in the Bakhtinian sense, which amounts 
to dedicating oneself to an idea rooted outside. Rather, it means dominating 
an idea, appropriating an idea. When a character claims that his ethics are 
his own, and when no other individual or institution even mentions ethics, 
much less presents an alternate ethical voice, then each individual version of 
the ethical is on the road to becoming the living embodiment of the idea.75 
In this sense, the individual version of the ethical resembles the individual 
theism that went some distance toward preserving religion in the face of the 
nineteenth-century process of secularization.76 And yet, as the hard-boiled 
evolves, the idea as such ceases to be the force or model that ennobles, that 
saves one from self-absorption. Rather, the idea becomes sublimated to a 
 74. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 71.
 75. Much as Homais’s “my religion” was in many ways a reasonable phenomenon, given 
the steady secularization of the mid-nineteenth century.
 76. As Don Cupitt writes, “[Theological realists] declare their unshakable allegiance to a 
vanished world in which the prevailing cultural conditions made it possible really to believe 
in objective theism. We do not have that particular mode of consciousness any longer because 
we do not live in that world any more. Theological realism can only actually be true for a het-
eronomous consciousness such as no normal person ought now to have.” Cupitt, Taking Leave 
of God, 12.
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voice, a character, and an attitude. That sublimation has its perils, all of which 
are outlined in schematic form in these first hard-boiled novels.
 I claimed that each of these novels is the almost entirely undisputed foun-
dation for hard-boiled novels that followed: the outlines that Daly created in 
Snarl are repeated in Raymond Chandler, Dashiell Hammett, James Cain, 
and others.77 Each hard-boiled character examined here functions as a cul-
turally specific respondent to the modern world, but each is also significantly 
different from its successors. These initial incarnations of the hard-boiled 
present an ideal of sorts, a high point of character solidity that engenders 
subsequent iterations. Not, as Robert Skinner proposed, because these first 
examples provide the raw-ish material of what will later be made fuller and 
more eloquent, but because they provide an ideal, if rather schematic, rendi-
tion of what will later, indeed almost immediately, become diluted and dis-
appointing. Hammett’s Red Harvest, published three years after The Snarl of 
the Beast, and La mort et l’ange, published five years after 120, rue de la Gare, 
represent steps toward that devolution of accountable subjectivity. Tolstoy 
famously wrote that whereas all happy families are alike, every unhappy fam-
ily is unhappy in its own way. In the hard-boiled, heroes are similar to one 
another in their heroic function, yet each culturally specific heroic model is 
contaminated in its own way. In the American post–hard-boiled, traumatic 
memory and stifling social pressure return to destroy both accountability and 
a sense of self. In the French post–hard-boiled, or néo-polar, contemplations 
of the self and its parameters will create a parody of introspection that invites 
rumination on complicated ideological models even as it steadily dismantles 
character (and Character) as such. In the American post–hard-boiled, “plain-
speaking” anti-intellectualism and instinctive sense of right will escalate to 
sociopathic proportions. In the French, the capacity for aesthetic contem-
plation in the midst of violence will morph into a Clockwork Orange–style 
pleasure in destruction. In the post–hard-boiled literature of each nation, 
ideals deteriorate precisely because they are founded, embodied, incarnated 
in a too-volatile individual who abdicates conscience and accountability. 
The individual has become volatile precisely because the forces of corrup-
tion, trauma, or deadening convention are exploited to such sinister narra-
tive effect as to evacuate character as such. The history of twentieth-century 
crime fiction thus becomes the history of the dismantling of the canonical 
culture hero and also of accountability itself, that foundation of self and of 
moral authority.
 77. Schwartz, Nice and Noir, 156. Geoffrey O’Brien writes: “Hammett was in every way 
the pivotal writer. . . . The hardboiled novel was born complete in Red Harvest in 1929, after a 
decade of experiments in the pages of Black Mask.” O’Brien, Hardboiled America, 63.
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THE HARD-BOILED GENRE is inextricably intertwined with the idea of con-
science as a continual achievement and with restoration of individual moral 
choice in the midst of circumstances that could dilute it. Essential to the ten-
sion of the hard-boiled is the sense that encroaching social contamination 
threatens the individual’s autonomy. Indeed, the dominant narrative theme 
of the hard-boiled has most often been read as one of society against the indi-
vidual. Jim Thompson’s novels dismantle that opposition, provoking critical 
questions of whether the faltering individual merely responds to a corrupt 
environment or is in fact amoral to start with. I contend that that entire ques-
tion, which foregrounds social criticism even as it puts individual psychosis 
on display, is the wrong one to ask. In Thompson’s work, the individual is 
as much the problem as it is the solution, and the notion of the individual 
crushed by outside forces becomes a strategy for avoiding accountability.
 Before focusing on Jim Thompson, I should say a word about the roads 
not taken in this chapter. In the aftermath of Carroll John Daly, Dashiell 
Hammett and Raymond Chandler created characters that are for the most 
part functional embodiments of the Race Williams dynamic. Sam Spade and 
Philip Marlowe join an individualistic manner of being with an incarnation 
of spiritual values—a freedom of agency together with a traditional, if acci-
dental, ethics of reciprocity and community. And when those ethics waver, 
as they inevitably do, Chandler and Hammett nonetheless maintain a space 
for the accountable subject. This is even the case in Hammett’s famously 
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bloody Red Harvest, in which corruption and violence are as encompassing 
as possible. In that 1929 novel, the Continental Op has been called to Per-
sonville to “clean up” the town. Not much is personal about the characters 
who populate Personville, which Sean McCann calls a “fantastically cosmo-
politan underworld”; almost all the characters are perpetrators, victims, or 
witnesses to the novel’s numerous murders.1 In the course of the novel, the 
Op acknowledges—not surprisingly given the sixteen murders committed 
at that point—that the town is getting to him: “This damned burg’s getting 
me. If I don’t get away soon I’ll be going blood-simple like the natives. .  .  . 
This is the first time I’ve ever got the fever. It’s this damned burg. You can’t 
go straight here.”2 With these statements, the Op’s narrative describes more 
communal and political decline than individual corruption.3 John Whitley 
writes, “In Red Harvest the question of individual guilt becomes submerged 
in a wider view of social guilt.”4 This view of guilt is so vast, in fact, as to con-
sume the conventional structures and vocabulary of morality; “fever” and the 
neologism “blood-simple” disconnect the novel’s violence from conventional 
moral discourse and situate violence at a cellular level. As Christopher Breu 
incisively puts it, “While placing the Op at the center of the violence (and of 
the critique of this violence), the text resists making him its cause. Instead, 
his increasingly brutal tactics are presented as one more symptom of the 
town’s (always already) ‘fallen’ condition.”5 The “always already” nature of the 
“fallen” condition amounts to an utter absence, rather than loss or abandon-
ment, of moral and spiritual standards. Indeed, the earlier-cited description 
of Fichtean philosophies of history as “mak[ing] a negative judgment on the 
present without basing it explicitly on a value judgment” comes to mind 
here, since as Breu and others note, the town radiates an amorality that is 
totalizing and irreversible.6
 1. McCann, Gumshoe America, 80. 
 2. Hammett, Red Harvest, 584.
 3. Indeed, the novel constructs a continuous loop that erases the accountable (or even 
conscious) subject before it is even postulated. For instance, shortly before telling his col-
leagues, “Don’t kid yourselves that there’s any law in Poisonville except what you make for 
yourself ” (551), the Op declares that “anybody that brings any ethics to Poisonville is going to 
get them all rusty” (549). That initial disclaimer weakens the subsequent “you” as a meaning-
ful maker of laws; the subsequent mention of “laws you make for yourself ” rings hollow.
 4. Whitley, “Stirring Things Up,” 452.
 5. Breu, Hard-Boiled Masculinities, 66. Some critics do see the Op as responsible for 
his “blood-simple” condition. Heise writes, “The line between law and crime is deliberately 
rubbed out by Hammett, who consistently figures the detective as the most violent, blood-
thirsty presence in a city where municipal reform is made synonymous with the expunging of 
immigrants and criminalized working-class culture.” Heise, “Going Blood-Simple,” 490. 
 6. Romantic heroism is conspicuously absent here. Even Cooper’s description of Hawk-
eye’s “expression of sturdy honesty” gets retroactively undercut as the Op comments: “I looked 
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 The 1802 Baptist minister cited in the first chapter of this book had 
described American religious revivals—themselves a sort of cleaning up and 
reconstruction—in which “hot-headed young men, intoxicated with the pre-
vailing element of excitement” “assumed the office of public exhorters and 
instructors.” In that formulation, the excitement of being the cleaner turns 
into an excitement that impedes the cleaning. And indeed, the dominant leg-
acy of religious revivals is precisely that excitement, that fervor, which finds 
a sort of counterpart in the Op’s blood-simple “fever.” Excitement drives the 
“assumption of office” and the devolution into ego, much as the Op’s “fever” 
drives the enthusiasm and then the degeneracy of the cleanup. In both cases, 
excitement for the job devolves into corruption and domination. Despite the 
force of exhilaration, though, Hammett’s novel does nonetheless remind us 
that the flow of ideas between the individual and the outside world is nei-
ther automatic nor unconscious, and that moments of conscience stand in 
the midst of that motion. When the Op tells Dinah Brand that he fears going 
“blood-simple,” she observes, “Your nerves are shot. You’ve been through too 
much excitement in the last few days. Keep it up and you’re going to have 
the heebie-jeebies for fair, a nervous breakdown.” The Op then holds up his 
hand to display its steadiness, and Dinah says, “That doesn’t mean anything. 
It’s inside you. Why don’t you sneak off for a couple of days’ rest?” To which 
the Op answers, “Can’t, sister. Somebody’s got to stay here to count the dead. 
Besides, the whole program is based on the present combination of people 
and events. Our going out of town would change that, and the chances are 
the whole thing would have to be gone over again.”7 This dialogue creates 
a moment of subjectivity wherein the Op’s emotional response to his sur-
roundings meets his accountability as an actor within those surroundings. 
In one sense, the excitement that Dinah cites aligns with the term “blood-
simple” that implies biological resistance to understanding.8 At the same time, 
Dinah’s warning not to “keep it up” makes the Op responsible for perpetuat-
ing the excitement and thus for continuing the narrative. Also, crucially, it is 
when she notes that “it’s inside you” that the Op declares the whole program 
“based on the present combination of people and events.” That moment inter-
rupts the continuous diffusion of responsibility and places emphasis, as in 
Saussure’s linguistic chessboard, on the world as it presently is. It acknowl-
most honest when I was lying.” Hammett, Red Harvest, 598.
 7. Ibid., 588.
 8. John Walker writes that the Op “internalizes and replicates the violence of his environ-
ment in the manner of a machine, yet his delirium precipitates a regression to animal instincts.” 
Walker, “City Jungles,” 126.
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edges that individual people have a distinct role in that world and that the Op 
knows it.
 Most of Chandler’s and Hammett’s characters make pointed admissions 
of halfheartedness, even corruption, that point to an environmental under-
tow but maintain conscious subjectivity. One such gesture is Philip Marlowe’s 
admission at the end of The Big Sleep (1939): “I was part of the nastiness 
now,” an admission that casts the individual as an astute if fading beacon 
in a spiritual night.9 But as Johanna Smith writes of that admission, “While 
it would appear that Marlowe is now tarnished by the corruption around 
him, his statement actually attests to his continuing purity. That is, simply 
by knowing that he is ‘part of the nastiness,’ Marlowe in effect testifies to 
a moral discrimination so fine as to negate his self-condemnation.”10 In a 
similar vein, Hammett’s third-person Maltese Falcon (1930) describes Sam 
Spade—and here one need not be concentrating on the spiritual resonances 
of hard-boiled heroism to read this as a symbolic provocation—as looking 
“rather pleasantly like a blond satan.”11 And yet, Sam Spade’s insistence that 
“I won’t play the sap for you,” as he turns Brigid over to the police at the end 
of The Maltese Falcon, is often read as a declaration of independence from 
corruption.12
 In their relationships with women, such characters slip from Race Wil-
liams’s “Victorian” attitude to an abiding mistrust—of women and of people 
in general—that turns individualism into self-absorption. John Irwin had 
written that Sam Spade’s decision to turn Brigid in has to do with a typically 
American privileging of who one is over relationships one has, and he also 
notes “the recurring situation . . . of Spade telling parabolic stories or giving 
explanations .  .  . only to have those not be understood by the women who 
hear them.”13 Philip Marlowe avoids romantic entanglements, and John Paul 
Athanasourelis proposes that this avoidance might amount to “downright 
misogyny.”14 LeRoy Panek contests that reading, proposing instead that the 
detective of the twenties and thirties merely “wants what he cannot find in 
this world.”15
 9. Chandler, The Big Sleep, 197.
 10. Johanna M. Smith, “Raymond Chandler,” 596.
 11. Hammett, Maltese Falcon, 5.
 12. Deming, Running Away from Myself, 30. As Ross Macdonald has written, “the classless, 
restless man of American democracy, who spoke the language of the street .  .  . [Sam Spade] 
possesses the virtues and follows the code of a frontier male.” Macdonald, On Crime Writing, 
15–16.
 13. Irwin, Threat of Death, 28, 26. John Cawelti has written of hard-boiled misogyny in 
Adventure, Mystery, and Romance, as has, more recently, Erin Smith in Hard-Boiled.
 14. Athanasourelis, Raymond Chandler’s Philip Marlowe, 72.
 15. Panek, Introduction to the Detective Story, 163.
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 A similar compendium of violence and sentimentality, empathy and 
distance, stoicism and sensitivity emerges in Mickey Spillane. Spillane is 
sometimes grouped with Jim Thompson under the heading of pathological 
aggression, and his name has become shorthand for literature made to please 
an unthinking public. Frank McConnell calls Mike Hammer “hyperviolent,” 
and E. M. Beekman finds in him a “savage delight in blood and guts.”16 To 
cite an account from a critic of Spillane’s own time, Frank Leonard writes, 
“The sex content of such works as Spillane’s is of an unreal nature, in no way 
comparable to the experiences of readers in their own lives; Spillane seeks to 
challenge no commonly held ideas, to discuss no real human problems, and is 
therefore free to write on the subject more or less as he pleases.”17 At the same 
time, Mike Hammer is often read as an embodiment of the national mood, 
particularly with respect to communism and the Cold War. Although he can 
be read as a character driven by aggression, he belongs in fact to the clas-
sic hard-boiled school. An examination of Spillane demonstrates that what 
marks the real deterioration of the hard-boiled hero is neither violence nor 
crudeness but rather an abandonment of self-appraisal.
 In I the Jury (1947), Mike Hammer’s close friend and army buddy, Jack 
Williams, has been murdered. He promises his dead friend that his killer will 
die the same way he did, “with a .45 slug in the gut.” In the course of his inves-
tigation, Hammer meets and falls in love with Charlotte Manning. In the end, 
he finds out that she is in fact the murderer, and he shoots her in the stomach. 
The novel ends thus: “‘How c-could you?’ she gasped. I only had a moment 
before talking to a corpse, but I got it in. ‘It was easy,’ I said.”18 This ending 
recalls Hammett’s The Maltese Falcon, which ended with Sam Spade handing 
over to the police the woman who had murdered his partner. The Maltese Fal-
con, however, ended with a turn to the police rather than to an eye-for-an-eye 
revenge killing; John Cawelti has cited Hammer’s “It was easy” as evidence 
of Hammer’s misogyny as well as of the hardening of the hard-boiled hero.19 
But in spite of a “kill-crazy” public persona, he falls into conventional ethical 
parameters. The contrast between Hammer’s minimal reaction to violence 
done to him, and his empathic response when violence is done to others, 
shows him to be the descendant of Race Williams and Nestor Burma.
 16. McConnell, “Detecting Order,” 183; Beekman, “Raymond Chandler,” 155.
 17. Leonard, “Cozzens without Sex,” 216.
 18. Spillane, Mike Hammer Collection, 1:7, 147.
 19. “Here the killing of the evil one is obviously a matter of self-defense, vengeance, and 
the righteous execution of a vicious killer who endangers society. But the killing is given fur-
ther moral overtones as an appropriate response to an immoral use of feminine sexuality for 
the purpose of betrayal. It becomes a purification of the obscene as well as the destruction of 
a killer.” Cawelti, “Myths of Violence,” 527.
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 One of the most striking elements of the Hammer series is the spiritual 
import given to another person’s moral evaluation of him—to the combi-
nation of empathic connection and self-appraisal. In Spillane’s fourth Mike 
Hammer novel, One Lonely Night (1951), Hammer is leaving a courtroom 
where a judge has reluctantly acquitted him of murder. Hammer is tormented 
at recalling the judge’s lecture, which accused him of having developed a 
taste for blood during the Second World War. That lecture, in Hammer’s 
mind, resonates not just as another person’s moral evaluation of his char-
acter but also as a sort of divinely significant indictment. “He had a voice 
like an avenging angel. The dignity and knowledge behind his face gave him 
the stature of a giant, the poise of Gabriel reading your sins aloud from the 
Great Book and condemning you to your fate. .  .  . He prophesied a rain of 
purity that was going to wash me into the sewer with the other scum leaving 
only the good and the meek to walk in the cleanliness of law and justice.”20 
The judge’s words to Hammer, as well as their overtones of fire and brim-
stone, echo throughout the book. “So the judge was right all the while. I 
could feel the madness in my brain . . .”21 Although the character’s ideas can 
be seen through the lens of national mood, it is the individual rather than the 
national mood who acts within the world of the hard-boiled, which, particu-
larly in Spillane, is invariably a microworld of individual characters. Alternat-
ing between vituperative indictments of society and claims to want to stand 
up for it, Hammer’s focus is on society’s problems and the insufficiency of its 
institutions. And yet, the character’s own most compelling problems are not 
with society but with himself and other people. It is striking that this novel, 
which gives an almost anthemic voice to national concerns about commu-
nism, also reveals Hammer engaged in his most insistently personal moral 
inventory. The events of the novel, coming on the heels of the judge’s lecture, 
pushes him not only to an investigation into the identities of others but to 
self-examination as well.
 Prominent in the judge’s discourse and in Hammer’s endless recollec-
tions of it is the claim that Hammer found pleasure in war’s violence: “He 
had to go back five years to a time he knew of only secondhand and tell me 
how it took a war to show me the power of the gun and the obscene plea-
sure that was brutality and force, the spicy sweetness of murder sanctified 
by law.” Hammer subsequently goes into a sort of moral tailspin, concerned 
that he “would be washed down the sewer with the rest of all the rotten-
ness sometime.”22 Implicit in his concern is that the experience “over there” 
 20. Spillane, Mike Hammer Collection, 2:6, 7.
 21. Ibid., 2:6, 158.
 22. Ibid., 2:6, 8.
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was incidental and that the “taste for death” was innate. His recollections 
take on an obsessional, apocalyptic cast. In a dream, for instance, remem-
bering a suicide he witnessed, “I saw the bridge again, and two people die 
while the stern face of the judge looked on disapproving, uttering solemn 
words of condemnation. I saw flashes of fire, and men fall.”23 What is sig-
nificant about these ruminations and remembrances is their representation 
of postwar mental intactness in spiritual terms as well as of postwar mental 
aftermath—a collective experience—as they relate to individual moral assess-
ment. His violent memories echo Lyman Beecher’s nineteenth-century warn-
ings against sin. Benoît Tadié points out the potential dangers in Hammer’s 
quasi-admission of a “taste for death,” but also his ultimate avoidance of that 
peril: “The author brings his narrator to the dangerous point of knowing his 
own cruelty, which imperils his own existence as protagonist: the reader who 
is not aberrant will have trouble identifying with a character who enjoys cut-
ting prisoners of war into little pieces. But the plot of the novel allows the 
violence to be justified. .  .  . Violence and the taste for murder prove useful 
to the community” [L’auteur conduit son narrateur jusqu’à cette limite dan-
gereuse où il reconnaît sa propre cruauté, mettant en péril ses conditions 
d’existence comme héros de roman: le lecteur, à moins d’être un pervers, aura 
du mal à s’identifier à un personnage qui découpe en rondelles des prison-
niers de guerre et aime ça. Mais l’intrigue du roman permettra de justifier la 
violence du héros. . . . La violence et le goût du meurtre s’avèrent finalement 
utiles à la collectivité].24 It is true that Hammer’s violence has become useful 
to the collective, but what really prevents him from coming across as an out-
of-control psychopath is precisely his ruminations, his admissions of perver-
sity. In his moments of introspection he turns to his secretary, confiding, “I 
want to find out about myself, Velda.”25 These ruminations protect Hammer 
in part because the American heroic tradition is much more welcoming than 
the French to admissions and redemptions but also because those admissions 
underscore accountability, the point being that an individual conscious and 
critical of his own actions is inherently more likely to be helpful to society.
JIM THOMPSON
Criticism of hard-boiled fiction often uses a vocabulary of ethical pollution—
submersion, repetition, desensitization, internalization—that represents the 
 23. Ibid., 2:138.
 24. Tadié, Le polar américain, 20.
 25. Spillane, Mike Hammer Collection, 2:16.
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individual as ceding to the outside. As long as his principal battle is against 
the outside world and his own “internalizations” of it, as long as there is a 
“self ” to wage that battle, the character can maintain an ontological separa-
tion from the outside world and preserve his status as repository of moral 
authority. With Jim Thompson, though, the hard-boiled genre made a radical 
turn from that tension. Departing from the well-trodden opposition of the 
good or trying-to-be-good individual to a problematic environment, even a 
problematic internal environment, it veered into the individual as problem-
atic in and of himself, on his own steam. This sharp break altered the history 
of the hard-boiled, not because there were no more novels published about 
classically heroic characters but because autonomy and accountability became 
optional. The very notions of character and self and conscience, solid in the 
classic hard-boiled, began to splinter, or rather to be splintered by the nar-
rating character himself. The deliberate nature of this dismantling is crucial, 
since otherwise the distinction between an individual who is the source of 
contamination and one who merely succumbs to it might seem purely aca-
demic or semantic. If corruption is so extensive that even the best-intentioned 
individual ends up being a relatively active part of it, and if the individual 
turns out inevitably to perpetrate or perpetuate structural and institutional 
corruption, then what is the use of talking about the individual qua individual 
at all? And yet Jim Thompson demonstrates that the dilution or truncation of 
individual autonomy is less an external reality than a demoralizing narrative 
strategy.
 In a sense, the contamination or corruption of the individual in Thomp-
son’s fiction mirrors the suppression of meaningful individualism by total-
izing bourgeois structures. Carl Freedman and Christopher Kendrick, for 
instance, frame Hammett’s Continental Op in terms of “bourgeois legality”: 
“Though he is on one level independent of the police—and hence free of cer-
tain statist constraints on the individualist or ‘whole man’—his entire posi-
tion as a respectable entrepreneur (or an entrepreneur’s loyal employee) ties 
him to the state and makes him function, in the last analysis, as an adjunct 
to the official forces of law and order.”26 Bourgeois legality focuses on social 
responsibility and the ethics of reciprocity, whereas post–hard-boiled repre-
sentations of contamination underscore meanness, carelessness, and violence. 
The first focuses on social function and the latter on social dysfunction, but 
the essential problem remains the same: what is the point of the individual? 
Is talking about individual autonomy in some sense always tantamount to 
reanimating a useless fantasy of free subjectivity?
 26. Freedman and Kendrick, “Forms of Labor,” 214.
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 Jim Thompson’s momentous contribution to that conversation lies in 
showcasing an individual cannily manipulating the apparent bounds of 
autonomy. What appears to be structural or institutional corruption is in fact 
the work of an individual or individuals. That work may be represented as 
careless and nearly automatic in nature, or at times as inevitable (as in post-
Foucauldian examinations of ethics and motivation), but automation and 
inevitability in Thompson’s fiction are in fact a narrative ruse intended to 
blur the lines of accountability. What is more, such a ruse serves to mock 
the blame-diffusing effect of twentieth-century theories of subjectivity. The 
reason these mockeries merit examination is that, paradoxically enough, 
hard-boiled representations of the individual as intensely, dramatically, and 
creatively bad and unethical—and these are numerous as the twentieth cen-
tury evolves and as the bar of unacceptable conduct falls lower—are the best 
road to a constructive critical conversation about moral authority and the 
possibility of an ethical collective. To put it another way: the opposition, even 
the eventually failed opposition, of the individual and the collective may 
make for a compelling dramatic line. But discussions of contamination, cor-
ruption, pollution, and deterioration—all of which appear in the traditional 
hard-boiled—can also be powerful instruments for distracting attention from 
the individual. In The Killer Inside Me, Thompson’s most famous novel, the 
narrator puts the idea of limited autonomy and accountability to great use. 
Provocatively, he manipulates the discourse of traumatic repetition, mental 
illness, and overbearing social control to create these limitations by painting a 
broad and sinister picture of the self as hopelessly porous social product. But 
he also reveals that porous mass to be something of an illusion, since every 
individual is a narrative actor.
NOIR AND THE MID-CENTURY HARD-BOILED
Jim Thompson’s name functions as veritable shorthand for the post–hard-
boiled of the postwar period. Two of his most popular novels, The Killer Inside 
Me and Pop. 1280, feature sheriffs as characters and thus maintain a tenuous 
connection with the idea of law enforcement, but these are not crime fight-
ers in the usual sense, nor were his novels murder mysteries. The unknowns 
in Thompson’s novels focus on who will be killed next and what pathologies 
revealed, rather than the traditional hard-boiled questions of who has done 
the killing and what the detective can do about it. Resolving unknowns is 
thus disconnected from either social restoration or redemption and resem-
bles watching a train crash. Given these sharp structural and tonal depar-
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tures from the hard-boiled formula, as well as Thompson’s relentless ridicule 
of Chandler’s “man of honor” and “man who is not himself mean,” includ-
ing Thompson in the hard-boiled school may not be immediately compre-
hensible. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising to find him in the pantheon of 
hard-boiled crime fiction authors at all; and yet, not only is he there, he is 
the quintessence of the postwar hard-boiled. It is in that capacity that he so 
radically transfers responsibility to the main character and ushers in the prob-
lematic individual.
 One oft-mentioned explanation for such inclusion in—not to mention 
position atop—the hard-boiled pantheon is the rise of noir as a generic and 
critical term. J. Madison Davis writes of Thompson: “A tiny number of grum-
blers might argue he doesn’t deserve to be a household name, dismissing 
him as a pulp writer, but thanks to the French critics who recognized the 
underlying power of a certain kind of film and novel and dubbed it noir, as 
well as the breakdown of artistic hierarchies among critics in general, pulp 
fiction is no longer immediately dismissible.”27 Because Thompson’s popular-
ity coincides with a distillation of hard-boiled into noir, it is worth a moment 
to parse this coincidence and point out that Thompson’s contribution to the 
hard-boiled school depends essentially on its basis in individualism, not its 
dissolution into noir despair. As generic descriptors, “hard-boiled” aligns 
more with fiction and noir with film; as critical terminology, it emphasizes 
narrative form and attitude, whereas noir looks at ambiance, atmosphere, 
and existential worldview. Alistair Rolls and Deborah Walker write: “To noir 
is not to remember the past with longing or to harbour delusions as to the 
way life used to be; instead, it is to act in the present with no idea of what is 
to come and in full (if suppressed) knowledge that our memories of the past 
are longings and not more than that.”28 For Christopher Breu, “What emerges 
from [noir stories] is a resolutely negative fantasy space, in which the reader 
has no stable site of identification and in which no larger social collectivity 
or unproblematic social or moral position can be imagined.”29 In these and 
other interpretations, noir is an absence—of technicolor, heroism, idealism, 
redemption, transcendence, order, the absolute.30 It is not a coincidence that 
Jim Thompson found great critical and commercial success in France, where 
film noir was born and where his books were made into movies. A Hell of a 
 27. Davis, “No Man Is a Prophet,” 39–40.
 28. Rolls and Walker, French and American Noir, 7.
 29. Breu, Hard-Boiled Masculinities, 43.
 30. Noir is also a common term to use when referencing French interactions with—in-
terpretations of or influences on—the American hard-boiled. The closest French translation 
of hard-boiled is roman noir, for the more literal dur à cuire usually has a somewhat parodic 
resonance.
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Woman (1954) became Alain Corneau’s 1979 film Série noire, and Pop. 1280 
(1964) became Bertrand Tavernier’s 1981 Coup de torchon, set in 1930s West 
Africa.
 The transition from 1930s and 1940s hard-boiled fiction into noir fiction 
and film, or from urban wasteland into negative fantasy space, coincides with 
the publication of Jim Thompson’s work, that in criticism is often read as evi-
dence of those precise absences. In other words, he is a writer often associ-
ated with what has gone missing from society, and virtually every critic who 
studies him employs the vocabulary of disappearance or deterioration. Peter 
Prescott, in a review for Newsweek, finds in Thompson’s novels “the absence 
of any moral center at all.”31 This absence is situated in the principal charac-
ter but is most often read as emblematic of a contaminated world. So it is for 
Kenneth Payne, who sees the “world gone wrong” as emblematic of the post-
modern condition: “There is a place for Thompson in the postmodern. .  .  . 
His discourse of disintegration undermines the illusions of American com-
munity, exceptionalism, and moral order.”32 Joel Black writes, “Stories of serial 
violence are inherently episodic and lack any definite beginning, middle, or 
end. . . . Such ‘promiscuous analogism’ flourishes in the absence of narrative 
structures informed by cause, intention, and motive.”33 These readings fur-
nish incisive descriptions of his novels’ bleakness but are persistently wrong 
about its cause. Like the transition to secularism in the nineteenth century, 
the mid-century dissolution of the individual subject is as much a story as it 
is a historical phenomenon. Historical circumstances such as the McCarthy 
witch hunts, the development of the hydrogen bomb, and increased social 
conformity contributed to the material generation of that story, in which the 
principal character was precisely the absence of individual character. But 
Thompson nonetheless places individual moral choice in the foreground, 
insisting that individuals acting upon one another combine to generate the 
stories that become master narratives.
 The advent of noir, with its focus on ambiance and atmosphere, encour-
aged discourse around the hard-boiled to focus with respect to individual 
characters on mental condition rather than thought. If hard-boiled is a per-
sona and a series of decisions, noir is a diagnosis, and one that seems to 
underscore the hopelessness of worlds inside and out. Furthermore, since 
the early hard-boiled foregrounded (and criticism of it studied) the tension 
between the individual and a spreading corrupt environment, both noir and 
the mid-century hard-boiled read as symptomatic of that encroachment. 
 31. Prescott, “Cirrhosis of the Soul,” 90.
 32. Kenneth Payne, “Pottsville, USA,” 127.
 33. Black, “Murder,” 790.
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Biographer Michael McCauley writes of Thompson: “His criminals and their 
actions are only the most extreme examples of a whole world gone wrong.” 
Biographer Robert Polito writes that the vision in Pop. 1280 “wriggles past 
private madness, or American rot, to universal horror.”34 In these readings, 
the myriad wrongs in Jim Thompson’s world find reflection in the individual 
but do not necessarily have their source in him—the atmosphere seems too 
grim to be reducible to one individual. And yet, the elephant in the room, 
the element that renders Thompson’s fiction hard-boiled, and that renders 
his name synonymous with a hard-boiled turn toward hopelessness and away 
from exemplarity, is not just its dark mood and anti-idealistic characters, but 
its maintenance—ironic but nonetheless insistent and consistent—of the indi-
vidual as beacon and center of the narrative. When Race Williams declared, 
“My ethics are my own,” he placed himself at the moral and narrative center 
of the novel, refusing to cede ground to the forces of meanness and destruc-
tion around him, and refusing as well to cede to other perspectives, other 
voices. Philip Marlowe made small gestures in the direction of some such sur-
render at the end of The Big Sleep, musing, “I was part of the nastiness now.” 
Mickey Spillane’s Mike Hammer also wondered about his role in the world’s 
nastiness, though he viewed his own nastiness as standing hand in hand with 
the world’s, not subordinate to it. Jim Thompson’s main characters combine 
these stances, switching shrewdly between determined centrality and gestures 
of hopelessness. The result is not existential torment but an ersatz nihilis-
tic powerlessness. There is much more drive than pessimism in Thompson’s 
fiction, for hard-boiled individualism and behavioral consistency—in the 
vein of Race Williams’s “my ethics are my own”—are alive and well in Lou 
Ford. He perpetuates the cult of personality and of individualism that Race 
Williams had inaugurated. What is missing, of course, is the continuity of 
this individualism with received historic models of heroic conduct—models 
discursive and behavioral—for the man is a point-by-point rewriting of the 
hard-boiled American model of spiritual exemplarity.
THE KILLER INSIDE ME
The Killer Inside Me, published in 1952, one year after Spillane’s One Lonely 
Night, is Thompson’s best-known novel. Lou Ford, the twenty-nine-year-old 
sheriff of Central City, pretends to be a bland and boring rube though in fact 
committing every murder in the novel. He recounts memories of his child-
 34. McCauley, Jim Thompson, 242; Polito, Savage Art, 456.
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hood, his tendency to violence, his overbearing father, his sexual relationship 
with the housekeeper, and his early awareness of his own mental illness. In 
some ways he comes across as a descendant of Spillane’s Mike Hammer, who 
wanted to “find out about myself.” Lou Ford seems at numerous points to 
want to find out about himself, describing his present behavior in relation 
to past experiences, searching his father’s collection of psychiatric literature 
for accounts of his diagnosis, remaining on the lookout for circumstances 
that could reactivate his sublimated—and italicized—sickness. Dorothy Clark 
writes, “He is a constant, self-consuming commentator on his own char-
acter, a kind of literary critic of his own life narrative.” This is quite true, 
though it is essential to note that he is also the author of his life narrative. 
Ford’s gestures of introspective curiosity are misleading, in part because, as 
Clark notes, he subverts the “traditional, modern, and postmodern explana-
tory models of evil” even as he proposes them.35 Beyond this, though, much 
of what is demoralizing about this character—for it is a character-centered 
narrative, not a philosophical one—is Ford’s subversion of the standards of 
heroism laid down in the nineteenth century and solidified in the classic 
hard-boiled. Ford turns simplicity into stupidity, intelligence into calcula-
tion, guilelessness into cluelessness—not to mention a consistent narrative 
voice and point of view into a disorienting series of contradictions. Virtu-
ally every feature of the Western or hard-boiled hero, including steadiness of 
vision, point of view, and critical distance from the outside world is undone, 
and so the crucial character connections among intelligence, simplicity, and 
moral uprightness—connections central to the American hero for more than 
a century—are broken.
 First, Ford eschews any humble or practical distance from the intellec-
tual: while Race Williams avoided “long-winded professors,” Lou Ford quotes 
Wordsworth and then states, “I reckon I should have been a college profes-
sor or something like that.”36 He also mentions his capacity to read German, 
French, Spanish, and Italian, noting, “I’d just picked ’em up with Dad’s help, 
just like I’d picked up some higher mathematics and physical chemistry and 
half a dozen other subjects” (27).
 Second, he embraces rather than demurs the claim of spiritual authority: 
he declaims Bible verses before murdering Johnnie Pappas, who had looked 
up to him and trusted him. This reversal is still stronger in the 1964 Pop. 1280, 
where Nick Corey exults in messianic delusion: “I said I meant I was just 
doing my job, followin’ the holy precepts laid down in the Bible. It’s what I’m 
 35. Clark, “Being’s Wound,” 52, 54.
 36. Thompson, The Killer Inside Me, 5. Subsequent references to this work are given par-
enthetically. 
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supposed to do, you know, to punish the heck out of people for bein’ people. 
To coax ’em into revealin’ theirselves, an’ them kick the crap out of ’em.”37 
Kenneth Payne describes Corey’s messianic fantasies as “futile gestures in the 
face of his overriding sense of the vacuum at the center of things.”38 But futil-
ity is the character’s very aim, for Corey is the source of the vacuum, its nar-
rator, and its most enthusiastic fan. His ironic abdication, “You can’t fault a 
jug for being twisted because the hand of the potter slipped,”39 reminiscent of 
Chandler’s rueful “I was part of the nastiness now,” taunts the reader who is 
accustomed to blaming character on culture.
 Third, Ford abandons all claims of responsibility. He explains that his 
affair with Amy “hadn’t started anywhere. We’d just drifted together like 
straws in a puddle. . . We hadn’t needed to do anything. It was all done for us” 
(30). When he murders Joyce, he tells the man he intends to frame, “Don’t you 
say I killed her. SHE KILLED HERSELF!” (52). And when he finds out Joyce is 
not in fact dead, he complains that “things shouldn’t have turned out this way. 
It was just plumb unreasonable” (55).
 Fourth, he abandons the physical initiative of the pioneer wanderer: On 
his visit to Fort Worth, Ford remains in the hotel, musing that “I had to 
stay here by myself, doing nothing, seeing nothing, thinking the same old 
thoughts” (78). A sense of limited possibilities accompanies his sedentari-
ness, as does a sense of limited perspective. On the plane to Fort Worth he 
sleeps through the flight, missing the bird’s-eye view, and he “felt kind of dis-
appointed. I’d never been out of the county before, and now that I was sure 
Joyce wasn’t going to live I could have enjoyed seeing the sights. As it was I 
hadn’t seen anything. I’d wasted all my time sleeping” (74). And in contrast 
with Hammett’s Continental Op, who plowed though Red Harvest on large 
quantities of alcohol and almost no sleep, Ford declares: “I can sleep eighteen 
hours and still not feel rested. Well, I’m not tired, exactly, but I hate to get 
up” (94).40
 Fifth, he mocks the former soldier, declaring of Howard Hendricks, the 
county attorney: “I hoped that chunk of shrapnel under his ribs had punc-
 37. Thompson, Pop. 1280, 206. And, “I’m the savior himself, Christ on the Cross come right 
here to Potts County, because God knows I was needed here” (179).
 38. Payne, “Pottsville, USA,” 56. 
 39. Thompson, Pop. 1280, 179.
 40. So too in Pop. 1280, whose principal character, small-town sheriff Corey, eats and sleeps 
a lot: “I’d sit down to a meal of maybe half a dozen pork chops and a few fried eggs and a pan 
of hot biscuits with grits and gravy, and I couldn’t eat it. Not all of it” (3). “It was the same way 
with sleeping. I’d climb in bed. . . . And then, no more than eight or nine hours later, I’d wake 
up. Wide awake” (4).
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tured a lung. That chunk of shrapnel had cost the taxpayers a hell of a pile of 
dough. He’d got elected to office talking about that shrapnel” (100).
 Sixth, he disposes of the ethics of amusement: Nestor Burma was able to 
deride his own misfortune, but he was careful not to mock the troubles of 
others. Ford’s sense of the comic is strongest when others suffer. “I’ve stood 
like that, looking nice and friendly and stupid, like I wouldn’t piss if my pants 
were on fire. And all the time I’m laughing myself sick inside. Just watching 
the people” (121). When the body of his murder victim is discovered by the 
man he intends to frame for that murder (this occurs twice), he laughs (187). 
He deadpans about the women he has pummeled, calling them cases of sui-
cide (182).
 Seventh, he twists the populist resonances of plainspokenness. As Erin 
Smith writes about the language of advertisements published in Black Mask:
Rather than employing learned terms, the language of these [advertised 
educational] programs was like the speech of working men addressing each 
other. One advertised training method was “so simple, thorough, and up-
to-date that you can easily understand and apply every line of it—no big 
words, no useless theory, no higher mathematics—just plain, every-day, 
straight-from-the-shoulder, man-to-man English-the kind you and I use 
everyday.” . . . Not coincidentally, both autonomous work and plain-speak-
ing were deeply enmeshed with “manliness” in the phenomenal world of 
Black Mask.41 
As discussed in earlier chapters, “plain-speaking” in this sense means a popu-
list avoidance of elaborate language and unnecessary verbosity. Lou Ford’s 
plainspokenness, however, takes the term to another conclusion: rather than 
speech that avoids ornamentation and intellectualism and facilitates commu-
nication, it is speech so bland and uninteresting as not to constitute com-
munication at all. As David Anshen writes, “Thompson’s novel represents 
clichés as both a key feature of commodified social existence and emblem-
atic of the way late capitalist society presents itself as stagnant, timeless, and 
beyond challenge.”42 If the environment at hand is stagnant and timeless, then 
a subject that “is its travels” could not be blamed for clichéd noncommuni-
cation. This novel seems to capitalize on the idea that in the absence of aims 
given to the character, either with “immediate obviousness” or not, there is 
no hope for conscious subjectivity and expression. For Anshen, the cliché 
 41. Erin A. Smith, “How the Other Half Read,” 215.
 42. Anshen, “Clichés and Commodity Fetishism,” 402.
 JIM THOMPSON • 109
resonates with postmodern alienation: “The novel also stages a fictional indi-
vidual’s relationship to his own language which can, usefully, be taken as an 
allegory for the relationship between labor and commodity production that 
exists in modern and postmodern society under conditions of generalized 
reification.”43 This reading can be expanded to indicate a general elision of the 
subject, which is the novel’s point, albeit an ironic one.
 Numerous speaking moments in the novel are also constructed to this eli-
sion. In the novel’s opening scene, a waitress from Dallas is surprised that Lou 
carries no gun, and his response is a model of disarmed and disarming bland-
ness. “‘No,’ I smiled. ‘No gun, no blackjack, nothing like that. Why should I? 
.  .  . People are people, even when they’re a little misguided. You don’t hurt 
them, they won’t hurt you. They’ll listen to reason’” (3). The refusal of weap-
ons suggests a personal (as opposed to impersonal) approach to policing, but 
what is more remarkable is the use of “smiled” that obscures or erases the act 
of speech. As clichéd as Homais and as bland as Charles Bovary, Lou Ford’s 
entrance into speech is notable for the elision of the speaker. The same era-
sure appears in conversation with Joe Rothman, who will eventually accuse 
him: “‘Sure,’ I smiled stupidly. ‘You just haven’t thought this deal through, 
Joe’” (22), and with Joyce Lakeland, as he launches into the novel’s first act 
of violence. “‘Sure,’ I grinned. My vision was clearing and I found my voice 
again. ‘Sure, ma’am, I know how it was. Used to get that way myself ’” (75).
DEMENTIA PRAECOX
When the hard-boiled switches directly from accidental or unintentional 
heroism to exclusion of the subject, it appears to let the individual abandon 
center stage—to turn the critical conversation from psychology to social con-
tamination, from character to culture. But Lou Ford’s particular reversals of 
the nineteenth-century model in fact serve to usher in a new sort of individ-
ual—the one who seems to blend into his surroundings, to cede to the atmo-
sphere, to blend into an overweening “nastiness,” but who nonetheless thinks, 
acts, and speaks with as much autonomy as his more reassuring predecessors.
 Lou Ford’s most detailed and provocative reversals of the classic hard-
boiled concern his perspective on his own shortcomings and his dealings 
with his own traumatic past. The original hard-boiled character practiced 
either a perspicacious self-deprecation or an admission of fault that actually 
belied moral intactness. In contrast with Race Williams and his descendants, 
 43. Ibid., 403–4.
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who held themselves to higher standards than other characters and seemed 
to reveal an organic American fortitude, Lou Ford perverts or inverts that 
formula. He demonstrates a consciousness, even a wariness of his own short-
comings, but that awareness changes nothing.
 When Ford sees a picture of his father’s former housekeeper, the woman 
who had abused him: “I was only like that for a few minutes, sitting there and 
staring, but a world of things, most of my kid life, came back to me in that 
time” (106). “So nothing had changed; I was still looking for her. And any 
woman who’d done what she had would be her” (216). This account perpetu-
ates his imprisonment within the bounds of the past and ensures his continu-
ing destructiveness. As narrator, he orchestrates this slide and, to harden the 
overdetermining force of his past, casts himself as a diagnostic study:
I’ve read a lot of stuff by a guy—name of Kraepelin, I believe—and I can’t 
remember all of it. I remember the high points of some, the most important 
stuff, and I think it goes something like this “. . . difficult to study because so 
seldom detected. The condition usually begins around the period of puberty, 
and is often precipitated by a severe shock . . .” That was written about a dis-
ease, or a condition, rather, called dementia praecox. Schizophrenia, para-
noid type. Acute, recurrent, advanced. Incurable. (219)
This citation is remarkable for several reasons. For one, it is not a quota-
tion from Emil Kraepelin, though it does sample a smattering of ideas about 
dementia praecox that were published by Kraepelin and others. However, 
the element of incurability—given dramatic prominence in Ford’s citation—
had already been abandoned or at least partially discredited in subsequent 
research on the illness. Eugen Bleuler, another researcher into “morbid psy-
chology” cited earlier in the novel, stated that progressive decline was not 
inevitable and that partial or near-complete remission was possible. The ref-
erence to Kraepelin rather than to Bleuler produces a Ford impervious to 
treatment, as overdetermined by his “sickness” as the noir character is by a 
nihilistic outside atmosphere. He is thus reaching for a dramatic anachro-
nism, an accountability-erasing diagnosis that would dovetail with received 
notions of traumatic repetition. What is most important about the references 
to Kraepelin, however, is that the precise pathology that Ford describes, cob-
bled together with ellipses and selected references to shrewdness, soundness 
of reason, and apparent logic, is nowhere close to clinical dementia praecox. It 
is true that some early research into the disease corresponds to some of Ford’s 
citations. Early writings about it include this account: “Some special physical 
or mental stress occurred at the critical period of adolescence. Other excit-
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ing causes may be severe illness, the puerperium, especially an illegitimate 
confinement, fright, or any severe shock.”44 Or: “It is not uncommon to have 
dementia praecox follow relatively slight psychic shocks.”45 As for the idea of 
being “seldom detected,” Kraepelin and Diefendorf write of a “‘moral imbe-
cility,’ in which patients show a certain shrewdness in the attainment of self-
ish advantages which often conceals the real severity of the disease.”46 These 
citations do not, however, establish an accurate portrait of dementia prae-
cox (later called schizophrenia). Schizophrenia is not “seldom detected,” nor 
does the schizophrenic (or dementiac) “appear logical” or “reason soundly, 
even shrewdly.” On the contrary, schizophrenia, particularly in the case of 
pubescent onset (hebephrenia), which Ford claims to have, is characterized 
by thoughts and actions that do not make sense to the outside world; accord-
ing to the DSM IV, “The most restrictive definition of psychosis requires a 
break in reality testing that is manifested by delusions or hallucinations about 
which the individual has no insight.”47
 The deceptively logical surface that Ford creates in the fictitious Kraepe-
lin blurb in fact corresponds not to schizophrenia but to psychopathy. Psy-
chopathy, not psychosis and not schizophrenia, is associated with “superficial 
charm, unreliability, poor judgment, and a lack of social responsibility, guilt, 
anxiety, and remorse.”48 The emotional component of morality is absent in 
the psychopath, though there are no cognitive impediments to its articula-
tion. As to the effects on narrative coherence, Gerald Prince writes: “Incoher-
ent commentaries expressed by the narrating voice, as well as deceptive or 
erroneous explanations and illogical conclusions . . . cast doubt on the inter-
pretive powers of the narrator; they do not necessarily deprive him or her of 
other powers. Lou Ford is a psychopath, but the geographical information he 
gives us about Central City is no less true.”49 Psychopathy, unlike psychosis, 
does not impede factual reporting but rather alters or eliminates its emo-
tional tenor. Not every psychopath, of course, is a murderer. But the empty-
ing of the emotional component threatens the substance of the hard-boiled 
character—threatens the outlines of character in general—by introducing the 
 44. Perkins, “The Nurse and the Mental Patient,” 175.
 45. Bartschinger, “Causation of Schizophrenia,” 227.
 46. Kraepelin and Diefendorf, Clinical Psychiatry, 63. Zane and Reid mention a class of 
criminal reformers who applied the term “dementia praecox” to any criminal. “They assert 
.  .  . that the victim of dementia praecox will not be cured by segregation and that he must 
be prevented from multiplying, for having inherited his condition he will transmit it.” Zane 
and Reid, Story of Law, 348. These authors, however, discredit the idea of dementia praecox as 
coterminous with criminality.
 47. Allen et al., DSM-IV Guidebook, 166.
 48. Sperry, DSM-IV-TR Personality Disorders, 37.
 49. Prince, “Narratology,” 548–49.
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specter of pure automation and pretense and destroying what Cassuto con-
vincingly described as his sentimentality. In light of this destruction, critical 
readings that see Lou Ford as embodiment of broad modern disillusion seem 
excessively apocalyptic. To cast psychopathic “lack of social responsibility, 
guilt, anxiety, and remorse” as continuous with the outside world is to paint a 
grim picture of that world. It is also to paint a startlingly pessimistic picture 
of the modern individual status quo. Elision of the accountable individual 
is part of the story of mid-century alienation, but it is nonetheless a story, a 
narrative invention. The actions and choices that Ford conceals under discus-
sions of dementia praecox create that story, constituting the central facts and 
dominant events of this novel.
 David Anshen distinguishes between Ford as narrator and Ford as char-
acter. “At the beginning of the novel, he seems a reliable narrator and an 
unreliable character but by the end as the character tries to master events his 
descriptive coherence breaks apart, spilling over into the narrative.”50 Anshen 
discusses this breaking apart in postmodern terms of words “losing referen-
tial character,” but the character’s unreliability is choreographed. It is strik-
ing that in this iconic tale of madness, the madness is so visibly fictitious. 
The misleading specter of dementia praecox, combined with moments of 
clarity that are inevitably washed over by further violent action, produces a 
doomed analytical process. Does Ford know something, or does he not know 
it? Does he actually believe something, or does he only pretend to believe 
it? But once the fact of his psychopathy emerges, once the “nastiness” of his 
being is shown to be a foundational part of the entire narration rather than 
an italicized adversary he must combat, then the story emerges as a dark sat-
ire of individualism. Once he is understood to be psychopathic rather than 
psychotic, and once cognition is separated from emotion, his apparent “try-
ing,” “believing,” and “knowing” cease to function in the service of an ethical 
telos, and his gestures at the sickness read as parodies of the sort of jaundiced 
clarity for which the hard-boiled is famous.
DANIEL PAUL SCHREBER
The mention of dementia praecox, by then a thoroughly outdated term for 
schizophrenia, exposes an intertextual reference that highlights Thompson’s 
satire of hard-boiled individualism. There is a moment in the narrator’s remi-
niscences when he recalls a conversation between his father and the family 
housekeeper, who had seduced Lou when he was a young teenager. “A mere 
 50. Anshen, “Clichés and Commodity Fetishism,” 418.
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child. Why not remember that? Listen to me, Daniel” (107). This is the sole 
mention of the name of Lou Ford’s father, but it calls to mind another father 
named Daniel, whose son, the famous real-life dementia praecox patient 
Daniel Paul Schreber, wrote memoirs about his illness in which his control-
ling father loomed large. Lou Ford’s references to dementia praecox, com-
bined with the schematic similarities between the Ford and Schreber families, 
encourage an intertextual association with Schreber. Like Lou Ford, Schre-
ber was raised by a physician (Daniel Moritz Schreber) who was deeply mis-
trustful of his own children. Like Lou Ford, Schreber had an older brother 
who died. Like Lou Ford, he worked in the domain of the law (as a lawyer 
and then a judge) until madness derailed him. Lou Ford’s mother was dead, 
and Schreber’s mother receded to the point of complete absence. Daniel Paul 
Schreber had by numerous accounts been irrevocably warped by his father’s 
catastrophically intrusive child-rearing practices. Furthermore, and unlike 
Lou Ford, Schreber actually was diagnosed with dementia praecox, and also 
unlike Ford, Schreber did not kill anyone. The connection is a shrewd red 
herring that parodies the hard-boiled traditions of humility and personal 
accountability.
 Daniel Paul Schreber (1842–1911), author of Memoirs of My Nervous Ill-
ness, was at the same time one of the most studied psychiatric patients in the 
world and also one of the most famous victims of an authoritarian, arguably 
sadistic father. As Rosemary Dinnage writes in the introduction to Schreber’s 
Memoirs, Schreber’s father “had a system and a manual for everything.”51 He 
invented the Geradehalter, a contraption to make children sit up straight, and 
a Kopfhalter, to keep the head straight. He wrote a number of books on chil-
dren, including Peculiarities of the Child’s Organism in Health and Illness and 
Medical Indoor Gymnastics. In an aside perversely relevant to Lou Ford’s sex-
ual memories of his family housekeeper, Schreber also authored The Friend of 
the Family [Der Hausfreund] as an Educator and Leader to Family Happiness 
and Human Refinement (1861). He had written of the need to rid a child of 
“that vestige of innate barbarity,” wanting, as Morton Schatzman puts it, to 
“curtail their children’s freedom by harsh disciplines” or as Louis Sass writes, 
to “root out and suppress much of the child’s natural spontaneity, willful-
ness, and independence.” Schatzman, in Soul Murder, intuits “a possible link 
between micro-social despotism in the Schreber family and the macro-social 
despotism of Nazi Germany.”52 Schreber’s Memoirs articulates an intense 
 51. Schreber, Memoirs, xii.
 52. Sass, Paradoxes of Delusion, 119; Schatzman, Soul Murder, 170. Schatzman also cites 
Elias Canetti, who did not speak of the father, but who found echoes of totalitarianism in 
Schreber’s delusions of God’s power.
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sense of persecution, of being watched and corrected, a sense readers have 
associated with his father’s relentless and disastrous parenting.
 Ford’s use of cliché and his suppression of the subject are also reminiscent 
of the detachment characteristic of Schreber. As Louis Sass writes about men-
tal illness and alienation from language:
The linguistic experience of the young child .  .  . seems to be vibrant and 
magical, with meanings proliferating wildly and sound and sense bleeding 
into each other. In Schreber’s experience, by contrast, language seems to 
be progressively stripped of significance: words stand forth with a quasi-
materiality nearly devoid of all emotional or semantic charge. It seems more 
accurate, and more consistent with the overall character of his panoptical 
world, to understand this linguistic opacity (and also the passivization) as 
resulting from an intense and disengaged introspection, from an alienated 
mode in which one does not live within language but contemplates it as a 
thing apart.53 
But whereas Schreber’s relationship to language was informed by his schizo-
phrenia, Lou Ford’s relationship to language seems choreographed to elimi-
nate the subject when the narrator finds it necessary.
 Another point of intersection between Daniel Ford and Schreber père lies 
in the two fathers’ opinions of religion. Lou Ford said of his father, “Dad 
always said that he had enough trouble sorting the fiction out of so-called 
facts, without reading fiction. He always said that science was already too 
muddled without trying to make it jibe with religion. He said those things, 
but he also said that science in itself could be a religion, that a broad mind 
was always in danger of becoming narrow” (104). The idea of the broad 
mind becoming narrow can read as a grotesque figuration of the Kopfhalter, 
or “head compressing machine” that Daniel Moritz Schreber invented. The 
notion that religion qua religion—the doctrinal nature of religion—can nar-
row the mind does correspond to what is known of his opinions. Eric Santner 
notes that Daniel Moritz Schreber advocated protecting children from reli-
gion until the age of twelve, since otherwise “the child is in danger of forever 
confusing the dead letter of religious doctrine . . . with the voice of authentic 
spiritual authority.”54
 The parallels between the Ford and Schreber father-son pairs, though 
schematic, are too numerous to be coincidental. Although there is no evi-
 53. Sass, Madness and Modernism, 137.
 54. Santner, My Own Private Germany, 90.
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dence that Jim Thompson researched the Schreber case, the team of doc-
tors of morbid psychology on Lou Ford’s reading list—Jung, Freud, Bleuler, 
Meyer, Kretschmer—all wrote about and studied Schreber, and it would be 
difficult to read about dementia praecox in even a cursory manner without 
encountering its most famous patient. These parallels, combined with Lou 
Ford’s disingenuous mention of dementia praecox as his own diagnosis, link 
him to a dramatic case of childhood trauma and, more to the point, of well-
documented, insurmountable parental fault.55
 Lou Ford declares that his trouble—the sickness he calls dementia praecox 
but that more resembles psychopathy—resulted from his father’s discovery of 
Lou’s relationship with the housekeeper: 
My [trouble] had started back with the housekeeper; with Dad finding out 
about us. All kids pull some pretty sorry stunts, particularly if an older 
person edges ’em along, so it hadn’t needed to mean a thing. But Dad had 
made it mean something. I’d been made to feel that I’d done something 
that couldn’t ever be forgiven—that would always lie between him and me, 
the only kin I had. And there wasn’t anything I could do or say that would 
change things. I had a burden of fear and shame put on me that I could 
never get shed of. (215)
The idea that Lou had a burden of shame “put on” him corresponds to Schre-
ber’s delusion of forces at once within and without. Indeed, this sense of a 
burden or force exerted both from within and without is borne out by Daniel 
Moritz Schreber’s pedagogical design.
 The points of intersection between Daniel Moritz Schreber and Dan-
iel Ford contribute to the representation of Lou Ford as a manipulated and 
confused victim of bad parenting and to his own endeavors to attenuate his 
accountability. Lou Ford writes that his father was subsequently conscious of 
his son’s pathology—a pathology for which at some level he seems to blame 
his father: “Dad had wanted me to be a doctor, but he was afraid to have me 
go away to school, so he’d done what he could for me at home” (27–28). Doing 
“what he could for me at home” meant arranging a job and a place to live. It 
meant encouraging his son to “talk and act like any other rube around town” 
 55. Theodore Dorpat opens a chapter titled “The Childhood Roots of Paranoid Psychopa-
thology” with an examination of the Schreber case, writing that “childhood traumas, includ-
ing corporal punishment and emotional and physical abuse, may play an important causal 
role in the etiology of paranoia and paranoid symptoms. One of the best-known cases of a 
patient with paranoid symptoms is that of Dr. Daniel Paul Schreber.” Dorpat, Crimes of Pun-
ishment, 26.
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in order to conceal his madness. It also meant arranging for his son to be 
sterilized, a procedure some of the psychiatrists cited on Lou Ford’s reading 
list recommended for patients with dementia praecox.56 He relaxes and eats 
his meals in his father’s office:
I sat in his big old leather chair, sipping coffee and smoking, and gradually 
the tension began to leave me. It had always made me feel better to come 
here, back from the time I was kneehigh to a grasshopper. It was like coming 
out of the darkness into sunlight, out of a storm into calm. Like being lost 
and found again. I got up and walked along the bookcases, and endless files 
of psychiatric literature, the bulky volumes of morbid psychology . . . all the 
answers were here. (27) 
Schreber’s memoirs also complain of the darkness: “Light, necessary for 
every human occupation, had become almost more essential for me than my 
daily bread in my allotted task of at all times convincing God, Who does not 
know the living human being, of my undiminished powers of reason.” Noting 
that “rays have the capacity to calm nerves and bring sleep,” he remarks that 
patients with nervous illnesses are calmer in the late morning “after the influ-
ence of a few hours of sunlight. The result is increased immensely if, as in my 
case, the body receives divine rays direct.”57
TRAUMATIC PANOPTICON
The intertextual shades of Schreber—the sympathetic specter of a damaged 
son—amounts to a subtle satire of accountability and a subversion of the clas-
sic hard-boiled profile. More than this, however, the Schreber case, with its 
implications of insurmountable trauma, raises the question of accountabil-
ity in a way that corresponds to mid-twentieth-century noir nihilism. The 
hard-boiled, as we remember, has to do with psychic fortitude and charac-
ter intactness in the midst of a contaminated atmosphere—with the ability 
to transcend or compartmentalize a traumatic past. Moritz Schreber was 
notable for a “poisonous pedagogy” that made transcendence impossible 
 56. For Schreber, part of his pathology seems to have centered on the desire to have chil-
dren. Writes Ida Macalpine, Schreber’s translator: “Schreber fell ill when a fantasy that he 
could, would or should have children became pathogenic. Simultaneously he became doubtful 
of his own sex” (Schreber, Memoirs, 385). Schreber and his wife had wanted children but had 
several stillbirths and no living biological children. They adopted a little girl.
 57. Schreber, Memoirs, 161, 92.
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precisely because it encompassed the child so completely.58 Not surprisingly, 
late twentieth-century analyses of his parenting and parenting philosophy 
focus on their wider resonances, or the ways in which his philosophy echoes 
an impersonal and inhumanly structured society. Sass, in an article titled 
“Schreber’s Panopticism,” wrote that Moritz Schreber’s child-rearing prac-
tices bore “an almost uncanny resemblance to the modern penal procedures 
of Discipline and Punish. His techniques can, in fact, be said to involve the 
two great bulwarks of the modern disciplinary order of power/knowledge 
described by Foucault: ‘exercise,’ whose goal is the creation of docile bodies; 
and ‘the examination,’ whose purpose is the monitoring—ultimately, the self- 
monitoring—of action and thought.”59 Some of the son’s delusions echoed his 
actual experiences at the hands of his father, though in his madness he attrib-
uted persecution and surveillance not to his father but to other individuals 
and to outside forces, notably, the “rays.” As Leonard Cassuto writes, “Thomp-
son’s unsettling play with the reader’s expectations invokes what sociologist 
Philip Rieff later called ‘the triumph of the therapeutic.’ In Rieff ’s influential 
1966 argument, the rise of psychoanalysis—or more accurately, the psycho-
analytic worldview—reduces the social to an analogy for the workings of the 
individual psyche.”60 
 I would contend that Thompson’s more disconcerting achievement is 
a reduction of the individual psyche to an analogy for the workings of the 
social, the result being a double reduction or endless transferral of reference 
that places responsibility nowhere. When we recall Christopher Breu’s state-
ment about Hammett’s Red Harvest that the Op’s “increasingly brutal tactics 
are presented as one more symptom of the town’s (always already) “fallen” 
condition,”61 it becomes clear that subsequent interpretation of the social as 
analogy for the individual psyche sets up ethics as a perpetual moving tar-
get, one that undercuts the idea of origination in individual choice. Much 
has been written about the parallels between Schreber père’s parenting and 
totalitarian political regimes, with some claiming that he was a proto-Nazi 
and others that he was not. But in either case, the parallels between Moritz 
Schreber’s poisonous and “panoptical” parenting and Foucault’s panoptical 
culture hint at an overbearing structure that the child has no hope of escap-
ing. Thompson’s novel predated Foucault, but the undercurrent of Schreber 
in Thompson conveys both the insurmountable and all-encompassing nature 
of the sickness and its congruence with a worldview that pushes against the 
 58. Miller, For Your Own Good.
 59. Sass, “Schreber’s Panopticism,” 112.
 60. Cassuto, Hard-Boiled Sentimentality, 132.
 61. Breu, Hard-Boiled Masculinities, 66. 
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idea of the autonomous individual. A sort of über-parent, Moritz Schreber 
both advocated and embodied the inescapably intrusive force of the father-
as-dominant-order. His style of parenting created an atmosphere in which the 
very notion of the subject becomes radically hopeless. Hopelessness, as trope 
and as social diagnosis, becomes the foundation of noir. In sum, the parallels 
between Ford and Schreber play with the notion of surroundings devour-
ing the individual by introducing the storied, and genuinely tragic, specter of 
Schreber’s helplessness and hopelessness.
 I have examined the Schreber parallel in order to show how Thompson 
conjures two major threats to hard-boiled individualism and even to the idea 
of the “individual” as such. One is the specter of psychic trauma, an experi-
ence that resists and derails narrativization and results in a splintered self, 
the other the presence of overwhelming and insurmountable social control. 
Evoking dementia praecox and the overbearing father combines both, locat-
ing internal and external enemies of psychic coherence. In this sense, demen-
tia praecox becomes a metaphor for the character’s autodeconstruction. And 
the image of Schreber père-as-panopticon widens the scope of the menace 
to subjecthood. Schizophrenia, being a pathology, can constitute a departure 
from what Clifford Geertz called the “Western conception of the person as 
a bounded, unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive uni-
verse, a dynamic center of awareness, emotion, judgment, and action orga-
nized into a distinctive whole” without threatening the normative status of 
that conception.62 But schizophrenia-become-social-phenomenon turns that 
departure into an atmospheric condition.
PARANOID READING
It is also worth noting that Schreber’s paranoid sense of being controlled by 
outside forces finds an echo in many critical responses to the late hard-boiled 
and to Thompson in particular. In her 2003 essay contrasting “paranoid” to 
“reparative” readings, Eve Sedgwick points out Freud’s comparison of Schre-
ber’s paranoia to his own theories and to theory in general: “In the last para-
graphs of Freud’s essay on the paranoid Dr. Schreber, there is discussion of 
what Freud calls a ‘striking similarity’ between Schreber’s systematic persecu-
tory delusion and Freud’s own theory. Freud was indeed later to generalize, 
famously, that ‘the delusions of paranoiacs have an unpalatable external simi-
larity and internal kinship to the systems of our philosophers’—among whom 
 62. Geertz, Local Knowledge, 59.
 JIM THOMPSON • 119
he included himself.” Sedgwick’s critique of what she calls paranoid readings 
is based on the sense that a “view of large and genuinely systemic oppressions 
does not intrinsically or necessarily enjoin that person to any specific train 
of epistemological or narrative consequences.”63 In other words, to know that 
the outside world is incontrovertibly iniquitous does not necessarily amount 
to meaningful understanding. Paranoid reading, similar to noir, constitutes a 
diagnosis. In a paranoid reading, the absence or ultimate uselessness of indi-
vidual moral choice—and the positioning of individual characters relative to 
that uselessness—seems a historical fact, whereas in reality it is as much an 
epistemological framework as the nineteenth-century idea of sacred frames. 
A complete examination of Sedgwick’s argument is of course outside the 
scope of this chapter; however, she argues for “reparative” reading in a pas-
sage that I will quote in its entirety because it comes close to the aim of the 
present study:
To read from a reparative position is to surrender the knowing, anxious 
paranoid determination that no horror, however apparently unthinkable, 
shall ever come to the reader as new; to a reparatively positioned reader, it 
can seem realistic and necessary to experience surprise. Because there can 
be terrible surprises, however, there can also be good ones. Hope, often a 
fracturing, even a traumatic thing to experience, is among the energies by 
which the reparatively positioned reader tries to organize the fragments and 
part-objects she encounters or creates.64 
To argue for the importance of individual moral choice and for the centrality 
of conscience to the hard-boiled genre is not to deny the broad cultural cur-
rents that make that choice seem compromised or even futile. My focus here 
is on the ways in which such cultural currents in fact renew, again and again, 
emphases on the accountable subject as site of narrative originality. To reduce 
Ford’s psychopathy to a symptom of broad cultural devolution, as many crit-
ics do, is to imitate Ford in his evocations of Schreber and concur with him 
in an overweening pessimism. It is also to concur with him in the elision 
of individual subjectivity—the very subjectivity that romantics participated 
in creating and that Race Williams buoyed when he insisted that his ethics 
were “his own.” It is true that The Killer Inside Me pushes for that elision, but 
with such insistence as to reveal its fictitiousness, its disingenuousness. Again, 
this is not to say that the accountable individual represents an ideal or can 
 63. Sedgwick, Touching Feeling, 125.
 64. Ibid., 146.
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reverse systemic oppression. Such a proposition would constitute a paranoid 
reading of its own, since dreaming of an ideal individualist would be almost 
as futile as declaring its nonexistence. And yet, in historically and culturally 
specific ways, the hard-boiled’s focus on individual moral choice continues 
to emerge and to counteract the very modern master narratives that would 
seem to attenuate it.
 Several chapters before the end of Stendhal’s Le rouge et le noir (1830), 
Julien Sorel declares, “My novel is finished, and the credit is all mine” [Mon 
roman est fini, et à moi seul tout le mérite].65 He is wrong, on the one hand 
because his novel is not finished but more importantly because the credit is 
not his alone: it belongs also to others. Lou Ford’s conundrum is of a com-
pletely other kind: rather than pretending to invent a life and a self that have 
in fact already been invented, he evokes reasons why self-invention is imprac-
ticable from the start. “Dad had made it mean something. I’d been made to 
feel that I’d done something that couldn’t ever be forgiven” (215). From the 
insurmountable parent to the incoherence within, Ford abdicates control of 
his person in ways that gesture at modern trauma theory. And yet, for all his 
complaints of a severely wilted individualism, Ford is nonetheless an indi-
vidual, remarkably articulate, active, and consistent.
 The philosophical question of whether or not “character” is a legitimate 
idea has been as much examined in philosophy as in literature. Gregory Cur-
rie writes, “Character must be displayed through the representation of regu-
larities of behavior that are robust under variation of circumstance,” but the 
version of circumstance, as various studies reveal, has a substantial effect on 
behavior.66 “Character” may not be a robust entity, which becomes problem-
atic if, as Currie claims, “Strong character is a necessary but insufficient con-
dition for being morally good.” Studies that demonstrate the force of outside 
circumstances complicate the issue of accountability without solving it. In 
essence, Lou Ford has anticipated these studies and run them to their most 
provocative conclusion, namely, that the individual cannot be pinned down 
enough, psychologically or conceptually, even to discuss accountability in 
a meaningful way. To say that the character cannot be pinned down is not 
the same as to say that the character is not “readable,” in the sense that Ste-
ven Cohan uses the term when he locates character readability “not in the 
psychological grounding of realism (representationalism) or in the aesthetic 
grounding of modernism (self-reflexivity), but in that crucial space between 
text and reader. For it is here that the coherence of character as a virtual exis-
 65. Stendhal, Le rouge et le noir, 585.
 66. Currie, “Narrative and the Psychology of Character,” 61–62.
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tent comes into play.”67 Ford’s mention of defining past experiences (“I had a 
burden of fear and shame put on me that I could never get shed of ”) are less 
about undercutting the coherence of character as a concept, as Cohan points 
out when he refers to poststructuralist critics for whom “character functions 
as a psychological microcosm of the text itself as representation”68 than about 
derailing accountability. In other words, in discussing Ford’s narrative and 
his evocation of outside forces, I do not mean to enter into the discussion of 
character as reliant on psychological determinism (Todorov) vs. character as 
phenomenological (Price)—a discussion that Cohan resolves by insisting that 
“to understand character as a readable figure we need to distinguish between 
its psychological attributes as a representational figure and its phenomeno-
logical identity as an imagined figure”69—but only to measure the character 
as someone who acts toward others and is conscious of those actions. Ford 
as narrative actor is remarkably consistent, and perhaps his most impressive 
accomplishment as such is to convey the sense of an atmospheric pollution 
that cannot be changed, that trumps or derails psychology.
AUTHORSHIP AND ACTION
Robert Polito writes, “During his dance around Stanton’s death, Ford styles 
himself a novelist.”70 Indeed, in one of his more exuberant moments, Ford 
promises a thorough narration: “In a lot of books I read, the writer seems to 
go haywire every time he reaches a high point. He’ll start leaving out punc-
tuation and running his words together. . . . But the way I see it is, the writer 
is just too goddam lazy to do his job. And I’m not lazy, whatever else I am. 
I’ll tell you everything” (180). The idea of Lou Ford as a novelist or narrator 
prepared to “tell you everything” generates—and then undercuts—a number 
of assumptions about reliable narrators and the value of “telling everything.” 
One assumption is that “everything” amounts to a coherent whole. Lou Ford 
as narrator-novelist puts out a rather jumbled “everything,” including false 
citations and fictitious diagnoses. As for point of view, the novel’s narratology 
becomes perplexing when Ford narrates from within an exploding building. 
As Polito writes, “The logic of the endings of The Killer Inside Me and A Hell 
of a Woman requires that we believe that their narrators have been speaking 
 67. Cohan, “Figures beyond the Text,” 9.
 68. Ibid., 7.
 69. Ibid., 15.
 70. Polito, Savage Art, 349.
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to us from beyond the grave.”71 As The Killer Inside Me ends, “Smoke poured 
up through the floor. And the room exploded with shots and yells, and I 
seemed to explode with it” (244). From this place within the explosion, Ford 
concludes: 
And they all lived happily ever after, I guess, and I guess—that’s—all. Yeah, I 
reckon that’s all unless our kind gets another chance in the Next Place. Our 
kind. Us people. All of us that started the game with a crooked cue, that 
wanted so much and got so little, that meant so good and did so bad. All us 
folks. Me and Joyce Lakeland, and Johnnie Pappas and Bob Maples and big 
ol’ Elmer Conway and little ol’ Amy Stanton. All of us. All of us. (244) 
This conclusion constitutes an assault on coherence, because of the exploded 
perspective, because of the “happily ever after” promised to the murder vic-
tims, and because “all of us” that “did so bad” lumps murder victims in with 
murderers.
 Another assumption about the value of telling “everything” is that a can-
did narrator is tantamount to a good and reliable character. Ford’s insistence 
that he will “tell you everything” activates American assumptions about 
frankness, simplicity, and reliability—assumptions nurtured over a century 
of humble, unpretentious, and courageous characters in the Western tradi-
tion. An open book is not necessarily a comprehensible one, by design: there 
exists a canniness of narration in the echoes of Schreber, the insistences on 
dementia praecox, the very inconsistencies that “challenge the Western con-
ception of the person as bounded and unique.” Furthermore, the narrator’s 
point-by-point reversal of the classic hard-boiled character outline reveals 
this satire, and so implies a wiliness of narration. More important, whatever 
Ford thinks, believes, wants, and remembers—and there is much of this, for 
he is a man of many musings—the most important and durable measures of 
his character are his actions. Twentieth-century history of the hard-boiled 
as a developing genre is the history of these knowing metaperformances, of 
orchestrated disconnections among thought, word, and action. They show 
the plain-speaking self-deprecator to be an empty mask devoid of morality or 
moral authority whose emptiness is apparent when we accord pride of place 
to action.
 In his first account of a violent act, Lou Ford attributes inconsistencies 
of narration to his aggression: When Joyce attacks him, he falls down, then 
stands up: “My vision was clearing and I found my voice again. .  .  . I took 
 71. Ibid., 9.
 JIM THOMPSON • 123
off my belt and raised it over my head. .  .  . I don’t know how long it was 
before I stopped, before I came to my senses” (12). Ellipses obscure the move-
ments, and the act of violence is made to seem born of bewilderment. This 
ruse is soon abandoned, however, and all subsequent instances of violence 
are narrated with clarity and exuberance. The moments when he burns a beg-
gar with a cigarette (15), beats Joyce Lakeland almost to death (50), shoots 
Elmer Conway (52), murders Johnny Pappas (120) and Amy Stanton (186), 
and stabs Joyce Lakeland (244) are narrated with zealous directness. Deci-
sions about narration are driven by decisions about action. When he pur-
sues the beggar, the man he intends to frame for Amy Stanton’s murder, he 
announces, “I grabbed up the knife and took off after the heartless son-of-
a-bitch” (188). This recounting pretends to root the chase in delusion—Lou 
the dementia praecox patient on a murderous rampage—but it is actually an 
invention in the service of premeditated action. Cassuto calls this “pile-on of 
pitiful details” a “narrative strategy of misdirected sympathy and perverted 
sentimentality.”72 Ford is fond of repeating the commonplace “the child is 
father to the man,” and for him the character is father to the narrator. That 
is, what he is as a character—a murderer who wants to elude responsibil-
ity—shapes his decisions as narrator. He calls the bum “heartless” because he 
has decided to frame him, not the other way around.73 This order of things 
is visible to the reader, and the absence of conscience it represents forms the 
foundation of the novel’s disillusion.
NARRATIVE VOICE
In having Ford narrate his murders simply and directly, Thompson mocks 
the American association of frankness and action with “good,” as well as 
the equation of the hard-hitting straight shooter and a basic moral recti-
tude. Indeed, it almost encourages nostalgia for heroes who cared about 
embodiment of virtue, which is ironic since Ford understands his actions 
and their consequences as fully as did any nineteenth-century romantic nar-
rator. This novel goes a long way toward undoing the American association 
of directness with reason, and of reason with right. The demolition oper-
ates effectively in the first person. Lou Ford’s account of prepubescent sexual 
abuse echoes that of Ralph Cotter, the narrator of Horace McCoy’s 1948 Kiss 
 72. Cassuto, Hard-Boiled Sentimentality, 133.
 73. In Michael Winterbottom’s 2010 movie version of The Killer Inside Me, Donizetti’s 
“Una furtiva lagrima” accompanies Lou Ford as he prepares to burn down his house. Ford also 
plays the piano, giving him an artistic side that he does not have in the book.
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Tomorrow Goodbye, who alludes early on to the memory of “little-boy fright 
(which, I also was to find out, was not annihilative as grown-man fright).”74 
Cotter reports toward the end of the novel that as a child, he had hidden 
under his grandmother’s skirt and touched her legs: she threatened to have 
him castrated, and to avoid this fate he murdered her. “It was there, the clo-
aca, as it most certainly had to be, as it inevitably had to be, αναγκη.”75 The 
use of the Greek for “necessity” or “inevitability” accords to his traumatic 
past an incontrovertible and ancient inexorableness. Cotter (or the uncertain 
subject operating under that name; we learn later that Cotter is not his real 
name) is destined to murder, with tragic but logical certainty. This novel, like 
The Killer Inside Me, ends with the narrator’s death, recounted as a return to 
the womb: “There was another flash of fire and my eyes went out and now 
I could see nothing. . . . I was safe and secure in the blackness of the womb 
from which I had never emerged.”76 The character exists as a generator of 
pure action, the search for whose motivations becomes lost in the jungle 
of a scarring childhood experience, a concealment of his real name, and an 
improbable narrative ending that puts him back in the womb, in essence 
negating the entire character. And yet, the very existence of the narrative, in 
McCoy and in Thompson, belies the erasure of the accountable subject, pre-
cisely because it is the subject who is narrating.
 Much as this disingenuous erasure resonates as a first-person phenom-
enon, it also operates in third-person narratives. In Patricia Highsmith’s 
The Talented Mr. Ripley (1955), the narrator initially invites sympathy in her 
report of Ripley’s childhood troubles, then undercuts that sympathy when 
she recounts Ripley’s readiness to blame them. For instance, when he pre-
pares to murder Dickie Greenleaf, he remembers his Aunt Dottie, who had 
called him a “sissy” and belittled him as a child.77 The moments that fol-
low the murder are replete with fear, but the fact and vehemence of the act 
are unmediated. At the same time, loneliness and pliability are Ripley’s most 
salient characteristics: whereas hard-boiled characters stand at the far end of 
a Bildungsroman, Ripley seems not to have started his. Lee Horsley writes, 
“Our dominant impression of Ripley is not of psychological imbalance but 
of rational self-interest, and in fact part of his insidious appeal lies in his 
 74. McCoy, Kiss Tomorrow Goodbye, 5.
 75. Ibid., 364.
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sheer pragmatism. . . . He does not resort to murder except when it presents 
itself as the only reasonable means of securing his goal or preserving his 
freedom.”78 These assessments are both correct, and the fact of a character at 
once murderous and malleable complicates the attribution of blame. Reacting 
to Dickie’s refusal of his friendship, for instance, he evinces pure distress:
They were not friends. They didn’t know each other. It struck Tom like a 
horrible truth, true for all time, true for the people he had known in the past 
and for those he would know in the future: each had stood and would stand 
before him, and he would know time and time again that he would never 
know them, and the worst was that there would always be the illusion, for a 
time, that he did know them, and that he and they were completely in har-
mony and alike. For an instant the wordless shock of his realization seemed 
more than he could bear.79 
This third-person narration, thanks to Highsmith’s inimitable combination 
of coldness and comprehension, reveals the troubled history of the subject. 
Leonard Cassuto writes, “If the sentimental action hero was supposed to quell 
Cold War fears, Highsmith and Thompson wrote the anxious fifties, giving 
those fears full reign.”80 But Ripley’s nervous apartness is individual before 
it is national, and so too are his crimes. In Ripley Under Ground, the narra-
tor explains, “The reason he had to speak with Jeff and Ed was simply that 
he felt scared and alone.”81 National anxiety may be the setting for crises of 
individual subjectivity, may even be their catalyst and the condition of their 
publication as narratives. But as both Thompson and Highsmith demonstrate, 
no amount of anxiety, national or individual, is a sufficient condition for dis-
mantling the accountable subject. The subject resists attempts to erase it, even 
when such attempts come from the subject itself. A traditional conception of 
the individual thus persists, even in moments of disclaimer and disavowal, 
and indeed especially at such moments. For if national crises emerge as most 
destructive and demoralizing when they suspend individual accountability, 
then that accountability, paradoxically, rebounds with surprising force the 
instant it names its dissolution.
 78. Horsley, Noir Thriller, 119.
 79. Highsmith, Talented Mr. Ripley, 265.
 80. Cassuto, Hard-Boiled Sentimentality, 18.
 81. Highsmith, Ripley Under Ground, 230.
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FORD’S DESCENDANTS
Jim Thompson was not the first or the only author to create an amoral char-
acter, but he is the first to put such systematic dents in both autonomy and 
accountability. And when the accountable subject devolves in his fiction, so 
too does the character model of American heroism. The hard-boiled is a fic-
tional genre, but the devolution of the heroic model—which is at its root a 
model of spiritual authority and exemplarity—has broader implications, and 
the flagrant consistency with which Ford abandons the heroic role anticipates 
other such abandonments.
 As Stephen King noted in the introduction to the 1989 Blood and Guts 
Press version of The Killer Inside Me, Lou Ford began a notable American 
character trend:
I have no idea if Mr. Kraepelin is real or another product of Thompson’s 
imagination, but I do know that the description (“difficult to study because 
so seldom detected. The condition usually begins around the period of 
puberty, and is often precipitated by a severe shock. . . . He reasons soundly, 
even shrewdly. He is completely aware of what he does and why he does it”) 
fits a lot more people than one mentally disturbed deputy sheriff in a cross-
roads Texas town. It describes a generation of killers, from Caryl Chessman 
to Lee Harvey Oswald to John Wayne Gacy to Ted Bundy. Looking back 
at the record, one would have to say that it also describes a generation of 
politicians: Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Oliver North, Alexander Haig, 
and a slew of others. In Lou Ford, Jim Thompson drew for the first time a 
picture of the Great American Sociopath.82 
In King’s estimation, just as hard-boiled character types derived from the 
personalities who took the nation in hand both spiritually and politically in 
the nineteenth century, so twentieth-century political character types have 
derived from the hard-boiled and its cinematic incarnations. Race Williams 
coming to the aid of the unfortunate in 1920s New York; Philip Marlowe 
rescuing self-destructors in louche Los Angeles: the character model of the 
plain-speaking, uncomplicated, instinctive man of honor has dominated not 
just the hard-boiled novel but the American political scene as well.
 Although it may be obvious to say that Thompson puts forth a problem-
atic and poisonous individual who dismantles hard-boiled ideals, what is 
important is how that dismantling occurs, and how it hamstrings eventual 
 82. Thompson, The Killer Inside Me, foreword by Stephen King.
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conversations about accountability in the political as well as the narrative 
realm. The evocations of a tyrannical father, an overbearing social structure, 
a psychiatric diagnosis, an aw-shucks foolishness—a compendium of forces 
historical, biological, psychological, and social conspire to render the indi-
vidual ineffectual as a source of solution, dominant as he may be as a source 
of the problem, precisely because these negative forces tend to diminish 
the individual as an idea, as an ontological entity. The borders of the indi-
vidual qua individual are continually breached not only by the individual’s 
own evocations of those forces but by critical responses that underscore their 
importance. Indeed, Thompson is so important because he takes all twenti-
eth-century indications of a weakened sense of self, these disculpating or mit-
igating psychic circumstances, these gestures at postmodern fragmentation, 
these collapses or surrenders in the face of the Kantian Ought, and makes of 
them disingenuous red herrings.
 Ford’s vacillation between pride and denial and his evocation of the 
social frame as a deadening force (evocation echoed in critical examina-
tions of Thompson and of noir as a genre) conspire to leave the individual 
qua individual shadowy, uncertain, and hard to hold accountable. Stephen 
King’s comment on political figures of the mid- to late twentieth century can 
be read as a sort of dramatic throwaway line, particularly its glib attributions 
of pathology, but it is true that the same shadowy uncertainty surrounds the 
political operators he mentions.83 A full examination of those resonances is 
far outside the scope of this chapter, but as characters, as public personae, as 
narrators, each of these four men combined, as did Lou Ford, self-directed 
action with renunciations of accountability. Alexander Haig famously com-
plained of a sense of powerlessness in his memoirs: “You heard the creak of 
the rigging and the groan of the timbers and sometimes even glimpsed the 
crew on deck. But which of the crew had the helm?”84 But Frances FitzGer-
ald later described Haig as living “on a psychological edge. . . . Eternally cho-
leric, always on the verge of a tantrum, he raised tempers even when he was 
warning against overreaction.”85 In 1984 Christopher Hitchens wrote, “Now, 
nobody has a higher opinion of General Alexander Haig than I do. And I 
 83. King is not the first to diagnose an entire generation; see Lasch, Culture of Narcissism. 
 84. Haig, Caveat, 85.
 85. FitzGerald, Way Out There in the Blue, 171. James Chace writes in a review of Haig’s 
book, “As his memoir so unwittingly reveals, Mr. Haig’s only real complaint over American 
foreign policy today is that he is not in charge of it.” Chace, “Turbulent Tenure of Alexander 
Haig,” n. pag.
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think he is a homicidal buffoon.”86 Greg Forter would later use this exact 
phrase to describe the main character of Thompson’s Pop. 1280.87
 Oliver North’s testimony in the Iran-Contra hearings echoes Lou Ford’s 
“I’ll tell you everything”: “Those are the facts as I know them. I came here 
to tell you the truth. The good, the bad, and the ugly, I’m here to tell it all.”88 
When explaining that he does not remember a question that was posed: “My 
memory has been shredded.” His testimony that the government provided 
him with the shredder, and that he prepared “a version of the chronology” 
that was not true, amount to absurd circumlocutions that resemble Lou 
Ford’s disconnection of narrative authority from moral authority, or even of 
narrative authority from autonomy. Rhetoric is used to moderate responsi-
bility rather than to claim it, which constitutes a radical reversal of the usual 
hard-boiled formula. The cloud that noir has cast over the mid-twentieth 
century can in many ways be put down to this inverse relationship between 
narrative authority and individual accountability.
 In an analysis of Horace McCoy’s 1948 Kiss Tomorrow Goodbye, in which 
the protagonist Ralph Cotter declares that he “came into crime through 
choice and not through environment,” Lee Horsley had written: “There is 
no doubt that focusing on the psychopathology of a character can become 
an indulgence of horrified fascination at the sheer nastiness of the aberrant 
personality, combined with a reassuring sense that normative values and con-
ventional lives are free from these evils.”89 In this formulation, the individual 
problem can be solved with a retreat into “normative values.” The problem-
atic individual, in other words, has not so much poisoned a place of relative 
integrity or purity “free from those evils” as ceded it to or displaced it onto the 
outside world. Where the classic hard-boiled described an individual in a 
struggle against corruption, with victory indicating transcendence and hero-
ism, here the individual is the problem and normative convention the cure. 
Of course, the idea of the outside world as solution is both false and under-
whelming. The idea of a conventional space outside the reach of individual 
corruption is illusory, particularly when the corrupt individuals in question 
are in positions of legal or political authority.90 Furthermore, “normative val-
 86. Hitchens, “Minority Report,” 662. Michael Barone writes of McCarthy, America’s “most 
hated senator,” “McCarthy was a pathological liar, an uninformed and obscure politician with 
certain demagogic gifts who latched onto the anti-Communist crusade without much believing 
in it himself.” Barone, Our Country, 235.
 87. “In Nick Corey, Thompson in fact refashions his father in startling ways, turning him 
into a morally tortured and yet homicidal buffoon.” Forter, Murdering Masculinities, 133.
 88. “Iran-Contra Hearings,” New York Times, July 8, 1987.
 89. Horsley, Noir Thriller, 104.
 90. Stanley Milgram writes of the consequences of trickle-down amorality: “Although a 
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ues” and “conventional lives” are not particularly compelling instruments 
of narrative resolution. Indeed, these serve as positive terms only when the 
alternatives are sufficiently disastrous: antisocial behavior, egoism, socio-
pathic violence. Convention, representing social and judicial stasis, eventu-
ally succumbs to another pendulum swing that will return to celebrate the 
individual. Normative convention, in other words, with no actual presence or 
narrative of its own, morphs into the enemy as soon as a sufficiently appeal-
ing or creative individual arrives. Hard-boiled crime fiction finds heroism in 
departures from convention, not in embrace of it. Furthermore, that seems to 
hold true whether the convention in question is a source of pollution or sim-
ply a dulling force of constraint. The twenty-first-century hard-boiled thus 
faces the challenge of how to present an individual who is at once exemplary 
and unconventional, autonomous and accountable.
person acting under authority performs actions that seem to violate standards of conscience, it 
would not be true to say that he loses his moral sense. Instead, it acquires a radically different 
focus. He does not respond with a moral sentiment to the actions he performs. Rather, his 
moral concern now shifts to a consideration of how well he is living up to the expectations 
that the authority has of him.” Milgram, Obedience to Authority, 8. Milgram’s experiment sug-
gests that it does not much matter whether the leader is deemed moral or not, competent or 
not—the mere presence of the person in a structural position of authority is enough to dilute 
others’ sense of agency.
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THE FRENCH DISMANTLING of hard-boiled character follows a process par-
allel to the American. Culturally resonant heroic character attributes are 
exaggerated to the point of pathology, even as the conceptual outlines of 
character and subjectivity are diminished. The result, here as in the Ameri-
can tradition, is a two-pronged weakening of individual moral authority. 
First, the individual is invested with characteristics that constitute gro-
tesque augmentations of early nineteenth-century ideals. Second, those 
augmented characteristics are represented as unbidden intrusions that 
impede full subjectivity. As in the American model, distortions of canoni-
cal character models undermine the beloved hard-boiled ideal of the indi-
vidual for whom spiritual principles become secular personality attributes. 
They change the entire landscape of ethical responsibility and of what can 
be imputed to the individual: perhaps the outside world is too contami-
nating and deadening a force, or perhaps, much more simply, human self-
interest can be expected to trump communal responsibility. And yet, those 
distortions and subversions amount to deliberately disculpating narrative 
strategies. Indeed, the idea of individual malaise and abdication as inevi-
table correlatives to the late twentieth century is itself transparently the 
result of such strategies.
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THE NÉO-POLAR
The 1960s and 1970s saw a radical change in French crime fiction. Around May 
1968 the roman noir made way for a more aggressive and politically explicit 
subgenre, the néo-polar. The term néo-polar was coined by Jean-Patrick Man-
chette, who wrote in 1981: “I came up with the word ‘néopolar,’ based on the 
words néopain, néovin, or even néopresident, which is how radical criti-
cism points out illustrious names given to the same old things” [J’ai formé 
alors le mot “néopolar,” sur le modèle des mots de néopain, néovin ou même 
néoprésident, par quoi la critique radicale désigne les ersatz qui, sous un nom 
illustre, ont partout remplacé la même chose].1 As David Platten writes, “the 
néo-polar took its inspiration from the American ‘hard-boiled’ tradition of 
the 20s and 30s, in which Manchette, its leading light, detected an uncompro-
mising, if nihilistic anti-fascism.” He points out, however, that in contrast to 
the American hard-boiled, whose stock-in-trade was the disinterested detec-
tive, the néo-polar became “a site of resistance to the perceived violence of 
the State.”2 As a movement, it was informed by Manchette’s vision of modern 
crime fiction that “talks about a world out of balance, liable to fall down and 
disappear. The polar is crisis literature” [cause d’un monde déséquilibré, donc 
labile, appelé donc à tomber et à passer. Le polar est la littérature de la crise].3
 The principal thematic elements of the néo-polar are violence, anti- 
idealism, and the alienation of individuals; its principal stylistic features are 
a graphic vernacular and a rapid narrative pace, all of which enacts a crisis 
at the level of form as well as content. Both in criticism and in the writ-
ings of néo-polar authors themselves, the passage from roman policier to 
néo-polar is most often examined from the point of view of social critique. 
Virtually every discussion of the néo-polar mentions its jaundiced political 
perspective and its nihilistic vision of society. Writes Jean-François Gérault 
of Manchette’s néo-polar, “The individual becomes a moveable pawn in a 
world that excludes him, a violent and pitiless world” [L’individu devient un 
pion manipulé dans un monde dont il a perdu les clés, un monde violent et 
sans pitié].4 In these critical formulations, the individual as narrative focus 
and actor is subordinated to the social. Individuals are cast as those around 
whom events happen, as children of, rather than actors upon, a particular 
social atmosphere. Margaret Atack notes, “May 68 forged a collective ‘nous’ 
 1. Manchette, Chroniques, 200.
 2. Platten, Pleasures of Crime, 93–94.
 3. Manchette, Chroniques, 53.
 4. Gérault, Jean-Patrick Manchette, 11–12.
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uniting all those excluded and marginalized by bourgeois society and the 
capitalist state, students, criminals, the young, the Third World, all actual 
or potential victims.”5 The notion that broad sections of the population 
are “actual or potential victims” underscores society’s dominance as prin-
cipal character. Several néo-polars were constructed around actual events 
of the 1960s and 1970s that were known most broadly as news stories, not 
as individual experiences. Manchette’s 1971 novel L’affaire N’Gustro, his first 
sole-authored novel, is about the 1965 disappearance of the Moroccan oppo-
sition leader Mehdi Ben Barka. The narrator of his Nada, which recounts 
the kidnapping and assassination of an American ambassador by a group of 
gauchistes who demand that their manifesto be read in the media, points to 
May 1968 graffiti on the walls. The police in that novel are able to identify 
the kidnappers from photographs of the May protests. Didier Daeninckx’s 
Meurtres pour mémoire resuscitates the 1961 massacre of Algerian protesters 
in Paris, as well as the deportation of Jews from Drancy during the Second 
World War.
 As Pierre Verdaguer writes, “the roman noir, particularly since the so-
called néo-polar of the 1970s, has been dominated by a sense of failure, dis-
illusionment, and even despair and existential disgust or nausée, to use a 
Sartrean term.”6 That nausea is shared, and caused by a shared social atmo-
sphere, but it is not any less individual for that, nor any less intentionally 
and artfully cultivated. Social readings of Manchette miss this artfulness, the 
fact that his work sustains traditional concepts of the individual and casts 
individual abdications of accountability as the foundation of social disorder. 
This might seem a reactionary reading for a corpus that conjures various 
intricate ideological and subjective models, from the culturally constructed 
to the Foucauldian poststructuralist subject. But as we will see, the decision 
to evoke an existentialist “nausea” functions, at times quite transparently, as 
a dramatic distraction from individual moral choice at precise moments of 
problematic conduct. David Platten writes that Manchette “back-track[s] to 
a variant on the Rousseau model of primitive man; they are ‘mauvais sau-
vages’ denuded even of pre-reflective pity, their brains programmed to ensure 
the greatest chance of their material survival.”7 And yet, the bad savage is 
as much a construct as the noble one, albeit a construct built on absences 
and reversals—as paranoid a notion as its predecessor is idealistic. For in 
the néo-polar, the principal characters do with the French character model 
what Lou Ford had done with the American: build upon it, distort it point by 
 5. Atack, May 68, 135.
 6. Verdaguer, “Politics of Food,” 198.
 7. Platten, Pleasures of Crime, 108.
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point, then represent the resulting disaster as an insurmountable psychoso-
cial problem.
THE EARLY ROMAN NOIR
The character who twists nineteenth-century romanticism into discontent 
and violence is not a néo-polar invention. Gallimard’s Série noire had been 
creating such marginal characters since 1948, but it was the néo-polar that 
turned them into elements of a broader social disorder. As a point of com-
parison, I want to look at Terry Stewart’s 1948 La mort et l’ange, the first 
French-authored novel in Gallimard’s Série noire.8 In that novel, an FBI agent 
named Maat poses as a prison guard to interview Ben Sweed, a serial mur-
derer from Indiana awaiting execution. The candid chronicle of numerous 
murders introduces micromoments of self-conscious subjectivity before end-
ing in execution, but for the most part Sweed presents himself as the unwit-
ting instrument of “a force that moves in me.”9 Sweed resembles a perverse 
romantic positing violence as natural correlate to melancholy solitude and 
pastoral existence. He anticipates Manchette’s characters in this perversion, 
but, crucially, with no element of serious social criticism.
 Early in his prison interviews, Sweed recalls when he started killing. “I 
started when I had just turned nineteen, there in the wheat fields. I never 
thought that my age had anything to do with it. I just think you have to be 
conditioned for it” [J’ai commencé alors que je venais d’avoir dix-neuf ans 
aux blés. Remarquez que je n’ai jamais cru que l’âge avait quelque chose à 
voir dans le truc. Je crois seulement qu’il faut être conditionné pour].10 Sweed 
is impotent as the result of a childhood injury, schoolmates mocked him, 
and he found refuge in violence: his alienation constitutes his conditioning. 
He recounts his violence as a near-equivalent for melancholic poetic expres-
sion in nineteenth-century romanticism. The nineteen-year-old wandering 
the fields is a commonplace of French romantic literature: at that age, Lamar-
tine was complaining of ennui on the banks of the Saône, Chateaubriand was 
departing for America (where he compared fields of wheat to a “choir of pas-
 8. That collection had until 1948 published only Anglophone crime fiction in translation; 
in fact, La mort et l’ange, written under an American pseudonym, pretends—with the collusion 
of the series editor—to be “translated from the American.”
 9. As Sweed observes, “I have a force that moves in me, I think that’s all” [J’ai une force 
qui bouge en moi, et je crois que c’est tout]. Stewart, La mort et l’ange, 84. This line already 
mocks the countless romantic writers and characters who represented “force” as a vital and 
welcome creative energy.
 10. Ibid., 21.
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toral angels to whose help we have appealed” [comme le chœur des anges 
champêtres dont on a imploré le secours]), Hugo was composing his Odes, 
and Musset was “first taken by the illness of the century” [je fus pris d’abord 
de la maladie du siècle].11 Sweed’s amoral recountings of his actions echo the 
solitude, alienation, and discourse of these authors’ romantic heroes, but in 
such a way as to cast himself passively as the biblical weed in the wheat field.12 
At another moment, referencing romantic fondness for nature in bloom and 
echoing the language of Genesis, Sweed says, “Every step I took, I had the 
chance to destroy someone. It grew in me like seeds in the ground” [A chaque 
pas que je faisais, j’avais une occasion de mettre quelqu’un en l’air. Ca venait 
à moi comme la semence dans la terre].13 Conscience for Sweed is an ironic 
negative rather than a basis for conscious subjectivity. His evocations of wheat 
fields and seeds in the ground route his violence through the discourse of 
scriptural inevitability, dismissing the accountable self.
 Toward the end of the novel, he complains, “I have too many thoughts, 
too many shadows. It’s like the plague and it’s destroying me” [J’ai trop de 
pensées, trop d’ombres. C’est comme la peste et ça me démolit].14 Evocation 
of the plague further contributes to the sense that thoughts and shadows are 
visited upon the subject (or carrier) from above or at least from the outside. If 
his conscience is obscured by shadows, then he would have no control or even 
sense of his role in an evolving narrative, his own or others’. On the other 
hand, to call one’s own murderousness a “plague” at the end of 1948, one year 
after Camus’s famously allegorical novel, is to underscore the disingenuous-
ness of the comparison and to cast the renunciation of responsibility as an 
ostentatiously sinister narrative choice. At the end of La peste, Rieux under-
stands his story as one of “all those who, unable to be saints and refusing to 
submit to pestilences, tried their best to be healers” [tous les hommes qui, ne 
pouvant être des saints et refusant d’admettre les fléaux, s’efforcent cependant 
d’être des médecins],15 while Sweed represents assaults on the autonomous self 
as coming from wheat fields, earth, and pestilential shadows. What I mean to 
point out is that the 1940s roman noir abandonment of accountability—con-
nected as it is in Manchette to the distortion of nineteenth-century charac-
ter models—functioned as the foundation of social disorder rather than its 
product. What in the roman noir was the deliberate action of the unrepentant 
 11. Lamartine, Correspondance, 235; Vinet, Chateaubriand, 46; Chateaubriand, Génie, 
2:381; Musset, La confession d’un enfant du siècle, 24. See also Chateaubriand’s fascination with 
George Washington, who at nineteen commanded a Virginia militia (327).
 12. Matthew 13:24–30.
 13. Stewart, La mort et l’ange, 159.
 14. Ibid., 173.
 15. Camus, La peste, 279.
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criminal returns in the néo-polar as the normal state of the “moveable pawn 
in a world that excludes him.”
 Both the French and the American post–hard-boiled traditions cre-
ate an apparently tautological existential catastrophe: the principal “social” 
problem is a consistent sublimation of individual characters to social forces, 
and those forces are so powerful and problematic that the individual is made 
increasingly unable to stand up in their midst. Lou Ford consigns to some 
historicopsychological trash bin the Race Williams heroic model of empathic 
connection, transcendence of a traumatic past, and an instinctual ethical 
sense. Furthermore, by trotting out a traumatically overbearing father-pan-
opticon and the specter of mental illness, he also undermines the very pos-
sibility of accountability, setting the scene for individual deterioration as a 
product—rather than a cause or correlative—of social or atmospheric dete-
rioration. In the novels of Jean-Patrick Manchette, the dismantling of the 
heroic model uses a similar approach. First comes a point-by-point undo-
ing of heroic characteristics, namely, an ethical sense of the aesthetic and its 
limits, a respect for French cultural and literary history, and an empathic and 
readerly interest in other people; second comes a blaming of that undoing on 
other forces, or, as Dominique Manotti puts it, a casting of “existential dis-
enchantment” as an accompaniment to political disillusions (“l’effondrement 
des espérances politiques s’accompagne nécessairement d’un désenchante-
ment existentiel”).16 Just as Thompson turns Leatherstocking into Lou Ford, 
so Manchette turns the desultory and melancholic aesthete of nineteenth-cen-
tury romanticism into a bored, self-absorbed spectacliste. A moveable pawn 
seems in some sense helpless. And yet, as we will see, the néo-polar ultimately 
illuminates the role of individual character and responsibility just as much as 
the American post–hard-boiled.
LE NOUVEAU ROMAN POLICIER
In a formal sense, the reduction of the individual as accountable social crea-
ture—reduction of communication, of psychology, of personality—partici-
pates in a broader literary movement, analogous to the blurring of character 
in the French nouveau roman. As Ann Jefferson, Jean Ricardou, and others 
have pointed out, the nouveau roman enacts the “death of fictional character” 
and the institution of the “grammatical person.”17 As Robbe-Grillet stated,
 16. Frommer and Oberti, “Dominique Manotti,” 46.
 17. Jefferson, Nouveau Roman, 58; Ricardou, Pour une théorie du nouveau roman. 
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The novel of characters belongs entirely to the past, it describes a period: 
that which marked the apogee of the individual. Perhaps this is not an 
advance, but it is evident that the present period is rather one of administra-
tive numbers. The world’s destiny has ceased, for us, to be identified with 
the rise or fall of certain men, of certain families. .  .  . To have a name was 
doubtless very important in the days of Balzac’s bourgeoisie. A character 
was important—all the more important for being the weapon in a hand-
to-hand struggle, the hope of a success, the exercise of a domination. It was 
something to have a face in a universe where personality represented both 
the means and the end of all exploration.18
Le roman de personnages appartient bel et bien au passé, il caractérise une 
époque: celle qui marqua l’apogée de l’individu. Peut-être n’est-ce pas un 
progrès, mais il est certain que l’époque actuelle est plutôt celle du numéro 
matricule. Le destin du monde a cessé, pour nous, de s’identifier à l’ascen-
sion ou à la chute de quelques hommes, de quelques familles. Le monde 
lui-même n’est plus cette propriété privée, héréditaire et monnayable, cette 
sorte de proie, qu’il s’agissait moins de connaître que de conquérir. Avoir 
un nom, c’était très important sans doute au temps de la bourgeoisie bal-
zacienne. C’était important, un caractère, d’autant plus important qu’il était 
davantage l’arme d’un corps-à-corps, l’espoir d’une réussite, l’exercice d’une 
domination. C’était quelque chose d’avoir un visage dans un univers où la 
personnalité représentait à la fois le moyen et la fin de toute recherche.19 
In Robbe-Grillet’s assessment, the end of the novel of characters is an organic 
result of the end of the world of characters. The formal elements of the nou-
veau roman map out a world view, as the “death of the fictional character” 
echoes the demise of a certain sort of universe, of the “falsely reassuring map 
of human experience.”20 Patrick Raynal, an editor of the Série noire, in fact 
complained that the nouveau roman was mired in conceptualism and claimed 
realism and relevance for the roman policier:
You had to write under the “empire of the sign.” That’s what literature is offi-
cially becoming: Duras, Sollers, Robbe-Grillet, Butor, etc. Everything else is 
considered a little . . . low-rent, not really presentable . . . and a little stupid. 
The roman noir, but also all the literature that was really fictional, and every-
 18. Robbe-Grillet, For a New Novel, 28.
 19. Robbe-Grillet, Pour un nouveau roman, 28.
 20. Gratton, “Postmodern French Fiction,” 243.
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thing that was excluded as “para-literature,” started arguing, “Listen, we’re 
novelists, and we just want to tell stories.”
On ne peut plus écrire que sous “l’empire du signe.” La littérature officielle 
deviant ça: Duras, Sollers, Robbe-Grillet, Butor, etc. Tout le reste est consi-
déré comme un peu . . . merdeux, pas vraiment présentable . . . un peu bête, 
aussi. Le combat qu’a mené alors le roman noir, mais aussi, avec lui, toute la 
littérature vraiment Romanesque, et tout ce que, par exclusion, on a appelé 
“paralittérature,” c’était en fait de dire, “Attention, nous sommes des roman-
ciers, nous voulons simplement raconter des histoires.”21 
Despite this protestation, however, the néo-polar matches the nouveau 
roman in demonstrating that personality is not “the means and the end of all 
endeavor.” It situates that negation in the context of social criticism: there is 
no room for a central personality, heroic or otherwise, in a period of “admin-
istrative numbers.” But whereas the nouveau roman does much to dismantle 
character as formal construction, the néo-polar undermines character as an 
“inner source of action.” It muddies the traditional concept of the individual 
and by extension the concept of accountability. And yet in the néo-polar those 
concepts continue to assert themselves and the genre ends up resuscitating, 
albeit in twisted form, the “novel of characters.” “Regularities” take the form 
of absences (of innovation, enthusiasm, and reflection), but these absences 
are so systematic and relentless that the néo-polar ends up as a photographic 
negative of the abandoned nineteenth-century novel of characters, and the 
crisis to which Manchette alluded becomes a crisis of responsibility. In this 
chapter as in the previous one, I will concentrate primarily on one author and 
one novel. The principal character of N’Gustro is neither a detective nor a 
policeman, but a former soldier who had been stationed in Algeria. I will also 
consider two of Manchette’s other novels, one a narration by a private detec-
tive, the other a third-person account of a professional assassin.
L’AFFAIRE N’GUSTRO
L’affaire N’Gustro (1971) is Manchette’s first sole-authored novel, and it alter-
nates between first- and third-person narration. In the first chapter, the prin-
cipal character, Henri Butron, prepares to listen to a recording he has just 
 21. Raynal, “Le roman noir,” 91–92.
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made of his own life story, a story he finds fascinating.22 But before he can 
listen to it, two men burst into the office and shoot him. They take the tape 
and deliver it to their boss, the maréchal Oufiri, who listens to the recording 
and laughs. The second chapter starts with Henri Butron narrating his life, 
starting in 1960 at the Lycée Pierre Corneille, where he studies philosophy 
before being arrested and joining the army. In the rest of the book, Butron’s 
narration is interspersed with descriptions of his murderers listening to the 
recording of that narration. The novel is nominally about the murder of Ben 
Barka (the title’s N’Gustro), a Moroccan opposition leader and head of the 
National Union of Popular Forces who disappeared in Paris in 1965. Butron 
serves as N’Gustro’s bodyguard but eventually, through carelessness and bore-
dom, turns him over to the people who murder him. In its titular plotline and 
in other narrative elements—clashes between youth groups to right and left, 
a military stint in Algeria, membership in the OAS—the novel would seem 
to concentrate on political phenomena of the 1960s rather than on charac-
ter. And yet, the indisputable nucleus of the narrative is its main character 
and sometime narrator, Henri Butron. Dieudonné N’Gustro does not appear 
until two-thirds of the way through the novel, and he is much more an affaire 
than a character. Butron, on the other hand, is palpable and present. A dis-
gruntled thug in the vein of A Clockwork Orange’s Alex, he is ostentatiously 
devoid of feeling and attachment, violent, unpleasant, antisocial, and smug. 
The character’s antisocial nature, his violent tendencies, and his disdain for 
social conventions and human beings in general make him a sort of “man of 
the crowd” for a contaminated society—the center of a narrative that Franck 
Frommer called “one of the strangest French polars of the last thirty years” 
[l’un des polars français les plus étranges de ces trente dernières années].23
 On the one hand, it seems obvious that the principal character in a world 
deadened by commercialism and 1968-era malaise would be antiheroic and 
antisocial. Butron’s most obvious literary ancestors are Albert Camus’s Meur-
sault in L’étranger and Anthony Burgess’s Alex in A Clockwork Orange. Other 
precedents include Stendhal’s Julien Sorel, Maupassant’s Georges Duroy in 
Bel-Ami,24 Sartre’s Lucien Fleurier in L’enfance d’un chef, Nimier’s Olivier 
Malentraide in Les enfants tristes, and Céline’s Ferdinand Bardamu in Voyage 
au bout de la nuit. These novels are not polars and do not (with the excep-
 22. Manchette, Romans noirs, 125. Subsequent references to this work will be given paren-
thetically.
 23. Frommer, “Jean-Patrick Manchette,” 90–91.
 24. Butron, like Duroy, is invited to cowrite with his lover an article about his time as a 
soldier in Algeria. Butron’s would be titled “Le Retour du petit soldat,” whereas Duroy’s was 
titled “Les Souvenirs d’un chasseur d’Afrique.”
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tion of Stendhal) address questions of heroism as such. The néo-polar does, 
however, demonstrating that the strongest foundation for a demoralizing 
atmosphere is a demoralizing central character. And the strongest recipe for 
a demoralizing central character is the point-by-point elimination or per-
version of those character traits that the culture has embraced as heroic, 
combined with the intimation that such elimination marks the decline of sub-
jecthood and the inexorable disappearance of individual conscience.
 In Butron’s case, point-by-point dismantling of the nineteenth-century 
character model operates through a series of perversions of romanticism 
and spiritual authority. For instance, Chateaubriand warns against disrespect 
for God, parents, and nation: “He who renounces the God of his country is 
almost always a man with no respect for the memory of his forefathers; tombs 
do not interest him, he takes no pleasure in remembering his mother’s words, 
her wisdom, her tastes” [Celui qui renie le dieu de son pays est presque tou-
jours un homme sans respect pour la mémoire de ses pères; les tombeaux 
sont sans intérêt pour lui; il n’a aucun plaisir à se rappeler les sentences, la 
sagesse, et les goûts de sa mère].25 Contrastingly, Butron declares, “Everyone 
for himself, and God for nobody” [Chacun pour soi et Dieu pour personne], 
calls his father and mother “old idiots” [vieux con/vieille conne], passes gas 
during his mother’s funeral, and recalls that whereas he used to trust in the 
idea of a nation, “I hadn’t really looked at what a putrid ant farm the Earth 
is. There are borders, sure, but all they do is make money for the people in 
charge” [J’avais pas bien regardé cette petite fourmilière puante qu’est la Terre. 
Il y a des frontières, certes, mais elles ne servent qu’à faire gagner de l’argent 
aux dirigeants] (152–53).
 Butron is also uninterested in the pastoral scenes so popular with roman-
tics: “I have no particular feeling about Nature, I only like seeing landscapes 
in the movies, I can tolerate sitting on a lawn if there’s something to drink, 
but anyway, it’s better than the grime and the suburbs” [Je n’ai aucun senti-
ment particulier à l’égard de la Nature, je n’aime les paysages sauvages qu’à 
voir au cinéma, je tolère les pelouses s’il y a à boire, mais en tout cas ça vaut 
mieux que les crasses et les banlieues] (213). He uses the flowered discourse 
of the romantics with Ben Sweed’s sense of ridicule. As he watches the Ami-
ral N’Gustro advance toward him: “His walk recalls temples swaying in an 
earthquake, at the start of some ancient cataclysm” [Sa démarche évoque le 
vacillement des temples en proie aux premières trémulations séismiques, dans 
quelque début de cataclysme antique] (193). The mention of an “ancient cat-
 25. Chateaubriand, Génie du christianisme, 2:156.
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aclysm” recalls nineteenth-century writings on the “ancient cataclysm that 
destroyed a godless world” [cataclysme antique qui causa la destruction d’un 
monde impie],26 but the great swaying temple that is N’Gustro will be elimi-
nated with Butron’s help.
 For Chateaubriand’s narrator, “in bread and wine, we see the consecra-
tion of human nourishment that comes from God” [dans le pain et le vin 
matériels, on voit la consécration de la nourriture de l’homme, qui vient de 
Dieu].27 In keeping with a God-centered sense of proportion, he also writes, 
“reflecting on the pointlessness of time, I thought only of eternity” [réfléchis-
sant sur la vanité du temps, je n’ai plus songé qu’à l’éternité].28 Butron echoes 
this sentiment about time’s pointlessness, but without its humble associa-
tions or spiritual undertone: “All we have is a pathetic scrap of time, relative 
to eternity; so let’s not sacrifice, let’s enjoy the good things. Food, Beaujo-
lais” [Nous n’avons qu’une parcelle dérisoire du temps, au regard de l’éternité; 
aussi, ne nous sacrifions pour rien, aimons les bonnes choses. La nourri-
ture, le Beaujolais] (130). In a sense, this is a mere turning of spiritual suste-
nance into nourritures terrestres. But the departure of God-centered morality 
accompanies a more general contraction of communication, thought, and 
social consciousness. A “paranoid” reading might call this social criticism or 
point to the historical abandonment of virtue as an idea. I would instead call 
it the production of a noir atmosphere through calculated dismantling of the 
subject.
“I BELIEVE I WAS AFRAID . . .”
Butron confides to women that he tortured prisoners in Algeria, hoping to 
seduce them with interesting stories and existential woes. As he recounts in 
one instance, “I believe I was a bit afraid. Not of being punished. But of the 
idea that such things were even permitted, not just to me, but to all mankind. 
Mankind abandoned in space, on this pitiful little globe we call Earth” [Je 
crois que j’avais un peu peur. Non pas peur d’être puni. Mais peur à l’idée 
que de telles choses étaient permises, non seulement à moi, mais à l’Homme. 
L’Homme abandonné dans l’espace, sur ce petit globe dérisoire qu’on appelle 
la Terre] (136). This pretended distress at existential abandonment is a rather 
comic version of Chateaubriand’s rendition of Tasso’s warrior, standing in the 
 26. Lenoir, Étude sur le spiritisme, 30.
 27. Chateaubriand, Génie du christianisme, 1:39.
 28. Chateaubriand, Œuvres, 1:208.
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light of the moon (“this beautiful globe” [ce beau globe]), “his face turned to 
the sky, as to his only hope. . . . His other hand rested humbly and piously on 
his chest, as if to ask God’s pardon” [son visage tourné vers le ciel, comme le 
lieu de son unique espérance. . .  . Son autre main, d’une manière humble et 
pieuse, reposait sur sa poitrine, et semblait demander pardon à Dieu].29
 In addition to these general mockeries of romantic antecedents, Butron 
also reverses Nestor Burma’s hard-boiled cultural ambassadorship, with its 
respect for literature and literary history, awareness of the ethical parameters 
of the aesthetic, and readerly interest in others. Manchette’s protagonist dis-
dains historical monuments: “I wander around my neighborhood at night 
pissing on monuments, especially the one with the stone guy and his stupid 
placard: Art inscribes a symbol within a dogma, or some somber crap like 
that” [J’erre dans mon quartier la nuit, compissant les monuments, notamment 
celui où il y a le gustave de pierre avec sa petite pancarte de merde: L’Art, c’est 
inscrire un symbole dans un dogme, ou quelque sombre péterie du même 
genre] (196). This scene evokes Simone de Beauvoir’s recollection of Sartre 
urinating on Chateaubriand’s tomb (“Chateaubriand’s tomb seemed so ridic-
ulously pompous in its false simplicity that to show his contempt, Sartre 
pissed on it” [Le tombeau de Chateaubriand nous sembla si ridiculement 
pompeux dans sa fausse simplicité que, pour marquer son mépris, Sartre 
pissa dessus]).30 Sartre had also said that his “first encounters with Beauty” 
came through popular writers like Arnould Galopin (creator of the Ténébras 
phantom bandit and the detective Allan Dickson), rather than through the 
well-constructed phrases of Chateaubriand.31 His contempt for the tomb’s 
pomposity, like Butron’s contempt for the “stupid placard,” falls in line with 
néo-polar political critiques and underscores the familial connections between 
the roman noir and existentialism. But Butron’s theories of art and subjectiv-
ity are themselves pastiches of existentialism, and as narrator, he uses all such 
isms to undercut the thoughtful subject. Art for him is a dull consolation in 
the absence of violence.32 Time means nothing to him (184), nor does indi-
vidual existence (189).
 29. Chateaubriand, Génie du christianisme, 2:303.
 30. de Beauvoir, La force de l’âge, 114.
 31. Sartre, Les mots, 57.
 32. “We made a plan to meet at the CineClub and see Hiroshima mon amour. I remember 
hoping there would be sex and violence, with a title like that. I was disappointed on that score, 
but I must admit the movie is a work of art” [Nous prenons rendez-vous pour aller au ciné-club 
voir Hiroshima mon amour. Je me rappelle que j’espérais qu’il y aurait du cul et de la violence, 
avec un titre pareil. Ce soir je serai bien décu, à ce point de vue, mais je dois reconnaître que 
le film est une œuvre d’art] (114). 
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 Pleasure, unsurprisingly, is ostentatiously detached from ethical con-
cerns. With this detachment, Butron undoes not just the romantic model but 
also the principal characteristics and ethical resonance of Nestor Burma. In a 
street brawl, he is disturbed by the unpleasant sounds his wounded opponent 
is making (140). When the police arrest him, he finds pleasure in pain: “I’m 
not gay or a masochist, but I admit it feels good to be roughed up by a bunch 
of strong brutes, especially your intellectual inferiors” [Je ne suis pas pédé 
ni maso, mais je dis franchement qu’il y a de la jouissance à être manipulé 
brutalement par un groupe de fortes brutes, surtout quand elles vous sont 
inférieures intellectuellement] (132). Instead of the comic understatement 
found in 120, rue de la Gare, this “jouissance” is a perverse performance of 
dissociation. Butron finds even more gratification in perpetrating violence, 
stealing a man’s car and beating him with its tire jack (131). When in another 
episode he sees an wounded policeman, he is pleased at the chance to do 
further violence: “The officer is crawling on the ground, barely conscious 
and covered in blood. I rush in all excited and kick him in his filthy, bleed-
ing face. When I get home, there’s a tooth between the upper and the sole of 
my shoe . . . . My spirits are high. I couldn’t care less about politics, but life 
has got some pretty good moments” [L’officier rampe à terre, peu conscient, 
tout sanglant, je me rue joyeux, je botte la face immonde et qui dégoutte. 
Rentrant chez moi, entre empeigne et semelle de ma pompe bon marché, je 
trouve une dent, une canine, net cassée. . . . Mon âme est très légère. Je me 
fous de la politique, mais il y a de bons moments dans la vie] (185). What 
separates N’Gustro from the existential continuum, even as he has literary 
predecessors there, is his resolute jollity and the unapologetic directness of 
his violence. Butron as narrator mocks and imitates the “nauseous” existen-
tialist, thereby demonstrating, ironically, what Chateaubriand had warned 
against: poetic verbosity devoid of “that moral tint without which nothing is 
perfect.”
 On the one hand, some of Butron’s discourse (“I believe I was afraid . . .”) 
is not much different from any other instance of disingenuous seduction. 
What is innovative about Butron is that while he uses romantic language 
without meaning it, he also contemplates—or pretends to contemplate—his 
own character, his own value, his existence. These contemplations focus on 
character as such—the “fictional character” that Robbe-Grillet outlined as 
well as Currie’s “Character” as compendium of attributes—as a narrative cen-
ter, even while intimating that that center is hollow. Pretenses at introspection 
reveal the absence of a “there” there, but this is Butron’s narrative point. In the 
end, the novel reveals, it takes an accountable subject to dismantle itself, and 
that dismantling is Butron’s masterpiece.
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THE UNCONSCIOUS
Butron can be read as the aggressively self-conscious embodiment of a lost 
generation, a sort of modern cipher. His interest in speed, violence, sex, and 
movies and his constant undercurrent of ennui echo the dull roar of television, 
consumerism, and the société de spectacle. But when we approach Butron not 
as a cipher but rather as a narrator eager to look like a cipher, we can discern 
a deliberate dismantling of heroism and subjecthood. Butron’s most explor-
atory statements about his own character and worth are at the same time the 
most obfuscatory for the notion of character as well as responsibility. Musing 
on his interviews with Jacquie Gouin, his occasional lover and mother of his 
girlfriend Anne, he says, “I can’t honestly say that I’ve hatched a long-term 
plan for forging my personality, but I’m sure it’s already there, guiding me 
unconsciously. I believe in the unconscious” [Je peux pas dire à présent en 
toute franchise qu’un plan à long terme pour forger mon propre personnage 
a d’ores et déjà éclos dans mon cerveau, mais je suis sûr que c’est déjà ça qui 
me guide inconsciemment. Je crois à l’inconscient] (153). The unconscious in 
this formula is the guiding motor, invisible but ever-present, that creates his 
character. But for Butron, the unconscious is less a fountain of ideas than a 
convenient straw man, a scapegoat for possible accusations. When he sets up 
N’Gustro to be intercepted and “disappeared,” Butron cites the unconscious 
again: “I am ready to swear that part of me knew what was going to hap-
pen. An unconscious part of me. I very much believe in the unconscious, in 
Freudianism and things like that” [Je suis prêt à jurer qu’une partie de moi-
même savait ce qui allait arriver. Une partie inconsciente de moi-même. Je 
crois beaucoup à l’inconscient, au freudisme et à ce genre de choses] (220).
 Butron’s shambolic ode to the unconscious, which devolves instantly into 
a mention of “Freudianism and things like that,” recalls that Flaubertian char-
acter famous for wandering into abstractions and incarnating culture’s dull-
est common denominator. (It is not surprising that Flaubert, incomparable 
when it came to putting blame everywhere and nowhere, finds such echoes 
in Butron.) Flaubert’s pharmacist Homais, a noncharacter or postcharacter 
avant la lettre, defends his religion much as Butron defends his unconscious: 
“I believe in the supreme Being, in a Creator, whatever he is, it doesn’t mat-
ter to me, who put us here to do our duty as citizens and fathers” [Je crois 
en l’Être suprême, à un Créateur, quel qu’il soit, peu m’importe, qui nous a 
placés ici-bas pour y remplir nos devoirs de citoyen et de père de famille].33 
The falling apart of sentence content, from the precise “supreme Being” to the 
 33. Flaubert, Madame Bovary, 116.
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still proper-named but unspecified “a Creator,” to the even vaguer “whatever 
he is, it doesn’t matter,” is mirrored in Butron’s slide from “the unconscious” 
to “Freudianism” to the broad and indistinct “things like that.” To “believe” in 
the unconscious and in “things like that” is as absurdist as it was for Homais 
to believe in “the supreme Being, in a Creator, whatever he is, it doesn’t mat-
ter,” made more ridiculous in the curious detail that Butron believes in the 
unconscious “very much.” In the hands of this narrator, the unconscious 
seems as incoherent a source of belief as was God in the secularizing nine-
teenth century.34
 To continue to use Flaubert as point of reference, as a window onto 
character-as-absent narrative center, we can consider what Flaubert wrote 
about God in a letter to Louise Colet: “The author in his work should be like 
God in the universe, everywhere present but visible nowhere. Because art is a 
second nature, the creator of that second nature must proceed like that of the 
first: in all its atoms, in all its aspects, one must sense a hidden and infinite 
impassivity” [L’auteur dans son œuvre doit être comme Dieu dans l’univers, 
présent partout et visible nulle part. L’art étant une seconde nature, le créa-
teur de cette nature-là doit agir par des procédés analogues: que l’on sente 
dans tous les atomes, à tous les aspects, une impassibilité cachée et infinie].35 
Jonathan Culler, reading that invisibility as an element of Flaubert’s deliber-
ate “uncertainties,” proposed: “It is not so much God’s objectivity Flaubert 
desires as his absence: the world will be totalized in a negative fashion, its 
order shown to be that of an ironic joke, but the author of that joke will be 
as difficult to pin down as the God who for so many centuries managed 
to escape, with the aid of his theologians, his obvious responsibility for the 
world’s evil.”36 In L’affaire N’Gustro, it is Butron, deconstructing his char-
acter, evoking the unconscious and orchestrating his own diffuse absence, 
who bears responsibility for trouble in the novel. “Everyone for himself and 
God for nobody,” claims Butron: God is absent from this novel, but human 
agency is alive and well. What Gregory Currie called “regularities of behav-
ior that are robust under variation of circumstance” dominate the story, even 
though the regularities in question are negative, the actions violent, and the 
words indifferent, but the individual as such, as actor and conscious subject, 
is nonetheless the definite center. Similar to Flaubert’s “difficult to pin down” 
 34. Gérault writes of Manchette, “His goal, like Flaubert, like Dashiell Hammett, is to 
describe and stigmatize a bourgeois society that he finds hypocritical, corrupt, and stifling” 
[Son but est, comme Flaubert, comme Dashiell Hammett, de décrire et stigmatiser une société 
bourgeoise qu’il trouve à la fois hypocrite, corrompue et étouffante]. Gérault, Jean-Patrick Man-
chette, 32.
 35. Flaubert, Œuvres complètes, 2:204.
 36. Culler, Flaubert, 79.
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or absent God, “difficult to pin down” or seemingly absent individual subjec-
tivity is the nucleus of the néo-polar’s noir vision.
 The unconscious in Manchette’s novel is rather indistinct as a choreogra-
pher of personality. And yet, in invoking the unconscious, Butron has done 
what Ford did with discussions of his sickness and his panoptical father: 
placed an escape valve in the coherent outlines of his character, a reason to 
read him as a series of personality fragments and dismiss him, to abandon 
the hope of understanding him, and certainly of holding him to account. 
Whereas Lou Ford raised the diagnosis of dementia praecox, Butron evoked 
a deliberately confounding but culturally resonant discourse of psychoanaly-
sis, existentialist philosophies, and situationist social criticisms to cloud the 
parameters of his own accountability. In fact, numerous similarities between 
Butron and Ford as characters, narrators, and erasers help make the case 
that Butron’s literary and sometimes Sartrean musings are carefully designed 
to eviscerate accountability. Both men are emotionally volatile sons of doc-
tors, both are resentful of their fathers’ authority, both sit in their fathers’ 
chairs, drinking coffee, smoking cigarettes, and looking at themselves in their 
fathers’ mirrors.37 Ford though remained a stronger master of the narration, 
compared to Butron. Lou Ford narrates until the end of The Killer Inside Me, 
rather than being murdered in the first chapter as Butron was, but more than 
this, he sounds as though he is in control even as he evokes the morbid psy-
chiatric ailments that theoretically obviate control. For Ford, being in his 
father’s home office “was like coming out of the darkness into sunlight, out 
of a storm into calm” (27). Butron, on the other hand, comes undone in his 
father’s house: “I kick the copper umbrella stand against the front door. The 
umbrellas go all over. I laugh and go into the kitchen, where I make a Nescafé. 
I have this idea to shit all over the carpets. I get hold of myself ” [D’un coup 
de pied j’envoie rouler contre la porte d’entrée le porte-parapluies décoré en 
cuivre. Les pébroques se répandent. Je ricane et passe dans la cuisine où je me 
fais un Nescafé. Je suis dévoré par l’idée de chier partout sur les tapis. Je me 
maîtrise] (147).
 As narrators, both characters address the reader and defend their gradual 
narrative expositions. “I haven’t said anything yet about the N’Gustro affair. 
Wait. I have to set the scene” [Je n’ai pas dit un mot encore de l’affaire N’Gus-
tro. Patientez. Tout le décor doit être mis en place] (170). And then, “I prom-
 37. After his father’s death, recounts Butron, “I smoke while I shave, always looking in the 
mirrors” (147) [je fume en me rasant, je ne cesse de me regarder dans les miroirs]. Writes Lou 
Ford, “The phone rang. I wiped my hands against my pants, and answered it, looking at myself 
in the laboratory mirror—at the guy in the black bow tie and the pink-tan shirt, his trouser 
legs hooked over his boot tops” (108).
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ise I’m getting to it now” [Promis je relate à présent] (197). Lou Ford, having 
announced that he killed Amy Stanton, also insists on sound narrative meth-
odology: “I’ll tell you everything. But I want to get everything in the right 
order. I want you to understand how it was” (180). Both narrators insist that 
they are honest and sincere. Butron says, “I don’t have to lie now. I have a fully 
developed life, I can be sincere because I’ve attained great authority” [Je n’ai 
pas besoin de mentir à présent. Ma vie s’est développée et je puis être sincère 
parce que j’ai acquis une grande souveraineté] (160). This declared candor 
echoes Lou Ford’s “I want to tell you, and I will, exactly how it happened” 
(179). Butron’s grandiose sincerity, however, recalls nothing so much as the 
“pompous false simplicity” of Chateaubriand’s tomb—an amoral fascination 
with his own discursivity.
 Butron functions as the French counterpart to Ford in his evasion of 
accountability, but he accomplishes that evasion through a particularly French 
postexistentialist discourse, one based on the early nineteenth-century model 
of the bored, languishing romantic. It is in that persona that he addresses 
the political idea of the individual as a product of circumstances. At the 
same time, he pretends to refuse that idea, to claim “great authority.” Where 
Ford claims dementia praecox but evinces cold and emotionless calculation, 
Butron claims control but evinces disorder: “I get hold of myself ” declares 
a control that his narrative and his actions do not actually demonstrate. On 
the one hand, that lack of control has a political cast—Butron is a right-wing 
character in the hands of a left-wing author, who could use Butron to ridi-
cule right-wing insistence on individual responsibility. But on the other hand, 
and more broadly, Butron reveals “everyone for himself and God for nobody” 
to be the foundation of, rather than the response to, dismantled individual 
accountability.
INDIVIDUAL VALUE
As Pierre Zima wrote, discussing Marcel Proust’s combination of psychology 
and psychoanalysis, “The fundamental and indelible difference that separates 
the Recherche from traditional psychological novels must be understood in 
terms of the difference between psychoanalysis and the ‘philosophical’ psy-
chology of the seventeenth or eighteenth century. In psychoanalysis, ambiva-
lence is so strong that the individual’s identity and the very notion of the 
Subject are put in question” [La différence fondamentale et ineffaçable qui 
sépare la ‘Recherche’ des romans psychologiques traditionnels devrait être 
comprise parallèlement à la différence entre la psychologie “philosophique” 
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du XVII ou du XVIIIe siècle et la psychanalyse. Dans cette dernière, l’ambi-
valence est si forte que l’identité de l’individu et la notion du Sujet elle-même 
sont remises en question].38 Once the unconscious is evoked, Butron’s actions 
cease to be the character’s principal problem, and instead his being, the 
parameters of self, the invisibility of his motivations, and the “very notion of 
the Subject” become themselves the problem. Butron’s search for motivation 
and understanding, quite by design, goes nowhere and discovers nothing. 
When another character questions his reasons and his empathic capacities, he 
switches back to an old-school protection of character as pure formal entity 
resistant to examination. Jacquie accuses, “‘It’s not possible,’ she continues, ‘to 
be that alone and egotistical, it becomes a mental illness. Because you don’t 
grasp other people’s feelings, you don’t even know that those feelings exist, 
because you don’t have any. And sooner or later, to have no heart, it’s like not 
having any intelligence’” [‘C’est pas possible,’ poursuit-elle, ‘seul à ce point, 
tellement égoïste, ça devient de l’infirmité mentale. Parce que tu ne connais 
pas les sentiments d’autrui tu ne sais même pas qu’ils existent, parce que tu 
en manques toi, tu en manques tellement. Et un moment, le manque de cœur, 
ça devient comme le manque d’intelligence’ (175)]. Butron merely warns her 
not to insult his intelligence.39 The questioning of subjectivity comes to a dead 
end when the Subject as such refuses to be questioned, and instead asserts its 
pure solidity as agent of thought and action.
 In his most philosophical monologue, Butron announces,
I couldn’t care less about the masses. Only Butron Henri interests me, the 
masses won’t save him. What do I have in common with those office and 
factory guys? Exactly, says Anne, that proves that your problem is social. 
If she were to be believed, I was the product of circumstances. Listening to 
her, I was the product of circumstances, their toy. That’s what they all say. 
To make excuses for me. I don’t need any excuse. I’m happy with what I’ve 
done. I know my value. And we were people of value. We had abandoned 
things and ideas that got in the way of pleasure. And all ideas get in the way 
of pleasure, I say.
Je me fous de la grande masse. Butron Henri seul m’intéresse, c’est pas la 
grande masse qui le sauvera. Qu’est-ce que vous voudriez que j’aie de com-
mun avec les mecs des bureaux, des usines? Précisément, me racontait 
Anne, c’est ce qui prouve qu’il est social, ton problème. À l’en croire, j’étais 
 38. Zima, L’ambivalence romanesque, 171.
 39. “Nie pas mon intelligence, je t’avertis” (175).
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le produit des circonstances. Qu’est-ce que j’ai pu l’entendre dire, que j’étais 
le produit des circonstances, et leur jouet. Tous ils reprenaient la chanson. 
Pour m’excuser. J’ai jamais eu besoin d’être excusé. Ce que j’ai fait, je suis 
content. J’ai conscience de ma valeur. Car nous étions des gens de valeur. 
Nous avions rompu avec les choses, avec les idées qui empêchent de jouir. 
Toutes les idées empêchent de jouir, je dis. (181–82)
In this meandering articulation of value and entitlement, Butron bounces 
from one ontological framework to another, from one conception of charac-
ter to another. It is worth a moment to untangle these, since this one para-
graph contains numerous contradictory visions of character and a shrewd 
undoing of conscience. Butron starts out by asserting that he has nothing 
in common with factory and office workers; he does not mention what sets 
him apart, but Anne diagnoses a general “social problem,” a misanthropic 
alienation. When Anne notes that Henri’s problem is social, she means that 
he fails to connect with other people, to feel and act as a social being. Fur-
thermore, since Anne’s principal interest is in social commonality for polit-
ical purposes—in a solidarity with “office and factory guys” that stands to 
improve the conditions of workers—Butron’s social problem, his inability to 
form social connections, becomes a “social problem” in the sense of a prob-
lem affecting society and social justice causes. But because Anne’s mention of 
Butron’s “social problem” is followed immediately by “To listen to her, I was 
the product of circumstances,” it is clear that Butron reads the directional-
ity of the “social problem” differently than Anne does. He essentially hears 
“social problem” as “a problem that society has caused,” a problem whose 
source resides outside him, and in any case, a problem he denies. From there, 
however, Butron (who introduces himself in the third person) wanders into a 
confounding compilation of positive assertions and emphatic denials.
 On the one hand, his insistence that “I don’t need any excuse. I’m happy 
with what I’ve done” denies the blaming of circumstances and hints instead at 
justification and even pride in his actions. In this sense, Butron departs from 
Lou Ford, claiming an individual agency that Thompson’s character some-
times evaded. The next phrase, however, in which he claims to “know his 
value,” abandons the topic of agency as such and celebrates the dominance of 
pure and formal individual worth. This statement echoes somewhat Sartre’s 
“existence precedes essence,” but having “value” or being conscious of one’s 
value cannot constitute a coherent alternative to needing to be “excused.” It 
might make sense as an alternative to needing to be praised, for instance, 
but to claim consciousness of value—rather than of actions, responsibility, 
or identity—as an alternative to “needing to be excused” is to slip from the 
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realm of actions and characteristics, which might be held to ethical standards 
and thus necessitate excuse, to the realm of the individual as pure fact. To 
return to Lukács’s description of the novelistic character as resident of a secu-
lar world, “The inner importance of the individual has reached its historical 
apogee: the individual is no longer significant as the carrier of transcendent 
worlds, as he was in abstract idealism, he now carries his value exclusively 
within himself.”40 So too does Butron carry his value exclusively within him-
self, but that value, cited as an antidote not to a meaning-giving God but 
to a need for excuse, has nothing to do with the “inner importance of the 
individual.” It is more along the lines of “value” as situated within the frame 
of existentialist philosophies. As Sartre writes, “Value is affected with the 
double character, which moralists have very inadequately explained, of both 
being unconditionally and not being” [La valeur, en effet, est affectée de ce 
double caractère, que les moralistes ont fort incomplètement expliqué, d’être 
inconditionnellement et de n’être pas].41 Butron’s use of the word amplifies the 
ambiguities in this discourse, particularly with first-person plural that lacks 
antecedent. Indeed, this character’s interest in “value” is limited throughout 
the novel to money. With these evocations of value generated in the view 
of others, value generated in one’s own estimation, value generated by the 
pure fact of existence, and value generated by the consumer market, ideas of 
“value” cancel each other out, as each replaces—at least for the duration of 
its utterance—the others. When Butron then declares, “We had abandoned 
things and ideas that got in the way of pleasure,” he has wandered away both 
from the claim of value and from the resistance to excuses, returning to 
value-free pleasure and to his person as pure locus of sensation.
 Here, as in Thompson, the character is narrating himself into a deliberate 
abstraction, into value without substance, words without intention, actions 
without emotion, pronouns without antecedents. On the one hand, the intro-
duction of the lexicon of psychoanalysis, nascent discourses on self-esteem, 
sociological forces, and consumerism can be read as a political statement—a 
presentation of the individual within a corrupt social frame. Manchette was 
a partisan of the Situationist International, a compendium of existentialism, 
Marxism, anarchy, and avant-garde art whose principal text, Guy Debord’s 
La société du spectacle, articulated the alienating and inauthentic nature of 
contemporary life. Using as a point of departure the idea of spectacle, Debord 
 40. Lukács, Theory of the Novel, 117.
 41. Sartre, Being and Nothingness, 68; L’être et le néant, 136. Writes Benoît Pruche, “Ma 
valeur est mise en cause et je me vois ramené à des questions fondamentales: quelle est ma 
place dans l’Univers? Qui pourrait me l’annoncer, sinon les autres?” Pruche, Existant et acte 
d’être, 29.
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described society (“a carnivorous plant” [une plante carnivore], according to 
May 1968 graffiti) as placing numerous obstacles between human beings and 
reality. In a phrase reminiscent of Manchette’s antiteleologies and of Butron’s 
anti-ambition, Debord writes: “Society based on modern industry . . . is fun-
damentally spectacliste. In the spectacle, image of the reigning economy, the 
goal is nothing, development is everything” [La société qui repose sur l’in-
dustrie moderne .  .  . est fondamentalement spectacliste. Dans le spectacle, 
image de l’économie regnante, le but n’est rien, le développement est tout].42 
It is tempting to see Butron as the voice and face of spectacliste inauthen-
ticity. Indeed, his interest in movie making and in money—and in making 
money through movies—supports this reading. It is also tempting to concur 
with Anne and read Butron’s claims on his value as the confused ramblings 
of a selfish character with a “social problem,” one whose difficulties in relat-
ing to others are matched by his difficulties in communicating. But for all 
the obfuscation that arises around this character, and indeed because of that 
obfuscation, the traditional individual continues to arise and assert itself. 
Butron embraces the unconscious but avoids self-examination, declines to 
be excused but resists accepting responsibility, and claims to be a person 
of value while pointing out that so is everyone else. And yet, at the same 
time, his posturings, interventions, and eventual demise align with what 
Robbe-Grillet called the “novel of characters.” Like Stendhal’s Julien Sorel, 
who promises to “only count on the parts of my character that I’ve tested” 
[je ne compterai que sur les parties de mon caractère que j’aurai éprouvées] 
and to “only say things that he believed to be false” [des choses qui lui sem-
blaient fausses à lui-même],43 Butron enters the French army determined to 
“hold onto my convictions, my revolt. The main thing was that I would learn 
to keep those inside as I launched myself into the social world” [J’y pourrais 
garder mes convictions, ma révolte; l’essentiel était que j’apprendrais à les 
conserver au-dedans de moi-même tandis que je me lancerais dans le jeu 
social] (133). The end of Butron’s life also resembles that of his 1830 predeces-
sor. At the end of N’Gustro, Butron, who has brawled relentlessly through 
the entire narrative, declines a friend’s gun when he is actually in danger, 
preferring to wait alone in the dark. “He wanted to leave me his gun. Maybe 
I should have accepted, but I was sick of asking other people for help. It’s 
me they’re trying to kill. So it’s me who should face it. Sitting in the dark, I 
am content” [Il voulait me laisser son flingue. J’aurais peut-être dû l’accep-
 42. Debord, Œuvres, 769. A. D. G., a rare right-wing author of the roman noir, read such 
contextualizations as so many attempts at excuse: “A. D. G. attacks the decadence of modern 
urban life and decries the hypocrisy of those who would sooner blame the ills of society than 
the individual who commits the crime.” Johnston and Marshall, France and the Americas, 321.
 43. Stendhal, Le rouge et le noir, 97, 216.
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ter, mais j’en avais marre de faire appel aux autres. C’est moi, pas eux, qu’on 
essaie de détruire. C’est moi qui riposte, c’est justice. Assis dans le noir, je suis 
content] (228). Because Butron is murdered in the first chapter, the entire 
narrative draws him to his death, aligning him with other protagonists who 
meditate on the eve of execution. For instance, in the prison interlude in 
Le rouge et le noir, Julien Sorel, unwilling to appeal his death sentence, “felt 
strong and resolute, like a man who sees clearly into his soul” [se sentait fort 
et résolu comme l’homme qui voit clair dans son âme].44 That same peace in 
solitude appears in the last paragraph of Camus’s L’étranger, when Meursault 
(Julien Sorel’s twentieth-century descendant, whom Butron also echoes in 
his apathetic funeral attendance) awaits execution: “Sounds of the country-
side were drifting in. Smells of night, earth, and salt air were cooling my 
temples. The wondrous peace of that sleeping summer flowed through me 
like a tide. Then, in the dark hour before dawn, sirens blasted. They were 
announcing departures for a world that now and forever meant nothing to 
me” [Des bruits de campagne montaient jusqu’à moi. Des odeurs de nuit, de 
terre et de sel rafraîchissaient mes tempes. La merveilleuse paix de cet été 
endormi entrait en moi comme une marée. À ce moment, et à la limite de la 
nuit, des sirènes ont hurlé. Elles annonçaient des départs pour un monde qui 
maintenant m’était à jamais indifférent].45
 Butron’s reference to his value similarly recalls L’étranger’s prison medita-
tions. As Meursault muses:
But I was sure about me, about everything, sure of my life and sure of the 
death I had waiting for me. Yes, that was all I had. But at least I had as much 
of a hold on that truth as it had on me. I had been right, I was still right, I 
was always right. I had lived my life one way and I could just as well have 
lived it another. I had done this and I hadn’t done that. I hadn’t done one 
thing and I had done another. And so? It was as if I had waited all this time 
for this moment and for the first light of dawn to be vindicated.46
Mais j’étais sûr de moi, sûr de tout, plus sûr que lui, sur de ma vie et de cette 
mort qui allait venir. Oui, je n’avais que cela. Mais du moins, je tenais cette 
 44. Ibid., 653.
 45. Camus, The Stranger, 122; Œuvres completes, 117. Writes Franck Frommer: “Manchette 
veut aller tellement loin dans la transgression et l’exercice de style, qu’il choisit un narrateur 
fascistoïde, petit mec sans envergure et indifférent (avec une référence explicite, dans une scène 
d’enterrement, au Meursault de L’étranger), mais dans la personnalité duquel se font jour toutes 
les contradictions politiques, économiques et sociales de cette fin des années gaulliennes,” 
Frommer, “Jean-Patrick Manchette,” 91.
 46. Camus, The Stranger, trans. Matthew Ward, 120–21.
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vérité autant qu’elle me tenait. J’avais eu raison, j’avais encore raison, j’avais 
toujours raison. J’avais vécu de telle façon et j’aurais pu vivre de telle autre. 
J’avais fait ceci et je n’avais pas fait cela. Je n’avais pas fait telle chose alors que 
j’avais fait cette autre. Et après? C’était comme si j’avais attendu pendant tout 
le temps cette minute et cette petite aube où je serais justifié.47 
I have cited these echoes of prison meditation and insisted on this line of 
character ancestry because Le rouge et le noir and L’étranger are character-
driven narratives, focused on a character who clashes with his culture (Julien) 
or whose insistent alienation sounds the end of the Bildungsroman (Meur-
sault). Butron, on the other hand, would seem to live in a world whose the-
matic foundation is that the individual, truncated and disillusioned at every 
turn, is more or less beside the point. This does not just mean that he aban-
dons the pursuit of good character, although he does. The point is that the 
idea of examining character itself as a narrative nucleus, as the locus of action 
and point of the story—this too recedes. And yet, as much as Butron obscures 
the idea of character, his actions, words, and attitudes are remarkably con-
sistent. His emphatic and precise reversals of the romantic ideal, discussed 
earlier in this chapter, and his reversals of the classic hard-boiled model, his 
cruelty to men and women, friends and lovers, not to mention the death of 
N’Gustro that he all but orchestrates, reveal a narrative intentionality that 
paints the entire noir decline, the entire crisis that the néo-polar chronicles, as 
centered on personal agency.
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE FRENCH STATE
Compared with Nestor Burma’s embodiment of literary historical and cultural 
memory, Butron’s lack of appreciation of French culture as such can be read 
in part as an indictment of that culture. Manchette’s novels are consistently 
described as containing mordant social criticism, but this raises the question 
of what “social criticism” actually means. For one, there is not much “society” 
in the conventional sense going on in Manchette’s novels. Populated towns, 
places of employment, and even family units are absent. Characters appear 
in bars, cars, streets, beaches, each other’s apartments, evidence of a popula-
tion in transition or at sea—in a sense, the individuals in Manchette’s fiction 
seem more to be sharing a habitat than forming a society. Except when a 
dense crowd functions as a grotesque corps de ballet in brawls or explosion 
 47. Camus, Œuvres complètes, 117.
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scenes—succumbing to or reeling in the face of catastrophe is one of the last 
and best remaining communal activities in Manchette’s world—a critical mass 
of people participating in social conventions is markedly absent from Manch-
ette’s fiction. Indeed, even social solidarity is missing. “Social” in the néo-polar 
carries instead an elemental and anthropological cast, one that emerges, and 
whose failings are underscored, any time that individuals come into contact 
with one another. The basic mechanisms that allow people to live among oth-
ers—communication, consciousness of others as others, listening, some mini-
mal participation in communal structures—all come apart in the néo-polar. 
The individual character in the néo-polar ceases to be a social creature in most 
senses of the word: not just disillusioned, not just corrupted, but blurred, 
washed out, reduced, and disconnected. Manchette’s society, then, means a 
group of individuals, and this simple definition undermines the complex ide-
ological models that his characters continue to reference. A society in decline 
means the decline of the individual as sentient and social being.
 While the American hard-boiled model devolves into unromantic indi-
vidualism without the intervention of culture as such, the French néo-polar 
lays its troubles at the feet of a culture in decline. In a sense, the fact that 
the blurring of “character” corresponds to a social problem—and that both 
connect to a devolution of the French character model—has to do with a 
specifically French symbiosis between individual identity and cultural iden-
tity. While personality and character always depends to some extent on 
social interaction (otherwise personality and character become as trees in 
an unseen forest), French political culture conceives of the state as inextri-
cably intertwined with individual identity. As Stewart Field notes, “the state 
has defended and inculcated particular ideas of the nation and république in 
which are expressed positive abstract notions of France and Frenchness.”48 
These notions are not demanded just of civil servants, but also of regular 
citizens—individuals like Butron who might have no particular interest in 
representing or being represented by the state. In other words, an individual’s 
failure to represent the state (“I couldn’t care less about politics”) does not just 
cause a decline to society, it is that decline. As Jacqueline Hodgson writes, “At 
the heart of the French republican tradition, as it might broadly be described, 
is the sovereignty of the French people and as the only body to enjoy the 
mandate of these citizens (through the election of politicians), this power is 
exercised in practice by the state, as the nation’s representative. In this way, 
sovereignty of the people becomes sovereignty of the state.”49 The idea that 
 48. Field, “State, Citizen, and Character,” 542.
 49. Hodgson, French Criminal Justice, 16.
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sovereignty of the people becomes sovereignty of the state refers at a basic 
level to practical consolidation of power. Sovereignty of the state, in other 
words, is supposed to render in unadulterated form a people’s sovereignty 
that would, without that rendering, remain necessarily theoretical for lack of 
embodiment and consolidation. But underneath that notion of equivalence 
or embodiment is a more literal resonance of becoming, one that implies an 
instinctive or intuitive manner, an individual interiority that morphs into part 
of the state. When Henri Butron declares that he doesn’t care about politics 
and opines that the apparently functioning state is a “putrid ant farm,” the 
symbiosis between individual and state still stands. As Müller writes of the 
antiheroes of French crime fiction, “They are unhappy and their unhappi-
ness belongs to society” [Ils sont malheureux et leur malheur est celui de la 
société].50 This comment echoes Hodgson’s remark that “the sovereignty of 
the people becomes the sovereignty of the state,” simply in negative form, for 
it is nihilism, not sovereignty, that the néo-polar projects.
MORGUE PLEINE
Henri Butron uses ostentatiously vacuous philosophical posturing to under-
cut the notion of accountability. But his methodical undoing of classic 
romantic and hard-boiled characteristics—actions that could be put down to 
his simple antiheroism—are just as present in Manchette’s other characters, 
professional assassins or private detectives. I will examine two more instances 
of that undoing so as further to illustrate the paradoxical power and central-
ity of the néo-polar’s apparently “moveable pawn.” Going in chronological 
order, I will look now at the novel that most closely resembles a classic detec-
tive novel in its formal construction. This is Morgue pleine, published in 1973, 
featuring Eugène Tarpon, former gendarme turned private detective. Tarpon 
also appears in Que d’os! (1976). In both novels, the character gives an impres-
sion of fadedness. Whereas Butron’s blurriness was conceptual, a product 
of garbled pseudo-introspection, Tarpon’s incompleteness is in the domain 
of affect. In action, word, thought, understanding, and communication, he 
seems washed out, though he is present in every scene. Bored lassitude is a 
common pose in the hard-boiled, and it recalls the studied indifference of 
Nestor Burma in his understatements of the camp experience. But whereas 
Burma pursues the criminals, understands the crime, and announces his 
collected research to the assembled group, Tarpon bumbles through all of 
 50. Müller and Ruoff, Le polar français, 76.
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Morgue pleine. We learn that during his police days, he shot a demonstrator, 
but his remorse emerges as vague bewilderment. When he shoots another 
man in the course of the investigation, “So once again I’d killed someone and 
didn’t know why. I thought I was going to be sick” [Comme ça, j’avais encore 
tué quelqu’un et je ne savais pas pourquoi, de nouveau. J’ai cru que j’allais être 
malade] (521). We learn that he is contemplating returning to the country to 
live with his mother, but he abandons this plan. When a client comes to his 
office looking for help, a drunken Tarpon declares that nothing can be done, 
punches him in the stomach, and sends him on his way. At the end of the 
novel, he wants to find the client: “I wanted to tell him not to give up hope, 
that I’d take his case, basically that there were ways to keep on swimming and 
paddling in this messed-up world” [Je voulais lui dire de ne pas désespérer, 
que je voulais bien m’occuper de son affaire, somme toute, qu’il y avait encore 
moyen de nager et de se dépatouiller, dans cette chierie d’univers] (578). He 
never does find him.
 Tarpon’s contributions to the novel’s noir atmospheric bleakness are his 
lethargy, hesitation, and confusion. He is an agent of reaction rather than of 
action. When he hits someone, “I hit him because he scared me” [Je l’avais 
cogné parce qu’il m’avait fait peur], he admits, though he has not even won 
the fight and is immediately cornered by another gunman (491). When he 
meets with the murder victim’s father, the man’s tears “freaked me out” [Il me 
foutait les jetons] (495). His most consistent experience is one of disorienta-
tion. He is unsure what is happening, he feels incoherent (494), he doesn’t 
know what to do (491), he decides he can’t do anything (492), and he doesn’t 
understand what people are saying (512). The woman who had sought his 
help when her roommate was murdered had this assessment: “You’re in the 
dark, huh?” [Vous êtes dans le noir, hein?] (535). The “noir” that surrounds 
Tarpon is more incomprehension than menace, directionless as the fish for 
which he is named. As the novel opens, he is depressed (453). As he alienates 
and then punches the only client who has come to see him, he is ashamed, 
and when the client leaves, “I started really drinking” [Je me suis vraiment 
mis à boire] (464).
 Physically, Tarpon is awkward and almost clownish. “He slid down the 
stairs like a luge, and I slid down on top of him, like in the ‘Seven Won-
ders’ show at Cinerama” [Il s’est mis à descendre l’escalier comme une luge, 
et moi, j’étais accroupi sur lui et je descendais avec, comme aux Merveilles du 
Cinérama] (490). He wrings his hands (497), he tries to disarm someone but 
cannot (513), he trips on the sidewalk and falls on his face (546–47), he falls 
down again and gets gravel in his palms (547), and his voice is “hysterical and 
quavering” [hystérique et chevrotante] (549). Mentally, he is usually worn out 
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(486), inebriated, disoriented, asleep (453), or passed out. He has not much 
mental acumen for the investigation: “Sure, her story didn’t hold up, but what 
does, these days?” [Bien sûr qu’elle ne tenait pas debout, son histoire, mais 
qu’est-ce qui tient debout, de nos jours?] (518). “Who has the money for a 
decent investigation these days?” [Qui peut se payer une enquête bien faite, 
de nos jours?] (522). At the end of the novel, it is Tarpon’s journalist friend 
who writes the article explaining the crime, noting that the criminal “hadn’t 
counted on the dazzling intuition of Eugène Tarpon” [c’est sans compter sans 
l’intuition fulgurante d’Eugène Tarpon] (576). The mention of Tarpon’s daz-
zling intuition is of course intended to be ironic.
 The elements of character fundamental to the hard-boiled, namely, voli-
tion, consciousness, an innate sense of ethics, and courage, are more present 
in Tarpon than they were in Butron, in that Tarpon is not a perverse bad 
actor; but each element is reduced, barely hinted at, or dulled by distraction, 
alcohol, boredom, and fatigue. The absence or reduction of these elements 
in turn creates a flatness of affect and casts “regularities of behavior” not 
as bedrock but as lackluster baseline. Tarpon does seem to have a minimal 
sense of ethics, in that he declares remorse for harms done and for good 
deeds not done. When Charlotte Schultz aka Memphis Charles comes to 
him claiming her roommate has been murdered, he is willing to help her, 
but not until she has knocked him out with his own telephone. Even then, 
his first impulse is to go back to sleep (469). When a random gauchiste is 
wounded in a fight, he worries whether she has received medical attention. 
But when no real answer is forthcoming, “I closed my eyes. Maybe I was 
going to wake up in my little room with Mommy bringing me hot choco-
late in bed because I was sick and delirious, seeing things that weren’t there 
and all that” [J’ai fermé les yeux. Peut-être que j’allais me réveiller dans ma 
chambrette et maman m’apporterait mon chocolat au lit parce que j’avais été 
bien malade, j’avais déliré, vu des choses qui ne sont pas et tout ça] (510). He 
understands that the murderer had had a troubled childhood, but he has no 
sense of how he became a murderer and no energy to think about it. “As to 
how he came to do it, I don’t know the details. I haven’t had time to think 
about details. I’m on so much medication, I keep falling asleep” [Quant au 
passage à l’acte, je ne sais pas les détails. Je n’ai pas eu tellement le temps de 
réfléchir aux détails. Je suis bourré de médicaments. Je n’arrête pas de som-
noler] (572). With Tarpon’s general placid innocuousness, with his continued 
somnolence, it soon becomes clear that it is not understatement that he is 
practicing but a studied nullity, a dearth of intention that remains in force, 
as it were, until the end of the novel.
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 What matters in the present argument is that the very characteristics 
that make Tarpon so subdued a specimen—trepidation, weariness, bewilder-
ment—are precisely those of early nineteenth-century romantic heroes, in 
exaggerated form. In Mémoires d’outre-tombe, the narrator laments, “Every-
thing bores me. I carry my tedium around every day, weary of life” [Tout 
me lasse: je remorque avec peine mon ennui avec mes jours, et je vais par-
tout bâillant ma vie].51 Chateaubriand’s René is a model of forlorn inaction: 
“This aversion to life that I had felt since childhood came back with renewed 
force. Soon my heart supplied no more nourishment for my thoughts, and all 
I felt of my existence was a profound sense of weariness” [Ce dégoût de la vie 
que j’avais ressenti dès mon enfance, revenait avec une force nouvelle. Bientôt 
mon cœur ne fournit plus d’aliment à ma pensée, et je ne m’apercevais de mon 
existence que par un profond sentiment d’ennui].52 From Vigny’s “I laid down 
my head, as if presenting it to the knife. I was delirious. What was I doing?” 
[Et j’allongeais ma tête, comme la présentant au couteau. J’étais dans le délire. 
Eh! que faisais-je?]53 to Tarpon’s “I was delirious, seeing things that weren’t 
there and all that,” from Chateaubriand’s “I was slipping into that fatigue 
well known to men who travel the world: no distinct memories remained; I 
felt myself living and vegetating with nature in a sort of pantheism. I leaned 
against a magnolia tree and fell asleep” [Je déclinais peu à peu vers cette som-
nolence connue des hommes qui courent les chemins du monde: nul souve-
nir distinct ne me restait; je me sentais vivre et végéter avec la nature dans 
une espèce de panthéisme. Je m’adossai contre le tronc d’un magnolia et je 
m’endormis]54 to Tarpon’s “I haven’t had time to think about details. I’m on 
so much medication, I keep falling asleep” are but short steps. The transpo-
sition of spiritual contemplation into the realm of sensation has apparently 
set it on uncertain ground, for Tarpon, without turning “bad,” nonetheless 
lapses into sedation. He never sees the lead woman again, and the villain in 
the story “kills himself with a nail” [se suicide avec un clou] (578), reduc-
ing the story’s end to a miniature point and an uncertain image. Surprised, 
abducted, insulted, attacked, disoriented, tired: in a sense, his most active 
and also incongruous act is the story’s very narration, for it hardly seems that 
he would have the energy necessary for such sustained production of words. 
Que d’os! puts more emphasis on Tarpon’s partnership with Charlotte Mal-
rakis (not the same Charlotte as in Morgue pleine) but nonetheless has him 
 51. Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’outre-tombe, 299.
 52. Chateaubriand, Atala, René, 134.
 53. Vigny, Stello, 246.
 54. Chateaubriand, Mémoires d’outre-tombe, 336.
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“knocked out like a steer” [camé comme un bœuf] and, at the end, “mainly 
tired” [surtout fatigué] (699).55 He produces, generates, discovers, and decides 
almost nothing. But he lives, breathes, and recounts, and this is enough to 
make him the narrator of the novel and its center—a center whose salient 
characteristic is the absence of intention and action.
A CHARACTER WHO DOESN’T EXIST SUFFICIENTLY
To underscore that individual absence is a constructed character attribute, 
I turn to Manchette’s last published and most praised novel, La position du 
tireur couché (1981), which was made into an American movie, The Gunman, 
in 2015. Written in the third person, it tells the story of Martin Terrier, a hired 
assassin who wants to leave the hitman profession and return home to marry 
his high school sweetheart. Terrier is in essence an entire classic crime fic-
tion plot contained in one character: he is the murderer, the one who wants 
to stop the killing, the one investigating the obstacles to stopping, and the 
would-be restorer and embodiment of bourgeois order. Already, however, this 
summary becomes misleading, since Terrier does not articulate a “want” but 
rather performs a series of actions. The name Terrier (and the narrator calls 
him this, rather than Martin) implies a burrowing prairie animal and a small 
dog—unthreatening, but not very indicative of complex humanity. Indeed, 
there is virtually no direct report of Terrier’s internal world. As Platten writes, 
“Martin occupies a single plane of existence where there are no highs or lows, 
since the emotional life of this character is extinct.”56 As Manchette wrote La 
position, he recorded in a journal the progress of his novel: “In La position du 
tireur couché as it stands now, the problem is that by representing the emo-
tional blockage of the main character by a near-total absence of reactions, I’ve 
made a character who doesn’t exist sufficiently” [Dans La position du tireur 
couché tel qu’il se présente actuellement, le problème est qu’à vouloir repré-
senter le blocage émotionnel du personnage central par une absence presque 
complète de réactions, j’ai obtenu un personnage qui n’existe pas suffisam-
ment] (873).
 Since existential crises framed by Sartre and Camus presented “insuffi-
cient existence” as a philosophical as well as literary conundrum, it is worth 
a moment to parse the measures of sufficient existence Manchette is using. 
It is unclear what the operating standard of existence is, or what purpose it 
 55. In The Snarl of the Beast, it is the monstrous villain, not the detective, who “hit[s] the 
pavement like a stockyard steer” (50).
 56. Platten, Pleasures of Crime, 105–6.
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serves—to generate compassion in the reader, to constitute intent under the 
law for purposes of prosecution, to drive a narrative arc, to interest other 
characters. Insufficient existence has legal consequences and can keep one out 
of prison, as we see in the book’s conclusion. But it also raises the question 
of what constitutes a character and a “narrative actor” as well as a sentient, 
social, and moral being.
 Itziar Giger and Jean-Paul Bronckart have studied verb tenses in the polar 
and noticed a preponderance of the passé simple in Manchette’s 1977 novel 
Fatale. Their study divides the story’s verbs into verbs of movement (there are 
60), verbs of speech (17), and verbs of sentiment, perception, or psychology 
(6).57 La position replicates this proportion and if anything tilts it even farther 
away from “sentiment, perception, or psychology.” The first page of the novel 
is filled with passé simple action verbs, whose final “a” creates a somewhat 
ludicrous sound effect. There are very few verbs of emotional expression, 
and those there are seem ironic or unconnected to surrounding content. On 
learning that his former girlfriend has been raped, tortured, and murdered, 
“For a moment he seemed to reflect. He did not seem shocked. Perhaps he 
felt a little sorrow” [Un instant il parut réfléchir. Il ne semblait pas ressentir 
un choc. Peut-être éprouvait-il un peu de peine] (896). We do see recounting 
of past emotion, though, principally rage: “That night, blinded by rage and 
humiliation, Martin almost came to blows with his father” [Ce soir-là, aveuglé 
de rage et d’humiliation, Martin manque se battre avec son père] (898). This 
character also has a father whose story becomes definitive. Charles Terrier 
had been shot in the head during some postwar black market business ven-
tures; the bullet remains in his head and when he drinks, he becomes clown-
ish. Martin’s mother runs off with a truck driver, leaving baby Martin to be 
raised by his father. At the end of the novel, Martin has also been shot. He 
lives with a bullet in his head, works as a waiter in a brasserie, and becomes 
clownish when he drinks. Bar patrons give him cocktails to make him act 
foolish, just as they had to his father. In the end, he lives in a “little lodging” 
[un petit logement], having retreated into the sort of subterranean “terrier” 
that his name implies (978).
 Uri Margolin remarks on the various components of action (context, 
manner, content, and so on) that allow acts to “serve as signifiers with regard 
to the characteristics and personalities of narrative agents. . . . Some physical 
acts, once identified, can be characterized in isolation and serve immediately 
as a source of characterization of the doer as well. These involve primarily acts 
with general, codified, context-free symbolic significance: bowing deeply for 
 57. Giger and Bronckart, “Le temps du polar.” 
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respect, tearing out one’s hair for despair, smiling for friendliness, etc.”58 Ter-
rier’s acts, from machine-gunning strangers for money to frowning and smil-
ing, seem as detached from their doer as they do from their context. When 
acts seem to be meaningless, one possible conclusion is that this is a world in 
which acts do not have meaning, in which, as Platten puts it, “human beings 
are diminished to the status of agents .  .  . where the professional assassin 
is the ultimate arbiter of market forces.”59 Here, however, that diminishing, 
absence, elision, or dissociation of the human actor emerges as the work of 
the narrator and not of society. The difference between a noir atmosphere 
and a non-noir atmosphere, I would propose, is quite simply the presence 
of a sustained and self-conscious character. In this sense, the néo-polar is a 
character-centered mise en scène of the vacuities introduced by existentialism 
and enacted through the nouveau roman. For even as it represents individual 
character diminished by deadening social forces, it also showcases the narra-
tive decision to play up that diminishing, and to create the character that does 
not exist sufficiently.
YAPPING TERRIER
At the end of La position, a man called only “blue suit” [complet bleu] explains 
to Terrier that he, Terrier, will publish a “book of recollections” [livre de sou-
venirs]. Terrier will not actually write this book, however, as someone else 
will already have written it—he will lend his name as author and correct the 
“verifiable inexactitudes” [inexactitudes vérifiables] (975). In fact, Terrier will 
learn from this manuscript what has happened to him, who shot him, who 
murdered his girlfriend, who the principal actors have been; all this under-
standing will then help him with his eventual court testimony. The publishers, 
however, find the manuscript “ridiculous.” Publication is canceled and legal 
prosecution abandoned. Blue suit explains the cancellation to Terrier:
—There will be no testimony, said blue suit. Everything is canceled. It’s over. 
You’ve been declared legally not responsible, so there’s no case. We’ll spread 
the word that you’re at a psychiatric clinic in the States .  .  .  . You can call 
yourself lucky.
 —Lucky? yapped Terrier.
 —You massacre three dozen people and they put you nicely back at 
square one! yelled blue suit. You don’t call that lucky?
 58. Margolin, “Doer and the Deed,” 208.
 59. Platten, Pleasures of Crime, 105.
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 —I don’t know, murmured Terrier slowly.
—Il n’y aura pas de témoignage, dit complet bleu. Tout est annulé. L’opéra-
tion est terminée. Vous êtes déclaré légalement irresponsable. Sur le plan 
judiciaire, vous avez un non-lieu. On fera savoir que vous êtes interne aux 
Etats-Unis dans une clinique psychiatrique.  .  . . Vous pouvez vous vanter 
d’avoir de la chance.
 —De la chance? glapit Terrier.
 —Vous massacrez trois douzaines de personnes et on vous remet genti-
ment sur la case départ! hurla l’autre. Vous n’appelez pas ça de la chance?
 —Je ne sais pas, dit lentement Terrier à voix basse. (976)
In this scene, the declaration of legal irresponsibility and the dismissal of the 
case coincide with the loss of the chance of authorship. Unable to provide 
testimony, Terrier becomes a character without sufficient legal existence to 
stand trial, the silent gunman reduced to a yapping dog. In the French legal 
tradition more so than in the Anglo-Saxon, an audience in court amounts to 
a recognition of the character’s humanity. Stewart Field notes that the French 
cour d’assises contains a comparution de curriculum vitae and quotes a French 
judge as stating, “you will be judged on the facts but through the personality.” 
He writes, “In American ‘contractual society,’ an offence is a deliberate breach 
of that contract, whereas in the French ‘political community,’ it is the straying 
of a sheep.”60 And yet, in Terrier’s case, even had he been heard, even had his 
book been published and his testimony recorded, that testimony would still 
be based on a manuscript he did not write and did not actually experience as 
such. The “I don’t know” when Terrier contemplates these options, when he 
envisions a prison term as compared to life as a waiter in a backwater brasse-
rie, one sort of “terrier” existence against another, is probably his most human 
moment of expression.
 Another néo-polar writer, Jean-Bernard Pouy, stated in an interview, 
“Manchette brought in something very important, he brought a specificity 
to the French novel. For once there were French noir novels that were not 
copies at large of the Anglo-Saxon, American models, but in which there 
was a true French voice.”61 The “true French voice” in question undoubtedly 
comes from Manchette and other néo-polar authors, but not from Manch-
ette’s best-known character. Indeed, there are numerous instances in Manch-
 60. Field, “State, Citizen, and Character,” 524, 538.
 61. Elfriede Müller, Interview of Jean-Bernard Pouy, January 29, 2004, trans. Steve Novak, 
http://www.europolar.eu/europolarv1/2_dossiers_entretien_Pouy_angl.htm (accessed February 
17, 2016).
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ette when at moments of strongest human pathos, the narrative turns to pure 
aesthetic spectacle and abandons character voice and thought. Once reunited 
with Anne, for instance, Terrier leaves for a walk and returns to find her in 
bed with one of the guards. Terrier loses the power of speech and is reduced 
to (or perhaps it is more correct to say expanded into) an interesting visual 
object. The narrator states also that Verdi’s Trovatore is on the turntable, the 
duet “Miserere” announcing the death of Manrico and Leonora’s devotion, 
and that a setter is barking outside (941). Terrier becomes unable to speak 
when he sees the couple, but he had not said much before that. With his 
speechlessness, his strange appearance and sounds, the opera with the man 
destined for death, and the dog (a double for Terrier) barking in the distance, 
the perceiving subject turns into a spectacle, a visual and musical scene. On 
the one hand, this turning renders a deadening modern environment in 
which loud noises and fast motion distract from human feeling; Manchette’s 
most vibrant writing is undoubtedly in such scenes, in which the narrator 
turns artist, television director, and anarchist musician.62 But it is worth con-
sidering that these vibrant cacophonies—echoes, it could even be argued, 
of Manchette’s own agoraphobic crises—emerge at emotional turning points 
for the characters. At those precise times when the character’s sentiment is of 
principal interest, narrative focus shifts to noise outside. This shift echoes on 
the one hand the multimedia nature of the néo-polar, the elements of punk 
rock, absurdist theater, and distracting spectacle that infuse the genre, but it 
has an important moral resonance. In a third-person narration, the narrator’s 
decision to concentrate on the distant barking dog, the operatic chords, the 
sexual position of the couple, and Terrier’s labored breathing turns a moment 
of emotional upset into a circus, but it does not indicate anything about Ter-
rier as a person and a character. In first-person narratives, however, those 
concentrations on aesthetic diversion do contain an ethical resonance for the 
character and ultimately anticipate one of the most important modern obsta-
cles to individual moral authority: a systematic and deliberate diversion of 
attention.
 As Müller writes, citing Dominique Manotti’s statement that “the crum-
bling of political hopes always brings existential disenchantment,” “Anchor-
ing that subjectivity within the social, that is the art of the polar” [Ancrer 
cette subjectivité au sein du social, voilà l’art du polar].63 There is no doubt 
that Manchette paints the decline of the subject as a social phenomenon. But 
it is equally incontestable that the social, reciprocally, has no other anchor 
 62. The Monoprix chase and explosion scene in Folle à tuer is an ideal example.
 63. Müller and Ruoff, Le polar français, 112.
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and expression than the individual. Again, this is not to suggest that any 
given individual can reverse broad social phenomena. Rather, it is to wonder 
why the individual is elided and accentuated in novels that focus on social 
criticism. It is also to propose that reading the individual and the social as 
mutually exclusive sites of responsibility may be a misreading. Manotti writes, 
“We have to reinvent the noir. Write the roman noir of globalization, of capi-
talism taking over with no one to stop it. Write the novel of these bad men 
who make our world, as Ellroy might put it” [Il faut reinventer le noir. Écrire 
le roman noir de la mondialisation, du capitalisme triomphant sans adver-
saire structuré, sans limites. Écrire le roman de ces hommes mauvais qui font 
notre monde, dirait peut-être Ellroy].64 Even in this formulation, however, 
which accords pride of place to globalization and capitalism, she points to 
“these bad men who make our world,” as though a group of individuals had 
been mentioned. In the American tradition, the principal character resists 
individual responsibility by pointing to concrete opposition or restrictions 
on his own movement, or by hinting at a traumatic experience that impedes 
complete subjecthood (Lou Ford). In the French tradition, that resistance 
appears in the form of ennui and malaise, or from outside cacophonies that 
distract from or drown out the individual. Lou Ford perceived or claimed to 
perceive, which for purposes of accountability amounts to the same, that he 
was a victim. In Martin Terrier’s case, the narrator accords to him as little 
perception as possible, as little evidence as possible of actual existence. And 
yet there is much action that is readable. Harming others and being kind to 
others function as “general, codified, context-free acts” that, as Margolin puts 
it, “serve immediately as a source of characterization of the doer.”
 To some extent, in the individual-social duality that characterized the tra-
ditional hard-boiled or roman noir, the individual as such has slipped out 
the back door and left the “social” to function as the scene of the narrative, 
its principal villain, and the source of possible reparation. Here again, how-
ever, there is considerable slippage in the meaning of “social,” since the alien-
ated néo-polar character is isolated not just from other people but also from 
basic mechanisms of thought and communication. The ostensible result of 
this isolation is a vacuum in which there can be no complete individual, for 
the simple reason that individual moral choices, individual conduct full stop, 
becomes manifest only when people come into contact with or think about 
one another, and Manchette and other néo-polar authors have shrunk this 
contact significantly. As Simon Blackburn writes in 2014, “Our sense of self is 
reciprocal with our sense of other people, and their sense of us. We discover 
 64. Manotti, “Le roman noir,” 109.
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ourselves only in the social world. Moral notions enter into the most impor-
tant dimensions of self-consciousness, and our sense of self is largely made 
up by them. They compose our identity.”65 What Blackburn describes is a con-
scious interaction between individuals—and between the individual and soci-
ety—that starts to demystify the social. The twenty-first-century corrective to 
the Butron phenomenon, to the character at once detrimental and indistinct 
and to the social at once invisible and incontrovertible, will follow a culturally 
specific pattern. The French solution to the self-absorbed but unaccountable 
protagonist is a character who thinks less about himself, more about oth-
ers, and more about the ideas he wishes to live. The contemporary French 
hard-boiled, or restorative hard-boiled, presents an abiding distrust of facile 
verbiage as well as of certainty. In place of oratorical flourishes, we see an aes-
thetic of hesitation and conscientiousness. We also see a much greater empha-
sis on partnership, not to distract from individual accountability and sense of 
self, but to render these possible once more, and to restore the “social” in all 
senses of the word.
 65. Blackburn, Mirror, Mirror, 28.
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IN BOTH American and French post–hard-boiled narratives, individual char-
acter takes on a deliberately fragmented quality. Character, such as it is, crum-
bles under the residue of heavy-handed upbringing, hypocritical bourgeois 
society, mental illness, commercialism, social pressure, fatigue, boredom, and 
confusion. The dismantlings of both heroic character models and account-
ability described in the third and fourth chapters are extreme examples of that 
crumbling but nonetheless represent a broad mid-century trend. To take up 
once more Currie’s notions of “character” and “Character,” an introspective 
character dissects his Character and lays the pieces at the feet of forces outside 
his control. Meanwhile, the character with a small C, the narrative agent and 
actor, remains strikingly intelligible and reliable. He drives the narrative. As a 
result, the laconic, pessimistic Frenchman and the reckless, resentful Ameri-
can are cultural commonplaces in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.
 On both sides of the Atlantic, the individual’s focus on intractable demons 
made him an unreliable repository or generator of public order. This was not 
because those demons were insurmountable but because narrative focus on 
them, the character’s immersion within them, had made the trustworthy mav-
erick almost an anachronism. The idea of a privately generated set of ethics 
and the absence of declared conventional morality, sources of liberation in 
the classic hard-boiled, now signified the mood swings of a dangerous loose 
cannon. Jim Thompson’s Ford describes his lawyer Billy Boy in terms almost 
identical to those employed by Race Williams: “His ideas of right and wrong 
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didn’t jibe too close with the books” (234). Billy Boy himself then announces, 
“A weed is a plant out of place. I find a hollyhock in my cornfield, and it’s a 
weed. I find it in my garden, and it’s a flower. You’re in my yard, Mr. Ford” 
(236–37), which echoes the dismissal of absolute values and the affirmation 
of the subjective. But when the flower in question is criminally insane and 
ready to burn down his own house, or even just disengaged, bored, tired, and 
unwilling to be held to account, then “not jibing too close with the books” 
becomes worrisome rather than liberating.
 I want to return for a moment to Mikhael Bakhtin’s earlier-cited com-
ment on Dostoevsky’s fiction, “Living an idea is somehow synonymous with 
unselfishness.”1 Bakhtin’s “ideinost,” or profound investment or immersion in 
an idea, was rather peculiar to nineteenth-century Russian ideas of social jus-
tice—Tolstoy’s interest in the liberation of the peasants, for instance. After 
the Second World War and after decades of unhinged or deluded characters 
of all stripe, “living an idea” showed itself to be as much problem as solution, 
encompassing at once idealism and dedication, obsession and delusion. On 
the one hand, living an idea (the abstract notion of justice, a particular social 
ideal, the importance of an institution, or even the investigation at hand) 
seemed preferable to, and sufficient to stop characters from, thinking always 
about themselves. At the same time, the twentieth century gave ample exam-
ples of individuals living even potentially reasonable ideas to the point of 
madness, and the mid-century hard-boiled showcased characters living some 
rather very questionable ideas. In Jim Thompson’s Pop. 1280, for instance, 
Nick Corey lives the idea of doing the Lord’s work. “I said I meant I was just 
doing my job, followin’ the holy precepts laid down in the Bible. It’s what I’m 
supposed to do, you know, to punish the heck out of people for bein’ people. 
To coax ’em into revealin’ theirselves, an’ them kick the crap out of ’em” (206). 
In his case, living an idea is code for messianic delusion. That parodic excess 
of individual grandeur is more extravagant than most, but lesser contamina-
tions of the “idea” abound.
 As Lee Horsley implies, those contaminations are the fault not of ideas 
themselves but of the people living them.
The psychologising of the criminal and the concomitant movement away 
from treating crime as the product of socio-economic deprivation is some-
times judged to weaken the capacity of the gangster narrative to act as a 
critique of the capitalist system. There is no doubt that focusing on the psy-
chopathology of a character can become an indulgence of horrified fasci-
 1. Bakhtin, Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics, 71.
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nation at the sheer nastiness of the aberrant personality, combined with a 
reassuring sense that normative values and conventional lives are free from 
these evils.2 
With the turn to “normative values,” however, the pendulum prepares to 
swing again; for compared to “libidinal investment” in the classic hard-boiled 
character,3 “normative values” are an underwhelming corrective to criminal-
ity. When the “lived idea” at hand is the importance of “normative values and 
conventional lives,” living that idea can easily mean submission to statis, cor-
ruption, or uselessness. After all, it was disaffection with normative values and 
conventional lives that encouraged the classic hard-boiled celebration of the 
individual a century ago.
RESTORING MORAL AUTHORITY
In the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, crime fiction in the 
hard-boiled mode engages deliberately with “living an idea” of individual 
moral authority and accountability. It also engages with the various mate-
rial conditions and communal norms that encumber that authority. This 
chapter examines the contemporary resuscitation of the individual as viable 
autonomous entity and of shared values as other than deadening, imper-
sonal, fraudulent, or corrupt. Indeed, I propose that that resuscitation is a 
principal concern in popular culture writ large. From the best sellers cited 
in this book’s introduction, to political discourse on individual and collec-
tive responsibility, to public discussion of political corruption both American 
and French, to television dramas that depict social systems deteriorating, to 
debates about juvenile justice and the age limits of accountability, to research 
on “bandwidth” poverty,4 popular culture on both sides of the Atlantic has 
addressed individual moral authority almost as a microcosmic measure of 
national identity. This is one reason I broaden the category of hard-boiled 
crime fiction in this final chapter to include television, for in that most widely 
resonant medium, analyses of accountability find the strongest both popular 
and intellectual representation.
 Insistence on individual moral choice, again, is neither reactionary nor 
utopian. It simply means that naming the social as source of disorder has 
often been an unproductive and truncated endeavor. Rather, naming either 
 2. Horsley, Noir Thriller, 104.
 3. Breu, Hard-Boiled Masculinities.
 4. See Mullainathan and Shafir, Scarcity.
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the social or the individual as source of disorder has been problematic, par-
ticularly because in much social discourse, the individuals most called to 
account are curiously those who have the least social capital and power. A 
more relevant and provocative undertaking would be to focus on those who 
have the most, and this is where the hard-boiled comes in. The relationship 
between social problems and individual moral agents is alive and ongoing. 
While moral agency must certainly be considered in view of collectively pro-
duced ethics, the hard-boiled has always insisted on individual authors as well 
as on individual resonances. To be an individual and to be part of a system are 
not mutually exclusive, either for heroes or for public enemies. In the twenty-
first century, when individual moral choice often seems subsumed under col-
lective productions or impositions, the hard-boiled continues to insist upon 
it as a source of reparation.
 Broadly stated, contemporary crime narratives remedy crises of account-
ability and character dissolution in two ways. One way is to reintroduce early 
nineteenth-century character outlines and laconic dedication to action, thus 
reinstating the maverick individual as throwback. Another way is to ramp up 
emphasis on institutional or collective models of social protection and to cast 
individuals in service to these models, acknowledging the precariousness of 
the individual qua individual and moving away from the hard-boiled model. 
And yet, these models, in some ways diametrically opposed, fuse into a con-
temporary balance. These modes of correction—and it is indeed correction, 
for the contemporary hard-boiled is consistently and explicitly dedicated to 
damage control, though the source of that damage varies—each cast the res-
urrection of individual moral authority as a common goal. Much of the work 
of restoration has to do with reversing the character tendencies described in 
the third and fourth chapters. Characters return to the discursive and behav-
ioral outlines of the nineteenth century, before psychoanalysis, before the 
modern age of the self. Bakhtin’s standard was living an idea, not declaiming 
or advertising an idea, and yet living an idea, like unselfishness, entails some 
thought of it, and in novels, much talking about or around it. It also entails 
considerable thought about the potential perils of living an idea, since by the 
time the contemporary hard-boiled endeavors to resurrect the individual, 
some of the road earlier traveled has been burned. But that is the precise and 
particular value of the contemporary hard-boiled: it plays out the relation-
ship of the individual to the idea, and of idea-living individuals to the good 
of society. Throughout the American and French narratives examined in this 
chapter, we see contemporary resurrection of empathic presence, responsive-
ness to others, and a diminished focus on one’s own interest. Furthermore, 
the idea of national identity functions as a powerful corrective repository of 
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“normative values,” even as it looms as a villainous or boringly conventional 
foil. Finally, partnerships and collaborations become crucial, not just in the 
sense of shoring up individuals, but of expanding their boundaries and devel-
oping the individual as social being.
 Ultimately, the contemporary hard-boiled examines how “living” the idea 
of morality, justice, patriotism, humanity, ennobles and animates the indi-
vidual, even as it encounters the duplicitous faces of convention. The content 
of the lived ideas varies subtly from culture to culture, as do the manners of 
living and sharing them, but common to both twenty-first-century models 
are a surprisingly explicit return to nineteenth-century character outlines and 
an active engagement with questions of accountability and social function. 
Contemporary hard-boiled characters stand in the public view, both as repre-
sentatives of national justice within their narratives, and as popular fictional 
characters in the world. In this sense, they are similar to political person-
alities, at once visible representatives of national justice and embodiments of 
what “living an idea” could look like, for better or worse, in each respective 
national setting.
THE CONTEMPORARY FRENCH CORPUS
French crime fiction in the post néo-polar years includes a rich variety of 
characters. These include Gabriel Lecouvreur, or Le Poulpe, who was dreamed 
up by Jean-Bernard Pouy, Serge Quadruppani, and Patrick Raynal and devel-
oped through the contributions of numerous authors from 1995 to the pres-
ent; Franck Thilliez’s Lucie Hennebelle and Franck Sharko; Brigitte Aubert’s 
Elise Andrioli; Antoine Chainas’s Paul Nazutti; Daniel Pennac’s Benjamin 
Malaussène; and Jean-Claude Izzo’s Fabio Montale. I focus on a character 
who resuscitates the nineteenth-century romantic model while fusing maver-
ick eccentricity to national intactness, and whose claim to hard-boiled status 
combines Nestor Burma’s cultural ambassadorship with Chandler’s “honor 
without thought of it.” This is Fred Vargas’s commissaire Jean-Baptiste Adams-
berg, a romantic-inspired hero in some ways more Maigret than Burma. And 
yet, to take up Lukács’s terms once more, his living of ideals as “subjective 
facts” casts him as both generator and interpreter of moral authority. Further-
more, his evolution over the past two decades demonstrates individualism 
nourished in connection with others and thus increasingly “social” in nature.
 Fred Vargas is the author of numerous crime novels, most of which cen-
ter on Parisian police commissaire Adamsberg (several others concentrate on 
the so-called three Evangelists, or scholars of various historical periods who 
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solve mysteries as amateur detectives). Vargas is credited with nothing less 
than the rejuvenation of French detective fiction, not just in France where her 
novels are best sellers, but across the world. Readers first encounter commis-
saire Adamsberg in L’homme aux cercles bleus (1991), and for the second time 
in L’homme à l’envers (1999). Since then, Adamsberg has appeared in seven 
more novels. I will start with L’homme à l’envers and then consider briefly the 
sixth Adamsberg novel, Sous les vents de Neptune (2004), in which Adams-
berg himself is suspected of murder. The plot of L’homme à l’envers is as fol-
lows: in the southeast of France, sheep are being killed in large numbers by 
what seems to be an enormous beast. A visiting Canadian biologist, Lawrence 
Johnstone, studies wolves and tracks their movements; he becomes curious 
about the fallen sheep. When a local woman is also killed, however, Lawrence 
and the villagers begin to talk of a werewolf; suspicion falls on a recently dis-
appeared loner, Massart. Three characters band together to pursue Massart: 
Soliman, the adopted son of the murdered woman; Le Veilleux, a local shep-
herd; and Camille, plumber and musician, current girlfriend of the biologist, 
and former love of the Parisian police commissaire. As the killings continue 
and the murderer eludes the group, the aforementioned commissaire, the 
highly intuitive and meditative Jean-Baptiste Adamsberg, is himself brought 
in to help investigate. In the end, Adamsberg solves the crimes, which turn 
out to be the work not of a village werewolf but of Lawrence himself, through 
a pathological and generations-old search for vengeance. L’homme à l’envers 
is published in English as Seeking Whom He May Devour, though the literal 
translation is Man Inside Out, which is how one of the characters describes 
the phenomenon of the werewolf.
 During the first half of the book, Camille, Soliman, and Le Veilleux form 
a motley investigative team, but they soon decide that some support from 
actual law enforcement would be helpful. Faced with the challenge of locat-
ing a policeman who will not look askance at their werewolf–murderer–
sheep-eater theories, Camille proposes to contact Adamsberg. Soliman asks 
Camille: “How is he then, as a cop? No scruples?” [Comment il est alors, 
comme flic? Pas de scrupules?] to which Camille answers, “Plenty of scru-
ples and not many principles” [Beaucoup de scrupules et pas beaucoup de 
principes].5 Adamsberg’s scruple-principle distinction fashions Chandler’s 
“honor without thought of it” to the French twenty-first century. The dis-
tinction paints Adamsberg as entirely instinctive both in his conduct with 
others and in his performance as police commissaire. As a result, he becomes 
 5. Vargas, L’homme à l’envers, 185. Subsequent references to this work will be given par-
enthetically.
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a sort of fantasy French civil servant, his mindfulness reflecting positively 
on French culture as a whole. From his introduction in L’homme aux cercles 
bleus, Adamsberg comes at policing for reasons interior, private, almost sen-
sorial: “I wondered why I was a cop. Maybe because in this job there are 
things to look for and a chance of actually finding them. That makes up for 
the rest” [Je me demandais pourquoi j’étais flic. Peut-être parce que dans 
ce métier on a des choses à chercher avec des chances de les trouver. Ça 
console du reste].6 When Camille insists that Adamsberg has scruples but 
not principles, her companions at first assume she means that he is corrupt. 
And yet the distinction between scruple and principle takes for granted that 
Adamsberg is a reliable protector of the people—again recalling the Burma 
model—and concentrates on why. The Oxford English Dictionary defines 
principle as “a general law or rule adopted or professed as a guide to action; 
a settled ground or basis of conduct or practice; a fundamental motive or 
reason of action, esp. one consciously recognized and followed” and as “an 
inward or personal law of right action; personal devotion to right; rectitude, 
uprightness, honourable character.” The dictionary’s cited examples of this 
definition’s usage include: “If I were to choose any servant . . . I would choose 
a godly man that hath principles” (Cromwell, July 4, 1653). And from Moll 
Flanders: “Thus my pride, not my principle, kept me honest.” Scruple, on 
the other hand, though it may well have the same net behavioral result as 
principle, takes the form of feeling rather than of “inward or personal law.” 
The OED defines it as “a thought or circumstance that troubles the mind or 
conscience; a doubt, uncertainty or hesitation in regard to right and wrong, 
duty, propriety, etc.; esp. one which is regarded as over-refined or over-nice, 
or which causes a person to hesitate where others would be bolder to act.” 
Given examples include, from Bishop Jeremy Taylor: “A scruple is a great 
trouble of mind proceeding from a little motive” (1660), and from Father 
Frederick Faber’s Growth in Holiness: “A scruple is a vain fear of sin where 
there is no reasonable ground for suspecting sin” (1854). Indeed, scruple is 
most often used in connection with religious nervousness.7 Merriam-Webster 
defines scruple in terms of principle (“an ethical consideration or principle 
that inhibits action”), but includes the element of “mental reservation.” The 
OED tells us Cicero first used “scrupulus” (rough or hard pebble) figura-
tively to designate a cause of uneasiness or anxiety. According to that usage, 
 6. Vargas, L’homme aux cercles bleus, 44.
 7. Further, scruple is often used as a synonym for a pathological oversensitivity. See 
Jenks, Blind Obedience; Casey, Nature and Treatment of Scruples; Van Ornum, A Thousand 
Frightening Fantasies. In The Doubting Disease, Ciarrocchi describes scruple as arising from 
an “overly sensitive moral conscience” (5).
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Adamsberg is to “scruples” as the princess is to the pea—he carries within 
him the mandate to remain ethical without thought of it. In some ways, the 
dominance of scruple in Adamsberg aligns with the dominance of senti-
mentalism as Leonard Cassuto outlines it in Hard-Boiled Sentimentalism. 
For Cassuto, “the hard-boiled detective relies on reason only in concert with 
intuition—that is, feeling. Sentimentalism strikes a similar balance between 
reason and feeling.”8 The scruple-principle distinction, however, breaks down 
the reason-feeling opposition even further, for it starts to question what 
thought is and who is responsible for it.
NARRATIVE MODESTY
Chandler’s formula of the character who is heroic “without thought of it, 
and certainly without saying it” referred to first-person narrators, and the 
Adamsberg novels’ third-person narration does much to transmit subtlety. It 
is relatively easy for Adamsberg to avoid “saying it” when a narrator is say-
ing it all for him. But even as a character, Adamsberg functions as a third-
person narrator, which is to say that his focus is on others. When he thinks 
about himself, it is as a vehicle for the investigation, and he is principally con-
cerned—this is the main focus of his scrupulousness—with clear thinking. 
When a person is found dead in a sheep pen and the story of the mad sheep-
killing wolf takes a more sinister turn, “Only at moments like this, when real-
ity fell in line with his darkest imaginings, did Adamsberg lose his poise and 
become almost scared of himself. He had never had complete confidence in 
his inner depths. He was as wary of those depths as of the charred bottom of 
a wizard’s cauldron” [Dans ces seuls instants, quand la réalité venait absur-
dement rejoindre ses plus obscures expectatives, Adamsberg chancelait et se 
faisait presque peur. Le fond de lui même ne lui avait jamais inspiré tout à 
fait confiance. Il s’en défiait, comme du fond calciné de la marmite d’un sor-
cier] (87). In this formulation, Adamsberg emerges as a sort of Saint Francis 
of criminal investigation, or channel for the truth of events and ideas. Vari-
ous reviewers describe Adamsberg as “zen-like” because of his temperament 
and stillness, but the term also speaks to his focus on pure receptivity. For 
instance, the narrator tells us that “Adamsberg never reflected, he found it 
sufficient to dream, then to sort out his catch” [Adamsberg ne réfléchissait 
jamais, il se contentait de rêver, puis de trier la récolte] (85). Rolls has writ-
ten that Adamsberg’s detective practice is “fetishistic in its deployment of 
 8. Cassuto, Hard-Boiled Sentimentality, 13.
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a Baudelairean prose poetics through which the hyperclarity of his vision 
alights on both the manifestly important evidence and the small, everyday 
occurrences that pass otherwise unnoticed.”9 What interests me here is that 
contemplation for Adamsberg is less an action than an experience; encoun-
tering his own thoughts becomes akin to watching images on the television 
(and indeed, it is through television that he encounters the sheep killings to 
begin with). All his policing movements emerge from a sensorial impulse 
in which professionalism seems beside the point. There are few instances of 
the verb “to think” [penser], but the noun “thought” abounds. For instance: 
“Adamsberg’s thoughts contained a fair amount of pebbles and seaweed, and 
he often got tangled up in them. He had to throw a lot out, eliminate a lot of 
it. He was aware that his mind tended to serve up a muddled conglomerate 
of thoughts, and that for other people it didn’t necessarily work that way” 
[Il y avait pas mal de cailloux et d’algues dans les pensées d’Adamsberg et il 
n’était pas rare qu’il s’y emmêlât. Il devait beaucoup jeter, beaucoup éliminer. 
Il avait conscience que son esprit lui servait un conglomérat confus de pen-
sées inégales et que cela ne fonctionnait pas forcément de même pour tous 
les autres hommes] (85).
 Returning to the terms that Lukács introduced in his comments on sub-
jective fact, his notion of “aims given to [the individual] with immediate obvi-
ousness, [involving] hindrances and difficulties but never any serious threat 
to his interior life,” I would propose that Adamsberg’s openness to thought 
resonates as almost premodern. When one character asks him, “You know 
these things, or you think them?” [Tu sais ces choses ou bien tu les penses?] 
Adamsberg responds, “I don’t know anything. .  .  . I just want to see” [Je ne 
sais rien. .  .  . Je veux voir] (242). In this sense, Adamsberg is not just a zen 
meditator but also an anachronism, going back beyond nineteenth-century 
romanticism to a frame of mind in which the value of his own subjectiv-
ity is never equal to the import, the weight, of what is “given” to him. This 
receptivity, like the distinction between “his mind served up thoughts” and 
“think,” like the distinction between scruple and principle, makes Adams-
berg a Lukácsian “unproblematic individual.”10 And yet, his “thoughts” in 
 9. Rolls, Paris and the Fetish, 107.
 10. Véronique Denain cites her interview with Fred Vargas, in which the latter noted that 
“while in the public’s mind the male character is neutral, any female character is inevitably 
going to be categorized according to a handful of stereotypes.” Dénain then elaborates: “No 
particular expectations or qualities are ascribed to a male hero whereas a woman is im-
mediately assimilated to one of thirty or more possible roles which are virtually impossible 
for a writer to counteract: from ‘the whinger’ to ‘the mother,’ from ‘the victim’ to ‘the bitch,’ 
the female character’s actions will be interpreted to fit one of those stereotypes.” Desnain, 
“Women in French Crime Writing,” 93.
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themselves are understood to be more problematic than the “immediate 
aims” given to Lukács’s epic heroes. Intervening centuries of modernity have 
blocked the channel of such giving and muddled the translucency of ideas. 
As Adamsberg acknowledges: “He was aware that his mind served up” [Il 
avait conscience que son esprit lui servait] maintains the integrity of “con-
science,” separate from “thoughts” and responsible for their evaluation. As 
such, this description stands in diametric contrast to Butron’s “I believe in the 
unconscious.” The French “conscience” corresponds to both conscience and 
consciousness and connects one to the other. Scruple, as “a great trouble of 
mind proceeding from a little motive” or as “a vain fear of sin where there is 
no reasonable ground for suspecting sin,” implies an automatic delicacy that 
conscience does not, but both speak to a mindfulness of one’s responsibility 
as generator and animator of ideas. In attributing to Adamsberg both scruple 
and conscience, the novel has the commissaire oscillate between an instinctual 
“honor without thought of it” and an awareness of his own responsibility.
 The notion that thoughts are independent and unreliable functions as a 
corrective to snarls of thought into which various self-obsessed characters 
fell—at times deliberately—in the néo-polar. Too much thought, however, 
does away with the instinctive quality that underlay the hard-boiled charac-
ter as conservator of sentimental virtues (Cassuto), as deserving of libidinal 
investment (Breu), and as embodiment of secular morality. Adamsberg’s con-
tinuous alternation between the two poles places him in an ideal twenty-first-
century dimension: a fusion between the unselfishness of “living an idea” and 
the conscious responsibility to ensure the soundness of ideas as he lives them.
CLOSING THE CASE
For most of the novel, Adamsberg’s temperament and the novel’s criminal plot 
run parallel to one another, with the truth of the crime emerging as though 
from a dream. The problem is that both the individual and the institution 
have practical as well as symbolic limits: while a solitary individual can con-
duct a criminal investigation, only a civil servant can actually close it. Con-
templation can drive or even substitute for deduction, but it cannot substitute 
for arrest and the judicial process. Someone actually has to put on the hand-
cuffs, and the very idea of judicial resolution is inseparable from official func-
tion. Official function is potentially redolent of all the “Oughts” that scruple 
and reverie would seem to circumvent, but this novel cushions its characters 
from the leaden weight of government even in the moment of arrest.
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 At the end of the novel, Adamsberg sets out for a midnight walk and is 
attacked by Lawrence. Rolls writes, “This departure from the road marks a 
move away from the central thrust of the narrative. The shift is apparently 
from an evidentiary-based investigation to an instinctive one. . . . The move-
ment here is away from the whiteness of rationality toward the darkness of 
myth and primal forces.”11 I would go further than this and propose that 
the entire novel moves to replace or at least conflate an evidentiary-based 
investigation with an instinctive one. Adamsberg reaches for his gun, finds 
it unloaded, and is on the point of being killed when Soliman, who does 
have a gun, comes upon him and holds up the murderer. Adamsberg, then, 
worried that Soliman will be too scared to shoot, disables the suspect by 
throwing a rock at his head. They then tie up Lawrence with Adamsberg’s 
holster and shirt. Policemen come and lead out the criminal, and “a third 
policeman gave [Adamsberg] back his shirt and his holster” [un troisième 
gendarme lui rendit sa chemise et son holster] (303). In this entire episode, 
the narrator takes pains to remove Adamsberg from formulaic police pro-
cedures. First, the commissaire is unarmed. Second, he is saved by Soliman, 
a civilian, not because the latter is a deliberate crime fighter, but because his 
mother was the murderer’s first victim, and he has become fond of Adams-
berg. Third, Adamsberg disables the murderer with a rock, an emphatically 
natural geological counterpoint to police-issue weapons. The rock echoes 
the story of David and Goliath, but whereas David promised to give the 
dead bodies of the Philistines “to the wild beasts of the earth,” Adamsberg 
passes Lawrence to the policemen who process him into the French system. 
The rock also echoes Adamsberg’s “scrupulus” (rough pebble) as well as the 
thought “pebbles” in his mind. Fourth, other police, not him, perform the 
act of arrest. Fifth, those other policemen hand Adamsberg his shirt and 
holster as they are leading the criminal away; it is therefore not until the 
criminal is gone that we see Adamsberg in police-issue clothing. Sixth, the 
entire process takes place in the country under the night sky, recalling the 
bucolic setting of the romantic poets. And last but not least, Adamsberg’s 
announcement to Camille that Lawrence was the killer is more therapeutic 
than judicial in nature: “He was split in two, the quiet man and the tor-
mented child. .  .  . They never gave him a chance at a normal life. It’s the 
truth. Think of it that way” [Il était en deux bouts, l’homme tranquil et l’en-
fant déchiré. . . . Ils ne lui ont pas laissé une seule chance de vivre. C’est la 
 11. Rolls, Paris and the Fetish, 94–95. He observes elsewhere that “Adamsberg becomes the 
very model of a flâneur-detective.” Rolls, Mostly French, 22.
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vérité. Penses-y comme ça] (307). Adamsberg will not judge Lawrence, and 
yet it will happen, the courts will do it, and far off-screen.
 The entire process of arrest seems as uncodified and as rooted in the per-
sonal as possible. It animates Rousseau’s idea of the noble savage, as powerful 
as an animal: “Pit a bear or a wolf against a brave, agile, and vigorous savage, 
as they all are, armed with stones and a good stick, and you will see that the 
peril will at the very least be mutual, and that after several such experiences, 
wild beasts who do not like to attack each other will be equally disinclined to 
attack man, whom they will have found every bit as ferocious as themselves” 
[Mettez un ours ou un loup aux prises avec un sauvage robuste, agile, coura-
geux comme ils sont tous, armé de pierres, et d’un bon bâton, et vous verrez 
que le péril sera tout au moins réciproque, et qu’après plusieurs expériences 
pareilles, les bêtes féroces qui n’aiment point à s’attaquer l’une à l’autre, s’at-
taqueront peu volontiers à l’homme, qu’elles auront trouvé tout aussi féroce 
qu’elles].12 At the same time, the sort of empathic understanding that Adams-
berg demonstrates at the moment of arrest distinguishes humans: “Man is 
not a dog or a wolf. It is necessary only to establish basic social relations, to 
give his feelings a morality that beasts cannot know. Animals have heart and 
passions, but the holy image of what is honest and beautiful lives only in the 
heart of man” [L’homme n’est point un chien ni un loup. Il ne faut qu’établir 
dans son espèce les premiers rapports de la société pour donner à ses senti-
ments une moralité toujours inconnue aux bêtes. Les animaux ont un cœur et 
des passions; mais la sainte image de l’honnête et du beau n’entra jamais que 
dans le cœur de l’homme].13 When we read Adamsberg as restoring the wan-
ing individual of the néo-polar without compromising the genre’s resistance 
to deadening political structures, the detective’s tendency to act in concert 
with—but also detached from—police procedural structures makes cultural 
sense.
 Vargas’s novel envelops any deadening intrusion of “conventional lives 
and normative values” in a redemptive individualism. Crucially, it also sepa-
rates the individual as social being from the individual as cog in the social 
machine. As Adamsberg novels accumulate, his storied reliability intensifies, 
as do the quirkiness of the people who surround him and the importance 
of human connection to the investigation. In Sous les vents de Neptune, for 
instance, he is saved from erroneous imprisonment in Canada by clinging, 
literally, to the back of his lieutenant, Violette Retancourt. In Dans les bois 
éternels, his team saves Violette’s life when the murderer attacks her. In Un 
 12. Rousseau, Discours, 136.
 13. Rousseau, Lettre à Mr. d’Alembert, 116.
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lieu incertain, Adamsberg is almost murdered by his own (recently emerged) 
son Zerk, then saved by an alexandrine-spouting recruit, Veyrenc. In the 2011 
L’armée furieuse, Adamsberg (reconciled and teamed with Zerk) encounters 
a man who speaks backwards, that man’s six-fingered brother, and another 
brother who believes his bones are falling into powder. These eccentricities 
undermine the linguistic, philosophical, and even physiological conventions 
that normally mark communities,14 and in Adamsberg’s France, communities 
build themselves on other grounds. In L’homme à l’envers, the usual anthro-
pological commonalities of religion, national identity, creed, origin, and eth-
nicity are so notably absent from the novel’s human groupings that entire 
communities as well as individuals appear to run on scruple rather than 
principle. The coming together of eccentrics and loners largely puts to rest 
the leaden force of the Kantian Oughts, the idea being that characters who 
don’t bother to use last names, who mistrust the police, and who call priests 
“jackass” to their faces are unlikely to be silently bending under the weight of 
top-down bourgeois “shoulds.” Their scruples are unlikely to be made up of 
internalized principle, since the characters are eccentric enough to be isolated 
from the usual channels of principle and convention, which saves these com-
munities from being “imagined,” to use Benedict Anderson’s term. Civiliza-
tion in Fred Vargas is a collectivity of the proverbial noble savages.
STATE SOVEREIGNTY, OR 
SYNCHRONICITY WITH THE STATE
The communities in this novel are emphatically human rather than national. 
Indeed, distrust of nationalism and its institutions is endemic to its charac-
ters. And yet, that distrust functions in such a way as to support, rather than 
undercut, a rather idealized vision of the French state. Jacqueline Hodgson’s 
earlier-cited statement that “the sovereignty of the people becomes the sov-
ereignty of the state” applies again here, for if scruple, rather than principle, 
makes for an exemplary civil servant, then the sovereignty of the individual 
(and his scruples) can become the sovereignty of the state without ceasing in 
the process to be the sovereignty of the individual. Sovereignty in this for-
mulation is not so much transferred as shared. Whereas Müller had written 
of the néo-polar’s antiheroes that “they are unhappy and their unhappiness 
belongs to society,” in Vargas’s fiction, Adamsberg’s scruple belongs to soci-
 14. Platten writes that Veyrenc’s “pseudo-Racinian language within the text—Vargas has 
invented numerous examples—signposts both the diegetic and non-diegetic importance of 
figurative language in the novel.” Platten, Pleasures of Crime, 239–40.
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ety.15 His scruples are representative and can thus transcend, albeit in all mod-
esty, the boundaries of the individual.
 Despite Camille’s assertion that Adamsberg has not many principles, he 
never comes across as unprincipled, any more than Race Williams comes 
across as unethical. The distinction could thus remain purely academic; it is 
important, however, because it attributes Adamsberg’s internal compass, his 
decisions, his conduct, his investigations, everything, to intuition rather than 
conscious decision. The distinction would not have the same resonance were 
Adamsberg an independent detective, or even a lower-ranking policeman; the 
stakes of his scruples would be too low, their personal nature beside the point. 
As a scrupulous commissaire, Adamsberg constitutes a French counterpoint to 
the ethical maverick Race Williams. When the decidedly unaffiliated Williams 
uses the strongly affiliated term “ethics,” that term, combined with Williams’s 
ethical actions, removes the sharp edges from his maverick independence. 
When, on the other hand, the classically affiliated Adamsberg is attached to 
the independent term scruples, the intuitive nature of the term removes the 
deadening or coercive nature of “normative values and conventional lives.” 
When a good policeman’s scruples step in for principle, or come to the result 
one expects of principle, the result is a sort of ideal society: a police depart-
ment, a crime-fighting force, a judicial system, a nation, in short, based on 
a natural and coincidental congruence of private temperament and public 
interest.
 As political historian Sudhir Hazareesingh describes, the notion of natural 
“becoming” that Hodgson outlines is fundamental to France’s self-image. He 
writes, “The presence of the State is maintained through its self-image as the 
guardian of the long-term interests of the nation. This self-image is constantly 
projected to the population, reminding French citizens of the benevolent and 
paternalistic vocation of their State.” The notion of “constant projection” 
implies a state that needs perhaps protest too much. Indeed, Hazareesingh 
writes that “the French State is almost unique in the extent to which its pub-
lic discourse reflects its inflated view of itself.” The state attempts to embody 
desirable personal characteristics (benevolence and paternalism suggesting, 
respectively, personal will and familial standing). The appeal of Adamsberg 
as commissaire lies in his being benevolent and paternalistic in fact but not 
in words—that is, not on principle. He himself does not remind or project, 
and in a sense seems to have no metaconsciousness of himself as state repre-
sentative or even person in society, which makes any principle-directed “rule 
 15. Sara Poole describes Adamsberg’s “moral mission” as “a mission to follow up
an intuited source of cruelty.” Poole, “Rompols Not of the Bailey,” 97.
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or code of conduct” beside the point. Camille’s friends are surprised to hear 
that this “special cop” is a commissaire rather than a mere inspector. As Haza-
reesingh writes, “French higher civil servants (hauts fonctionnaires) regarded 
themselves as embodying a particular institutional vocation: the defence of 
the public interest. Only a highly trained, disciplined, and efficient body of 
public servants could act as the guardians of the long-term interests of soci-
ety, because only they had as their prime motivation an abiding attachment 
to the common good.” The higher the ranking of the civil servant, the more 
that servant’s scruple becomes a happy accident, both for the individual and 
for the state.16
 Scruple, conscience, improvised societies, nicknames, mistrust of the 
government, and endless personal peculiarities ensure that personal sover-
eignty runs parallel to rather than underneath state sovereignty. And yet, the 
state and its legal institutions become a sort of honorary person, bearing the 
canonical characteristics of the French character exemplar. When a British 
reviewer calls Vargas’s work “a baked Camembert among the smorgasbord 
of chilly Scandinavian realism that dominates the foreign crime fiction mar-
ket,” the gastronomic allusion catches Vargas’s peculiarly French conflation 
of culture and state.17 In terms of character outlines, Adamsberg echoes the 
nineteenth-century romantic model more precisely than any other French 
detective, even Maigret. That echoing draws on private contemplativeness 
as element of the French patrimoine. Claire Gorrara, noting that one in 
five books sold in France is a polar, writes that “from being classified as a 
genre mineur, crime fiction has come to be recognized as an important part 
of France’s patrimoine culturel.”18 The early nineteenth-century French male 
romantic hero, postrevolutionary, solitary, nostalgic, melancholic, some-
times pro-Royalist, sometimes protorepublican model, emerged in French 
literature at the moment when the people’s sovereignty and state sovereignty 
were becoming linked, and when spiritual virtues morphed into character 
attributes. It was also in the early nineteenth century (1829) that sergents de 
ville, patrolling police forces, were introduced in Paris. As Christine Horton 
recounts, early directives to the sergents de ville “state that ‘our action with 
regard to the public .  .  . will never assume the character of repression or 
violence,’” and that they should “cause themselves to be remarked by good 
 16. Hazareesingh, Political Traditions in Modern France, 151, 152, 153.
 17. Jack Kerridge, “Fred Vargas: ‘I Write My Novels in Three Weeks Flat,’” The Telegraph, 
March 6, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/bookreviews/9900139/Fred-Vargas-I-
write-my-novels-in-three-weeks-flat.html (accessed February 17, 2016).
 18. Gorrara, “French Crime Fiction,” 210.
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bearing, regular conduct and honest and moderate words and deeds.”19 The 
romantics were not fond of the term “scrupules,” using the word to designate 
unreasonable hesitation or cowardliness.20 Adamsberg’s principal character-
istics, however, are precisely those of the inwardly directed and sentimental 
romantics: dreaminess and self-containment, fondness for nocturnal prom-
enades, artistic disposition, and apparent nonchalance. Sara Poole writes, 
“Part Mr. Spock . . . he is also part Cassandra.”21 The description of Adams-
berg’s childhood at the beginning of L’homme à l’envers establishes most of 
his qualities: “His whole childhood in the Pyrenees had been shrouded in the 
voices of the elders who told of the last wolves to live in France. And when 
he walked the mountain paths at night, at the age of nine, . .  . he could feel 
their yellow eyes following him all the way” [Toute son enfance pyrénéenne 
avait été enveloppée des voix des vieux qui racontaient l’épopée des derniers 
loups de France. Et quand il parcourait la montagne à la nuit, à neuf ans . . . 
il croyait voir leurs yeux jaunes le suivre tout au long des sentiers] (12). Poole 
points out that “elemental and/or natural imagery (the boundary blurs) is 
in these works not only a stylistic feature which defines characters, but an 
indulgence of those characters.”22 Adamsberg is part René, pausing to rumi-
nate against a tree on a dark and windy night, and part Leatherstocking, with 
fields of corn and clouds drifting toward the west.23 His characteristics hark 
 19. Horton, Policing Policy in France, 12, quoting Stead, “New Police.” 
 20. In Lamartine’s Raphael: “Je ne leur ressemble ni par la patrie, ni par le cœur, ni par 
l’éducation. Élevée par un mari philosophe, au sein d’une société d’esprits libres, dégagés des 
croyances et des pratiques de la religion qu’ils ont sapée, je n’ai aucune des superstitions, des 
faiblesses d’esprit, des scrupules qui courbent le front des femmes ordinaires devant un autre 
juge que leur conscience” (180). In Hugo’s Lettres à la fiancée: “Pardonne-moi et ne t’en prends 
qu’à toi, car c’est toi qui par tes scrupules et tes craintes, me conduis à ces tristes et insipides 
dissertations” (90). In both of these examples, scruple is coded as feminine, and in particular 
as a feminine weakness.
 21. Poole, “Rompols Not of the Bailey,” 96. Séverine Gaspari quotes from Vargas’s Les Jeux 
de l’amour et de la mort to describe Adamsberg’s “dure douceur ou douce dureté.” Gaspari, 
“Fred Vargas,” 43.
 22. Poole, “Rompols Not of the Bailey,” 104.
 23. The habits of solitary ambulation, especially at night, and of resting by trees in a 
landscape of clouds and wind is well established both among melancholic romantic heroes 
and French detectives. In Lamartine’s Raphael: “Je marchais, pour dépenser le temps, d’un 
bout à l’autre d’un pont qui franchit la Seine presque en face de la maison que Julie habitait. 
Combien de milliers de fois n’ai-je pas compté les planches de ce pont qui résonnaient sous 
mes pas!” (265) In Lamartine’s Jocelyn: “Je connaissais trop cette fatale route; mes genoux 
fléchissants m’entraînaient vers la voûte; j’y marchais pas à pas sur des monceaux mouvants 
de feuillages d’automne entassés par les vents” (2:380). In Hugo’s Le Rhin: lettres à un ami: 
“Pendant que je marchais, je voyais les étoiles paraître et disparaître aux crevasses du sombre 
édifice, comme s’il était plein de gens effarés, montant, descendant, courant partout avec des 
lumières. Comme je revenais à l’auberge, minuit sonnait” (40). One hundred years later, in 
Les vacances de Maigret: “Il marchait le long du remblai, en s’arrêtant de temps en temps. Il 
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back to a time when virtues were emerging in narrative as character attri-
butes, and when character attributes—even behaviors—carried a shade of 
virtue. The heavily romantic resonances of the character thus connect scruple 
to French nation-building to state sovereignty.
 Moreover, despite the nonchalance with which Adamsberg practices 
(though the word seems too assiduous) his profession, he is explicitly iden-
tified with France and with Frenchness. Adamsberg demonstrates some 
unconscious linguistic chauvinism: we learn that when talking about Law-
rence, “Adamsberg pronounced ‘Laurence,’ he had never been able to repro-
duce English sounds” [Adamsberg prononçait “Laurence,” il n’avait jamais 
pu reproduire un son anglais] (206), and because Lawrence is American, the 
narrative does become explicitly about the opposition of the insider to the 
outsider, which in turn underscores the association of policeman with state. 
When Lawrence speaks, he tends to eliminate the human subject from his 
sentence. “Disappeared.” “Didn’t say to leave.” “Won’t die wondering” (76, 132, 
299). In contrast to Adamsberg, who lives within the broad channel of his “je,” 
the absence of the pronoun speaks here to a disconcertingly blank interiority. 
Once it is revealed that Lawrence was made a puppet of his murderous father, 
his suppressions of the first-person pronoun resonate as part and parcel of 
his posttraumatic pathologies. Like the post–hard-boiled characters unable to 
transcend a traumatic childhood, Lawrence is without accountability or scru-
ple. And yet, in the scruple-principle opposition, Lawrence aligns with prin-
ciple: “He’d swept up the ageless and odorless droppings on the floor. .  .  . It 
had to be done, on principle” [Il avait débarrassé le sol d’un fumier hors d’âge 
et à vrai dire inodore. C’était pour le principe] (15). When the Canadian who 
acts on principle turns out to be, as Adamsberg puts it, “a tormented child,” 
then principle becomes an unreliable base. And the comparatively unteth-
ered notion of “scruple,” paradoxically, becomes a surer road to understand-
ing moral authority.
 This is not to suggest that Vargas is running a public relations campaign 
for the French government; the Frenchness/nationalism in question has noth-
ing to do with the blood purity or idealization of the political extreme right. 
Rather, Adamsberg exemplifies the way in which the idea of individual sub-
jectivity enters into master narratives of French identity. It is not individu-
alism that underlies the notion of the sovereignty of the people, or rather 
not American-style individualism, but the fortuitous convergence and con-
tinual regeneration of individually held qualities. And yet, part of France’s 
regardait la mer, les silhouettes multicolores qui devenaient de plus en plus nombreuses dans 
les vagues du bord” (17). In L’amie de Madame Maigret, the divisionnaire walks for the pleasure 
of walking.
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self-image is the very idea that the private sphere can at once prosper and 
enter into moral and aesthetic harmony with state interests. In all hard-
boiled literature, there stands a fundamental ambivalence between narrative 
momentum that relies on freedom from affiliation and narrative resolution 
that compresses it. This compression is literal as well as figurative, for the 
resolution of the crime generally marks the end of the narrative. In addition, 
a state that absorbs the sovereignty of the people inevitably domesticates that 
sovereignty precisely by embracing it, by naming the idea that individuals 
happen to live. Critics and historians have long noticed France’s fondness for 
its abstract nouns (“liberté, égalité, fraternité”). A state that keeps Adamsberg 
as commissaire and validates him in the name of state interest thereby claims 
him, his individualism, and even the “holy images” of honesty and beauty at 
which he has arrived through scruple alone. By placing scruples at the root of 
Adamsberg’s exemplary policing, Camille places the man, his scruples, and 
his entire temperament—his reverie, languor, nonchalance, indolence—onto 
the conveyer belt of “becoming.” And as Rolls points out, “it is quite possible 
to read Camille, the love object of the detective and the killer, via the lens of 
republican iconography. In such an allegorical role, Camille stands as Mari-
anne, and her plight is to be torn between two lovers, one American and the 
other French.”24 Adamsberg’s moral superiority to Lawrence is in many ways 
code for a superior sense of accountability.25 Those adults who accept respon-
sibility, who live ideas and give them shape, are the ones who can represent 
civilization in the broadest sense—both the state named as such, and a com-
munity of adults dedicated to scruple and conscience.
SOUS LES VENTS DE NEPTUNE
What makes Adamsberg a character deserving of the hard-boiled name is 
his fusion of a culturally specific heroic character model with a consistent 
empathic presence, a “scrupulous” ethics of his own, and a sense of personal-
turned-national responsibility. His expectations of others remain low, but his 
standards for his own conduct are high. I will take a moment to examine Sous 
les vents de Neptune (2004), for this novel explicitly considers those standards. 
 24. Rolls, Paris and the Fetish, 105.
 25. It also points to a more classically French masculinity; Adamsberg’s mispronunciation 
of “Lawrence” as “Laurence” in essence gives him a female name. Rousseau contrasted human 
to animal, and the novel thematizes these intersections, but the relevant divergence is also that 
between adult and child. In a subplot, Adamsberg convinces a young hooligan, Sabrina, not to 
shoot him by showing her a picture of her son.
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Furthermore, it connects ethical responsibility to emotional presence in per-
sonal relationships—a particularly twenty-first-century issue that brings the 
classic hard-boiled model up against contemporary discourses of intimacy. 
In Sous les vents de Neptune, Adamsberg is drugged and framed for a murder 
by the same trident-wielding, psychopathic judge who had framed Adams-
berg’s own brother for murder decades before. Adamsberg’s framing (this is 
the scenario that necessitates his ingenious rescue from Canadian justice on 
the back of his lieutenant) is foregrounded so that the reader never doubts 
his innocence. Adamsberg himself, however, is deeply troubled by the hours 
he cannot remember: “Was it the idea of losing a chunk out of his life that 
was so irritating, as if it had been confiscated without permission? Or was it 
that the alcohol was not enough of an explanation? Or, more seriously, was 
he worried about what he might have said or done in the missing hours?” 
[Était-ce que l’idée d’avoir perdu une parcelle de sa vie le contrariait, comme 
si on l’eût tronqué sans lui demander son avis? Ou que la simple explication 
de l’alcool ne lui convenait pas? Ou, plus grave, qu’il s’inquiétât de ce qu’il 
avait pu dire ou faire durant ces heures effacées?].26 He never seems actually 
to believe that he could have committed the murder, though the Canadian 
police think he has, but he wants to remember where he has been. Further-
more, in his musings, this failure to remember is coupled with the failure to 
bring Judge Fulgence to justice and thus to avenge the framing of his brother. 
And these shortcomings, in turn, link to a more general failure in his personal 
relationships:
Was it perhaps true that the absolute protection he felt he ought to have 
given Raphaël had kept him in orbit, far from earth, far from other people 
in any case, in a kind of weightless existence? And the same went for his 
relations with women too, of course. To allow himself to get carried away 
would have been to abandon Raphaël to die alone in his cave. And that was 
impossible. So it might explain why he had always fled from love, and even 
destroyed it? Had he really gone that far? (322)
Et il était possible, pourquoi pas, que l’absolue protection due à Raphaël l’ait 
retenu en orbite assez loin du monde, à bonne distance des autres en tout 
cas, dans une apesanteur. Et bien sûr à distance des femmes. S’en aller dans 
cette voie, c’eût été lâcher Raphaël et le laisser crever seul dans son antre. Un 
acte impossible qui l’obligerait peut-être à s’absenter devant l’amour. Voire à 
le détruire? Et jusqu’à quel point? (369) 
 26. Vargas, Wash This Blood Clean, 175; Sous les vents de Neptune, 204. Subsequent refer-
ences to these works will be given parenthetically.
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In this economy of conscience, the capacities to bring the criminal to justice, 
form a loving partnership with another person, and declare with certainty 
that one had not committed a felony the previous evening are all of a piece. 
To be accountable for one’s actions is to be counted, and thus to enter most 
fully into the social world. The fleeing from love arises from the failure to 
enact justice in society and in his original family, but it also proves his desire 
to redress that failure, to pursue justice rather than to “allow himself to get 
carried away.” In this sense, Adamsberg is a contemporary version of the soli-
tary 1930s American detective, casting his sometimes immature conduct with 
Camille as a side effect of the search for justice. Indeed, as if to compen-
sate for his absence from Camille and to demonstrate that it is a matter of 
understandable emotional blockage rather than active sexism or caddishness, 
this novel puts the action and the case’s resolution into the hands of women. 
Violette Retancourt saves Adamsberg from the Canadian police, Clémen-
tine hides him in France, and the senior citizen superhacker Josette provides 
information that convicts the judge in absentia.
THESE ARE THEIR STORIES
In the United States, numerous contemporary novelists have taken up the 
hard-boiled mantle, many with considerable commercial and critical success. 
Among these are Robert Parker, James Ellroy, Walter Mosley, Sara Paretsky, 
Lawrence Block, Marcia Muller, James Sallis, George Pelecanos, Sue Graf-
ton, and Barbara Fister. Rather than select one or more of these (or another, 
because this list is not exhaustive), I will examine some alternative but none-
theless central specimens of the contemporary American hard-boiled: ones 
taken from the small screen. In going from books to television, I am con-
scious of opening some avenues of analysis that will get too short a shrift here. 
And yet, television has generated some of the widest cultural conversations 
about moral authority and the individual as social being, and its immensely 
popular hard-boiled narratives deserve to be examined as such.
 A glance over the past forty years of American crime television reveals 
that, very schematically stated, an abundance of eponymous crime fighters 
gave way in the 1990s to a reinforcement of the institutional or collective 
model. Where once there were Mike Hammer (1956–1959, 1984–1989), Man-
nix (1967–1975), The Rockford Files (1974–1980), Baretta (1975–1978), Quincy 
(1976–1983), Magnum, P.I. (1980–1988), Cagney and Lacey (1981–1988), 
Knight Rider (1982–1986), T. J. Hooker (1982–1986), Remington Steele (1982–
1987), and Spenser: For Hire (1985–1988), television has turned in the last 
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two decades to, among others, Law and Order (1990–2010), Law and Order: 
Special Victims Unit (1999–present), Law and Order: Criminal Intent (2001–
2011), NYPD Blue (1993–2005), CSI (2000–present), Criminal Minds (2005–
present), Homicide (1993–1999), JAG (1995–2005), Third Watch (1999–2005), 
and NCIS (2003–present). Hill Street Blues (1981–1987) was an early example. 
The twenty-first century has produced dramas that focus neither on the lone 
hero nor on the institutional corrective, but rather on the individual as social 
being. These series include The Wire (2002–2008), The Killing (2011–2014), 
The Blacklist (2013–present), and True Detective (2014–present). On the 
French side, the eponymous trend continues with Julie Lescaut (1992–2013) 
and Léa Parker (2004–2006), but these are accompanied by such company 
narratives as RIS, Police Scientifique (2005–present), Braquo (2009–present), 
PJ (1997–2009), and the ensemble series Engrenages (2005–present).
 While the preponderance of chest hair and leisure suits has tarnished 
the philosophical gravitas of many 1970s and 1980s title characters, some of 
them are nonetheless the indirect narrative descendants of Leatherstock-
ing’s and Sam Spade’s contained self-sufficiency. Writes Dana Cloud about 
Spenser: For Hire (based on Robert Parker’s novels): “He can shoot bad guys, 
find counseling for a rape victim or reconcile an estranged father and son, 
quote Romantic poetry and wax philosophical on the state of society, make 
a soufflé, and go a round with his buddy Hawk in the boxing ring—all with-
out any sense of personal fragmentation or contradiction.”27 Writes Gregory 
Waller on Mickey Spillane’s Mike Hammer: “He is utterly unique in his world, 
a bona fide star. Always wearing a hat and a plain, unfashionable suit and 
tie, the experienced, self-confident Hammer looks like he stepped out of a 
hard-boiled detective movie of the 1940s.”28 The absence of “personal frag-
mentation” recalls the solidity of the trauma-resistant Race Williams—an 
unproblematic individual who stands as veritable instrument of drama and 
justice. And indeed, the two aforementioned television detectives were born 
as novel characters. The 1990s and the 2000s, however, saw a transformation 
in crime detective programs. The Practice edged out the individual detective, 
and an ethic of “We the People” replaced I the Jury. The title character detec-
tive drama has all but disappeared from the screen. Indeed, programs named 
for their main characters are for the most part comedies focusing on human 
foibles.29
 27. Cloud, “Limits of Interpretation,” 313.
 28. Waller, “Mike Hammer,” 119.
 29. A notable exception, the medical show House, combined the heroic model with a 
throwback to the tormented, sometimes drug-addled detective characters of the mid-twentieth 
century.
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 Given the repeated insistence in contemporary procedural series that the 
“system” must be maintained even when it proves inadequate, I would pro-
pose that the transition to an institutional focus represents fundamental sus-
picion of unconstrained individual force. However, the individualist excesses 
to which such contemporary programs respond are not rooted in television. 
Rather, I would propose, the excesses implied in contemporary crime drama 
come from the real world of crime and politics, which continued the sort of 
personality trends embodied in Jim Thompson’s fiction even as crime fiction 
retreated into more domesticated models. As Stephen King remarked in his 
introduction to The Killer Inside Me, the brute force and delusional certi-
tude of Lou Ford was shared by politicians, making Thompson’s a national 
as well as literary portrait of the “Great American Sociopath.” King’s obser-
vation points to the lived perils of autonomy detached from accountability. 
In what seems to be a direct response to abuses of power and declines in 
political answerability, American hard-boiled crime television since the late 
1990s has been principally concerned with correcting grandiosity and self-
delusion while resurrecting the empathic bond. To a surprising extent, these 
institution-driven dramas are dedicated to directing the characters’ focus 
outwards, to “living the idea” of the importance of the rule of law and the 
downsides of careless and unbridled authority. The vaunting of the institu-
tion and abstract nouns such as justice, law, and country allows the char-
acters to domesticate classic hard-boiled profiles. They walk a line between 
autonomy as breath of fresh air and autonomy as menace to social order, 
portraying maverick individualism as seductive, attainable, but needing to 
be formed to the common good.
LAW AND ORDER
I will start with a short discussion of Law and Order, which ran from 1990 to 
2010 and marks a transition from unrestrained individualism to what I am 
calling a restorative hard-boiled model. Law and Order is not a hard-boiled 
drama, nor does it embody an “ethics of my own,” but it does exemplify what 
passed for a corrective to rampant individualism in the 1990s. Every episode 
of Law and Order starts with a low male voice-over intoning, “In the criminal 
justice system, the people are represented by two separate but equally impor-
tant groups: the police who investigate crime and the district attorneys who 
prosecute the offenders. These are their stories.” The police and prosecutors 
are the people in our culture who, when a crime is committed, “respond” to 
the scene. In Law and Order, the strongest characteristic of the police and the 
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prosecutors is steadiness. In the first episode (1990), the detectives shout at 
each other in the office, the lieutenant discloses that he is recovering from a 
drinking problem, and the district attorney remembers aloud his alcoholic 
father. In later episodes, even in episodes later that same season, there is no 
shouting. At almost no time in the original series do we see homes, cars, 
friends, families, pets, or paychecks; personal lives take place off-screen. The 
true spectacle in this series, the principal story told, is not the characters’ 
dramatic response to crime, nor the plot’s resolution thereof, but the absence 
of unbalanced conduct by the main characters, the absence of psychic com-
motion or unrest.
 A television series differs from a novel in countless ways, including often, 
and especially in the case of Law and Order, the absence of a broad narra-
tive arc. Tensions rise and fall over the course of individual episodes, but 
each episode is a contained unit. Dick Wolf, producer of the series, likened 
it to Campbell’s soup and explained that “people feel comfortable going to 
something they know about. It attracts you because you know what you’re 
getting.”30 The detectives and the prosecutors are able to respond with steady 
impassivity each episode, immune to both evolution and devolution. In 
their stasis, I propose, they respond to a powerful cultural dream of indi-
vidual relationship to principle. Law and Order addresses the dismantling of 
“Character” as a whole by showing unrevealing movement rather than thriv-
ing interiority. The series replaces Martin Terrier’s “extinct emotional life” 
with a sustained—but just as immobile and impassive—intimation of emo-
tional presence. The absence of personal lives is more than just a matter of 
screen-time economy; it allows the characters to live the ideas of justice and 
procedure to the exclusion of everything else, thus suppressing problematic 
individualism.
 To some extent, the impassiveness of the Law and Order cast speaks to 
a public fantasy about response to widespread violence. Throughout the 
program, not just the police and prosecutors, but every character, from the 
random couple who finds the body, to the witnesses, to the medical exam-
iner, to the initial suspects and their families, to the courtroom spectators, to 
the incidental characters and bureaucracies that furnish information, to the 
juries, to the foreperson with the verdict, looks on with detachment. People 
standing around watching as suspects are hauled into the police car some-
time in the initial half hour invariably look as though they were watching a 
television episode being filmed on their street rather than an actual friend or 
acquaintance being arrested. Witnesses questioned by the police can scarcely 
 30. Interview by author with Neal Baer, executive producer of Law and Order SVU, 2002.
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be bothered to spare the time (“Are we finished here? I need to get back to 
work”), as if the appalling murder at hand were a minor distraction. Assis-
tant District Attorney Jack McCoy (Sam Waterston) shakes his head at mur-
ders in his world the way the public shakes its head at murders in the actual 
world—on the one hand because Law and Order does take its stories from 
the news (“ripped from the headlines”), so the public and the characters are 
in a sense witnessing the same murders, and furthermore because they are 
witnessing them in the same way: as detached spectators.31 Law and Order’s 
steadiness of focus is a dramatic occurrence because television representation 
of violence does not just bring to us what we would otherwise not see, and 
does not just bring it to us contained, but implies that what it contains would, 
without that containment, be devastating for us.32 At the same time, a corre-
sponding dramatic vein centers on the characters themselves—on emotional 
response and on the individual’s very self as a protected domain. Not only 
do the police and prosecutors protect the spectator from what Mark Seltzer 
calls “the pathological public sphere,” they demonstrate that public servants 
carry within themselves a fundamentally impermeable and protected emo-
tional world: that where scruple stood in the French model, static imper-
viousness stands in the American. Even the improbable impatience of the 
questioned witnesses conveys the main idea that all the show’s characters are 
living, namely, the idea of work and responsibility. Duty trumps personality, 
in what I would propose is a particularly American response to individualist 
excesses, even if it eventually proves to be an unsatisfying one.
 Philip Lane writes of Homicide: “The detectives of Homicide are very cool 
at the scene of a crime. They talk philosophy, engage in nonsensical repartee, 
discuss personal relationships and problems while standing over a corpse. 
They appear to be objective observers of a crime scene; but, in fact, their 
 31. Television spectators are of course not universally removed from daily violence. For 
one, in cities, suburbs, farms, and everywhere, domestic violence, as much a menace to society 
as street violence, is more common than television would have us think, and many times more 
common than dramatic gun battles. Second, there are numerous places in this country where 
street violence is an everyday occurrence, where interaction with the criminal justice system 
is a norm rather than an aberration, and where public discourse about violence is therefore 
more resigned than horrified. New York City, where Law and Order is set, contains some of 
these places. The point is that most residents of this country, and most spectators of Law and 
Order, do not have regular contact with police and prosecutors. And even those who do see 
shootings and robberies on their streets generally still see their first murder on television, not 
on their block. On the basis of sheer numbers, Law and Order addresses us, as most crime 
television addresses us, as spectators who know about violence from watching it on television 
or reading about it in the news. See Lee, “These Are Our Stories.” 
 32. As Avital Ronell wonders in “Trauma TV,” “What is television covering?” (309). And: 
“What video teaches, something that television knows but cannot as such articulate, is that 
every medium is related in some crucial way to specters” (313).
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daily dosage of death eventually gets to them.”33 But in Law and Order, that 
dosage (and Law and Order ran longer than Homicide) does not “get to” the 
detectives. There is no accumulation of trauma, no boredom, no hardness, no 
increase or decrease in the capacity for empathy. Again and again, the camera 
remains focused on one face long enough to see an unwavering steadiness of 
regard, serious but not cold. The pain of violence, of contact with victims and 
sociopaths, never contaminates the characters’ attendance record at the job 
or pushes them into a morass of depression or makes them uninterested in 
or hardened to human concerns. This vision in which social consciousness, 
ethical responsibility, and a fountain of calm flow forth from a seemingly 
inexhaustible source represents a vision of psychic security. But more than 
this, it represents a durable contentedness with living an idea that is always 
external. In addition to psychic intactness and empathic presence in the face 
of violence, the Law and Order characters represent characters content to live 
an idea—the idea of the rule of law—without acting upon or distorting that 
idea. Their dedication to the law, combined with their psychic intactness, con-
stitutes their contribution to society, their acts of protection and service. They 
are the guardians and handlers of important abstract nouns, charged with 
ensuring their unimpeded circulation.
McCOY: The New York County District Attorney’s office can’t—no, won’t 
knowingly convict a man of the wrong crime. What are you thinking? 
CARMICHAEL: Well, I’m just taking a page from the Jack McCoy playbook. 
Nobody gets to bend the rules but you?
McCOY: I’ve bent the rules to convict the right person of the right crime. 
This isn’t bending, this is turning the law against itself.
CARMICHAEL: You once hid a witness to get the result that you wanted.
McCOY: And I was wrong then. You’re wrong now. Don’t wait till you’re 
facing a disciplinary committee to realize it.34
In their continued insistence on following the rules and answering to institu-
tional authority, Law and Order characters depart from the menace created 
by the mid-century hard-boiled and the political characters who echoed it, 
characters who bore the specter of threat within them. The character who is 
as much problem as solution has become part of the landscape, part of the 
infrastructure, part of the preexisting symbolic environment, and the detec-
 33. Lane, “Existential Condition,” 146. Homicide: Life on the Street (1993–1999) ran parallel 
to Law and Order; at times, a two-part episode would start on one series and end on the other.
 34. “Agony,” Law and Order: The Ninth Year. Written by Dick Wolf and Kathy McCormick. 
Directed by Constantine Makris. Aired November 4, 1998. Universal, 2011, DVD.
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tives’ capacity to stand at a respectful distance from principal comforts the 
spectator against the prospect of such encroaching or unrestrained personal-
ity. It is remarkable that this program, the longest-running and most popular 
crime drama on American television, and one that constantly showcases the 
de facto insufficiency of the law, also represents the continuing suppression 
or domestication of interiority. This suppression, combined with the law’s 
insufficiency, places the series in the eye of the individual-institutional hard-
boiled storm. The characters cannot convict every murderer, and even when 
a conviction is made, it is invariably presented as a drop in the ocean. These 
continual shortcomings allow the series to continue, but they also establish—
again and again—that the value of the idea of the rule of law is not in its 
actual functioning, but in its essence, its very existence, its form, as echoed in 
the unbending narrative contours of each episode’s editing.
 Given that television is a medium that addresses spectators explicitly as 
consumers, the notion of a character as hero is more realizable than ever. 
And yet, while Law and Order gives a comforting vision of first responders as 
forming a sort of cultural security blanket, none of its characters would count 
as a culture hero. The act of listening suspends them between action and inac-
tion. The characters are present but unobtrusive, lending an individual ear but 
not acting in any way that could code as troublesome. Indeed, there is a near 
evacuation of the self, since these are stories (“These are their stories”) about 
living an idea without ruining it:
McCOY: I don’t know what I find scarier, Abbie, clowns like these [sus-
pects] having a free pass to break the law, or one of our own A.D.A.s 
taking their side.
CARMICHAEL: [The victim] is the bad guy here.
McCOY: He’s alive. His sister and the babysitter are dead.
CARMICHAEL: It’s overkill. But [the victim] is a coldblooded murderer. 
Like it or not, [the suspects] did us a service by catching him.
McCOY: A service? They’re outlaws. I’m going to check on their weapons 
permits. I don’t care if they forgot the period after their middle initial, 
I’m having their permits yanked.35
Law and Order plays as an antidote to the individualist excesses of the 1970s 
and 1980s. Its focus on abstract nouns and their institutions, its neutral cos-
tumes, its minimal facial movements—that such characters lasted for so long 
 35. “Hunters,” Law and Order: The Ninth Year. Written by Dick Wolf and Gerry Conway. 
Directed by Richard Dobbs. Aired February 10, 1999. Universal, 2011, DVD.
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demonstrates the powerful contemporary attraction of living an idea while 
maintaining a respectful distance from it. And yet the series, reliable and for-
mulaic, does not propose a real reconciliation of personality with principle. 
Not for these characters the ideinost of the Russian nineteenth century, since 
the repeated allusions to constitutional parameters, combined with the mini-
mal exposition of personal lives, hints at an individuality that varies inversely 
with dedication to principle. Law and Order provided an exit ramp from the 
hard-boiled dramas of individualism and its discontents, but in so doing 
merely deferred crime fiction’s ultimate drive to examine, again and again, 
what the individual could do on his or her own steam. To return to this drive, 
I examine two HBO drama series, True Detective and The Wire.
TRUE DETECTIVE
The first season of True Detective (2014) tells the story of two police detectives 
in southern Louisiana who investigate what seems to be a ritual murder. The 
series partners the swaggering, adulterous, southern traditionalist Marty Hart 
(Woody Harrelson) with the brooding and taciturn Rustin Cohle (Matthew 
McConaughey). It alternates between Hart and Cohle’s 1995 investigation of 
the murder and the 2012 police questioning of Cohle, who by then has scrag-
gly hair, bad skin, a mustache, a taste for bottom-shelf beer, and no badge. 
There is some suspicion that Cohle had himself had a hand in the crime. 
Cohle walks through the job with a combination of absentmindedness and 
grim determination. Indeed, without the muscles, the movie star looks, and 
the steady gaze, the 1995 Cohle could be a Eugène Tarpon, prone to show-
ing up drunk at dinners and responding to personal questions in incoherent 
sentence fragments. But this drama clearly endeavors to act out questions of 
moral authority, as well as to engage the decades of hard-boiled backstory 
that make those questions so fraught. The result is a radically stripped-down 
portrait of character that resurrects nineteenth-century American traits much 
as Adamsberg resurrects the French. The series has numerous shortcomings, 
outlined in review articles and online forums; Cohle, however, is the very 
embodiment of the post–Law and Order, postnihilistic hero, the embodiment 
of burdened individualism for the twenty-first century.
 Instead of the dedication of the Law and Order cast, which showcased the 
acting out of procedural norms without the muddling intervention of per-
sonalities, True Detective is all interiority. Cohle is a bereaved father with-
out friends, without intimate connections, without Gods or masters, without 
furniture—low on personality but rich in subjectivity. In the first episode, 
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he explains his worldview: “I think human consciousness is a tragic misstep 
in evolution. We became too self-aware. Nature created an aspect of nature 
separate from itself. We are creatures that should not exist by natural law. 
We are things that labor under the illusion of having a self. A secretion of 
sensory experience and feeling programmed with total assurance that we are 
each somebody, when in fact everybody’s nobody.” When Hart then asks him 
why he gets out of bed in the morning, Cohle answers, “I tell myself I bear 
witness. The real answer is that it’s obviously my programming, and I lack 
the constitution for suicide.” These lines are presented as an excessively bleak 
foil to Hart’s jovial conventionality—“My luck, I picked today to get to know 
you”—but the vocabulary of programming and self-awareness shows that this 
is a hard-boiled program for an era that has thought a great deal about the 
self as problem and solution. Emily Nussbaum, remarking on the overseri-
ousness of the series and its principal characters, describes Rust as “a macho 
fantasy straight out of Carlos Castaneda. A sinewy weirdo with a tragic past, 
Rust delivers arias of philosophy, a mash-up of Nietzsche, Lovecraft, and the 
nihilist horror writer Thomas Ligotti.” She then gets at the cultural appeal of 
the man and his gravitas: “Rust is a heretic with a heart of gold. He’s our fetish 
object—the cop who keeps digging when everyone ignores the truth, the 
action hero who rescues children in the midst of violent chaos, the outsider 
with painful secrets and harsh truths and nice arms. McConaughey gives an 
exciting performance, but his rap is premium baloney.”36
 If Cohle’s rap is baloney, it is because he moves with nonchalance across 
miles of post-Kantian philosophies of consciousness, and in so doing he con-
tradicts himself several times. And yet, he carries on hitting the precise con-
ceptual points that hard-boiled fiction has been covering for almost a century, 
and addressing them so as to show how embattled the ideas of autonomy 
and even moral authority have become in both the hard-boiled and political 
domains. It is hardly coincidence that the guilty parties in the show’s various 
murders are connected to the ruling political and evangelical families in the 
state, and that the suspect is a “metapsychotic.” If the suspect is a “metapsy-
chotic,” then Cohle is a metadetective, and indeed, nearly every one of Cohle’s 
scenes is about individual reclamation of authority through either declaration 
or metaphoric reappropriations. In an early scene, for instance, we see the 
large wooden cross decorating the wall above the mattress in Cohle’s apart-
ment. Since the cross is the apartment’s only decoration, Hart asks about it, 
 36. Nussbaum, “Cool Story, Bro.” n. pag. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/03/
cool-story-bro, accessed February 26, 2015. “The Long Bright Dark,” True Detective. Written by 
Nic Pizzolatto. Directed by Cary Joji Fukunaga. HBO, 2014. Television.
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and Cohle explains: “It’s a form of meditation. I contemplate the moment 
in the garden, the idea of allowing your own crucifixion.” The entire hard-
boiled enterprise is about locating a self, or a portion of the self, or a series 
of impulses within what we are accustomed to calling the self, that can act 
and decide in a meaningful way, and that can balance freedom of action with 
genuine benefit to society. Cohle’s appropriation of the cross is a philosophical 
version of Williams’s “My ethics are my own,” for an entire symbolic register 
is Cohle’s own. We are constantly reminded that he is the generator of his 
own ideas—when Cohle describes the murder suspect as being “religious in 
some kind of way,” his partner points out: “Every person within a thousand 
miles of here is religious in some kind of way. Except you.” And yet, while 
the series takes pains to show Cohle doing a lot of thinking, he nonetheless 
mistrusts and deprecates thought, insisting on distanciation from subjectivity 
(“we became too self-aware,” “we labor under the illusion of having a self ”).
 To the Chandler formula of the man of honor “without thought of it, 
and certainly without saying it,” Cohle seems to add “without wanting it and 
almost without tolerating it.”37 Again, if this rap is unbelievable, it is because 
the character both deploys and denigrates such a remarkable assortment of 
subjective mechanisms, and necessarily narrates himself into a philosophical 
corner while critiquing illusion, programming, constitution, and the entire 
“secretion of sensory experience” that is humankind. Robert Pippin, writ-
ing on Manfred Frank and the “priority and irreducibility of the subject” 
as counterpoint to “objectivism, the position that holds that the knowing, 
perceiving, and acting subject must be understood as just another, however 
unique, object in the world, in the best way objects in the world are under-
stood, by modern science,” points out that “awareness of the world must 
be something well beyond a receptor’s capacity to receive and process and 
respond to sensory data” (this would be the programming that Cohle men-
tions as he describes humans as secretions of sensory experience), “it must 
be an awareness . . . being ‘owned’ individually.” Cohle argues neither—again 
to cite Pippin on Frank—for “individual minds as primary bearers and sus-
tainers of linguistic and general meaning” nor for “the issue of the normativ-
 37. Nic Pizzolatto says, “If we’re talking about hard-boiled detectives, what could be more 
hard-boiled than the worldview of Ligotti or Cioran? They make the grittiest of crime writers 
seem like dilettantes. Next to ‘The Conspiracy Against the Human Race,’ Mickey Spillane seems 
about as hard-boiled as bubble gum.” Michael Calia, “Writer Nic Pizzolatto on Thomas Ligotti 
and the Weird Secrets of ‘True Detective,’” Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2014, http://blogs.
wsj.com/speakeasy/2014/02/02/writer-nic-pizzolatto-on-thomas-ligotti-and-the-weird-secrets-
of-true-detective/ (accessed February 17, 2016).
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ity and socially sustained normativity of meaning.”38 Rather, he stands as far 
from subjectivity as possible—not just from philosophies of consciousness, 
but from consciousness as a whole. Writer Nic Pizzolatto describes Cohle’s 
philosophy as a “kind of anti-natalist nihilism.” The “sinewy” descriptor is 
as relevant to his minimalist concept of self as it is to his extreme economy 
of movement and muscle tone. It modulates the pathological excesses of the 
American model. In a nod to the Europe of his philosophies of conscious-
ness, even his aestheticism and literary sensibility are without thought of it. 
Painterly impressions of nature come to him unbidden through acid flash-
backs, and he riffs on horror writer Thomas Ligotti to such an extent that 
Pizzolatto was accused of plagiarism.
 If the Law and Order cast lived the idea of individuals subject to and oth-
erwise responsible for getting out of the way of the rule of law, Cohle lives 
the idea of getting out of the way as an end in itself. As a result, he alternates 
between embracing isolation and wanting to be part of a greater whole. Asked 
what it means to be a pessimist, he explains, “It means I’m bad at parties,” 
to which Marty responds that he is “not great outside of parties, either.” In 
one of his 2012 questioning scenes, he states, “I know who I am. After all this 
time, there’s a victory in that.” Even the police work he does is presented as a 
matter of personal taste. When he leaves the station to track down prostitutes 
who might have known the murder victim, he presents it as a way to pass 
the time: “Mind if I escape? I got some names from vice. Just something to 
do.” This character is a far cry from the clear-eyed, institutionally entrenched 
idealists of the Law and Order cast, and much closer to the ruminating com-
missaire Adamsberg. And yet, when asked why he chose to work in homi-
cide, he quotes Corinthians: “The body is not one member but many. Now 
are they many, but of one body. I was just trying to stay a part of the body.” 
This contradiction, this resistance to and simultaneous participation in the 
social body, reveals the conscious exertion that being “without thought of 
it” demands. In using the vocabulary of the body, he turns his participation 
in society into an exercise in individual wholeness, which honors his self- 
containment even while giving it a broader resonance. And yet, that exer-
cise—and it is an exercise—is as laborious as it is necessary. Furthermore, 
as Emily Nussbaum points out in her discussion of the series’s “shallow deep 
talk,” the contemplations of subjectivity clash with a triviality in personal rela-
tions and in representations of women. The show concentrates on women 
as murder victims and vague romantic interests, not as characters. This is a 
 38. Pippin, Persistence of Subjectivity, 169, 170.
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remarkable flaw of the first season, but not of Cohle as a character. His inabil-
ity to form relationships is presented as one existential flaw among many.
A DREAM IN A LOCKED ROOM
The rise of hard-boiled individualism, its contamination, and contempo-
rary gestures toward its resurrection raise fundamental questions about how 
even to talk about individual autonomy without simply going back and forth 
between the idea of independence and its negation. The broad historical arcs 
of detective fiction on both sides of the Atlantic indicate that the most valued 
culture heroes are those who both resist convention and come on their own 
steam to empathic treatment of others—it is not the substance of convention 
that characters resist, rather the very fact of convention—but again and again 
this is a false binary. Just as that opposition breaks down when Race Williams 
declares an ethics of his own that closely resembles an ethics of reciprocity, so 
it does when Cohle as drunken agnostic pessimist quotes the Bible. And the 
question thus becomes: how does one talk about—and then in fact make—
individual decisions that are neither rote, flattened by Kantian Oughts, nor 
detrimental to the common good? Can autonomy be made to matter, and to 
have an enlivening rather than destructively entropic result? The hard-boiled 
genre traces the myriad obstacles and perils to such revitalization of auton-
omy but also, surprisingly, shows the way to its realization.
 Cohle’s speech illuminates the difficulty of living an idea in a way that 
gives living free rein and the idea transcendent importance. The hard-boiled 
genre is all about maintaining the balancing act of coincidence, where the 
character who could not care less about convention manages to do its office, 
and to do it better and more humanely than any institution could. Some 
of this has to do with avoiding “preexisting symbolic environments” where 
actions, ideas, places, and characters are already marked. It is telling that 
Nussbaum describes Cohle as delivering “arias of philosophy, a mash-up of 
Nietzsche, Lovecraft, and the nihilist horror writer Thomas Ligotti,” since 
the entire conversation around autonomy has morphed into a sort of eternal 
sampling, to the point where originality has become a sort of anachronism, 
and innovation means citation of obscure references. Pizzolatto points out the 
similarities between True Detective and Camus’s “existential stoicism,”39 and 
 39. Dave Walker, “‘True Detective’ Writer Nic Pizzolatto Discusses Crime Fiction, Noir 
and Existential Questions,” New Orleans Times-Picayune, July 8, 2013, http://www.nola.com/tv/
index.ssf/2013/07/true_detective_writer_nic_pizz.html (accessed February 17, 2016).
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were it not for his dedication to justice, this character could too come very 
close to the “pompous false simplicity” of Butron and Chateaubriand’s tomb.
 The history of the hard-boiled is the history of maverick action as an 
escape from leaden Kantian Oughts, but also of that action’s associations with 
excess, madness, and eventual futility. If there is a lesson to be learned from 
the hard-boiled, it is that there are limitations not in autonomy’s manifesta-
tions but in what it can do for the individual and for society. True Detective 
showed a detective struggling against those limitations as well as the bound-
aries of narrative and character. But that struggle, as painful as Cohle makes 
it seem, is the entire point. The sheer abundance of discourse around the 
character—his philosophies, actions, tone, and “sinewy weirdness”—indicates 
that when it comes to talking about autonomy, it is not a disembodied idea 
that one wants but a character living that idea and living it with others. Andy 
Greenwald writes of Cohle: “In the ’90s he’s all pinched stillness, a rubber 
band wrapped tight around a razor blade. That version of Rust Cohle keeps 
everything inside because he believes he’s in control. The 2012 Rust has let 
everything go because he knows for certain he’s not.”40 But the seventeen-
year jump forward—to a man more tattered and tired, less handsome—also 
tracks a broader, culture-wide weariness with the exaltation and disappoint-
ments of individual autonomy—the same exaltations and disappointments 
that the hard-boiled genre has been tracking for almost a century. During 
interrogation, Cohle meditates on the limitations of subjectivity: “All your 
life, all your love, all your hate, all your memory, all your pain, it was all the 
same thing,” he soliloquizes. “It was all the same dream—a dream that you 
had inside a locked room. A dream about being a person.” These rumina-
tions might indeed be self-protective, for as Shane Ryan writes, “Cohle, for 
his stoic demeanor and the absolute confidence of his delivery, is a man in a 
constant state of turmoil. He talks the talk of someone who has given up on 
life, but it’s a defensive act, a last grasp for protection, when the staggering 
and heartbreaking truth is that he wants, deeply, those things that an unlucky 
fate has denied him.”41 But for the purposes of charting a hard-boiled his-
tory, and what is more a history of the hard-boiled’s trust in the individual as 
repository of moral authority, the 2012 version of Cohle’s character, his edge 
dulled by alcohol, stands as an incarnation of arguments about autonomy 
 40. Andy Greenwald, “True Detective: Six Questions for the Second Half of the Season,” 
https://grantland.com/hollywood-prospectus/true-detective-six-questions-for-the-second-
half-of-the-season (accessed May 5, 2014).
 41. Shane Ryan, “True Detective Review: ‘The Locked Room’ (Episode 1:03),” http://www.
pastemagazine.com/articles/2014/01/true-detective-review-the-locked-room-episode-103.html 
(accessed May 5, 2014).
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and consciousness themselves. Cohle is devoted to standing apart from self, 
constitution, programming, illusion, and even self-awareness, but the energies 
he tries to dismiss in the name of those phenomena inevitably return. So too 
does the paradigm of the individual as generator of moral power.
MOMENTS WORTH IMITATING
What makes Cohle and other hard-boiled characters “fetish objects” is that 
they seem to take their ideals either from themselves or from some pristine 
platonic sphere; one very rarely sees hard-boiled characters imitating some-
one else. Cohle’s numerous discourses are notable for not referring to actual 
people. He has been clear that there is no one for him to emulate, not the sur-
vivalist father or the absent mother. And yet, that is how people tend to learn, 
to choose their conduct—in imitation not of disembodied principles but of 
people or characters, even if the characters are there only to animate the prin-
ciple. No one envisions “honor” in a vacuum, but rather as an embodied attri-
bute. The hard-boiled plays on that paradox of imitation: it fastens morality 
to a set of characteristics, to a character outline that seems itself, somehow, 
improbably, to be born in a vacuum. Much research shows that people learn 
moral behavior by imitating, but the buck stops with hard-boiled characters 
who have no other apparent source than themselves.42 What the hard-boiled 
offers, then, is a compendium of admirable moments—moments of living 
an idea that is at once one’s own, and greater than oneself. Law and Order’s 
aggressively strict editing—no families, no homes, no tracking shots—sug-
gests that impassivity and empathy are not eternally sustainable. So too with 
the laconic hard-boiled characters—Philip Marlowe and his epigrams, Race 
Williams and his bursts of energetic narration, Rust Cohle and his soliloquies 
in the car. In a sense, this is the hard-boiled’s strongest fictional triumph: 
its editing of character portraits to make moments of force and compassion 
seem enduring, and its philosophical discourses constitutive. Even Chandler’s 
iconic “down these mean streets a man must go who is not himself mean” 
gives an illusory picture of character solidity. It does not take much time to 
walk down a street, but we do get the sense that this “man of honor” is honor-
able all the time. Indeed, Cohle’s character only makes sense—and his solil-
oquies can only be delivered—in the context of his partnership with Hart. 
What the contemporary hard-boiled showcases is less a character model than 
 42. Rushton, “Generosity in Children”; Eisenberg, The Caring Child.
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a goal, a portrait of the endeavor to live an idea, and an outline of the com-
munity needed to do so.
THE WIRE
The real complexities of community are fundamental for the contemporary 
hard-boiled’s treatment of individual moral agency. For while the outside 
world contains empathic listeners, it also contains material conditions and 
structural rigidities that impact subjectivity. In order to examine the meaning 
of individualism within collective structures—as well as the role of individu-
als in their creation—I turn to the television drama The Wire, which ran on 
HBO from 2002 to 2008. The Wire preceded True Detective in chronology, 
but its epic scale, its critical success, and its emphasis on the vital symbio-
sis of individualism and community make it an ideal concluding illustration 
of the restorative American hard-boiled.43 The Wire showed characters con-
stantly negotiating the sometimes considerable distance between ideas and 
realities, or between ideals and possibilities. It takes place in the East Coast 
American city of Baltimore, and each of its five seasons underscores the ambi-
tions, failures, and corruptions of particular social groups and institutions. 
These include the police department, government, courts, public education, 
and media, as well as less legally codified systems such as the Barksdale drug 
organization, families, and a sprawling population of drug dealers, consum-
ers, henchmen, bystanders, and casualties. Much of what makes The Wire 
valuable as a specimen of the restorative hard-boiled is its close proximity to 
the systemic hopelessness of the néo-polar and its characters’ strong potential 
to follow in that suit. Indeed, the chess metaphor that the series’s drug dealers 
use to discuss their own chain of command is reminiscent of Gérault on the 
néo-polar: “The individual becomes a moveable pawn in a world that excludes 
him, a violent and pitiless world.”44 I propose, however, that The Wire, even 
as it insists on the futilities of idealism and the crushing force of institutions, 
 43. To discuss this series in a book about hard-boiled crime fiction is to trust David Si-
mon’s early statement that it is a “novel for television” (http://www.borderline-productions.
com/TheWireHBO/exclusive-4.html, accessed April 2, 2016) and endorse the editor of Film 
Quarterly in his comments on The Wire as a “major work of recent American fiction in any 
medium.” White, “Make-Believe, Memory Failure,” 4.
 44. Gérault, Jean-Patrick Manchette, 11–12. Paul Allen Anderson remarks, in his excellent 
analysis of the series’s often-used game metaphor, that understanding social control does not 
invalidate it: “The pathos of the pawn’s situation is that increased self-awareness and knowledge 
about the game and its terms only increase recognition of one’s limited agency and constraint.” 
Anderson, “‘The Game Is the Game,’” 380.
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nonetheless opens up a provocative and complex space for individual moral-
ity. As such, it has suggestive implications for the attribution of accountability 
and the relevance of moral criticism in modern corporate capitalism.
 In one sense, it is true, The Wire resists the very concept of individual 
autonomy. As numerous critics have noted, the series is an ensemble piece in 
the most fundamental sense, meaning that no one can transcend the ensem-
ble. The Wire plays out the failure of one social system after another, one 
ambition after another. Anmol Chaddha and William Julius Wilson write: 
“Through a scrupulous exploration of the inner workings of drug-dealing 
gangs, the police, politicians, unions, and public schools, The Wire shows 
that individuals’ decisions and behavior are often shaped by—and indeed 
limited by—social, political, and economic forces beyond their control.”45 
David Simon also stated: “The Wire is making an argument about what insti-
tutions—bureaucracies, criminal enterprises, the cultures of addiction, raw 
capitalism even—do to individuals.”46 Much has been written about systemic 
oppression and this series insists upon it. And yet the series does represent a 
core group of characters who consistently maintain accountability and sub-
jectivity within this badly failed social system. Because of that maintenance 
and because this is an ensemble series, it approaches a modern, somewhat 
more gender-inclusive, and intersubjective vision of heroism. Furthermore, 
through those examples, this series raises the glaring question: where are the 
authors of institutional failures? Where is the accountable subjectivity of those 
who win when institutions decay? Chaddha and Wilson note that the series’s 
“focus on institutional practices effectively challenges alternative explanations 
that overemphasize the role of individual actors.”47 This is true, but most dis-
cussions of “individual actors” within oppressive systems focus, like the series 
itself does, on those actors on the receiving end of such systems. Those who 
contribute to and gain from institutional corruption are almost absent from 
the picture. There are a number of reasons for this absence, but through its 
very elisions, The Wire does encourage the viewer to consider who gains from 
iniquitous systems and what “honor” would demand of them.
WHY BOTHER?
Though there is no one dominant character in The Wire, its best contenders 
for the classic role of hard-boiled principal are Detective Jimmy McNulty 
 45. Chaddha and Wilson, “‘Way Down in the Hole,’” 186.
 46. Quoted in Penfold-Mounce et al., “The Wire as Social Science-Fiction?” 154.
 47. Chaddha and Wilson, “‘Way Down in the Hole,’” 183.
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(Dominic West) and the stickup man Omar Little (Michael K. Williams), 
both of whom embody Race Williams’s “my ethics are my own.”48 Detective 
McNulty, a Baltimore police officer, disregards protocol in order to inves-
tigate the murder cases that his more press-phobic superiors are ready to 
abandon.49 As Roshan Singh and others comment, publicity for the series fore-
grounds McNulty as principal character.50 He is described as “natural police,” 
which puts him in the same camp as Adamsberg. But whereas being “natural 
police” in some sense intimates “honor without thought of it,” no character 
in this series acts without thought for long. Series writer Rafael Alvarez, call-
ing the show’s Baltimore “a universe where hoped-for escapes to places that 
value individual desires do not exist,” nonetheless insists that it “is making a 
case for the individual trying to get by in a society of harsh, indifferent insti-
tutions: bureaucracies on both sides of the law, the cultures of addiction—to 
power as well as dope—and raw capitalism.”51 This reference to the individual 
who “tries” goes to the heart of the series’s representation of accountability. 
I said earlier that the hard-boiled character resides in the negativity of the 
outside world as in a permanent home, even as he counteracts that negativ-
ity through his own conscience. That conscience simply is. It is neither uto-
pian nor anachronistic, it represents no solution, and it leads to no narrative 
conclusion. The Wire presents relatively little in the way of positive outside 
forces that can motivate a character; indeed, most outside forces produce 
frustration or disillusion.52 All that this series has in the way of imperatives 
are internal, but it has those, and thus resists paranoid readings as well as 
utopian ones.
 Alasdair McMillan comments that McNulty’s pursuits of justice come 
from stubbornness rather than dedication to ethics: “What propels McNulty 
is ultimately revealed as little more than the raw will-to-power channeled, 
 48. As Fredric Jameson writes, “A work of this kind challenges and problematizes the 
distinction between protagonists and ‘secondary characters.’” Jameson, “Realism and Utopia 
in The Wire,” 359.
 49. Jason Grinnell examines the relationship between ethics and professionalism in “Came 
to Do Good, Stayed to Do Well.” 
 50. Singh, “The Wire,” 111.
 51. Alvarez, The Wire, 61.
 52. Kristin Jacobson writes of McNulty’s ultimate settling down: “McNulty’s infidelities are 
not so much a rejection of or a revolt against domesticity but a character flaw that he, like the 
female protagonists in much sentimental fiction, must overcome.” Jacobson, “HBO’s The Wire,” 
161. It could be said that McNulty “must” overcome his character flaws in order to remain 
with his girlfriend, but this imperative on its own is not entirely convincing. She then argues 
convincingly that the female detective Greggs also has this character flaw to overcome, and 
that in its concentration on personal evolution, the series “develops feminine, not masculine, 
narrative structures” (Jacobson, “HBO’s The Wire,” 161). 
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organized, and individuated by discipline. He is driven not by an internal 
wellspring of the Good, but by a will ‘to grow, spread, seize.’”53 In other words, 
what seem to be good works are but side effects of his pushiness. McNulty 
does evince a certain grandiosity, but the point is that he continues to put 
his obstinacy into service to the greater good. This is not a picture of uto-
pian individualism, but neither is it the chronicle of a loose cannon. Rather, 
McNulty demonstrates the resilience of individual conscience and the pos-
sibility of its continual maintenance. His plan to pursue a murder investiga-
tion into Marlo Stanfield (a drug dealer responsible for numerous murders) 
demands considerable narrative creativity as well as a meta-understanding 
of the police department. Knowing that his bosses are uninterested in pursu-
ing Marlo, he invents a sensationalist serial killer who will be seen as deserv-
ing those resources—resources that McNulty will then divert into his pursuit 
of Marlo. It is true that McNulty’s “ethics of his own” uses the corrupt police 
system to do what it would do in any case, which is pursue those who murder 
whites rather than those who murder blacks.54 He does not change the sys-
tem and does not believe he can. The point is that McNulty wants something, 
does something, and is able to put enough distance between himself and the 
system to manipulate it. The first result of this distance is condemnation of 
the system—one roots for McNulty and other team members, and when their 
scheme is frustrated and crushed by the higher-ups in the police department, 
that frustration translates into moral condemnation of the entire corrupt sys-
tem. Furthermore, though his scheme fails in the end, the fact that it ever 
existed is evidence of individualism, of conscience, outside the system.
 In this series the modern enemies of accountability and even subjectiv-
ity circle incessantly: these include corruption, scarce resources, crumbling 
infrastructure, inadequate technology, fear, trauma, crime, addiction, bore-
dom, pessimism, despair, broken families, drug-dealing parents, and the 
list continues. And yet, both principal and secondary characters continually 
assert themselves as characters, as accountable and even ethical beings. These 
include dedicated police officer Kima Greggs, drug dealer–turned–boxing 
mentor Dennis “Cutty” Wise, policeman-turned-schoolteacher Roland “Prez” 
 53. McMillan, “Heroism,” 57.
 54. Leigh Claire La Berge writes, “The representation of black economic violence produces 
one form of seriality—that is, the series’ realism. Conversely, white fictitious killing, the form 
of seriality that emerges in season 5, offers a critique of the series’ previous realism and its 
reception. Black serial killing is read transparently as economic: it is treated as real within the 
narrative frame, and it is read as realist by the viewer; white serial killing is treated as psycho-
logical within the narrative frame and therefore read as not realist by the viewer.” La Berge, 
“Capitalist Realism and Serial Form,” 549.
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Pryzbylewski, the Sherlock Holmesian Lestor Freamon, Port Authority officer 
Beatrice “Beadie” Russell, the loveable and doomed Wallace, and of course 
the righteous stickup man Omar Devone Little. As a witness for the prosecu-
tion in a murder case, Omar Little rebuts the defense lawyer’s accusation that 
he is amoral, pointing out that he robs only drug dealers: “I ain’t never put 
my gun on no citizen.”55 He then points out that his position is analogous to 
the lawyer’s, as both are “parasites” of the drug trade. Despite the oppressive 
weight of the system, The Wire shows a sense of accountability—that “fragile 
achievement”—as an intrinsic and inescapable element of the living mind.
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
In the aforementioned court scene, Omar Little points out the similarities 
between a criminal on the margins (himself) and the defense lawyer Mau-
rice Levy. “I got the shotgun. You got the briefcase. It’s all in the game, 
though. Right?”56 The lawyer squirms at the comparison, the jury members 
chuckle, the judge looks startled, and the scene ends. I would propose that 
this moment, so popular with fans of The Wire, is so because it shows the rare 
spectacle of a mainstream individual being held to account. Levy is portrayed 
as unequivocally sleazy from the start, but the scene is striking because it 
shows a lower-power person holding a more powerful one to account at the 
very moment that power is being exerted. The satisfaction of this moment 
comes from its rarity. On the one hand, if there is a moral lesson to be learned 
from The Wire, it is that there is no “honor without thought of it,” only contin-
ued endeavor with thought of it. But a corresponding and equally provocative 
lesson—visible in Levy’s embarrassment—is that there is no dishonor “with-
out thought of it.” The Wire’s attention to those whose choices are restrained 
shows social systems to be inescapable, but it also pushes us to consider the 
individual role in maintaining what seem to be collectively (which is to say 
anonymously or automatically) produced structures. For instance, it pushes 
us to wonder what would happen if those who contribute to and gain from 
social iniquities were held to as much meticulous account as those who 
struggle under them. In his reading of The Wire’s “standstill of inequality and 
injustice,” Younghoon Kim comments on the character of Tommy Carcetti, 
mayoral candidate: “Through Tommy Carcetti’s political career, the show 
clarifies the point that policy changes or civil activism would not change the 
 55. “All Prologue,” The Wire. Written by David Simon, Ed Burns, Joy Lusco Kecken, and 
Rafael Alvarez. Directed by Steve Shill. Aired July 6, 2003. HBO, 2006. DVD. 
 56. Ibid.
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socioeconomic structures that have plummeted Baltimore into poverty and 
crime.”57 The fact of this broad conclusion illuminates (perhaps unwittingly) 
the absence of more powerful lawmakers from the central series cast. This is 
not a criticism of The Wire: the series is dedicated to showing that systems go 
wrong rather than examining why, and its dramatic focus is on local effects 
rather than abstract causes. The invisibility of those who have the most power 
is already part of the system and therefore part of the series’ realism. And 
yet, that invisibility is itself a convention worth questioning. As Paul Allen 
Anderson writes, citing Adorno: “In order to reduce exposure ‘by eliminat-
ing all linguistic traces of the will of the superior,’ a high-power figure might 
say business is business to displace responsibility for an unpopular decision 
onto the abstract and nonmoral rules of the relevant institution or practice.”58 
The high-power figure in Anderson’s reading is Avon Barksdale, “king” in 
the dealing economy fond of repeating “The game is the game,” but the series 
intimates that more could be learned by holding to account the orchestrators 
of broader economic structures. The elision of the individual that Lou Ford 
practiced has been reified and systematized in twenty-first-century finance 
and corporate capitalism, but it is as much a narrative construct here as it 
was there.
 There are of course a number of obstacles, both practical and philosophi-
cal, to such accountings. One of these obstacles is the fact that dedication to 
money and power, or narrow self-interest, is in a sense antithetical to charac-
ter nuance. Fredric Jameson’s article on The Wire derides contemporary soci-
ety’s “loss of individualism and of bizarre eccentrics and obsessives—in short, 
its increasing one-dimensionality,” and then points to the role of financial 
motivation in that one-dimensionality: “Meanwhile, the psychic realm has 
also been drastically reduced, perhaps in part as a result of the omnipresence 
of money as an all-purpose motivation, perhaps also as a result of the famil-
iarities of universal information and communication and the flattening of the 
individualisms.”59 Financial motivation reduces rather than expands the indi-
vidual as such, both in realism and in discussions of institutions, thus creating 
the tautological sense that one cannot discuss the individuals responsible for a 
system because such individuals are subsumed by the system.60 To counteract 
that reduction and that tautology would constitute an important—and dis-
tinctly “reparative”—social analysis.
 57. Kim, “Rogue Cops’ Politics,” 200.
 58. Anderson, “‘The Game Is the Game,’” 387.
 59. Jameson, “Realism and Utopia in The Wire,” 366, 367.
 60. See Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes; Kotz, Rise and Fall of Neoliberal Capitalism; Phillips-
Fein, Invisible Hands.
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 I do not claim that The Wire offers much hope for social change, but nei-
ther would I concur with Peter Dreier and John Atlas that the series “was 
the opposite of radical; it was hopeless and nihilistic.”61 What it does do is 
draw a contrast between the nuanced individual and the relentlessly corrupt 
system that is so stark as to call for sustained attention. It prompts the ques-
tion of how a group of individuals becomes a system and why the individuals 
who are the least able to alter the system are the most present as individu-
als. Again, it has become almost a contemporary commonplace that those at 
the head of systems look out for themselves and that those on the margins 
look out for others, but The Wire encourages us to wonder why individual 
exemplarity must be relegated to dark alleys. This wondering perhaps consti-
tutes the contemporary hard-boiled’s most provocative contribution to mod-
ern moral criticism. If questioning the inexorability of systems allows even 
a small reversal of the “reduction of the psychic realm,” then it is worth the 
trouble to frame narratives of social systems in a different way so as to start to 
reverse the “flattening of the individualisms” that Jameson found. A repara-
tive reading can examine the system and its inexorability as products, ones 
with a material and narrative history, ones that actual individuals have gener-
ated, perpetuated, and tolerated.
 61. Dreier and Atlas, “Dystopian Fable,” 194. Jason Vest also points out that the series even 
“verges on civic nihilism.” Vest, The Wire, 171.
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THE PHILOSOPHICAL TERRAIN that the hard-boiled covers is in many ways 
identical to the terrain examined by numerous other disciplines, includ-
ing philosophy, sociology, and psychology. In many disciplines, questions 
of autonomy and accountability are examined along political lines. But the 
hard-boiled, no matter what the political bent of its authors, has insisted on 
holding individuals to account, even when the bleakness at hand seems to be 
emanating from the very air. Like the epic, the hard-boiled underscores that 
an idea can be lived only through an individual and that regardless of social 
currents, the actions and decisions of the individual are crucial. Unlike the 
epic, however, the hard-boiled represents individual actions and decisions 
as born in a moral vacuum, or at least without moral support. The outside 
world is understood to be a problematic foil, rather than a source of meaning 
and encouragement, and as a result, individual moral choice must be con-
tinually regenerated. At the same time, the hard-boiled demonstrates again 
and again that such regeneration exists, and this demonstration counteracts 
dominant narratives of inexorable modern decline.
 On the one hand, what makes the moral authority of the hard-boiled 
character appealing is its apparent effortlessness and continuity. Raymond 
Chandler’s ideal hard-boiled character was a sort of cinematic still, placed 
against an evocative but nonetheless static backdrop. The idea of an individual 
who reaches within himself or herself to find a reliable, fully stocked well 
of “subjective facts” is a cornerstone of Western culture but is no less ficti-
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tious for that. Indeed, for every real study that shows the individual able to 
rise on his or her own steam, there is another pointing out the vital precon-
ditions—health, education, family support, a caring adult—that make that 
success possible. And yet, in the mid-century post–hard-boiled, even those 
novels that seem to skewer society end up reinforcing the importance of indi-
vidual responsibility. The more outside forces seem to be at fault, the more 
the individual points out those faults, the more that pointing out—as valid 
and as awful as the faults at hand may be—resonates as an evasion of respon-
sibility. Even those attributions of blame that seem incontrovertible, such as 
mental illness, a disconnected parent, political disenchantment, the omni-
presence of corruption, adolescent boredom, or a dead-end town, resonate 
as disingenuous when they are cited as reasons for misconduct, or reasons to 
not hold oneself to account. This disingenuousness is most palpable in first- 
person narration, since a character who pleads his own case in a carefully 
spun narrative has already made the dilution of subjective agency seem 
insincere. But it even operates in the third person, in Manchette’s account 
of Martin Terrier’s troubles and his decisions, in Highsmith’s matter-of-fact 
description of Tom Ripley’s cold guardian aunt. The hard-boiled responds, it 
seems, to a broad Western impulse to see individuals able to bear responsibil-
ity without evasiveness or self-pity. What Chandler called honor turns out to 
be accountability and competence.
 Where these concepts could alter the landscape of moral criticism would 
be in their application to ostensibly unalterable systems. I gestured at that 
application in the last chapter, but it deserves further examination. The idea 
of the hard-boiled character as maverick—like moral criticism itself—poses 
no real threat to broad political and economic structures. Precisely because 
the outside world and “the age of absolute sinfulness” are lived without judg-
ment, the hard-boiled character is not poised to overthrow those structures. 
At the same time, the consistently marginal position of such characters raises 
the question of why dominant economic and political narratives cast con-
science as the domain of the marginal. The hard-boiled has for one hundred 
years foregrounded social consciousness and accountability as indomitable 
character attributes, and their absence from economic and political systems 
is conspicuous. It is a hard-boiled commonplace that exemplary characters on 
“mean streets” does not render those streets less mean. And yet, once we start 
to read that atmospheric stasis as itself a narrative construct, we can approach 
the ahistoricity and inalterability of social inequalities in the same way.
 The visible outline of accountability and competence—of an exemplary 
character, in other words—varies from culture to culture. The American 
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model is heavier on anti-intellectualism, plainspokenness, and declarations 
of personal independence, while the French model focuses on historical and 
cultural consciousness, aesthetic discernment, and verbal lyricism. Interest-
ingly, it is these cultural variables—these characteristics that render the hard-
boiled hero as heroic silhouette rather than as compendium of actions and 
choices—that have become the objects of cultural admiration. As Proust’s 
narrator comments on the shallow Odette de Crécy, who prefers smooth-
talking suitors to men of substance:
People who enjoyed “picking-up” things, who admired poetry, despised 
sordid calculations of profit and loss, and nourished ideals of honour and 
love, she placed in a class by themselves, superior to the rest of humanity. 
There was no need actually to have those tastes, provided one talked enough 
about them; when a man had told her at dinner that he loved to wander 
about and get his hands all covered with dust in the old furniture shops, 
that he would never be really appreciated in this commercial age, since he 
was not concerned about the things that interested it, and that he belonged 
to another generation altogether, she would come home saying: “Why, he’s 
an adorable creature; so sensitive! I had no idea,” and she would conceive 
for him a strong and sudden friendship. But, on the other hand, men who, 
like Swann, had these tastes but did not speak of them, left her cold. She was 
obliged, of course, to admit that Swann was most generous with his money, 
but she would add, pouting: “It’s not the same thing, you see, with him,” and, 
as a matter of fact, what appealed to her imagination was not the practice of 
disinterestedness, but its vocabulary.1
De ceux qui aimaient à bibeloter, qui aimaient les vers, méprisaient les bas 
calculs, rêvaient d’honneur et d’amour, elle faisait une élite supérieure au 
reste de l’humanité. Il n’y avait pas besoin qu’on eût réellement ces goûts 
pourvu qu’on les proclamât; d’un homme qui lui avait avoué à dîner qu’il 
aimait à flâner, à se salir les doigts dans les vieilles boutiques, qu’il ne serait 
jamais apprécié par ce siècle commercial, car il ne se souciait pas de ses 
intérêts et qu’il était pour cela d’un autre temps, elle revenait en disant: 
“Mais c’est une âme adorable, un sensible, je ne m’en étais jamais doutée!” et 
elle se sentait pour lui une immense et soudaine amitié. Mais, en revanche 
ceux, qui comme Swann, avaient ces goûts, mais n’en parlaient pas, la lais-
saient froide. Sans doute elle était obligée d’avouer que Swann ne tenait pas 
 1. Proust, Swann’s Way, 227.
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à l’argent, mais elle ajoutait d’un air boudeur: “Mais lui, ça n’est pas la même 
chose”; et en effet, ce qui parlait à son imagination, ce n’était pas la pratique 
du désintéressement, c’en était le vocabulaire.2
Classic hard-boiled crime fiction provides the practice and the vocabulary 
fused together. The mid-century post–hard-boiled separates one from the 
other. Contemporary crime fiction reconnects them, sometimes pretending 
that the disconnection never happened and that practice is borne of vocabu-
lary, but more often underscoring the exertion needed to sustain the practice.
 Even in contemporary crime fiction that has witnessed the evacuation 
of the silhouette, however, appearances nonetheless continue to dominate. 
Emily Nussbaum calls Rust Cohle “our fetish object,” “the outsider with pain-
ful secrets and harsh truths and nice arms,” and the nice arms are crucial.3 
The trench coat and the cigarette, the American laconic offhandedness, the 
French understatement and aesthetic discernment, are all much more cul-
turally resonant than the idea that one should be responsible for one’s own 
ethics (whether one is “religious in some kind of way” or not), or that a con-
sistent empathic consciousness of others’ troubles is advisable. The hard-
boiled acts as a reminder, then, both of the importance of conscious effort 
and of the potential emptiness of the “vocabulary.” The notion of a charac-
ter who has already completed his Bildungsroman, or who has, better yet, 
sprung fully formed into conscious exemplarity is a strong Western illusion, 
a seductive image. Indeed, constructing and maintaining that image is part 
of the hard-boiled’s charm. But as I have tried to show in the foregoing chap-
ters, the hard-boiled has also done the crucial work of revealing the prac-
tice and the struggle underneath the vocabulary. What is more, it has done 
some of the work of revealing “honor” to be a common responsibility rather 
than a rare commodity. The idea of the industry magnate subsumed under 
the apparently insurmountable social systems he helped create is as much a 
fictitious diversion as Lou Ford’s traumatic panopticon or Henri Boutron’s 
ennui. Every historical period has such accountability-diluting diversions, 
the depersonalization of finance and corporate capitalism being one of the 
most formidable, but the hard-boiled consistently counteracts these diver-
sions with its focus on individual choice and action.
 The fact that the hard-boiled is a literary form is crucial because account-
ability, in all these texts, is inextricably interwoven with the ability to account, 
or recount, in narrative form. Those who are conscious of themselves as 
actors and narrators, who claim responsibility for their own subjectivity, 
 2. Proust, Un amour de Swann, 81.
 3. Nussbaum, “Cool Story, Bro,” n. pag. http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/03/03/
cool-story-bro, accessed February 26, 2015. 
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their own actions, and the effect of those actions on others, who concen-
trate not on their own troubles but on those of others, are not just “men or 
women of honor,” which is a rather abstract term, but also strong narrative 
agents. This reading of the importance of individual competence of course 
itself poses an ethical problem. That is, there are ways in which the indi-
vidual can use narrative voice and ethical decisions to create autonomy, but 
to actually place the responsibility for that creation on everyone, including 
those disenfranchised, discriminated against, or deprived, is to enter ethi-
cally as well as politically problematic territory. The enemies of free and com-
plete subjectivity tend to go all the way down: persistent economic inequality, 
the challenge of behaving in an ethical manner when others do not, and the 
paucity of social and economic incentives have been well documented. Even 
the incitement to read, to see what narrative agency can do for someone’s 
competence and confidence, is dependent on the availability of books, on lit-
eracy, not to mention the willingness to discern the practice underneath the 
vocabulary. There is certainly potential to read this book’s argument as ideal-
ist or reactionary, since public discourse about accountability so frequently 
amounts to blaming the disenfranchised, but the more provocative use of the 
hard-boiled’s insistence on individualism is to impute responsibility up the 
socioeconomic ladder as well as down. If honor without thought of it is an 
improbable phenomenon, so is dishonor without thought of it. It seems to 
matter little whether character as an idea maintains coherence or not. What 
the hard-boiled does is hold all individuals responsible for seeing themselves 
as narrative agents in their own lives and as actors in the lives of others.
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